




Second
Infantry
Division



ROUTE OF THE 2D INFA



1ST ARMY DIVISION - WORLD WAR II

C O M B A T H I S T O R Y
O F T H E
S E C O N D I N F A N T R Y D I V I S I O N



I N
W O R L D W A R I I

ORGANIC UNITS OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

* * *

9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

23D INFANTRY REGIMENT

38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

* * *

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY,
2ND INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

* * *

12TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

* * *

2ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

* * *

2ND MEDICAL BATTALION

* * *

HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL TROOPS, 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

* * *

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

702D ORDNANCE COMPANY

2ND QUARTERMASTER COMPANY

2ND RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

2ND SIGNAL COMPANY

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON, 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION BAND

UNITS ATTACHED THROUGHOUT COMBAT

612TH TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

741ST TANK BATTALION

462D ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY BATTALION

2ND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

PHOTO INTERPRETATION TEAM No. 6

ORDER OF BATTLE TEAM No. 8

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETER TEAM No. 415

INTERROGATION PRISONER OF WAR TEAM No. 25

INTERROGATION PRISONER OF WAR TEAM No. 27

INTERROGATION PRISONER OF WAR TEAM No. 28

DETACHMENT "I", 165TH SIGNAL PHOTO COMPANY

AIR SUPPORT PARTY, IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

TO: *The Soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division.*

Closely following actual combat operations, brief editions of our participation in World War II were published. With the passage of time, the need for a more authentic and comprehensive history of this period has become evident. This book is designed to meet that need.

This history shows that from D+1 to V-E Day our Division, in the face of repeated fanatical enemy action, was employed constantly as a spearhead shock division, and that in this role it maintained unblemished its proud record of never having failed to take its objective nor of having relinquished ground so gained. During operations we were concerned with our immediate task. Now in the light of subsequent events and broader perspective, the importance to the nation and to our army of our successes becomes increasingly evident. Further historical analysis will enhance this.

With full humility, let us dedicate this book to our fallen comrades who gave their all in this epoch making operation. To the surviving members, let us take full pride in our great Division's accomplishments.

To future wearers of the famed Indian Head, we give you our untarnished record. Guard it well, and keep it inviolate.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. M. Robertson". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

W. M. ROBERTSON
Major General, U. S. Army



MAJ. GEN. WALTER M. ROBERTSON

Commanding 2nd Infantry Division

June 6, 1944—June 2, 1945



BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM K. HARRISON

Commanding 2nd Infantry Division

June 3, 1945—September 8, 1945

MAJ. GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET

Assistant Division Commander


July 3, 1944—October 17, 1944



BRIG. GEN. THOMAS L. MARTIN

Assistant Division Commander

June 6, 1944—July 2, 1944



MAJ. GEN. GEORGE P. HAYS
Commanding Division Artillery
June 6, 1944—November 13, 1944




BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. HINDS
Commanding Division Artillery
November 14, 1944—September 8, 1945



BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. STOKES, JR.
Assistant Division Commander
October 18, 1944—June 13, 1945
Chief of Staff
June 6, 1944—October 17, 1944




COL. JAY B. LOVLESS
Assistant Division Commander
June 14, 1945—September 8, 1945



COL. RALPH W. ZWICKER
Chief of Staff
October 18, 1944—June 20, 1945



LT. COL. DONALD P. CHRISTENSEN
Chief of Staff
June 21, 1945—September 8, 1945



DIVISION STAFF SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION


MAY, 1944

FRONT ROW: *From left to right:* Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, CG; Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Martin, Asst. CG; Brig. Gen. George P. Hays, CG, Div. Arty.

SECOND ROW: Col. John H. Stokes, Jr., C of S; Lt. Col. Jay B. Lovless, Dep. C of S; Maj. Arthur M. Sherwood III, Staff Officer; Lt. Col. Donald P. Christensen, Staff Officer; Lt. Col. John H. Chiles, Staff Officer; Lt. Col. Homer S. Reese, Staff Officer.

THIRD ROW: Lt. Col. Edward W. Wood, CWO; Lt. Col. Samuel H. Ladensohn, IG; Lt. Col. Matt F. C. Konop, Hq Comdt.; Lt. Col. James H. Caruthers, QM; Lt. Col. Walter R. Cook, Surgeon; Lt. Col. Morris Braveman, AG; Lt. Col. Kenneth E. Belieu, Signal O.; Lt. Col. Alexander J. Stuart, Jr., Ord. O.; Lt. Col. Luther W. Evans, Chaplain; Lt. Col. Harry H. Schultz, JAG; Lt. Col. Lenson Bethel, Finance O.; Lt. Col. Ellis O. Keller, CAO.

FOURTH ROW: Maj. Forrest G. Prutzman, Jr., Asst. Staff Officer; Maj. Daniel Webster, Asst. Staff Officer; Maj. Eugene Wolfe, Asst. Staff Officer; Capt. William M. Duncan, ADC; 1st Lt. Claude L. Toll, ADC; Maj. Frank A. Hoke, SSO; Maj. William F. North, PM; Capt. Norman L. Jones, ADC.



THE ARTILLERY COMMANDER AND STAFF

SEPTEMBER, 1943

Front Row L to R:

CAPT. WILLIAM M. DUNCAN, Adjutant, S - 1 & S - 4

MAJ. THOMAS W. DONNELL, S - 2

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE P. HAYS, Commanding General Artillery

COLONEL RICHARD SEARS, Executive Officer

MAJOR HERRON N. MAPLES, S - 3

Second Row R to L:

FIRST LIEUTENANT HARRY L. BUSH, Liaison Pilot

FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT B. WEIDLEIN, Assistant S - 2

CAPTAIN AARON I. SIMON, Surgeon, Medical Detachment

CAPTAIN HUGH C. BUSBY, Chaplain

FIRST LIEUTENANT ROY L. ALBRIGHT, Communication O Div. Arty.

FIRST LIEUTENANT THOMAS B. HUMPHREY, Aide-de-Camp

MASTER SERGEANT JOHN H. PODMENICK, Sergeant Major



Insignia

THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION

Members of the Second Infantry Division have been wearers of the famed Indianhead Patch in two wars. The insignia had its origin during World War I as the identifying insignia on the vehicles of the Division Supply Trains.

The Commanding Officer of the trains held a contest in March, 1918, to select a distinctive identifying symbol for use upon the vehicles after he had seen the vehicles of adjacent French units decorated in this manner. Through his adjutant he sent out a memorandum authorizing prizes for the best designs submitted, with a first prize of forty francs. The winning insignia, which obtained the final approval of Division Headquarters for use upon supply train vehicles in April, 1918, was the striking red-and-blue Indianhead, superimposed upon a white star. The head covered the reentrant angles of the star and exposed only the points.

Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy, the Division Commander, and his chief of staff, Col. Preston Brown, later Major General Brown, were riding in a command car one day in April when General Bundy's eye was caught by the insignia emblazoned on a truck. According to a letter from Major General Brown written some time later, General Bundy stopped the driver, asked the meaning of the device, and was told by the driver that it enabled him to find his vehicle in the dark.

The letter does not bring out that the insignia had been authorized and was probably coming into use on all the vehicles of the trains at that time. At any rate, the General

and his chief of staff promptly sent their cars to the area to have the insignia painted upon them. In this manner the Indianhead became associated with the Second Division as its identifying insignia some time before it became the standard shoulder patch so proudly worn by men of the Division.

In October, 1918, the Commanding General of the AEF requested units to furnish insignia for approval. Major General LeJeune, USMC, in reply to the request, submitted the red-and-blue Indianhead upon a white star as the insignia of the 2nd Division. The head was contained within the reentrant angles of the star in this design, the whole contained within a circle three and one-half inches in diameter. As the Indianhead in the representation was somewhat crudely constructed, it was designated that the St. Gaudens Indian, in use on the five-dollar gold piece, be substituted.

On November 14, 1918, an order was published by Headquarters 2nd Division announcing that the insignia as described had been made official for the Division. The cloth background for the insignia was of varying shapes and colors, designating the major unit to which the individual wearer belonged and the subordinate unit. The background chosen for Division Headquarters was the black shield.

In 1933 Maj. Gen. Preston Brown, taking command of the Division, abolished the differentiation of backgrounds and made the black shield official for all elements of the Division.

THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION

Introduction

UNITS OF THE DIVISION

This is the story of the Second Infantry Division in World War II. It is the story of innumerable acts of fortitude and courage, of individual sacrifice and devotion to duty under fire, by a fighting division which has served with honor in two world wars.

The story of the Second Division began long ago. While the Division fretted for action in the marshalling areas in South Wales in June, 1944, awaiting D-Day, it could look back to another June in 1918 when it made a farce of the Kaiser's highest hopes at Chateau Thierry. Fighting its way from hedgerow to hedgerow of the bitter Normandy Campaign of June and July, 1944, it could remember Soissons. Through the Siege of Brest in September, it had the sterling example of another great victory, St. Mihiel Salient in September, 1918.

With proud traditions and wearing the fourragere of the Croix de Guerre won at Soissons and Mont Blanc in the last war, the Second Division entered the War in the European Theater of Operations with the incomparable esprit which comes from a notable heritage.

In the Normandy Peninsula, at the Siege of Brest, on the Siegfried Line, racing across Central Europe, and in the last days of the Wehrmacht's disintegrating power in Czechoslovakia, the Division for the second time proved itself "Second to None" in upholding its country's finest military traditions.

Its operations and achievements reflect credit upon the army of which it was a part and upon the men who fought its battles through the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France, the Rhineland, the Ardennes, and Central Europe. The impressive array of battle honors and individual citations won can only indicate the untold acts of gallantry and great fighting spirit which marked eleven months of combat in German-held Europe.

The Second Infantry Division completed its organization as a division on November 18, 1917, in France, under the command of Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy. Elements of the Division had received training prior to overseas movement at Pine Camp, New York, and had joined in the spirited race to be the first American unit overseas. On arrival in France, the Division was activated with the veteran Ninth and Twenty-Third Infantry Regiments making up the Third Brigade; the Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments composing the Fourth Brigade, and the Twelfth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Field Artillery Regiments, plus the Second Engineer Regiment and the Second Sanitary Train.

Following a short tour of duty as occupational troops on the Rhine after the first World War, the Division returned to

the United States in August, 1919, and was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and then Camp Travis, where it remained in garrison for 23 years.

The Fourth Marine Brigade, composed of the Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments, was inactivated and was subsequently replaced by the Fourth Infantry Brigade, comprised of the First and Twentieth Infantry Regiments, later dropped and stationed at what is now Fort Francis D. Warren in Wyoming.

In October, 1940, with the dropping of the Fourth Brigade, the Division underwent a streamlining. It became the first triangular division, organized from the Ninth and Twenty-Third Infantry Regiments with the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Regiment completing the triangle. At the same time, the Fifteenth Field Artillery Regiment was divided into three battalions, the Thirty-Seventh, the Thirty-Eighth, and the Fifteenth Field Artillery Battalions. The Twelfth Field Artillery Regiment was reduced in size to become the Twelfth Field Artillery Battalion, the fourth unit included in Division Artillery. The Second Engineer Regiment became the Second Engineer Battalion, and the Second Medical Regiment, which had been formed in 1921 from the old Second Sanitary Train, became the Second Medical Battalion.

The integral parts now comprising the reorganized Second Division were the Ninth, the Twenty-Third, and the Thirty-Eighth Infantry Regiments; the Twelfth, the Fifteenth, the Thirty-Seventh, and the Thirty-Eighth Field Artillery Battalions, and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery; the Second Medical Battalion; the Second Engineer Battalion; and special troops including Headquarters Company, the Second Signal Company, the Second Quartermaster Company, the Seven Hundred and Second Ordnance Company, the Second Reconnaissance Troop, and the Military Police Platoon.

Some of these component parts of the Division have separate and distinct histories as military organizations. Some have records of military service extending far into the roots of this nation's past and forming an integral part of American history. Others are products of the modernization of the nation's armed forces in recent times.

Oldest unit of the Division is the venerable Ninth Infantry, rich in military lore and tradition. Activated in 1798, it was demobilized shortly thereafter and reactivated in 1812, participating in five major engagements of the War with England—the Capture of York, Fort George, Sackett's Harbor, Fort Erie, and the Chippewa River Battle. Disbanded in 1814, it was reorganized in 1847 for the War with Mexico, in which it fought at Cerro Gordo, the Invasion of the Valley of Mexico, Contreras, Churubusco, and Chapultepec. In 1848,

after two wars in which it fought under that impressive battle-figure General Winfield Scott, it was disbanded for the third time.

Banded together for the fourth time in 1855, the Regiment has remained in active service ever since. Between 1855 and 1892 it was credited with no less than 400 battles and skirmishes along the American Frontier. It participated in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippine Insurrection of 1899, and the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 and 1901.

During the war in China at the Battle of Tientsin, the Regiment won its most prized trophy. A detachment saved a Chinese mint from being looted and was presented two ingots of silver by the grateful government. A twenty-gallon punchbowl and 50 silver cups, ornate with the five-clawed Manchu dragon, were made from the ingots. The trophy is called the Liscum Bowl in memory of a gallant regimental commander who seized the colors from a fallen color guard and held them high until he himself fell mortally wounded.

It was in China, too, that the Ninth Infantry won its sobriquet, the Manchu Regiment, and added the dragon to its regimental coat of arms.

Ordered overseas in 1917 for duty with the AEF, the Ninth Infantry was assigned to duty with the Second Division, of which it has been an integral part ever since. It participated in the campaigns of the Aisne, Aisne-Marne, St.

Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. For its combat performance it wears the fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre, for having been cited twice in Orders of the French Army.

As part of the Army of Occupation in the Rhineland, it was stationed at Bendorf, Germany, until it was transferred in August, 1919, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Battle streamers awarded the Ninth Infantry include Washington (1856-1857), Wyoming (1866-1867), the Little Big Horn, Mississippi (1862), Kentucky (1864), Murfreesboro, Tennessee (1863), Chickamauga-Chattanooga, Georgia and Atlanta (1864), Santiago, San Isidore-Luzon (1899-1900), Zapote River-Malolos, Tarlac-Samar (1901), Tientsin, Yang-Tsun-Peking, Lorraine-Aisne, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Aisne-Marne-Meuse-Argonne, and the streamers of the Croix de Guerre.

Next oldest unit of the Division is the Twenty-Third Infantry. It was organized in June, 1812, and participated in thirteen battles and skirmishes of that war including Sackett's Harbor, Lundy's Lane, and the Capture of Fort Erie.

In May, 1815, elements of the regiment helped form the Second Infantry of that time, and the Twenty-Third Infantry ceased to exist under that name until after the Civil War when the Second Battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was designated by that name. This Battalion, organized in 1862, served through the Civil War amassing battle honors which

A gun crew from Regimental Headquarters Company, 23rd Infantry, fires a 37-mm. gun against entrenched German positions in World War I.



the Twenty-Third Infantry assumed on its activation in 1866.

One company of the Regiment served as garrison at Sitka, Alaska, from April, 1869 to June, 1870, adding the Russian bear and the totem pole to its regimental coat of arms. Between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, the Regiment participated in numerous Indian Wars. After the Spanish-American War, in which the Regiment participated in the Capture of Manila, it took part in the quelling of the Philippine Insurrection and returned to the States in 1901.

The Regiment saw two other periods of duty in the Philippine Islands, in 1903-1905 and in 1908-1910. The time from 1913 to 1917 was spent on guard duty on the Mexican Border.

Sent to France as part of the Second Division in September, 1917, the Twenty-Third participated in six major engagements of that war and was twice cited in the Orders of the French Army. For this honor the members now wear the fourragere in colors of the Croix de Guerre.

Battle streamers awarded the regiment include the Peninsular Campaign, Manassas, Fredericksburg, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Virginia (1863), the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Arizona (1866), Idaho (1868), the Little Big Horn, Manila, Manila-Malolos, Lorraine-Aisne, Ile de France-Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel-Meuse-Argonne, and the streamers of the Croix de Guerre.

Following its term of service with the Army of Occupation in the Rhineland, after World War I, the Regiment returned to the United States on August 4, 1919.

The Thirty-Eighth Infantry Regiment, a unit of the Third Division in World War I, became a part of the Second Division in 1940 when the change was made from a square division to a triangular division. It was activated on June 1, 1917, at Syracuse, New York, and earned its sobriquet, "The Rock of the Marne," on July 15, 1918, when in the pre-dawn darkness eight miles east of Chateau Thierry it stopped a desperate head-on thrust of the German 10th and 36th Divisions, halting a concentrated attack. Gen. John J. Pershing in his report to the Secretary of War of the United States nine days after the signing of the Armistice, said in his one mention of an individual regiment:

"A single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its wide front while on either flank the Germans who had gained a foothold pressed forward.

"The men of this one regiment, firing in three directions, met German attacks with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German elite divisions into complete confusion, capturing more than 600."

The Thirty-Eighth carries battle streamers on its colors for the campaigns of the Aisne, Champagne, Champagne-Marne, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. For outstanding performance of duty in France and for "unshakeable tenacity" the Regiment was cited an "elite regiment" by General Marshal Petain and was awarded the Croix de Guerre with Palm.

As Rhineland occupation troops, the Regiment was billeted in Niedermendig, Obermendig, Ettringer, and St. Johann. It embarked for the United States eight months later at Brest.

The Twelfth Field Artillery also saw action in the last war. It was organized in June, 1917, from a cadre of the Third Field Artillery. As a regiment the organization engaged in the Aisne campaign, Chateau-Thierry, the Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Champagne, and the Meuse-Argonne. The single fleur-de-lis in its coat of arms comes from the city of Soissons where it won the Croix de Guerre with Palm of the French Government. The golden crown on the fleur-de-lis comes from Verdun where the unit received its baptism of fire. The green Aztec war bonnet is derived from its parent organization, the Third Field Artillery, which saw service in Mexico.

The Twelfth Field Artillery wears the fourragere in colors of the Croix de Guerre and the streamers of that French decoration. It served in the Army of Occupation in the Rhineland for eight months and was then transferred to Fort Sam Houston. There, in 1940, it was reduced to battalion strength and reorganized as a medium field artillery battalion with the 2nd Division.

The Fifteenth Field Artillery Regiment, parent organization of three of the Division's four artillery units, was organized at Pine Camp, New York, on the eve of departure for overseas in August, 1917. It was formed with a cadre from the Fourth Field Artillery Regiment. Upon arrival in France in February, 1918, it was assigned to duty with the 2nd Division. It saw action with that organization in Lorraine, the Aisne, Ile de France, the Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne, being in continuous action from July, 1918, to November and the signing of the Armistice.

Decorated with the ribbons of the Croix de Guerre for two citations by the French Ministry of War, the Meuse-Argonne and the Aisne-Marne campaigns, this organization served in the Army of Occupation until mid-summer of 1919 and then moved to Fort Sam Houston.

On October 10, 1940, the regiment officially became three battalions, the Fifteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and Thirty-Eighth Field Artillery Battalions. In this reorganization process the Fifteenth Field Artillery Battalion retained the records, standards, and honors of the old regiment. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2nd Division Artillery, was organized October 1, 1940, at Fort Sam Houston, its personnel being obtained by transfer from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and First Battalion, Twelfth Field Artillery Regiment and Headquarters Battery, Fifteenth Field Artillery Regiment.

The Second Engineer Combat Battalion is one of the few American units organized on foreign soil, having been created on July 1, 1916, at Colonia Dublan, Mexico, as a result of expansion of the old Second Battalion of Engineers. Its history traces back to Companies C and D, Corps of Engineers, organized in 1861. Through these older organizations the present battalion has on its colors battle streamers of the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the Philippine Insurrection.

After participating in the Mexican punitive expedition in 1916 the battalion moved to France in September, 1917, as part of the Second Division when it was organized. It participated in the campaigns of that Division at Chateau Thierry, Soissons, St. Mihiel, Mont Blanc, Attigny, and the Argonne. Attached to the Thirty-Sixth Division, it fought through a

short campaign with that organization. For outstanding exploits it wears the French fourragere, and served as part of the Army of Occupation at Enger-am-Rhine until July, 1919, when it returned to Fort Sam Houston.

The Second Medical Battalion is one of the oldest medical units in the entire army, dating back to 1894 and the so-called School of Instructions, Hospital Corps, Washington Barracks, D. C. It was part of the Cuban Expeditionary Force from October, 1906, to November, 1908, and in March, 1911, was reorganized as Field Hospital and Ambulance Company No. 1, Hospital Corps. It went overseas as part of the Second Sanitary Train of the Second Division in August, 1918.

Headquarters of the Sanitary Train was organized in France, and it assumed the history of Field Hospital and Ambulance Company No. 1. The Train was awarded battle honors for Lorraine, the Aisne Defensive, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, Meuse-Argonne, and St. Mihiel. It was twice cited in French Orders of the Army and thus wears the fourragere and streamers in the colors of the Croix de Guerre.

After serving with the Army of Occupation while stationed at Sayn, Germany, until July, 1919, the Train returned to Fort Sam Houston where it was reorganized as the Second Medical Regiment on February 17, 1921. It became the Second Medical Battalion on October 7, 1940.

Division Headquarters Company, the Second Signal Company, the Second Quartermaster Company, the Seven Hundred and Second Ordnance Company, the Second Reconnaissance Troop, and the Second Division Military Police Platoon began serving as units of the Second Division when it was triangularized. These complete the organization of the Division whose units fought together over some 1,665 miles of enemy-held territory in eleven months of almost continual combat in World War II.

THE SECOND DIVISION IN WORLD WAR I

To make the story of the Second Division in the European Theater complete, its record in World War I must be touched upon briefly. The Division, equipped and trained by the French Army, participated in five major engagements of 1918.

Assigned to a quiet subsector near Ranzieres, it remained in that defensive position for four months. Then it was hurriedly pulled out of that sector and thrust into the front against the Germans, to halt a major break-through in the French positions near Chateau Thierry. Rushed forward into the strategic Paris-Metz Road sector, the Division counter-attacked a full-scale German drive toward Paris in that area. Pushed into line astride the road into Paris, after four months of intensive training for trench warfare, the Division found itself engaged in open fighting, against an advancing enemy. The Division halted the ruthless drive of elite German troops, then consolidated its positions while the Fourth Marine Brigade advanced to drive the enemy from bloody Belleau Wood. It suffered heavy losses, but its great defensive steadied the entire Allied Line from Switzerland to the sea.

On July 18, Marshal Foch hurled his best divisions, among which he included the American Second Division, against the west side of the German positions at Soissons. Moving on to this sector, the Division did not even halt its march at the line of departure for the attack. It continued marching and fighting in a spectacular forward sweep until it obtained its objectives, sending the enemy reeling back along the line. For Soissons, the Division in its entirety was decorated with



The 2nd Division Memorial in Washington, D. C.

the Croix de Guerre by the French Ministry of War for its conspicuous part in this operation and its bravery in action. Now, in two great battles, fighting with the French, the Division had proved its worth and had taken its place with great American fighting units of all times.

From Soissons, the Division went on to become a part of the American First Army and to see its first action fighting under American command. This was at St. Mihiel Salient.

The significance of the salient lay not in its depth, for that was not great, but in its strength. The enemy had remained entrenched here for four long years. Repeated assaults and continued storming had failed to drive him out.

The Division took in a day objectives that had resisted months of bitter siege. Fighting as a shock troop unit, the Division took in a single blow, objectives that had been assigned for much later, and captured vast quantities of material and supplies.

In October, the French Fourth Army requested the services of the Division for operations against an objective of formidable proportions, Mont Blanc. Attacking from both sides, in flanking operations by the two brigades, the Division assailed the heights of this stronghold in a terrific onslaught, taking it quickly and opening the way toward the Argonne Forest. In this great action, the Division won its second Croix de Guerre.

Reverting to American command, the Division now took part in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the last great forward drive of World War I, which began the German rout that was completed with the signing of the Armistice.

The Second Division took one-fourth of all the prisoners captured by the AEF, and one-fourth the total number of

guns and weapons seized. It suffered one-tenth of the casualties in the American armies, more than any other one division, and received the largest quota of Distinguished Service Crosses. It had fought in every major campaign of the war in which American troops participated, and had left its dead on many battlefields.

By virtue of its two citations in the French Orders of the Army, the Division wears the fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre awarded for conspicuous action. Only one other American division in France, the First Division, received that honor. In World War II, the Third Division received that distinction.

Officers and men who fought with a division in the actions for which it received that honor are privileged to wear the decoration of the looped braid and pencil after being transferred to other units. According to military tradition, the fourragere originated when an ancient Prussian leader gave each member of a failing unit a loop of hangman's rope and a nail on the eve of battle, presumably for hanging if he failed again. So gallantly did the men fight in subsequent battles, the story goes, that the rope and nail became a badge of military honor, symbolized in the present braid and pencil.

The Division completed its tour of occupation in the Rhineland in July, 1919, and as the units returned to the United States they were sent to Fort Sam Houston, where the Division remained in garrison during 23 years of peace, until a new German war machine once more went on a rampage and trampled human decency from the face of Europe.

PRELUDE TO WORLD WAR II

In October, 1940, as a result of its own tests conducted in the years of peace, during which it pioneered many changes in military technique and equipment, the Division became the first triangular division to take form. In 1939, the 38th Infantry Regiment had been added to take part in tests to determine the feasibility of streamlining the old square division. In 1940, final tests were completed during maneuvers in Louisiana. In October of that year, utilizing the results of these tests, the organization was completed essentially as it fought through World War II.

The Division engaged in maneuvers in Texas and Louisiana

in 1941, and elements participated in airborne operations for experimental purposes. Elements likewise demonstrated field artillery problems in 1941 and 1942. During the high point of the Nazi submarine warfare, when U-boats were known to penetrate coastal waters, the Division furnished protection in Gulf Coast areas of strategic industrial importance.

The Division conducted tests and pioneered developments in the use of liaison planes for field artillery observation, and furnished cadres for the 85th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, in 1942. After VIII Corps maneuvers in Louisiana in late summer, the Division undertook tests to develop a technique for the transport by air of an entire infantry division, concluding this operation in October.

On October 16, orders were received for a permanent change of station. The Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, was to be transferred in its entirety to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. In November, 1942, the Division moved by rail to Camp McCoy, leaving Fort Sam Houston for a permanent change of station for the first time since 1919.

A four-months program of intensive training for winter warfare followed. The Division tested new equipment for fighting under conditions of extreme cold weather, and the men became proficient in the use of skis and snowshoes. At the end of February, this training program culminated in a period of winter maneuvers in Michigan, the first undertaken on a divisional scale. Returning to Camp McCoy at the completion of these maneuvers, the men entered upon an intensive program of training and battle indoctrination. Individuals and units were put through specific types of battle training designed to equip them for the kinds of fighting they might be expected to encounter overseas.

In the early summer, elements of one regiment were sent to Detroit to restore order after race riots in that city threatened an explosive situation. As the summer drew to a close, the men began preparations for overseas movement, drawing new clothing and essential equipment, packing and marking, and in general making plans for leaving Camp McCoy. During the last days of September, the final order came. The Division began its move by rail to a staging area at Camp Shanks, New York. It closed there on October 2, and was immediately alerted for overseas movement.

Troops of the 2nd Division debark at Belfast, October 18, 1943



October 7 was the official sailing date as the large convoy moved out of New York Harbor, with battleship, destroyer, and air protection. The voyage across was made without undue incident, and on October 17, the Division began arriving in the Irish Sea off Belfast.

Disembarking at the Irish port of Belfast, the units of the Division moved by rail to points in County Armagh and County Down, North Ireland. They then marched to the billets they would occupy, in hutments, castles, manorhouses, and factories, throughout the scattered Irish towns and hamlets. Division Headquarters was set up in Armagh, the county seat of County Armagh, reputed burial place of Good St. Patrick.

Mastering the idiosyncrasies of the Irish language (which proved to be a pure, clear English and not at all the brogue of Irish comedians on the American stage), the men fell in quickly with the customs of the country. They made friends readily with their amiable Irish neighbors and soon learned to tell a crown from a bob and stout from ale.

One of the great surprises was the Irish weather. It was generally wet and overcast with long slow rains and heavy swirling fogs. There hovered constantly a blanket of mist which kept the countryside a dazzling green. Once the men got used to murky skies and boggy ground, other aspects of life in garrison became more pleasing.

The units, well trained upon arriving in the United Kingdom, were even more better trained before they left Ireland; this was true especially in fast-moving operations over large areas. During this staging period every effort was made to increase their combat efficiency to the fullest despite the limited terrain in the densely populated and cultivated isle. Training ground, especially for units larger than battalion strength, was necessarily curtailed by the large number of troops in this already crowded spot, and by the food shortage which precluded the use of cultivatable land to any extent.

The limitation of space and the unfavorable weather and ground conditions caused the emphasis to be placed on training in small or individual units. Some training was done indoors, in battlemented castles or deserted factories. Maneuvers of corps or army strength in Texas and Louisiana prior to departure from the United States made up somewhat for

Major General Robertson, Brigadier General Leroy Collins, commanding North Ireland Base Section (SOS), and Brigadier General William G. Weaver, Deputy Field Commander, SOS.



the limit on large areas in the United Kingdom. This realistic training contributed immeasurably to the readiness of the troops, their fitness for battle, and their eagerness to get the job started so that they could get it done as soon as possible. In addition, the men were fully equipped and ready for embarkation when the time arrived.

But life was not all given over to training by any means. There were dances for the American boys, who taught the Irish jitterbugging and took part with gusto in the Irish countrydances. Doughboys were amazed at the spectacle of local gallants turned out in white tie and tails for neighborhood social functions.

Then there were cheerful Irish pubs, and fish-and-chip shops; there were many hearty Irish families eager to invite the Americans to their homes; there were pretty Irish girls to dance with, and many a lasting romance was begun.

Food was not too scarce for civilians in Ireland, although it showed a distressing preponderance of such national standbys as cabbage, sprouts, and turnips, vegetables almost invariably despised by the boys from Texas and New Mexico. Bread, made of the national flour in wartime measure, brown inside as well as out, caused groans of consternation at first. When the diet got too monotonous, the men took powdered milk and powdered eggs and froze their own ice cream. Cigarettes, candy, and soap were available in the quantities allowed by British wartime rations.

Beds of planks with straw-stuffed ticks and scratchy British wartime blankets seemed primitive at first. The sanitary arrangements, taken care of on contract by British civilians, never ceased to seem primitive.

Passes were liberal. Many GIs roamed the great, gray Irish port city of Belfast and outlying North Irish towns. Local passes were available to visit the villages and Irish countryside. Late winter brought a quota of passes to London and other points in the British Isles.

Red Cross and United Service Organization shows began to arrive to break the routine of garrison life. Spring brought more days of rare and shimmering sunshine, but it also brought more time for outdoor training and rehearsal for the events to come. An intensification of the training program for small and individual units was put into effect, and more emphasis was placed on night training.

A drivers' school gave instruction in such matters as the lefthand drive. The men became accustomed to using such terms as petrol and lorry, bonnet and windscreen. Many bought bicycles when they discovered that this was the primary nation-wide means of getting about. The railway carriages proved to be of diverting interest—not only the first class carriages with their private compartments and closed corridors, but also the third rate carriages where the compartments were entered from the outside.

The quickening of the tempo as Spring went by was felt by everyone. On April 1st General Patton addressed the assembled troops in the Mall at Armagh and told them something about the things they had to face.

Then in mid-April came departure from Ireland. The men bade goodbye to County Armagh and County Down as they moved by rail to Belfast, and there embarked for the short sea voyage to marshalling areas in South Wales.

The move to South Wales was the last stage in the marshalling of the troops for the invasion of Fortress Europe. The journey by rail and troopship found the men in excellent spirits and high morale. They disembarked in South Wales and scattered to their various marshalling areas in small Welsh seaside and inland towns. Division Headquarters was set



Nissen huts housed most of the troops in Ireland



A sentry guards the entrance to a cantonment area, Wales



Dance in a Nissen hut, Wales



Nissen huts deck the lawn of a Welsh estate



Irish scene, with camouflaged vehicles



The Irish countryside looking toward the Mourne Mountains

up at Tenby, a famed Welsh seacoast resort noted for its high and crashing tides, and its rows of pleasant Victorian hotels along the beach.

Garrison life was resumed under virtually the same conditions as in Ireland. The men were once more quartered in hutments about deserted manor houses or public buildings. Division Artillery had a unique headquarters—it was St. Donat's Castle, a grim historic pile with lavish landscaping restored to former grandeur by William Randolph Hearst.

A waterproofing and de-waterproofing school was held. Finally all vehicles and equipment were waterproofed for the Invasion crossing. The weather was warm and pleasant in Wales, with drifting clouds and balmy air, but all thoughts were firmly fixed on the crossing of the Channel.

The Second Division had been selected to take part in the coming Invasion of Europe as part of V Corps under Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow. The 1st and 29th Divisions were to make the assault landing on Omaha Beach. The 2nd Division would follow these two ashore.

Landing at St. Laurent-sur-Mer, the Division would reinforce the 1st and 29th Divisions in the attack inland from the beaches and the securing of a beachhead.

Although not destined to take part in the initial assault landings as a whole, the Division was represented in the first wave of American troops ashore by personnel chosen from the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion and from the infantry, to form part of a special engineer assault force. This force was to open gaps in the interlaced steel and concrete beach




Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, commanding the First Army, and Major General Robertson of the 2nd Division meet at St. Donat's, Wales, May 24, 1944.

obstacles erected by the Nazis, and to make the initial break through the beach defenses and clear the way for the assaulting infantry.


In the closing days of May, surrounded by the strictest security measures, the Division moved into its final staging areas in Bristol Channel ports. The Pre-Loaded Bristol Channel Build-Up Force was the name given this set-up in Allied Headquarters. In early June, just prior to D-Day, the units of the Division began the long-awaited move to active war fronts. Each phase of loading and of movement was accomplished by carefully worked-out plans, covering all contingencies down to the last detail.

Embarking on transports, LSTs, and other types of craft, the Division, on D-Day, June 6, was steaming down the Bristol Channel, around Land's End, out into the English Channel, and across that body of water toward the invasion beaches of France.

On the morning of June 6, while heavy naval units and aircraft poured their tons of thundering explosives onto the beaches east and west of Port-en-bessin and north of Isigny where the Cotentin Peninsula juts out to the north, and while



Troops of the 23rd Infantry board transport to cross the Irish Sea.



St. Donat's castle was a picturesque headquarters at the marshaling area in South Wales.


the first wave of assault troops and engineers attacked the beach obstacles and mines, and while the first infantry units poured onto the beaches in their assault boats, the 2nd Division was moving up for the landing on D-Day plus 1.

Victory in Europe depended on the success of this operation, aimed at the heart of Germany and the disruption of her armed forces. If it failed, the Invasion of Europe might well be a failure. Therefore the men had waited with anxiety as higher headquarters and naval units pondered the navigational hazards and extreme tidal variations of this section of the French Coast. But the efficiency of the build-up and the excellent job of transportation done, the eager spirit and fitness of the well-trained and well-equipped men who went ashore paid off at once. Within a matter of hours it was apparent that the Allied Invasion Force was on the beaches to stay.

General Patton inspecting troops of the 2d Infantry Division on the Mall at Armagh, April 1, 1944.

Troops assemble in the Mall at Armagh to hear General Patton, April 1, 1944.

Lieutenant General Patton talks; in second row, Major General Robertson and Major General Wade E. Haislip, commanding XV Corps; in third row, General Robertson's staff.



CAMPAIGNS OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Normandy	June 6—July 24, 1944
Northern France	July 25—September 14, 1944
Rhineland	September 15, 1944—March 21, 1945
Ardennes	December 16, 1944—January 25, 1945
Central Europe	March 22—May 7, 1945



BATTLES OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Trevieres Offensive	June 7-10, 1944
Cerisy Offensive	June 11-19, 1944
St. Germain d'Elle—St. Georges d'Elle—Le Parc Defensive	June 20—July 10, 1944
Hill 192 Offensive	July 11-12, 1944
St. Germain d'Elle—La Croix Rouge—Le Soulaire Defensive	July 13-25, 1944
Vire Offensive	July 26—August 7, 1944
Tinchebray Offensive	August 8-16, 1944
Daoulas Peninsula Offensive	August 21-30, 1944
Brest Offensive	August 21—September 18, 1944
Schnee Eifel Defensive	October 4—December 12, 1944
Wehlerscheid Offensive	December 13-16, 1944
Rocherath—Krinkelt—Wirtzfeld Defensive	December 17-19, 1944
Elsenborn Ridge Defensive	December 20, 1944—January 29, 1945
Wehlerscheid—Harperscheid Offensive	January 30—February 5, 1945
Harperscheid—Dreiborn Defensive	February 6-28, 1945
Gemund Offensive	March 1-5, 1945
Breakthrough to the Rhine	March 6-12, 1945
Rhine Defensive	March 13-20, 1945
Remagen Bridgehead Offensive	March 21-27, 1945
Ruhr Encirclement	March 28-31, 1945
The Pursuit through Germany	April 1-12, 1945
Battle of Leipzig	April 13-18, 1945
Mulde River Defensive	April 19-30, 1945
Czech Offensive	May 1-7, 1945

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THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN



CHAPTER I

INVASION


The Second Division landed with the Allied Invasion Forces and began unloading operations on Omaha Beach in Normandy on D-Day plus 1, June 7, 1944. The most gigantic operation ever attempted in the history of war was getting underway, with a fingernail hold upon that narrow strip of beach. The culmination of the long months of training at home and in the British Isles had begun when the Division landed and began at once to hammer its way inland, grinding desperately at the enemy's defenses.

The landing in itself was unforgettable. German air power staged daring raids upon the transport ships by night. The deafening roar of bombs and anti-aircraft guns shattered the air again and again as the German bombers struck. Great barrage balloons burst into towering pillars of flames while flak fell on the decks like hail.

Along the coast lay the great man-made harbor, formed by a breakwater of hulks of wrecked and broken ships of all nations and great concrete caissons towed from Britain to provide a landing-place where none existed. Thousands of ships and landing craft waited offshore in the Channel to unload their men and supplies upon the beaches.

Big Rhino barges of astonishing capacity and other landing craft grated ashore far from the water line, disgorging their troops in water waist-deep to shoulder-deep. Some men died there before they set foot on the soil of France. While the troops pushed inland, groggy from the rolling sea, and clung to the cliffs and hummocks back of the beaches, the enemy's rain of fire fell on the sand. This narrow strip of France on which they landed was already hideous with the fearful wreckage and debris of war.

The picture was staggering to the imagination. The men



struggled ashore through the ghastly array of broken and twisted steel and concrete beach obstacles, smashed German gun emplacements, scattered gas masks and life preservers, piles of crushed and damaged equipment, huge tanks and vehicles already partly buried in the sand and sinking a little deeper with each tide. Some of the sunken hulks which formed the breakwater for the landing craft broke loose from their moorings and crashed ashore in the pounding surf, creating difficulties in the landing operations, but most served their purpose well as wave after wave of troops and supplies were put ashore.

The operation had been minutely planned and timed, and each detail had been carefully worked out. One phase of the operation, however, which did not work out as scheduled was the clearing of the beaches. The invasion plan called for the clearing of the beaches by the assault elements, then an unopposed landing of the Division in a designated and well-marked transit area. From the transit area units were to proceed to assigned assembly areas, reorganize, and be prepared to resist and repel attack.

The assault forces, however, had encountered from the first heavier resistance than had been expected. The German 352nd Infantry Division had moved into the area only a few days before the Invasion, to engage in maneuvers. There were tense hours while the Germans continued to pound away at the shallow beachhead and snipers harrassed forward units. The ports had been avoided because of the certain knowledge that they were heavily protected against assault from the sea. The landing on the beaches would have taken place with considerably less resistance had it not been that enemy reinforcements were so unpredictably close and in such force.

As a result, casualties to the assault elements had been heavy, and unloading could not proceed exactly as it had been scheduled. The Division pushed ashore beyond the beaches into an assembly area that had not yet been cleared of Germans. Pushing their way up trails through the mine fields into the steep coastal bluffs, lead elements of the units cleared their own areas of snipers.

To the individual, the appearance of this operation was one of utter chaos and mass confusion. This impression was caused by the magnitude of the operation; no one man could see more than a minute part of it. As it was, the Invasion was going very well, and according to the plan and time schedule.

The 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments, with their accompanying artillery units, the 15th and the 38th Field Artillery Battalions, forming two Regimental Combat Teams, were the first Division units ashore and over the beaches. Division Headquarters was established with the Command Post in St. Laurent-sur-Mer on June 7 as the units disembarked and formed in their assembly area. The first field order was issued on June 8. It directed the 9th and 38th Regimental Combat Teams to relieve units of the 1st Division north of the town of Trevieres, then to attack south. The attack was set for June 9 at 1200 hours, high noon.

The men received their baptism of fire without their heavy weapons. Starting with only rifles and carbines for fire-power, the combat teams jumped off; their machine guns and other automatic weapons were brought up as rapidly as they could be unloaded from the barges and dragged up across the beaches and thrust into position. The 38th Infantry, attacking in the right half of the Division sector, immediately encountered stiff resistance from carefully prepared positions around Trevieres, which had been an important German headquarters.

The attack went slowly and precariously at first, due to the absence of the heavy weapons. Launched without the machine guns and mortars, the drive progressed with the artillery taking mission after mission which would have gone under ordinary conditions to the infantry's own heavy weapons. The Regiment crossed the l'Aure River in a wide flanking movement under fire from artillery and mortars. Greatly aided by close

artillery support, the 38th RCT was in the town by close of day.

The 9th Infantry pressed forward on the left flank, likewise without its heavy weapons, and moved on to seize the town of Rubercy. The Division CP pushed forward to Formigny, and set up in a barn.

The Germans in this area as the attack began included elements of the 352nd Infantry Division; the 716th Infantry Division, the original coastal defense troops in that area; the 30th Schnelle Brigade, a mobile unit which had hurried to the scene of the Invasion from a reserve position, and varied labor troops and scattered units.

Capt. Omery C. Weathers, of the 38th Infantry, won the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism on the initial day of the attack. As Captain Weathers' company crossed its line of departure, artillery fire was placed upon the enemy's front line, acting as a shield and pinning down resistance in front of the Regiment in order to support its advance. His men had moved but a short distance when enemy artillery pinned them to the ground. Realizing that excessive losses from enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire would be incurred if they moved without the protection of their own artillery, he ran across the front of his entire company shouting to the men, encouraging them and urging them forward. Inspired by his bold action, the men got up and followed his example, rallying in a vigorous assault.

Captain Weathers was killed by an artillery shell after he had advanced only a short distance, but his men continued their implacable advance. Capt. Weathers' citation reads in part—"By his coolness and bravery under fire, his personal sacrifice and his unswerving devotion to duty, Captain Weathers acted in keeping with the highest traditions of the Armed Forces."

The DSC was awarded S/Sgt. Marcelo M. Soliz, then Private First Class, for his valor in action on June 9 when his platoon of a company of the 38th Infantry was pinned down by enemy machine gun fire which killed one scout and wounded another. Alone, Sergeant Soliz crossed the exposed and fire-swept ground toward the enemy's gun position.

"Although his rifle was shot from his hands," his citation for the DSC reads, "he continued his advance and secured a rifle from a casualty. Sergeant Soliz crawled the remaining distance to the enemy position. In the face of devastating fire, he leaped into the emplacement, killed two Germans and wounded a third. His heroic actions enabled his platoon to continue its advance and reflected the highest credit upon himself and the military service."

The 38th Infantry renewed its furious attack early on June 10 to storm the remaining defenses of the town of Trevieres. The Germans fought with great tenacity, doggedly defending the town house by house. Many had to be literally dug up from the cellars before they would surrender.

The enemy's defenses could not withstand the vigor of the attack. In a few hours the battered town fell into the hands of the Division. The Battle for Trevieres was ended, resulting in complete rout of all enemy troops within the town.

Movements of all units were still subject to sniper fire from the rough cliffs behind the beaches as the Division, its foothold gained, proceeded to unload and move inland with its vehicles, weapons, and supplies.

Leaving a small holding force to occupy the town of

Troops in hold of transport en route to Omaha Beach on D-Day





Part of the invasion fleet off Omaha Beach. Breakwater of sunken ships.



Trucks rolling off LST onto Omaha Beach

Trevieres, the 38th Combat Team moved on, advancing rapidly to the south in conjunction with the 9th and scattering the remnants of the enemy as they went. The 9th Infantry plunged headlong in its sector to clear the towns of LeMolay and LaMine and cut the main railway line from Cherbourg to Paris. Continuing to the south, the 9th Infantry pushed aggressively through the Cerisy Forest, meeting slight resistance, clearing the forest as they went and emerging to seize and cut the St. Lo-Bayeux Highway in that sector.

At the point near the road junction in the eastern part of the close-set forest, an armored reconnaissance detachment from the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, consisting of a tank and two armored cars, blundered into the American lines. Antitank fire proved ineffectual against the tank as it fled, but the cars were taken and their occupants killed or captured. It was believed that the presence of the detachment indicated that the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was operating somewhere in that area; but close interrogation of a prisoner brought out that his detachment was lost and was actually many miles from its destination.

Meanwhile the 38th Infantry on the right had made equally rapid progress along the west side of the forest, and had seized the village of Cerisy. The 1st Battalion pushed on through an arm of the forest to the road junction of Haute Littee, on the St. Lo-Bayeux Highway. Here they met strong resistance from the enemy in well-prepared locations. A heavy barrage by Division Artillery scattered the enemy and the infantry secured the junction. One company pushed forward to seize and occupy the village of Vaucrevon, representing an advance of 17 kilometers in the Division's line for that day of June 10.

This whirlwind gain was rendered possible by previous activity of the Army Air Forces, which had pounded German supply and rear areas along the beaches in advance of the Invasion, smashing the installations and greatly aiding the infantry in its surge forward. Throughout the battered countryside the dead lay all about amid the blooming gardens and the dooryards of the Normandy fields and villages in the balmy June weather. The Cerisy Forest had sheltered enemy supply and ammunition dumps which were expected to afford some stiff defense. These had been largely neutralized, how-

ever, before the Invasion began, and provided surprisingly little opposition, or captured materiel, to the 9th Infantry as it cleared the forest. Once past the beaches, leading elements encountered surprisingly little trouble from areas that had been mined and booby-trapped in the first days of attack.

The 23rd Infantry awaited its vehicles in an assembly area south of St. Laurent-sur-Mer while the 2nd Engineers completed their unloading. The 12th Field Artillery Battalion began early on June 9 and completed its unloading next day, giving general support in the capture of Trevieres. The 15th and the 38th Field Artillery Battalions had moved on in support of their respective combat teams. The 2nd Reconnaissance Troop unloaded on June 10 and began patrolling activities in the Division sector. As fast as the vehicles, equipment, and weapons of the units were brought up over the beaches into the assembly areas, they were de-waterproofed and made ready to be rushed into service.

June 10 saw the first large contingent of prisoners taken by the Division; they were a bedraggled and disillusioned lot. This was no spit-and-polish Wehrmacht, these strange dejected

Along the winding sunken farm roads of Normandy





As the 2nd Infantry entered Trevieres, first important town to fall.

men, speaking weird dialects and grovelling before the invading Americans. Many were South Russians with Mongoloid faces—Poles, Turkamons, Georgians. Nothing could have been more unlike the supermen of Goebbels' propaganda.

Questioning of these prisoners revealed that many had joined the army to escape the prison camps and to enjoy the better army fare. Many declared that they had never fired a shot against the Americans. It was believed, however, that most had fought until a fortuitous moment for capture or surrender. Some adopted civilian clothes in an effort to pass as impressed laborers. Many were eager to be of help, now that they were captured, but few knew anything of value to their captors.

June 11 brought a brief halt on the edge of the Cerisy Forest. The 23rd completed its unloading and moved into an assembly area north of Cerisy la Foret in preparation for an attack. B Battery of the 38th Field Artillery Battalion was bombed by night raiders and suffered casualties. Heavy casualties from mortar fire were incurred on the road junction at Haute Littee. Thirty-three prisoners were questioned during the day.

June 12 brought several notable events. The 9th Infantry covered several kilometers and brought the left shoulder of the Division down to the village of Chemin de St. Lo. The 23rd Infantry attacked with two battalions between the 9th and 38th west of Haute Littee, advancing on their left to the small meandering stream called the Elle, and on their right to a depth of two kilometers.

The Division had its first contact with German Paratroopers on June 12. They now faced elite troops, haughty and of high morale, meticulously trained and primed for fighting, indoctrinated with the Nazi creeds to the point of fanaticism. Lead elements of the 3rd Parachute Division had just begun arriving when they were encountered by the 23rd Infantry. Prisoners taken indicated that they came from Rennes, Brittany.

The first prepared enemy strongpoint was encountered when the 23rd Infantry came up against St. Georges d'Elle in their sector. This hard-fought-over town was much disputed throughout the next month, and changed hands many times.

Positions in this area were not hastily thrown up in the

face of an advancing attack, but had been well-dug-in far ahead, with carefully constructed underground shelters, gun emplacements, and communications trenches. Likewise, on June 12, the Division encountered an increase of artillery fire. Shelling continued sporadically, and during the night there was some danger from anti-aircraft guns on the beaches, but no systematic artillery fire had been apparent. From now on artillery would be an increasingly important factor in every operation.

The Division had now pushed 25 kilometers inland from the sea, in four days of actual combat. On June 13, the 38th Infantry advanced against spotty resistance and cleared a by-passed enemy pocket. An attack scheduled by the 23rd Infantry was cancelled when information was received that an armored division, thought to be the 2nd Panzer Division, had been seen moving into an area to the front by reconnaissance aircraft.

This information also halted the 38th in its advance. All units dug in for an all-around defense against a mechanized attack. The 2nd Reconnaissance Troop actively patrolled roads in the Cerisy Forest, maintaining contact between the 2nd and 29th Divisions. It also patrolled along the flank in view of the expected attack. The 2nd Engineer Battalion was active clearing roads and moving obstacles, filling the craters left by pre-invasion bombs. Fifty prisoners were taken in the Division sector.

On the morning of June 13, as the 38th Infantry advanced, one company had the mission of crossing the River Elle and gaining the high ground on the south side. Resistance to the attack was heavy from the start, mostly from heavy sniper fire and rifles in heavily wooded stretches. Two assaulting platoons advanced across an open field which led down to the dry stream bed, then sharply up the far side. Machine guns opened fire 250 yards away, threatening heavy casualties.

Pfc. Theodore Mister, a runner from Company Headquarters, took in the danger of the situation at a glance. In an action which won him the Distinguished Service Cross, he ran forward of his own volition through the two platoons to the stream bed, knowing his chance for survival was small. Shouting, "Come on, follow me!" Mister charged up an embankment and dashed straight toward the enemy. "Inspired and given courage by the dynamic actions of Private Mister,"

General Robertson and General Hays enter a ruined French town



the citation reads, "the two platoons surged forward in response to his gallant example. Though Private Mister never reached the objective, his life was not given in vain. The men he led fought on and successfully accomplished their mission."

On June 14 the 23rd and 38th Regiments straightened the Division line by limited objective attacks and then maintained patrol activity in view of the anticipated 2nd Panzer Division attack to the front; this attack did not materialize. Enemy armor was successfully engaged by the British 20 miles to the east at Villers Bocage, but none was seen in the Division sector.

The Division generally organized its positions among the hedgerows on July 15 and patrolled tirelessly, this time looking toward a new attack. The 9th Infantry, engaged in patrolling for a fresh move forward, was strafed by five Foch Wulfe 190 planes which shot down one of the Division's Liaison cubs. The 23rd Infantry, at St. Georges d'Elle, was counterattacked briskly and forced back slightly in its sector.

June 16 found the attack carried forward once again on both the left and right fronts of the Division sector. The 9th Infantry ran into sticky going to the left in the vicinity of St. Germain d'Elle. The 23rd, in the center, attacked and met strong opposition, but made limited gains. On the right, the 38th Infantry attacked toward Hill 192, reinforced by the 2nd Engineer Battalion. Elements of the 3rd Battalion pushed all the way to the crest of that keypoint, but were forced to withdraw to avoid being cut off.

That battalion engaged in fierce firefights from hedgerow to hedgerow, and was then subjected to determined counterattacks on the north slope of the hill when the 2nd Engineer Battalion reinforced them at midnight. The Engineers took up front line positions in the foxholes and fought as infantry to reinforce the struggle to hold the ground that had been gained.

There were many heroes made in these days of hedgerow fighting. One of these was Pvt. Joe M. Marez, a medical aid man acting in support of the 9th Infantry near the village of Montrabot during the advance of June 16. Disregarding a hail of machine gun and rifle fire which swept the area, Private Marez ran forward to attend two wounded riflemen. As he was treating the men, he was struck in the head by a rifle bullet. Despite his own wound, he continued applying a tourniquet to one man's leg, thereby saving his life. He was crawling forward to the second wounded man when he collapsed. He was evacuated just in time to save his own life. "The courage, fortitude, and devotion to duty displayed by Private Marez reflects great credit upon himself and is in keeping with the highest traditions of the Armed Forces," reads his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross.

The Division consolidated its positions all along the line on June 17 and 18. The 9th Infantry was strafed by two 190's and shot one of them down. Opposing forces were so close together that the infantrymen, not without a sly sense of humor, rigged up slingshot devices made of abandoned inner-tubes stretched between trees to hurl grenades into the enemy lines. This piece of Yankee ingenuity kept the Germans puzzled for some time as to how "patrols" could penetrate so deeply inside their defenses.

The green American troops had come to grips with the most hardened, seasoned, highly-trained soldiers of the German army and held their own. All units of the Division braved enemy 88 and artillery fire constantly in carrying out their duties. The men fought their way out of traps, braved fields



Villagers in Cerisy la Foret hold a service of thanksgiving for their liberation. General Robertson stands near the priest in the center of the picture.

crisscrossed by deadly fire, and made savage frontal assaults when they could get through the hedgerows no other way.

Throughout this struggle Division Artillery pounded the German positions to hold the Supermen inside their well-constructed holes while the men of the Division patrolled the weaving sunken roads and readied themselves for the next smashing drive ahead.

The long advance southward from Cerisy La Foret on June 16 was marked by many contacts with the enemy and highlighted by many instances of gallantry and courage in action displayed by men of the Division. There was Pfc. Byron B. Dickinson, who was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for action against the enemy while attacking strong hedgerow positions during the advance. Two assault squads of his platoon were pinned to the ground by a heavy volume of German infantry fire from the nearest hedgerow. "Voluntarily moving to the head of the leading squad, Private First Class Dickinson sprayed the hedgerow with intense automatic rifle fire," his citation reads. "Although he was painfully wounded, he continued forward and was the first to reach the hedgerow.

"Rising to a half-kneeling position, he placed his automatic rifle over the hedgerow and poured devastating fire upon enemy emplacements, thus permitting his squad to reach positions from which a successful assault was launched a short while later." Almost blinded and weak from loss of blood, he brought another wounded man back with him, and only at an officer's insistence did he allow himself to be evacuated from the field. The incident took place during the 23rd Infantry's attack on St. Georges d'Elle.

Communication between units at this stage was maintained by sheer personal effort and bravery on the part of the men of the 2nd Signal Company, as mopping up had not yet progressed to the point where small detachments could move about with impunity. Elements of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion had moved into Trevieres as the town was liberated, to fill bomb craters and remove abatis while civilians stood about gazing ruefully at the ruins of their shell-blasted town.

The 2nd Medical Battalion set up its clearing station at St. Laurent-sur-Mer, but quickly established a collecting station near Trevieres to evacuate casualties of the Trevieres fighting.



St. George d'Elle changed hands many times.



German foxhole. St. George d'Elle

The attack jumped off on schedule on June 19, but quickly ground to a halt. All efforts to penetrate the strongly fortified enemy defense line failed. The offensive was met head-on and thrown back by heavy machine gun fire, mortars, and artillery. The Division accomplished only limited gains, and quickly dug them in against the enemy, holding the line against possible counterattack and laying minefields around positions and approaches.

At this time, all along the line of the Allied Invasion Front, the advance was coming to a halt. The beaches were secured. For the remainder of the month of June the Division consolidated its positions and held to its front lines. It would not attack again until July 11. In the meanwhile, all along the line, it faced the enemy in a tense deadlock. At some points the German front was only a hedgerow away.

As the Division dug in, its objective had been achieved. The invasion spearhead had seized and secured a foothold deep and firm enough to insure ample room for the friendly forces piling up at the Division's back along the beaches. "Operation Neptune," the object of which was to secure the beaches, could be written off as a success. The German plan of annihilating the invasion forces had been thwarted.

Since the Germans, with some 60 divisions in France, could not hope to throw a cordon along 1500 miles of prospective invasion beach, they had based their defense upon a series of fortified strongpoints, usually towns, and upon a coordinated counterattack to throw the invaders back into the sea. This plan had failed and resistance on the invasion front had been wiped out. It was now time for the Allied Forces to reorganize and build up for the fight which lay ahead.

Cerisy la Foret lay deep in the hedgerow country



Infantry-tank engineer teams train in Normandy



CHAPTER II

T H E E L L E S

The German defenses in the Division sector now ran roughly from the base of Hill 192, key point of all the territory to the west toward St. Lo, some three miles away, and to the sea. From Hill 192 the line ran east through the village of Berigny and roughly parallel to the Elle River to St. Germain d'Elle. Fronting these defenses, the Division set up its own positions in preparation for the attack on Hill 192. In these positions the Division entered upon a period of static warfare which afforded time for a build-up of men and supplies on the beaches, together with a corresponding development of transportation and administrative facilities necessary for the all-out effort to drive the enemy out of Normandy and Northern France.

In the western part of the Division sector the most troublesome obstacle was the village of St. Georges d'Elle, the scene of violent patrol clashes again and again. The Division patrolled it extensively and claimed possession several times; yet there was still resistance with heavy artillery and mortar fire, anti-personnel devices, and trip wires attached to warning flares.

The base of Hill 192 was zeroed in by the Germans at every gap in the hedgerows. The hedgerows themselves provided an excellent natural advantage which the Germans were quick to seize in building their fortifications. The hedgerows, built first in ancient times to protect the fields from roving half-civilized tribes, had become through centuries of use hard-packed mounds of earth held by stones and twisted roots. The small fields of Normandy were surrounded by these tough, steep earthen walls from three to seven feet in height, sometimes in double rows. From the tops dense shrubs and hawthorne bushes grew.

While the Division held largely to its line, acts of heroism, fortitude, and devotion to duty were many as the men patrolled, advanced their outposts, and dug in among the hedgerows under enemy fire which was not only heavy at times, but also extremely accurate. The enemy's observation posts were "looking down our throats" and would continue to do so until Hill 192 could be reduced. Vicious fighting took place among the hedgerows while the Germans waited to spray the fields with fire, or propped up dummies in their foxholes and attacked with knives.

A company of the 38th Infantry was attempting to set up an outpost on the lower slopes of Hill 192 on July 2 when a squad commanded by S/Sgt. Joseph S. Pomber was pinned down by incessant machine gun and grenade fire from a hedgerow less than 25 yards away.

"With complete disregard for his own safety, Staff Sergeant Pomber, in the face of direct machine gun fire, jumped from

his covered position and charged the hostile weapon," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "Throwing many hand grenades and firing his sub-machine gun, he fearlessly charged the emplacement, killing two Germans and destroying the weapon. A second enemy machine gun from the opposite flank opened fire on Staff Sergeant Pomber, killing him instantly." His wiping out the gun position enabled the remainder of his detail of 15 men to accomplish their mission and establish the outpost.

The hedgerows made picturesque and useful natural fences in times of peace. In war, as the Germans were quick to see, they provided earthworks, tank traps, and natural camouflage at one and the same time. Behind them, or in dugouts tunnelled under them, a handful of men with well-emplaced machine guns could hold off a regiment of infantry simply by crossing each field with deadly close-range fire. The summer foliage of Normandy in July helped conceal positions from the air. A few tanks, backed into the corners of the fields and screened by greenery, could provide terrific close-support firepower for the enemy infantry.

While the Division held to its Elles positions, industrious enemy Paratroopers were at work digging their emplacements into the hedgerow corners, constructing underground shelters and entrenchments. They cut boxed-in apertures in the hedgerows at ground level through which their 88s and machine guns could sweep the fields with deadly accurate fire while remaining unobserved. Mortar sections utilized the twisting sunken farm roads, worn deep into the earth by centuries of use, and deserted buildings from which to fire and fire again, always moving on, providing tricky targets for counterbattery fire.

The German hedgerow positions were well camouflaged. Their track discipline was good. Reconnaissance photos showed scarcely a trace of indication where their deeply tunnelled fortified embrasures and gun emplacements were dug in.

In addition to the hedgerows, the Germans had flooded rivers in their favor. They patrolled ceaselessly and tirelessly. German snipers contributed to the weary watchfulness of the men. Rain and mud bore heavily upon the troops and rendered air support unable to operate at maximum efficiency. Nevertheless, the build-up on the beaches continued at an astonishing pace while the infantrymen prepared to launch a new offensive.

The Division now had ample opportunity to observe the value of well-dug foxholes, not only for escaping the attention of the enemy, but as protection against the long, chill rains and ordinary combat discomforts. At the close of the Cerisy Offensive, the Division had set up its Headquarters



General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commanding the First United States Army; Major General Walter M. Robertson, commanding the 2nd Infantry Division, talking over the situation in the command post of the 2nd Infantry Division near Cerisy la Foret, in Normandy.

Command Post south of the village of Cerisy la Foret. The defensive line through St. Germain d'Elle, St. Georges d'Elle, and Le Parc was now dug in and reinforced with logs, earth, and sandbags in semi-permanent positions constructed by the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion. The 2nd Signal Company set up and maintained 114 miles of wire and 41 lines radiating from a telephone switchboard. The 702nd Ordnance Company conducted an intensive program of maintenance and repair of arms and vehicles as rigid inspections were held.

The Division rear echelon was established in a capacious French countryhouse across the way from the forward CP, some three kilometers behind the front lines. The house had recently been vacated as a German headquarters and proved most convenient. Here the men published and distributed a daily mimeographed information sheet called "The Spearhead," and the Special Services Office distributed "The Stars and Stripes."

There was occasional strafing of the area by enemy planes, and some were shot down. Propaganda leaflets were distributed profusely by both sides. Those issued by the Germans proved highly diverting to the Division troops. The entertainment value of those fired at the Germans by the Division's guns was never known, but they caused no great rush of offers to surrender.

Patrolling was the most hazardous single feature of this static defense and provided many a hair-raising shock. Virtually all the Division took a turn at it and related nerve-racking experiences, with the Hun ensconced behind his fortified hedgerows perhaps only two or three small fields away.

Flares and illuminating shells contributed to the problems confronting the Division's patrols. The blood-chilling effect

of pulling an enemy trip-wire and having a flare burst overhead in a brilliant white light, with the fear of sudden exposure to a watchful enemy, was experienced by many. The Germans also employed deadly and vicious anti-personnel mines against patrols. Mortars and automatic weapons, even self-propelled 88's, blazed away at patrol parties on the slightest provocation, playing hide and seek with the Division's artillery. Extreme tightness of the enemy defenses in this area, plus mines and trip wires and projected flares, kept the situation tense. Then there were the machine guns with their interlocking fields of fire, mortars firing tirelessly and without limit. From Torigni-sur-Vire the railway guns dropped shells behind the Division's lines on any probable target.

There were several types of patrols employed against the enemy. Some maintained contact between the Division and the units on its flanks, and covered the gaps between to prevent infiltration of enemy patrols. Others maintained contact between the Division and its own outposts and elements.

There were patrols for taking the enemy in ambush, for reconnoitering changes in the German line and positions, for capturing enemy patrols for purpose of identifying enemy troops in the Division sector. Some patrols were elaborate coordinated movements with mortar and artillery fire on call for support, or with heavy machine gun fire to seal off the area through which they must progress. Occasionally patrols and outposts pushed forward to the near side of an enemy-occupied hedgerow, where they could hear Germans conversing in their dugouts on the other side.

Most patrolling was accomplished in the night-time, and the shortened nights of midsummer brought an intensification of activity during the hours in which free movement under darkness was possible.

Training for the attack on Hill 192 was emphasized throughout the Elles Defensive. The infantry had broken through the crust of beach defenses, but now there were the hedgerows. Tanks almost stood on end trying to climb over them, exposing their lightly armored undersides to the accurate enemy fire. Various expedients were tried without success until canny ordnance mechanics devised great bulldozer blades from German beach defenses. These "rhinos" plowed through the hedgerows instead of climbing over: the results were gratifying.

In secrecy the infantry, engineers, and tanks trained rigorously in teams. They learned to operate as teams. Moving as a unit, the engineers blasted the earthen walls with demolitions, the tanks plowed through, and the infantry surged on through the gaps, supported by tank fire, to seize and secure these otherwise unyielding positions.

The men became adept at this type of infantry-engineer-tank warfare combining Yankee ingenuity with sheer fortitude and courage. Soon they would have a chance to try it out against the Germans with machine guns propped up in the embrasures of the hedgerows, or squatting along the ditches with rifles and machine pistols. This hedgerow warfare was made up of scores of desperate small-scale skirmishes all along the line, making up the big push.

Snipers were found everywhere, even in the trees which sometimes grew as high as 20 feet above the hedgerows. Routing them out of the lushly foliated fence-rows was a tremendous task. They utilized every pile of masonry and rubbish, hedge corner, field, and shrub. One would wait patiently and indefinitely for a chance to fire at an American. They gave no respite until cleaned out of an area. And when cleaned out, they frequently returned by infiltration to take up their watchful waiting again.

On June 23 Division Artillery began "serenading" the enemy with TOTs, or time-on-target missions. In these the four battalions of the Division, sometimes with supporting Corps artillery, would concentrate their fire upon a single target at one time. During comparatively quiet periods, the target chosen might be a rest area or a mess line or some similar concentration of troops. At a given signal the guns would fire by careful timing so that their shells all burst upon the target at one moment, resulting in an instantaneous explosion of all Division Artillery firepower upon a single point. Some nights as many as 20 TOTs were fired. The harassing effect, prisoners testified, was terrific. At times a TOT was used to drive the enemy underground so that patrols could operate.

On June 30 the first "B" rations since the landing on Omaha Beach were hailed with joy by the men as the kitchens were brought up over the beaches. As artillery and mortar fire were heavy, the men at times did much of their cooking and eating in their foxholes. Packaged rations were augmented now and then by eggs and chickens acquired by barter, or a cow which first had been utilized as a mine-detector by being driven around a field to set off stray mines or booby

traps which might have been overlooked. There was also the "cidre" of this famed apple-growing country and its fiery derivative, calvados, with which some of the men experimented using lemon powder from their "K" rations in an effort to produce a drink not searing to the palate.

Shower heads were set up in the rear area by the 2nd Engineer Battalion and provided welcome relief. The units were sent to the rear in rotation for steaming showers and complete changes of clothing from head to foot supplied by the 2nd Quartermaster Company.

The Red Cross clubmobile and doughnut dugouts provided welcome coffee and hot doughnuts, with records to be played, and the sweeter music of a feminine voice from home. The Division band played concerts within rifle shot of the front lines.


During this static period from June 20 through July 10, American forces all along the line were laboring toward a general attack to break out of the Normandy Beachhead. American troops had captured the great port of Cherbourg and secured the Cherbourg Peninsula to assure a much-needed point for Allied supply lines to supplement those over the beaches which had heretofore served for the build-up of forces and materiel.

A violent storm on Omaha Beach upset unloading schedules somewhat, and caused a curtailment of certain supplies. Division artillery fired harassing rounds on a quota basis as ammunition dumps were replenished and reinforcements of men and materiel poured in once more across the beaches.


Soon the Normandy Beachhead would hold a powerful and concentrated force which would burst out through the enemy's lines and plunge into an implacable drive across Europe. In the meanwhile infantry and mechanized units of the 2nd Division held themselves in readiness for the attack on Hill 192 after two weeks of intensive drilling in combat team units.

This attack, previously postponed several times because of uncompromisingly bad weather, was definitely set for July 11.

Big German railway guns dropped shells behind the lines



H I L L 1 9 2



On July 11, striking in a magnificently planned offensive, the Division accomplished the reduction of Hill 192, the main enemy strongpoint in the Division's sector. This ugly eminence dominated the countryside and afforded an excellent view of Allied landings and operations, not only northward to Omaha Beach, but westward toward St. Lo, major German bastion to the right of the Division and some three miles away.

"The Hill," rising 192 meters above sea level and honey-combed with massive defenses above and below ground, was reduced in a well-timed infantry-armor attack which took the hill and cleared the enemy from it in a one-day operation, with most of the units securing their objectives before night-fall. The second day's attack of that two-day offensive was given to straightening the lines and improving the Division's positions. The units had now advanced to rest their lines against the highway running eastward from St. Lo.

The offensive was notable for two outstanding features. One was the use of infantry-tank-engineer combat teams to

blast the hedgerows, smash through them, rout the enemy entrenched behind them, and secure the field. The other was an expertly plotted barrage and fire program by Division Artillery, which was later described as one of the best-planned of the War in Europe.

Active patrolling operations were carried out in the days preceding the attack to simulate normal operations. Maps were abundant and detailed. Preparatory fires began at 0500 hours and lasted for one hour, rising in crescendo to a terrific pounding barrage during the last 15 minutes. The infantry-tank-engineer teams jumped off at 0600 hours, ripping through the first line of hedgerows under a tremendous protective artillery barrage.

The fire plan devised by Division Artillery utilized the firing of eight battalions of artillery—the four organic battalions of the Division and four attached and supporting units. A color was assigned to each zone of fire, a letter to each point of concentration within the zone. Thus fires could be

delivered accurately on call by color and letter as the infantry pushed forward over the hill.

The entire front was ablaze with fire as the artillery laid down the mightiest preparatory barrage it had yet been called upon to deliver. Then the artillery attack was kept rolling ahead of the infantry advance in fifty-yard bounds. It formed a protective shield against the violent and sanguinary resistance offered by the hill's fully prepared defenders. The artillery bombardment so shattered the hill that foxholes dug later in the slopes caved in.

On the heels of the hour-long preparatory pounding, the 38th and 23rd Infantry Regiments jumped off with their accompanying tanks and engineers. The progress of the attack was slow at first; the obdurate Hun refused to come out of his foxhole and surrender even when his positions were overrun. When he did come out, he was full of fight.

The infantry-tank-engineer teams had been trained to a fine point for hedgerow fighting. First, demolition squads of engineers blasted holes in the hedgerows behind which the enemy Paratroopers had dug in their "impregnable" defenses. Sometimes saddle charges were used, thrown across the hedgerows to fall on both sides, blasting from two sides at once to tear a gap through which a tank could smash its way.

The tanks, equipped with arrangements of spikes like great bulldozer blades which enabled them to plow through the gaps rather than climb over and thus expose their vulnerable bellies, moved forward accompanied by the riflemen who secured the positions. Movement and fire were coordinated through the tanks' telephone systems. Progressing in this manner, the teams moved forward steadily as the day went on.

The barrage was notable not only for its excellent planning of preparatory and accompanying fires, but for its volume. More than 25,000 rounds, fired by organic and attached artillery battalions according to plan, fell within the small area occupied by the fortifications of Hill 192. In addition to the utilization of the prearranged code for location of the front lines, the plan allowed for quick shifting and accuracy. Despite the lack of observation in the rolling, heavily wooded ground lined with hedgerows, dense foliage, and stream beds, observed fire missions accounted for three tanks, a number of vehicles, and innumerable strongpoints.

The German dug-outs sometimes ran as much as 12 feet underground, behind hedgerows up to six feet high. In these fortifications, which were not only deep but stoutly constructed, the Germans could calmly sit out the barrages, wait for the fire to lift, and then pop up like jacks-in-the-box to confront the advancing infantry. Even after the pounding

they received they could still emerge full of fight, although somewhat deafened and bewildered, to offer fanatical resistance.

The gun emplacements were so massively built that each was a virtually impregnable island of defense. It was only the genius and grim determination of the doughboys which contrived means of reducing these hideous defenses. Often it was only by leaping into an emplacement and exterminating the crew that a gun could be silenced. Behind these fearful obstacles the Germans crouched ready to spray machine gun fire and automatic weapons fire the first time an American set foot into their fields of fire. Heavy concentrations of massed fire aided in the reduction of these formidable results of the enemy Paratroopers' long digging in, but many a hero stepped forward that day as the mighty hill defenses fell.

By mid-afternoon, victory was a foregone conclusion. By nightfall, most of the units of the Division had secured their objectives and established positions on the hill. In one day, Hill 192 had come into the possession of the Division.

The 38th Infantry advanced over the west slope and the crest of the hill, two battalions fighting abreast, against the most rigid and austere resistance. The enemy emerged from their bulky well-prepared defenses somewhat dazed by the bombardment they had received, but ready to hold out rigorously and determined to thwart the Division's assault. Nevertheless, the Regiment had taken 1500 yards of the enemy's well-dug-in defenses and fields by night.

The 23rd Infantry, advancing in column of battalions in the other half of the Division sector, took some 1200 yards of the enemy's territory under the same conditions on the eastern slope of the hill. The two regiments fought their way up one side of the hill and down the other. The enemy

German grave on Hill 192





German prisoners taken in the attack on Hill 192

did not give up and retire to his secondary line of defense on the St. Lo-Berigny Highway until the entire hill had been covered, hedgerow by hedgerow and field by field. Casualties to the Division were heavy for that one day of fighting, but not to be compared with what they might have been in an extended offensive against the same objectives. The infantry-tank-engineer method of fighting and the artillery barrage which leaped over the hill in advance of the attacking units were credited with holding down greatly the cost to the Division.

Effectiveness of the fires was fully attested by the uninhibited manner in which the infantry-tank-engineer teams were able to break through the enemy's tight-clamped defenses. Further evidence, if it is needed, is found in a letter taken from the body of Gefr. Helmut Kaslacka of the 9th Parachute Regiment, expressing one Paratrooper's reaction to the shelling of Hill 192. It reads as follows:

"In the field
24 July 1944

Dear Struppel,

For the third time I am writing to get in touch with you by letter. I hope that it will reach you. Some time ago when I left the 6th Group, I arrived by way of Gardeleben in Wittstock where I made my ten jumps. Then I came to my regiment in France and to my Company. We were stationed in Brittany near Brest. When the invasion started we moved out approximately 30-40 km daily, but only at night. During the day American fighter bombers controlled the area. Then we were put into line E of St. Lo approximately 5 km away from the town. When we were committed, our company strength was 170.

Then the 11 July arrived and the most terrible and gruesome day of my life. At 0300 our Co sector got a dense hail of arty and mortar fire, that we thought the world was coming to an end. In addition to that the rumbling of motors and rattling could be heard in the enemy lines—tanks. It scared the pants off us. We could expect a very

juicy attack. If we thought that the Arty fire had reached its climax we were disillusioned at 0530. At that time a tremendous firing started which continued to 0615. Then tanks arrived. The movement of tanks, however, is somewhat difficult here in Normandy. As we at home have our fields fenced in by wire and wooden fences, so the fields over here are lined with hedgerows. They are about five feet high and have the same thickness. These hedgerows are winding criss-cross through the terrain. We dig in behind these walls and the Americans do the same. It is a regular "hedgerow war." Well, on that 11 July the tanks were rolling toward us. They shot with their guns through the hedgerows as through cake dough. Sharpshooters gave us lots of trouble. You must know however that the Americans are using H.E. ammunition, which tears terrible wounds. Around 1000 the order came to withdraw as the position could not be held. I had one wounded in my MG position. When I wanted to get him into position with the help of someone else, a shell landed 2 yds. away from us. The wounded fellow got another piece of shrapnel in his side and the other fellow also was wounded. I, however, did not get one single piece of shrapnel. Anyway on that day I escaped death just by a few seconds a hundred times. A piece of shrapnel penetrated through the leather strap of my MG and was thus diverted from my chest. In this way I could name many instances.

At 1135 I left the platoon sector as last man. Carried my MG through the enemy lines into a slightly more protected defile and crept back again with another fellow to get the wounded. It was time to get them, for tanks were moving 30 yards from us.

On our way back we were covered again with terrific Arty fire. We were just lying in an open area. Every moment I expected deadly shrapnel. At that moment I lost my nerves. The others acted just like me. When one hears for hours the whining, whisting, and bursting of shells and the moaning and groaning of the wounded, one does not feel too well. Altogether it was hell.

Our company has only 30 men left. In the meantime it was reorganized to a certain extent. We are now located in a somewhat more quiet sector, i.e., what we call quiet. We are expecting a new attack supported by tanks today or tomorrow.

I have been recommended for the Air Force Ground-Fighting Badge, on account of the hand-to-hand fighting on 11, 12, and 13 July.

Now I would like to finish this letter. I gave you sufficient reading material, I guess. Hope to hear from you soon.

With best regards, I remain as

your friend
Helmut."

Just preceding the attack on July 11, during the night prior to that engagement, the enemy laid down a heavy barrage and concentration of artillery and mortar fire, then

staged a full-scale attack in front of the sector occupied by the 29th Division, which was likewise preparing to jump off at 0600 hours. The attack, lasting from 0030 to 0300 hours, failed to upset the 2nd Division's timetable or to affect in any way the well-planned strategy of that attack.

The 9th Infantry Regiment staged its own diversionary attack on July 11, a limited objective drive designed primarily to detract attention from the all-out advance on Hill 192 by the other two regiments of the Division. Its purpose accomplished, the attacking unit withdrew to its original position and went into reserve.


The next day, July 12, saw the 38th Regiment resuming the attack and striking toward the west to make minor gains and improve its hold upon the hill. It quickly secured its objectives. St. Georges d'Elle, the long-disputed stronghold to the east of the Hill 192, now proved untenable to the enemy who withdrew from that village to positions along the St. Lo-Berigny Highway, vacating the pocket formed by the Division's advance of the preceding day.

When the Division finally occupied Hill 192, it could see not only the Elles Valley and the Normandy countryside and orchards away toward St. Lo, but even the invasion ships riding at anchor 25 kilometers away on Omaha Beach. The hill afforded excellent observation of the approaches toward St. Lo, which it dominated, and its loss deprived the enemy of use of the hill in holding that bastion, thus playing a role in the 29th Infantry Division's attack there on July 11. The final taking of the hill gave the Allied forces the key for communications which they needed for the planned breakthrough of the Normandy Peninsula. The operation also netted 127 prisoners and virtually wiped out the 9th Parachute Regiment.

Just after crossing the line of departure, as the 38th Infantry advanced over the southwest slope, First Lt. George W. Reynolds' platoon was pinned down by hostile fire from artillery, automatic weapons, and small arms.

"First Lieutenant Reynolds unhesitatingly and courageously advanced toward the enemy to reconnoiter a route for supporting tanks," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "Constantly exposed to both frontal and flanking fire, he fearlessly crawled along a hedgerow, and came upon a position from which the enemy was placing devastating fire upon his men. With great valor and with utter disregard for his own safety, Lieutenant Reynolds personally killed three Germans and forced the surrender of four others, thereby completely reducing the strongpoint and permitting his men to advance safely. By his courage, prowess, and heroic devotion to duty, Lieutenant Reynolds acted in keeping with the highest traditions of the armed forces."

THE NORMANDY BREAKTHROUGH



After the two-day offensive on Hill 192, the Division held to its lines once more along the St. Lo-Bayeux Highway from July 13 through July 25. On that day, the great American breakthrough to the west between St. Lo and the sea was completed. On July 26, the Division attacked again in the wide breakthrough operation known as Operation Cobra, which smashed the enemy's strength in Normandy as American troops broke out of the Cotentin Peninsula.

Gen. Omar Bradley attacked in a swift, hard-driving campaign to break out of the Normandy Beachhead. Preceded by a prolonged and terrific bombardment to pulverize the enemy's attacking power, the American Armies struck out again and again, forcing the enemy to the south and east, crushing his organized defenses and scattering his lines to complete the series of operations known as the Normandy Breakthrough.

On July 26, one day after the fall of the St. Lo defenses, the Division attacked south across the highway supported by artillery and tanks. The 2nd Reconnaissance Troop on the left flank and the Cavalry on the right flank patrolled extensively. Resistance was stiff and difficult to overcome all

the way. The Division's advance was once more under constant observation from the hilltop of St. Jean des Baisants, some sixteen meters higher than Hill 192.

The artillery fired a twenty-minute preparation. The initial sortie called for tanks alone. Simultaneously the artillery delivered time fire over the area to be covered by the tanks, to keep the enemy in their holes which formed a line approximately three fields deep along the south side of the highway. The tanks breached the intervening hedgerows and the first lines of the enemy's fortified positions. Then they returned to accompany the attacking infantrymen through the gaps, while the artillery raised its points of burst to keep the enemy in their holes.

Every field, every hedgerow, was heavily defended, and the enemy made the most of their prepared positions. Time and again, the Germans were forced back into their foxholes and held there by artillery fire which was suddenly lifted in high bursts to allow the tanks to break through the hedgerows under it, and the infantry surged forward while the big guns still sounded above the advancing tanks. In this manner the attack was destined to roll forward all the way through Cou-

lances and Etouvy, striking toward the bombed out shell of the city of Vire. Striking through sunken farm lanes, hedgerows, and orchards while the enemy made the fullest use of every advantage he possessed, the infantry maintained a vigorous pursuit, repulsing and crushing every effort of the Germans to rally for a firm stand.

But while the enemy made no firm, sustained attack against the forward thrusting of the tanks under artillery bursts followed by the infantry closing up swiftly, he nevertheless aggressively defended every hedgerow. The paralyzing effect of the artillery bursts kept the enemy troops inside their fox-holes while the tanks broke through, but it did not prevent them from emerging full of fight to engage the infantry in close hand-to-hand fighting until the Germans were routed in one desperate encounter after another.

The weeks of patient build-up paid the highest dividends. When General Hodges' men began their breakthrough out of Normandy there was no stopping them. Strictly speaking, there were two phases of the breakthrough: one along the line from St. Lo where the 2nd Division fought at Hill 192, and the second in late August finding the Division at Vire and Tinchebray.

But now, the next objective was St. Jean des Baisants and the hedgerows were defended to the utmost all the way. The method of attack functioned wonderfully against the Germans fighting an endless delaying action all the way, but it involved the hardest sort of fighting for the footsoldier and constant displacement and adjusting on new positions for the artillery.

The infantry attack jumped off at 0600 hours. Two kilometers were gained on the left flank and to the center; on the right, where the resistance encountered was exceedingly strong, the gain was somewhat less.

The 9th Infantry Regiment attacked southwest, securing in its path the town of St. Germain d'Elle, then continued to press forward against heavy and tenacious resistance, scoring a total gain of 2700 yards for the day. Normal gaps in the hedgerows had been protected by thickly sewn minefields covered by machine guns and 88's. The initial sortie of the tanks cleared gaps in the hedgerows through which the assault troops could advance with the tanks. The 38th Infantry, on the right, met the same stubborn quality of resistance, plus intense artillery and mortar fire from the right flank and right front. The mechanized 102nd Cavalry, which had the mission of covering the right flank of the Division, experienced difficulty in the jump-off with its heavy armored vehicles in the low ground and rough up-hill terrain and was unable to use some of its mechanized equipment. As a result, part of the day's advance was made with an exposed right flank. Fire from self-propelled guns was encountered later in the day. Progress was slow initially, but a coordinated attack launched at 1745 hours resulted in a gain of 1700 yards by the end of the day.

The 23rd Infantry, attacking in the center of the line,

moved south from the St. Lo-Bayeux Highway against extremely heavy and forceful resistance.

This one day's action brought out innumerable examples of courage and fortitude as the First Army's big push along the front line got underway. There was, for instance, the case of Lt. Col. Raymond B. Marlin, a battalion commander with the 23rd Infantry, who moved his CP to a point on Hill 192 just prior to darkness on July 25 in preparation for the next day's attack toward the village of Notre Dame d'Elle. As the attack began the Battalion CP came under heavy fire from light artillery and heavy mortars. As a result of the intense barrage, his communication with his assault squads was lost.

Fire had leveled all cover on this section of the hill. Aware that the enemy could observe his every move, Colonel Marlin went forward in search of his assault companies. Upon reaching the St. Lo Highway, he and his group were subjected to a heavy volume of artillery fire. One officer was evacuated with severe wounds, but Colonel Marlin pressed forward despite a wound in the thigh. After the group had gone only a short distance, the enemy laid down another intense concentration upon them, and again the leader was hit by shell fragments. He pushed forward once more in an effort to maintain contact with his forward parties, but was finally persuaded to return to the Battalion CP. During the progress to the CP he was hit a third time, but refused to be evacuated upon arrival. He continued to direct the operations of his command from the CP until the arrival of his Battalion Executive Officer.

One company of the 23rd Infantry attacked on July 26 with the mission of seizing a portion of Le Bois de la Roche and protecting the left flank of the Battalion. The attack was launched north of the St. Lo-Berigny Highway at 0600 hours, and the Company received a heavy artillery barrage soon after crossing the line of departure. Two assault platoons remained pinned down by the heavy fire. Nevertheless, it was vital that the Company continue the attack in order to keep up with the progress of its Battalion and to protect the flank; furthermore, to remain in their present position was tantamount to destruction.

Lt. George R. Mitchell, the Company Commander, raced 150 yards through the heavy barrage to reach his assault platoons, which were without officers and were approaching a disorganized state due to casualties in the lines. With shell fragments flying around him, Lieutenant Mitchell, reorganized both platoons, issued orders under fire with complete calmness, and personally led the platoons out of the impact area.

As the Company pressed on to LeBois de la Roche, heavy enemy machine gun fire from emplacements in the wooded area hit the left flank assault platoon, causing severe casualties, while mortar fire fell heavily into other company positions. The Company was again halted and pinned down in open ground. Lieutenant Mitchell raced ahead of his for-



An American medium tank, carrying explosives to blast hedgerows, is hit by enemy fire.

ward platoons, exhorting the men to follow him. He advanced 150 yards into the woods, which he knew to be the location of elements of the enemy and from which two machine guns were firing, threatening his men. When he reached the edge of the woods a machine gun opened fire on him from an emplacement some 200 yards to the left flank. He silenced the gun with five rounds from his M-1 while bullets struck the ground all about him. His men continued to advance through the woods, subject to heavy mortar fire, but never holding back when he urged them on.

The left flank of the Company was exposed by a small open field on the edge of the woods. Another machine gun opened fire from a hedgerow corner in this field, inflicting heavy casualties upon the left flank. Lieutenant Mitchell again silenced the gun, firing a clip directly into the position while his men were pinned down. His company contained only about 70 men now, but they continued to advance, moving on into the woods as he led the assault platoons. Approaching the far edge of the forest, the forward elements came upon a German CP which they mistook for a pillbox and started to withdraw. Lieutenant Mitchell advanced toward the position alone, calling to his men to follow. They did so, and captured 20 Germans cowering in their foxholes.

Under his leadership, the Company, which did not number more than 80 men after it left the line of departure, took 40 prisoners and captured a position manned and defended by an estimated 300 Germans. "The extraordinary heroism and courageous actions of Lieutenant Mitchell," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads, "reflect great credit upon himself and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service."

Lt. Ewell L. Smith, Jr., likewise received the Distinguished Service Cross for his work in that bloody day of July 26 as the 23rd Infantry advanced upon Le Bois de la Rillerie, Le Bois de la Roche, and Notre Dame d'Elle. In the attack on Le Bois de la Roche, an entire company was halted by a heavy artillery barrage. It was imperative that the left flank assault platoon commanded by Lieutenant Smith drive on re-

gardless of its casualties, or the entire company would suffer. In the face of artillery shelling and constantly at the mercy of deadly direct machine gun fire, Lieutenant Smith moved back and forth among his men, encouraging them and urging them on. Despite its heavy casualties, the platoon moved forward and advanced upon the enemy with savage aggressiveness.

"Lieutenant Smith was seriously wounded. Heedless of his own personal safety and disregarding his wound, he continued to display cool-headed, courageous leadership as he placed his remaining men in position," reads his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross. "As the result of this daring drive by Lieutenant Smith and his platoon, the Company were able to push on to their objective, and only after reinforcements had arrived would he permit himself to be evacuated to safety."

Only six men remained in the platoon when finally they reached the edge of the woods.

S/Sgt. Gayln Clay was another who won the Distinguished Service Cross in the breakout from the Normandy Beachhead, for "extraordinary heroism and courageous devotion to duty in the face of fire." Sergeant Clay, a member of a rifle platoon, wrenched a machine gun out of the enemy's hands across a hedgerow. Tossing it aside, he emptied a clip from his rifle into the machine gun nest, wiping out the gun's crew.

Clay's squad had the mission of wiping out an emplacement holding up the advance of the entire Company. As the squad advanced, all its members were either killed or wounded. Sergeant Clay was badly wounded in the leg, but went on alone, crawling through short grass, still exposed to machine gun fire. Approaching the position, he was again wounded, this time by a grenade which struck him in the face. This, in addition to the casualties among his comrades, made him so angry that he rushed up to the position, jerked the gun out of its emplacement, pulled it over the hedgerow, and then poured a clipful of rifle bullets into the crew. Then, for good measure, he tossed in two hand grenades. This single-handed advance, which successfully wiped out the machine gun, enabled the attack to move forward with the result that the objective was obtained.

The first day of the drive to accomplish the breakout of the beachhead in Normandy was a day of heavy fighting for all sectors of the front line. PFC. Alfred A. Cannon was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in action while the 23rd Infantry was engaged in close fighting with the enemy.

"While engaged in an attack near Notre Dame d'Elle, two platoons encountered heavy grazing fire from an enemy machine gun which halted their advance and forced the men to take cover," Cannon's citation reads. "Private First Class Cannon, voluntarily and with great valor, crawled toward the gun positions. When he came within 50 yards of the emplacement, he was severely wounded by an enemy grenade.

"Despite his painful wounds, he dragged himself closer to the machine gun and, with great effort, threw a grenade, killing two Germans and knocking the weapon out of action."

After the 300-yard crust of enemy fortifications along the St. Lo-Berigy highway was demolished in the Division sector, the going became somewhat easier as the demoralizing effect of the quick initial sortie by the tanks followed by swift infantry attack was fully experienced by the enemy. Nevertheless, resistance continued to be stiff until St. Jean and the surrounding ridge were taken on July 28, ending this phase of the operations in the Breakthrough.

In the fighting on July 26, as General Bradley's move to break out of the beachhead got under way all along the front, elements of Division Artillery came within mortar range of the enemy as they operated in close support of the tank assaults.

Supplies were still being brought up across the beaches, and the tremendous quantities of material accumulated there and the splendid achievements of the supply trains in getting it to the front contributed immeasurably to the breakout and to the destruction of a considerable portion of the enemy forces facing the invasion troops at this crucial stage.


The 38th Infantry attacked to the south with St. Jean des Baisants in its line of advance and with the enemy taking advantage of every opportunity of observation, raking the countryside with artillery fire. 1st Lt. John I. Jensen, a rifle platoon leader, won the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in connection with a direct assault upon a well-entrenched enemy resisting stubbornly from well-protected positions. Lieutenant Jensen, wounded twice, refused to be evacuated for three days while he led his men in pursuit of the strategically retreating enemy, keeping them on the run at a critical stage of the operations.

On the fourth day he was wounded once more, and his platoon suffered heavy casualties. Yet he continued to direct mortar fire effectively upon the next enemy strongpoint. In leading the remaining five men of his platoon in a direct assault upon the next hedgerow, he and his men were pinned down by withering enemy crossfire. He ordered the withdrawal of his men and remained forward alone, adjusting fire by radio upon the enemy position. He was killed in this act and was awarded the DSC posthumously.

Two days later in the same action PFC. Lee D. Stroup was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for a courageous and self-sacrificing act. "Private First Class Stroup, while occupying a position in a hedgerow prior to an attack by his company, saw an enemy hand grenade land in the midst of his squad," his citation reads. "Fearlessly and with utter disregard for his own life, he threw himself upon the grenade to absorb the fragments with his body and prevent injury to his comrades nearby."

By such acts was the breakout of the Normandy Beachhead accomplished. Citations for valor were numerous among men of all ranks in these days of arduous and uncertain fighting.

The Division's attack on July 26 had broken through the prepared defenses which the enemy had been perfecting since the middle of June when reinforcements arrived within the area. It had forced the enemy back on both flanks, leaving



Tank equipped with improvised blades for ripping through hedgerows of Normandy.

the center of his line thrust forward in a salient which would rapidly become untenable. A total of 235 prisoners taken in that one day's drive represented all three regiments of the 3rd Parachute Division. Prisoners of war indicated during interrogations that the enemy was reaching a point where there were few reserves available to fill the depleted ranks.

On July 27 the attack was resumed at 0800 hours. The enemy had withdrawn unostentatiously from the salient in the middle of the Division line during the preceding night. Resistance was exceedingly heavy on both flanks, however. Only limited gains were made that day as the enemy clung to his prepared defenses and gave up only when a knockout blow shattered them. Casualties were heavy in the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry on the right flank of the Division while engaged with the 3rd Parachute Battalion and two companies from the 15th Parachute Regiment of the 5th Parachute Division.

The 23rd Infantry, in the center, advanced against moderate resistance to seize Notre Dame d'Elle and patrol the salient evacuated during the night by the enemy. The 9th Infantry met heavy resistance, but cleared a large wooded area and uncovered tremendous quantities of mines and booby traps, seizing the village of Rouxville on the St. Lo-Caumont Road. Virtually every unit of the 3rd Parachute Division with the exception of the artillery regiment, was identified among the 91 prisoners of war taken that day. One prisoner, of doubtful reliability, reported that he had seen a new type of tank in Brittany, utilizing one 220 millimeter howitzer, two 75 millimeter howitzers, and eight machine guns.

For two days now the Division's attack had been uphill all the way. Now the line was confronted by the 208-meter hill which was crowned by the town of St. Jean des Baisants with its church spire towering against the skyline. Resistance decreased somewhat along the entire Division front on July 28, but progress was slowed and made infinitely difficult by the minefields which the enemy had thickly embedded on all approaches. The 5th Division moved in to relieve elements of the 9th Infantry in the early morning. The advance was

resumed at 1000 hours, with the 9th Infantry meeting brisk resistance on the left of the Division sector. The 23rd Infantry, in the center, fought its way against small arms fire, minefields, and booby traps, then entered the town of St. Jean des Baisants at 1715 hours, occupying one more town on the long advance down through the ancient twisted apple orchards and worn, sunken farm roads of French Normandy.

The 38th Infantry, committed as a reserve unit, encountered heavy fighting on its right front, then broke through the enemy defenses and fought its way through positions to the southwest of the town. The 9th Infantry overcame resistance on the left to take possession of the area to the southeast of that town by close of day. The 23rd Infantry had cleared the main road by 2000 hours.

The enemy had that day committed its scanty reserves opposite the left front of the Division. These included elements of the 15 Parachute Regiment. Prisoners of war now stated that heavy casualties had been suffered by the Germans. No one knew the definite position of the enemy in the area to the south of St. Jean des Baisants.

On July 29 resistance in the Division sector was only moderate as small groups accomplished a neat delaying action on a narrowing front while the enemy's main line pulled back to new more favorable positions. Fire from machine guns and small arms was heavy and was occasionally supported by that of self-propelled guns.

Col Chester J. Hirschfelder, Commanding Officer of the 9th Infantry, was cited for extraordinary heroism displayed on July 28 as his regiment charged an important and heavily fortified enemy-held ridge before St. Jean des Baisants. "Colonel Hirschfelder moved from the leading elements of one assault company after another, constantly driving them forward toward the objective," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "At one time, when enemy resistance was at its peak and his men had begun to show signs of battle fatigue, Colonel Hirschfelder, fully exposed to concentrated enemy mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire, turned his back to the enemy, removed his helmet, and with his hands on his hips asked his men what was holding them up.

"This display of courage and psychological inspiration was the needed spark that created new life in his tired men. As the advance continued despite a seemingly impregnable wall of enemy fire, Colonel Hirschfelder, with complete disregard of his own safety and with superior leadership, led the smashing blow that took the objective. Still under heavy enemy fire, he remained with his men, inspecting and improving their positions."

Colonel Hirschfelder was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in World War I when he was a captain in the 5th Machine Gun Battalion of the 2nd Division. Five days later in the crossing of the Souleuvre River near Vire he was awarded a second oak leaf cluster to his DSC.

A strong pursuit was now indicated, and the battle-weary men of the Division did not flinch as they pushed off early on the morning of July 29 as the 9th and 38th Regiments sent out patrols at 1000 hours to reconnoiter the enemy's new lines. No evidence of organized positions was reported, and at 1500 hours the Regiments jumped off to renew the attack. Initially light resistance was encountered from delaying groups strategically spotted to slow and hamper the Division's inevitable advance. Later in the day, the 9th Infantry ran into considerable firepower on its left front. All indications, however, were of a hasty and expeditious enemy withdrawal to the front.

Five enemy planes bombed the Division zone on July 29. The Division CP was moved forward to a farm north of St. Jean des Baisants. On July 30, with the enemy falling back during the night to hastily prepared positions, the Division moved forward to encounter organized resistance along the high ground north of the highway from Torigni-sur-Vire to Caumont. These positions were smashed during the day and the Division made slight gains, continuing the advance on the entire front, although the 9th Infantry ran into heavy fire. On the night of July 30 the enemy once more retreated, pulling back to a ridge line seven kilometers to the south; taking full advantage of the high ground in each position, the enemy left more resisting groups in small numbers and offered opposition only as a delaying measure.

The Division's advance continued patiently, successfully. On July 31 the attack was resumed to the south, against artillery and mortar fire from the enemy's advantageous positions, but no organized resistance was encountered in the initial stages. As the 9th and 38th progressed they made short work of various delaying positions posted by the enemy and recorded an advance of seven kilometers for the day.

To exploit the success of this advance, the 23rd Infantry was committed on the left flank of the Division that afternoon and made a sizeable advance before the close of day. Reconnaissance troops, sent out in an effort to regain contact with the enemy withdrawing during the night, encountered considerable trouble from thickly planted mines. Roads in the wake of the enemy had been mined not only heavily, but over an extensive area.

The complete extermination of the enemy in this area and his hasty retreat to the south and east were progressing rapidly as the Division prepared for a change-about in the zone of action. American forces would begin to accomplish the initial breakthrough of the main German defense line now in Northern France. Hammering their way forward by continuous frontal attack upon the enemy, the men were footsore now, but fresh enough to finish the task before them. The push across the Vire River must be made while the enemy was still in full, if skillful, retreat.

CHAPTER V

ON TO VIRE

Now the results of the tremendous build-up on the beaches were becoming apparent. The narrow shelf-like strip of French soil held by the Allied Forces would soon hold two million men, 17 million ship-tons of supplies. Now General Bradley got his "flying weather." He was ready to complete the breakthrough out of Normandy.

The 2nd Division's role in this gigantic operation was to maintain the terrific pressure now being exerted upon the center of the German Seventh Army. V Corps had now wheeled, while the Division struck south, to turn the German left flank away from the French coast and to push the enemy on south and east completely out of the Normandy Peninsula.


On July 29, the 9th Infantry Regiment dispatched a reconnaissance party in force at 1000 hours. It advanced south against scattered light resistance in preparation for a resumption of the attack next day. The 38th likewise reconnoitered to the south, and the Division front moved up some 4000 yards. The Division CP was moved forward to St. Jean des Baisants, and observation was pushed forward beyond the St. Jean ridge. Air OP's flew constantly now.

Two battalions of the 9th Infantry continued the advance on July 30, encountering fire from Hill 183, and the 38th Infantry, advancing two battalions, recived heavy frontal fire and considerable fire on the right flank. July 31 brought artillery fire, but no organized resistance. The 9th Infantry advanced 7200 yards against scattered opposition; the 38th, two battalions abreast, encountered artillery and mortars. The 23rd, which had been in reserve near St. Jean des Baisants, moved 1200 yards to the vicinity of Le Breuil.

That night the Division made one of its night combat marches. Resistance increased as the troops pressed forward to make contact with the enemy.

That was a night of dim moonlight and great clouds of dust. To the men of the Division, it seemed as if all the armies in France must be on the move. A grim excitement pervaded all operations.

August 1 found the Division's attacking elements making contact with the next delaying force established by the enemy.



Resistance was moderate with stiff opposition on the left flank. When these positions had been overrun and wiped out, the enemy withdrew again on the night of August 1 and displaced to the next favorable high ground. The handful of prisoners taken indicated the presence of the 752nd Infantry Regiment on the Division's left front.

Throughout the first two weeks of August the enemy would continue thus. The war settled down to a pursuit, with the enemy withdrawing overnight to establish positions which would be held the next day. This method of fighting involved continuous assault upon new positions for the weary men of the Division, continuous heavy supporting fires and displacements for the artillery, and unceasing reconnaissance and patrolling for all elements. Telephone communications were maintained by constant work and careful planning.

The Allied offensive had by now attained a tremendous momentum as the enemy continued to fall back under pressure, utilizing the defensive properties of high points, streams, and draws, defending points of natural advantage, always



The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion built this bridge across the Vire.

moving under darkness when possible, with machine gun and mortar fire and observed artillery to support his tactics.

The Division's sector had narrowed to two kilometers on its attacking front when the 9th and 23rd jumped off at 0600 hours on August 2, pushing the advance rapidly, despite minefields, up to the north bank of the Souleuvre River, which crossed the front of the Division zone from east to west. A series of high, hilly bluffs on the south side of the Souleuvre afforded perfect terrain for cover and observed fires, and could have made the crossing extremely difficult.

The physical and tactical position of the enemy could have made the crossing far more costly than it was, had they exploited their advantages more fully. As it was, the crossing in itself was dramatic. Reaching the river at 1100 hours, the assault elements plunged across with rifles lifted high above their heads, scaled the heights beyond under cover of a smoke screen and quickly overcome resistance, advancing fully three kilometers before they dug in for the night.

The 2nd Engineer Battalion, advancing with the infantry, threw up a plywood ramp bridge and a ford across a blown-out dam. This enabled the attacking infantry troops to cross with their tanks and vehicles, which proved invaluable in routing the enemy from his vastly superior, concealed positions in the hills on the south side of the river.

The engineers worked under constant small arms and mortar fire from the south bank. After the attacking elements had crossed, they constructed a Bailey bridge on the main highway in the Division sector, all bridges having long

ago been blown by the Germans. Other elements and vehicles of the Division followed over this bridge.

Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, 9th Infantry Commanding Officer, personally directed and supervised the crossing of the river by the assault troops and tanks and the scaling of the steep and bluff-like banks on the south side. In this operation he added a second bronze Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Cross won in France in the last war.

"Colonel Hirschfelder, on numerous occasions, advanced to the foremost elements of his command while exposed to heavy enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire to make personal reconnaissance and issue attack orders," the citation reads. He shouted orders and encouragement and set an example of fearlessness and courage under fire as he had done in the hedgerow fighting before St. Jean des Baisants, when he won his first Oak Leaf Cluster.

Taking up a precarious position at the edge of a bluff from which he could view the operation, Colonel Hirschfelder determined the route of advance for the two assault companies and directed the laying of the smoke screen over the enemy-held bluffs which enabled them to ford the river. Twice, when supporting tanks hesitated in the face of intense fire, he went forward from tank to tank, directing their operations to give the greatest amount of support to the advancing infantry.

This combined infantry and tank assault brought many instances of personal courage and effort. PFC. Julian Gonzales was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the operations which preceded the crossing of the river in the fighting near the village of La Courbe during the approach to the crossing. His squad was pinned down by heavy machine gun fire while attacking a hill, and the supporting tanks were halted by rocket fire.

Gonzales, voluntarily and alone, crossed the intervening field in plain view of the enemy. The citation says, "He leaped a hedge concealing the enemy and ferociously attacked a machine gun and rocket launcher crew with his automatic rifle, killing or wounding five Germans and driving off the others. The tanks and his squad were then able to continue their advance."

In addition to their bridge-building activities, the 2nd Engineer Battalion had a tremendous task in the pulling and

stacking of the hateful Tellermines sewn in the route of advance. A harvest of S-mines was also gathered through the fields on the advance to the river. Roadblocks proved to be largely of the cheval-de-frise type and easily demolished, but mine-clearing parties were often forced to operate as much as two miles to the front of the advancing infantry. Personal heroism on the part of the mine-clearing details came to be a frequent occurrence in this part of the advance.

PFC. Joseph A. Elwell of the 2nd Engineer Battalion typified this spirit of courage and daring. He won the Distinguished Service Cross for clearing a minefield and road under the direct fire of the enemy and for two separate patrol actions into enemy territory. Elwell volunteered to remove the mines which were blocking the path of reconnaissance cavalry. "While exposed to heavy machine gun fire and small arms fire," the citation reads, "he calmly cleared a path which enabled the armored vehicles to go forward."

In order to approach the mines and attach a rope so that they could be pulled, it was necessary for him to brave the fire of at least one machine gun. He was forced to pull the mines from a distance of 25 feet instead of the prescribed 50 yards, to keep from coming under the fire of another enemy machine gun. He then went to work as a member of a mine-detector crew clearing the road over which the cavalry's heavy vehicles had to advance to cross the Vire, a task which was accomplished under heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire.

On the morning of August 3rd Elwell volunteered as a

Torigni-sur-Vire




Pfc. James Bundschuh, Fairmont, Ohio, looks over a bell which was once in a church steeple in St. Jean Des Baisants. The steeple was used as an observation post by the Nazis.

member of a three-man patrol to search out and plot mines in an area fully a half-mile behind the enemy lines. Later he went out to plot the limits of a particular field to facilitate mine removal and obtained exact information. He and one other member of the patrol were shot down and fatally wounded by enemy guns as they returned. The third man returned with vital information which greatly facilitated the movement of the attacking forces at a time when rapid forward movement was necessary to prevent the enemy from digging in and catching their breath in new positions before the Breakthrough was complete.

Maj. J. Lloyd Ptak was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in connection with operations on July 31 near the village of St. Symphorien les Buttes Groucy. When the Battalion which Major Ptak was commanding was subjected to intense fire from artillery and machine guns, he ordered one company to move off to the right and assault the objective from the flank. After fierce fighting, this company attack came to a halt. Major Ptak moved up to the front and saw that his men were beginning to withdraw under the enemy's fire.

He quickly reorganized his units and personally led them in a renewed assault to storm the enemy-held heights and capture the objective. Later in the day, when darkness had fallen and the night combat move of July 31 was getting under way, Major Ptak, again with utter disregard for his own safety, assumed the role of lead scout and called for his



Captured German ammunition dump in Normandy



Engineers build a corduroy road in Normandy.



Between the hedgerows of the Bocage country



A hedgerow ripped apart for tanks to pass



Rest for a moment in a shelled-out town



Abandoned German materiel in Normandy

men to come with him, bolstering their spirits and improving their morale by his own courageous attitude. Three days later, while again leading an attack by his Battalion, he was struck and severely wounded by mortar fire.

"Before he would relinquish his command or permit himself to be evacuated," his citation for the DSC reads, "he made certain that his superiors and all members of his staff were fully acquainted with the situation and his plan of action."

The indomitable spirit of the men at this critical stage of the Breakthrough was nowhere better exemplified than in a message sent by Lt. Col. H. K. Wesson, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry on July 31. It was midnight, and the men had been fighting all day. The message said: "I have no water, I have no chow, I have no batteries for my radio, I have no communication. My men are dead dog tired. I repeat, my men are dead dog tired. I have been given an order to attack. I am about to comply with this order. End of message."

August 3 found the remaining elements of the Division crossing the river on the just-completed Bailey bridge, beginning at 0515, and pushing forward on the opposite side. Patrols had roamed the woody terrain all night long. The assault elements jumped off at 0700 hours. Progress was slow due to heavy artillery and mortar fire and automatic weapons from small, well-situated enemy positions. In the afternoon the 38th Infantry was committed in the right half of the Division sector and advanced some two kilometers against determined resistance after proceeding by motor to a front some eight miles north of Vire. The 23rd Infantry moved 2500 yards, securing the small town of Etouvy and with it an important highway center six kilometers above Vire, advancing on the St. Lo-Vire Highway. The 34 prisoners captured on that day were virtually all paratroopers.

The Division, moving its CP from an orchard north of St. Jean des Baisants to another orchard four kilometers north of the river, was now the left flank of V Corps and all the American forces in Normandy, being on the left in contact with units of the 2nd British Army resting against the Vire-Tinchebray road.

The artillery followed in extremely close support during these operations, frequently within mortar range during the

enemy's disengaging efforts. The enemy's withdrawal tactics made repeated displacements necessary. Concussion victims from artillery fire appeared among the 3rd German Paratroop Division prisoners captured and among those of the reinforcing 363rd German Infantry Division.

Continuing the attack at 0630 hours on August 4, the 38th Infantry, having passed through the 9th Infantry and the 23rd Infantry, made an advance of three kilometers against fairly well-defined opposition. Near the close of day, contact was established with a firm and well-dug-in line defending the north approach to the town of Vire. The village of Campanolles fell, then Coulañces, where one battalion received a heavy shelling. Reconnaissance indicated that a column of armor was being brought up into the area.

Enemy armor was sighted in front of the British sector, but no armored action was encountered to the Division front. The 15 tanks reported seen were believed to be part of the 9th SS Panzer Division then engaged in battle with the British on the left. The 24 prisoners taken that day were mostly paratroopers.

In the attack on the village of Coulañces PFC. Lawrence Georgeatos distinguished himself for extraordinary heroism and won the Distinguished Service Cross when a company was pinned down by intense machine gun and rifle fire for four hours, by an enemy well entrenched behind the next hedgerow. "When an advance was attempted," the citation reads, "two scouts were severely wounded and were unable to crawl back to safety. Private First Class Georgeatos voluntarily and courageously left his covered position, passed through heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire, hurdled a hedge bank, and personally carried each of the wounded men to the sheltered side of the hedgerow."

On another occasion he crawled through a hedgerow, inched his way toward a hostile machine gun position, and hurled a grenade over the next hedgerow when he reached throwing distance. After it exploded, he jumped over the hedgerow and fired his automatic at point blank range into the gun position, killing five Germans, but being fatally wounded himself. His action enabled the men to push forward to their objective.

By now, the German Seventh Army, badly mauled at



U. S. Infantrymen pass the rubble that once was the town of Vire, France, August 8, 1944

Cherbourg and all the way through the peninsula, was fighting still fanatically, but with somewhat less assurance. Allied air forces operations had snarled German traffic and supply lines hopelessly, all the way from the front in Normandy, on backward to the Rhine. The orderly and well-conducted withdrawal action would now fall apart and crumble; the first signs of disintegration had appeared. General Bradley's forces were getting ready for the kill, as the 2nd Division, with the 29th Division, now closed down on the shell-blasted town of Vire.

On August 5, the Division front was moved forward some 2000 yards on the left, slightly less in the right half of the Division zone, and the CP was brought forward to the village of Les Rairies. In the early evening, the enemy was found to be withdrawing to the front. Losing no time, lead elements promptly closed up during the hours of darkness in a night combat march to seize the high ground overlooking Vire from the west. Next day, the Division held this ground and consolidated its positions as the 29th Division passed in front of


its lines to occupy the town itself, with the 2nd Division remaining in active defense.

On August 7, the 9th Infantry relieved some elements of the 29th around Vire as the 23rd Infantry moved its line to hold against possible counterattack on the north outskirts of the town. Next day, the Division adjusted its lines slightly to take over and enclose the town.

On August 9, the Division pulled out of Vire and formed a line three kilometers south of the city, preparing to advance to the southeast on Tinchebray. These moves were accomplished without opposition except for a shelling which the 9th Infantry received in moving to the high ground overlooking Vire.

The taking of Vire marked the first breakthrough of the main German line of defense in Northern France. Its immediate result was the extermination of all enemy resistance in the sector and the hasty retreat of the remaining German forces to the south and east. Its ultimate result was the crashing out of the Normandy Peninsula and the end of the first great campaign of V Corps in the war.

ADVANCE TO TINCHEBRAY



Taking a stand to the south of Vire on August 9, the Division began a swing to the south and east to the town of Tinchebray as a part of the pressure on this end of the Falaise-Argentan pocket. The 9th Infantry, spearheading a three-day drive with open flanks, sent out patrols to the south on August 10. Having encountered only slight resistance, they attacked at 1400 hours, gaining two to three kilometers.

The 2nd Battalion captured Maisoncelles la Jourdan. The 3rd Battalion, which had been occupying the high ground south of Vire, received a counterattack from the southwest by armor and infantry, in the zone of the 29th Infantry Division. The counterattack was repulsed briskly, and the 2nd Battalion advanced and ambushed a column of three tanks and their complement of riflemen, attempting to escape toward the south. The enemy retaliated by another counterattack later in the day with only infantry. This was repulsed and the attackers cut down by machine gun and rifle fire at extremely close range.

Division Headquarters displaced to Coulances on August 10. On August 11, the Division held to its lines against possible counterattack but made no aggressive action. Forty-one prisoners were taken from the 363rd and 331st Infantry Divisions. The enemy had suffered tremendous losses of materiel, some of it hastily abandoned in half-finished fox-holes. They had suffered the loss of roads, of cities, of high ground and tactical advantage, as well as casualties, including large numbers of prisoners. On August 10 the prisoners taken presented a cross-section of four German divisions and gave every indication of the confusion and disintegration in the ranks of the enemy.

On August 12 the attack was resumed at 1000 in the last great drive which secured Normandy for the Allied Forces in the Division sector. Some 376 walking prisoners were taken in that day alone, with units of three divisions scattered through the lists.

The direction of the attack had now changed east toward

Tinchebray. In this advance the difficulty of keeping unit zones straight was extreme, as units were pinched out or had their zones of action sharply altered in the closing of the Falaise Gap. Liaison was difficult, and when contact was vague or impracticable, reconnaissance elements sometimes observed the progress of adjacent units and reported it by radio.

The Division, exhausted by long and heavy fighting in the line, continued to fight valorously whenever the enemy was engaged. On August 13, when the 23rd Infantry was viciously engaged by the enemy in a local counterattack near Vieuxville, France, PFC. Richard Von Patten was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for "personal bravery, spartan effort, and unswerving devotion to duty" when an enemy machine gun position succeeded in placing devastating fire directly upon his platoon. He left his fox hole voluntarily and crawled along the hedgerow toward the gun. Under machine gun and small arms fire, he reached a position only 15 yards from the emplacement.

"Courageously, he rose to a kneeling position and hurled a grenade in the midst of the gun crew, killing three men," his citation reads. "With the machine gun knocked out of action, the platoon, inspired by Von Patten's heroic actions, vigorously repulsed the counterattack."

Eight divisions of the once-powerful Wehrmacht in Normandy were represented in the 196 prisoners taken on August 14, as well as Kampfgruppen, those stop-gap battle groups of 50 men upward largely organized of patchwork elements of disintegrated units.

The enemy was cleared from the high ground south of the Tinchebray-St. Pois Highway that day, having just about exhausted a defense based on salient terrain features, buildings which could be converted into strategic strongpoints, and systematic withdrawal. Artillery was moderate, bolstered by Russian guns of the mobile assault type. In the vicinity of Vire, interdiction from long-range artillery had given trouble. Now, antipersonnel and antitank mines were an even more bothersome threat to assault elements. Enemy air activity was desultory, being largely for reconnaissance and at night. Counterattacks were as a rule limited in scale, and accordingly ineffectual.

With the objective of clearing Tinchebray of the enemy, the 23rd and 38th Infantry Regiments jumped off at 0900 hours on August 15 against half-hearted and ragged resistance, with light artillery support. The enemy made one bold effort to evacuate the area. The 38th Infantry seized the town of Tinchebray at 1630 hours, when the 2nd Battalion entered the town, and the 3rd Battalion took up positions just south. Tinchebray was badly damaged by the firing, but not flattened like Vire. Morale of prisoners taken was at an unprecedented low. Much material was seized and the enemy deprived of its use.

The last objective of the 2nd Division in Normandy was secure. The 109 prisoners taken on the last day of action at Tinchebray presented a polyglot spectacle of disintegration and defeat, representing various infantry units and the 3rd Parachute Division. On August 16, the Division went out of contact with the enemy and fell back for a two-day rest before proceeding to a new war front. The 2nd Division was now attached to VIII Corps, which was detached from the main First Army front for the conquest of Brest and the Brittany Peninsula.

The men of the 2nd Division had advanced some 70 kilometers through enemy territory which was hotly contested virtually all the way. They had encountered some weak units, particularly in the initial stages of the invasion, and later some of the finest the Wehrmacht had to offer. They had taken a total of 1952 prisoners of war in 68 days of combat. As the spearhead of V Corps south across the Normandy Peninsula, they had headed the Allied advance to the south for a large part of this time.

General Bradley's paralyzing attack on the German lines after the breakthrough at St. Lo and Avranches continued in a vigorous pursuit of the shattered German forces after the 2nd Division was pinched out for action elsewhere. General Hodges' First Army and the British Second Army repulsed and crushed violent German counterattacks launched to cut the Allied corridor at Avranches and cut off General Patton's armor which had fanned out in three swift-moving columns.

On August 13, as the 2nd Division prepared to pull out of the line, the Third Army swept north from Le Mans around the southern flank of the German positions in Normandy in the direction of Argentan, while the Canadians of the British Second Army drove south from Caen toward Falaise. This pincers movement created the Falaise-Argentan pocket out of which some 100,000 German troops were captured later, in addition to the many thousands dead or wounded.

As the Canadians broke through at Falaise to meet the Americans coming up from Argentan, the gap was closed in the four days from August 19th through 23rd, and the remnants of the German Seventh Army were destroyed.

The southward push of the 2nd Division through the hedgerows of Normandy had vastly aided and abetted both this drive of destruction and also the Third Army's bone-crushing sweep as General Patton and his armor raced through Chartres and Orleans with their sights raised to Paris.

On August 25, while the 2nd Division was engaged in some of the heaviest fighting of its history in the by-passed fortress of Brest, Paris fell to the Free French patriots, French soldiers, and General Hodges' tanks. Seventeen days later American troops carried the fighting into German territory. The 2nd

Division, however, would fight one of its bitterest campaigns of the war before it left French soil.

The Normandy Campaign remains one of the greatest achievements of the 2nd Division. The historic battlefields of the bocage country remain a vivid page in the story of the War in Europe. Putting the Battle of Normandy behind them, the men of the Division looked back upon an operation of great magnitude, carried out with skill and gallantry.

Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, commanding V Corps, wrote on the occasion of the Division's transfer to the command of VIII Corps at the end of the Normandy Campaign:

"The record of the 2nd Infantry Division from its arrival on the beaches of Normandy until the capture of Tinchebray has been one of hard, relentless fighting against a stubborn enemy. It was largely through the persistent determination and unflinching courage of the officers and men of the 2nd Infantry Division that the Battle of the Hedgerows was won. For more than two months of continuous fighting they were to a great measure responsible for the success of V Corps."

During the Normandy Campaign several changes of command were made in units of the Division. Col. Jay B. Lovless replaced Col. Hurley E. Fuller as commanding officer of the 23rd Infantry Regiment. Col. Francis H. Boos, Regimental Executive Officer, took over the command of the 38th Infantry Regiment in the place of Col. Walter A. Elliott. Col. James A. Van Fleet became assistant commander of the Division replacing Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Martin.

On August 15 reports by G-2 estimated the German strength available for battle at forty-three divisions. Some thirty-five of these were engaged in the combat zone. The new German Fifteenth Army had eight divisions. Of the sixty-five divisions in France and the Low Countries on D-Day, eight had been destroyed and fourteen divisions cut off or otherwise occupied in Brittany, Southern France, and the Channel Isles.

On August 1 the Twelfth United States Army Group became operational under General Bradley with two armies, General Hodges' First Army and General Patton's Third Army, totalling thirteen infantry divisions and five armored divisions. On August 15 the Seventh Army landed southwest of Cannes. The Canadian First Army and the British Second Army completed the Allied force, now looking to the beginning of operations which would carry the war into the Reich itself.

The following communication addressed to all units of General Montgomery's 21st Army Group was received by the Division on August 13:

"Allied Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen:

"Through your combined skill, valor and fortitude, you have created in France a fleeting but definite opportunity for a major Allied victory, one whose realization will mean notable progress toward the final downfall of our enemy. In the past, I have, in moments of unusual significance, made special ap-

peals to the Allied Forces it has been my honor to command. Without exception the response has been unstinted and the results beyond my expectations.

"Because the victory we can now achieve is infinitely greater than any it has so far been possible to accomplish in the west, and because this opportunity may be grasped only through the utmost zeal, determination and speedy action, I make my present appeal to you more urgent than ever before.

"I request every airman to make it his direct responsibility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied safety either in flight or in flight.

"I request every sailor to make sure that no part of the hostile forces can either escape or be reinforced by sea, and that our comrades on the land want for nothing that guns and ships and ships' companies can bring to them.

"I request every soldier to go forward to his assigned objectives with the determination that the enemy can survive only through surrender; let no foot of ground once gained be relinquished nor a single German escape through a line once established.

"With all of us resolutely performing our special tasks we can make this week a momentous one in the history of this war—a brilliant and fruitful week for us, a fateful one for the ambitions of the Nazi tyrants."

"Most sincerely

(sgd) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER"

As the Division moved to Brest, the following communication was received from General Gerow, under whom the men had fought as part of V Corps:

"1. Upon the relief of the 2nd Infantry Division from assignment to V Corps, I desire to express to you, and through you to your officers and men, my warmest personal thanks and appreciation for their excellent performance during the long period while under my command.

"2. The record of the 2nd Infantry Division, from its arrival on the beaches of Normandy until the capture of TINCHEBRAY, has been one of hard, relentless fighting against a stubborn enemy. It was largely through the persistent determination and unflinching courage of the officers and men of the 2nd Infantry Division that the battle of the hedgerows was won. For more than two months of continuous fighting they were to a great measure responsible for the success of the V Corps.

"3. The 2nd Infantry Division is battle tested. It has proven that it is a good, hard fighting division. It is with sincere regret that I accept its loss to my command. My sincere thanks and best wishes for your continued success go with each and every one of you. Good luck.

/s/ "Gerow

"L. T. GEROW,


"Major General, U. S. Army.

"Commanding."

THE BRETON PENINSULA

CHAPTER VII

FORTRESS BREST



The 2nd Division moved out of Normandy to a new operational front on August 18 and 19 as the battered remnants of the German army which had defended the Normandy Peninsula fell back north of the Seine after losing 400,000 casualties, 200,000 of them prisoners of war.

As the enemy withdrew he left substantial garrisons to defend the critical seaports—Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient, Dieppe, LeHavre. These were the points the Allied Force might use to develop harbor facilities for their lengthening supply lines. The Germans freely expended thousands of men and tons of supplies that the taking of these ports might be made as difficult as possible.

Brest was the most severely fortified of these. The three divisions of VIII Corps, the 2nd Division, the 29th Division,

and the 8th Division, under Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, were assigned the reduction of this German-held French port. On September 5 they became a part of the newly activated Ninth United States Army under Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, as part of the 12th Army Group.

It had been hoped that a quick campaign might result in the seizure of Brest Harbor lying in the protected estuary of the Landerneau River. Magnificent port facilities and a natural breakwater with fortified docks made the objective highly desirable. Supply lines were growing longer and more tenuous along the Allied front following the retreating enemy. Allied columns in Europe stretched out to ever greater length while the Germans rallied and fought fiercely to protect their shortening supply routes.

Dieppe and LeHavre were put into operating condition after the elimination of the German divisions bottled up in those two ports. Brest, on the other hand, was too heavily defended. The city and harbor had to be literally pounded to pieces before the Germans would give up, and the damage was too heavy to justify immediate reconstruction.

Brest had played a role in the 2nd Division's history in World War I. Many units of the AEF including elements of the 2nd Division had debarked there in 1917. Many more used it as a port of embarkation for the trip returning home. The principal square in the old part of the city had been renamed the Place de President Wilson. A monument had been erected there on the south wall of the city commemorating the valor of the American soldier and his part in World War I. Division Artillery knocked it down, as it did most other monuments in the city before the Germans gave up their fanatical defense, but that is another story. Now the city was a German stronghold as elaborately defended as any to be encountered on the Continent.

After the breakthrough west of St. Lo the pressure upon the German forces in Brittany had been increased as had that in Normandy. With the rapid advance of Allied troops across the base of the Breton Peninsula, armored units and their accompanying infantry fanning out to seize or contain the vital ports had compressed the Germans back into the tip of the peninsula.

German resistance to the armored drive had been spotty and erratic, as most of the crack troops of the Wehrmacht in the area had been withdrawn to bolster the crumbling front in Normandy. The German strategy now consisted largely of retiring within the port cities and establishing a perimeter defense to hold as long as possible.

On August 6 units of the 6th Armored Division had engaged German forces to the east and north of the city and forced them back into the outskirts of the city. To the west, other patrols had compressed scattered enemy parols back toward Le Conquet and St. Renan. To the southeast of the city the enemy had been driven into the Daoulas and Crozan Peninsulas where they were lightly contained by armored and cavalry units and by groups of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, none of regimental status. These were augmented subsequently by the arrival of the 8th Infantry Division in the area.

The defense of Brest and its surrounding area had fallen to Maj. Gen. Herman B. von Ramcke. Under his command, he had an estimated 50,000 troops. They varied in quality from the highly trained 2nd Parachute Division, which he had commanded until this time, to civil service workers and postal employees, sketchily uniformed and equipped for action. Many of the units of Von Ramcke's hodgepodge troops were composed of naval and marine personnel from the submarine force and harbor facilities which the Germans had maintained at Brest. His mission was to deny the Americans the port facilities of Brest for at least 90 days, with the added

mission of occupying as many American troops for as long a time as possible, in view of the critical situation rapidly developing in the Fatherland. Every shot fired by the Americans at Brest, the German troops were told, meant one less fired upon the Reich itself. Thus they crawled into their underground tunnels and made the Americans virtually demolish the city, blast virtually every building within the inner wall, before they would surrender.

The Germans, having considered Brest one of the probable invasion ports, had ringed it heavily with antiaircraft and coastal defense guns. These were set up in massive permanent concrete emplacements. The defense of the city was so organized as to take maximum advantage of the existing antiaircraft weapons.

The defense of the city was separated into two commands. In the eastern sector, to the east of the Penfeld river, was contained the Old City, ringed about with an ancient moated wall, constructed by a famed French military engineer named Vauban in the 17th Century. It had never been breached in history when the Nazis took it over. They added certain improvements of their own. They added modern barracks, tunnels, and gun emplacements constructed under and adjacent to the barrier itself. They bored and widened tunnels, strengthened weak points, and furnished electricity and ventilation by generators. They installed concrete bunkers with firing slits. When they had finished the bastion was well-nigh impregnable. When the Division did get through, it was by ingenuity, but that was later.

To the west of the Penfeld the western defense sector contained the sprawling suburb of Recouvrance, almost as large as the inner city itself, and a long chain of coastal defense installations extending out to the tip of the Breton Peninsula.

To the south lay the land-locked harbor, enclosed by the three-pronged promontory of the Crozon Peninsula, a strip of land defended by low-caliber infantry units, including even some Russian units of the German army.

On the east side of the harbor, south of the Landerneau River, lay the Daoulas Peninsula, thrusting into the harbor like an extended wrist and hand with a pointing forefinger. This peninsula was defended by elements of the 266th Infantry Division and naval personnel, with a slight seasoning of parachute shock troops.

The 2nd Division, out of contact with the enemy as the German VII Army struggled in the British-American vise, was officially relieved by British troops on August 17. On August 18 and 19 they made the march to the Breton Peninsula, closing in around Lesnevens to the northeast of Brest, from which point they would attack downward toward the city.

The march was made by motor, utilizing the organic vehicles of the Division and the trucks of attached quartermaster companies. Coming out of shell-blasted, much-fought-over Normandy into Brittany was an experience which made an indelible impression upon the men of the Division. For the



Machine gun crew moving up in the early stages of the siege of Brest.

first part of the journey, the long motor convoy progressed through land which bore the unmistakable marks of combat at every turn. Farms, villages, and even the faces of the people bore all the signs of a titanic struggle. The scenes reminded the men of the country over which they had fought during the past two months. The peculiar devastation and despair of bitterly contested country was everywhere.

Approaching Brittany, the troops came out into pleasant green fields and blue late-summer skies. Even the air seemed different; it was free of the acrid smell of ground that has been fired over, of the reek of burning wood and the stench of destroyed animals. Among the rolling farms lay pleasant villages, waiting to welcome the American soldiers with demonstrations of wild joy.

Little evidence of the struggle rocking Europe had appeared here in the age-old Breton countryside which had been liberated by the rapid dash of General Patton's tanks. Except for patches of bomb damage about railway stations and key road centers, war scarcely seemed to have touched the land at all. The French population turned out en masse and beaming—with a noticeable absence of all males except the young and aged.

Their faces provided as great a contrast to Normandy as their towns, villages and farms. These people could still laugh. They had suffered deprivations, but were able to re-

joice in their release and liberation from the Nazi yoke. Displaying a hysterical jubilation, they thronged every road junction for a glimpse of the American doughboys. They pelted the white-starred vehicles with flowers and apples, and many a man of the Division had occasion to find out how formidable a missile an apple may be when hurled into a moving vehicle.

Each time the long convoy ground to a halt, the people swarmed up over the vehicles, offering wines and liquors, eggs and fruit. The soldiers affably returned the favor with "le bonbon," "le cigaret," and even the much-despised malted milk tablets in the packaged K rations, an item highly prized by the French. It was the first real fun the men had been able to enjoy in weeks, since first they made contact with the enemy. They laughed and joked and cheered as the Bretons swarmed out of farmhouses and villages to embrace the Americans with shouting, tears, and kisses.

It was like a scene from another world, although there were the same neat hedgerowed fields, the houses of weathered masonry, the orchards and sunken winding farm roads, the scattered mellow villages and farms. The men gave themselves over to the enjoyment of a feeling of release.

After an uneventful march so far as contact with the enemy was concerned, made partly under blackout and partly under skies banked with cumulus clouds, the Division closed into its assault area before the grim, foreboding city of Brest. The Corps plan of attack was for all divisions to move in upon the city at one time. The 2nd Division would strike downward from the northeast, the 29th Division from the northwest, and the 8th Division against the center of the line. Artillery was to play a major role.

The Daoulas Peninsula, jutting out to the southeast of the port of Brest and looking down upon the city from across the harbor, had to be cleared in the early stages of the siege, in order to prevent the enemy from using enfilading fire from its ridged promontory upon the Division as it closed in for attack.

A task force composed partly of the 38th Regiment Combat Team and attached and reinforced units set out to reduce Daoulas as the move to break the outer ring of fortifications about the city began. Commanding Task Force B. was Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, assistant commanding general of the 2nd Division. The force assigned by VIII Corps to clear the strip of land included in addition to the 38th Infantry and its supporting artillery units, the 323rd Field Artillery Battalion (Battery C), the 3rd Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, and two companies of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The task force moved forward against Daoulas on August 22 to feel out the enemy's strength and dispositions. Numerous coastal defense and antiaircraft guns were encountered, most of which had been slanted toward the sea, but were mounted with a 360-degree traverse so that they could be turned around to operate against a land attack. The entire peninsula bristled with prepared defenses.

Moving forward to the slopes of Hill 154, which provided the first obstacle, the task force reconnoitered this dominant feature of the terrain while aggressively patrolling to the front. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry was to lead off the attack at 1300 on August 22. The weather was clear, visibility excellent, and morale of the American troops and the enemy troops high. The attack was launched with Companies I and L assaulting the hill, each with a heavy machine gun unit attached. The two advanced beneath a hail of fire from small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars emplaced upon the hill.

L Company, targeted continuously, began to move out of its column of platoons and move up by infiltration, single file. Indian fashion, the infantrymen crouched and crawled forward, taking advantage of such scant cover as the terrain offered, hiding in slight depressions or behind low clumps of brush, sprinting from one small pile of rocks to the next. Using such low-lying cover as the enemy thought not worth clearing away, the men contrived to encircle and surprise the enemy and seize Hill 154, which proved to be the key point to all defenses on the peninsula.

I Company was meeting less resistance; they were pushed over to the right sector of the area before dark, and by concentrating the bulk of fires in the L Company sector and ordering the left-flank assault platoon of that company to move across the road into the open, an envelopment was effected.

The designated group moved forward across the road into a firefight which pinned down the lead assault elements and those trying to aid them. While the bulk of the enemy's

fires were thus concentrated on L Company's moving target, I Company was able to move 400 yards to the right and occupy that sector of the hill, accomplishing their aims almost without attracting any observation by the enemy.

The taking of this hornet's nest, which had strong forward and reverse slope defenses constructed on a north-south line, was now well underway. At dusk two men from L Company equipped themselves with a bazooka and crawled forward to knock out a 75 millimeter self-propelled weapon just outside the double apron of barbed wire. The high velocity weapon had brought L Company to a standstill and prevented assault platoons from reaching their objective. With this weapon eliminated, L Company moved in toward the slopes. One sergeant "requisitioned" a large-bore German gun and ammunition. Strapping the gun to a tree, he fired numerous rounds into the line of eight great enemy pillboxes, causing damage and confusion in the German ranks.

The 3rd Battalion worked until well after midnight consolidating its positions. The attack still had far to go; there was a circular system of trenchworks around the base of the hill, another just below the crest. The defenses were protected by at least 25 heavy machine guns and several of those high-velocity, flat-trajectory weapons employed to good advantage by the enemy, as well as rifles and mortars. Individual positions were carefully constructed to give a maximum field of fire, were well-concealed and heavily planked.

The defenders, mainly units of the 266th Infantry Division and naval personnel with a seasoning of tough, fighters from the 2nd Parachute Division, had likewise got a grip upon themselves during the night. A fresh attack was

Nazi prisoners taken as the 2nd Division fought its way in toward Brest. A woman wearing a Red Cross arm band and carrying a kitten walks beside a German officer.



scheduled by the task force for 0800, but enemy reinforcements had arrived upon the reverse slope of the hill during the night. A counterattack in force was staged at 0630 hours.

At 0620, the Battalion CP became aware, through supply details operating to the base of the hill, that the enemy was infiltrating between the two forward companies and the CP itself, with the aim of cutting off and capturing the CP.

Those in the forward command group, about 40 men, seized guns and moved forward to engage the enemy in a sharp firefight. Company I's weapons platoon quickly and correctly sized up the situation: they began to lob mortar shells over into the enemy's assault line from their consolidated positions in the line to the rear, lower on the hill. One platoon of Company K moved in on the right flank, and the 3rd platoon of Company L on the left.

Totally confused, the counterattacking enemy fled to their own rear in wild disorder, leaving 35 of their number as prisoners and 12 dead. The 3rd Battalion coolly resumed its advance in the manner of the day before, infiltrating forward on the hill as individuals, making the most of the scant cover. Often a man was pinned to the ground in one position for hours by the enemy's fire.

On August 23, Company I having slipped forward into position on the hill the night before, encountered prompt and stiff resistance to the front and on both flanks, with all three rifle platoons committed. L Company moved up by infiltration, one man at a time, until both assault platoons were forward. They were quickly pinned down by enemy fire among the loose boulders and sparse vegetation of the hill.

The call went out for tank destroyers and the supporting platoon took over, directing fire at enemy pillboxes now only 450 yards away, forcing the enemy backward under cover. With L Company firmly halted, an assault platoon of K Company swung around to the left flank of I Company and hit the enemy a staggering blow from the flank. The other assault platoon followed, and as they started up the hill they

swung abruptly to the left, hitting the enemy on his other flank.

In the vise thus constructed, a pincer movement was adroitly put into effect. Too late, the enemy tried to reinforce his strongpoints at the top. Outmaneuvered and outflanked, and literally dug out of his pillboxes and tunnelled trenchworks, the enemy drew back. The hill was wrested from his grasp. In retaliation he blew up the bridge at Pte. Ste. Barbe, connecting the tip of Daoulas with the mainland.

The enemy force of 125 which had been manning the reverse slope of the hill attempted to retreat en masse to the second main line of defense at the town of Plougastel. L Company's forward observers brought down in succession eleven battalion volley of time fire upon the enemy. They refused to surrender, and the assault elements moved forward to virtually wipe them out in close fighting with small arms and automatic weapons. Their abandoned defensive positions were readily seized and occupied by the Americans. With enfilading fire from Hill 154, it was not difficult to bring the remainder of the peninsula to terms. The enemy failed to make a comparable stand during the subsequent fighting, which lasted stubbornly all the way to the tip of the peninsula.

On August 23 an enemy pillbox atop Hill 154 was holding up the advance of both attacking companies when the platoon to which S/Sgt. Alvin P. Carey's heavy machine gun section was attached was pinned down by enemy fire from the pillbox, located some 200 yards farther up the hill directly to the front of the lead elements. Sergeant Carey, acting on his own initiative, gathered a number of hand grenades and crawled up the hill, under a hail of machine gun fire, until he encountered a German rifleman whom he shot down at 40 yards. Then he moved on to a point within throwing distance of the pillbox and began tossing grenades. He was hit by enemy fire and fell mortally wounded, but continued to hurl grenades until he hit the opening of the pillbox, scoring a direct hit and killing all the occupants.

He lay in this position until the two companies had advanced and occupied the area. He died of his wounds before his comrades reached him.

Sergeant Carey was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for single-handedly knocking out the pillbox.

Hill 154 was taken by such incidents of daring. It was an infantry operation all the way, without benefit of artillery or air support. Seldom did individual effort on the part of each man taking part count for more or show to better advantage.

The 3rd Battalion received the first Distinguished Unit Citation awarded to the 2nd Division in World War II for this completely successful and hazardous operation. Upon occupation of the hill, it was discovered that it had been not only one of the most formidably massive of the enemy's hideously efficient strongpoints in the area, but an observation point which commanded a panoramic view of the Plougastel

Bailey Bridge, LeRelecq-Kerhoun





Two views of the 17th Century moated wall surrounding the inner city of Brest.

area of the peninsula and of the outskirts and the major part of the city of Brest. Its capture made possible a close cooperation between the infantry and all its heavy supporting weapons in the drive upon the city.

Casualties to the 3rd Battalion were extremely light, while one hundred enemy dead were evacuated by American troops alone, and a large number of wounded were accounted for.

It was due only to the courage, initiative, and cool daring of the infantrymen that the Division's casualties were not large, for the enemy possessed and used to best advantage every terrain feature for defensive fighting. The ingenuity of the infiltrating troops in making use of all available cover and concealment was remarkable. One stabsfeldwebel of the 5th Battery, 811th Naval Antiaircraft Battalion, an observer stationed on Hill 154, said that he could see several villages, parts of the main road from Plougastel to Landerneau, and much of the terrain in all directions, but no troops, vehicles, or movements of any kind.

The defenders knew the Americans were coming. Later, they could even hear them. But so perfect was the maneuver and so carefully was the operation conducted under cover that they could not see the doughboys until they were attacked from the flanks. They did not shoot until assaulted because the Americans provided no targets to shoot at. The Germans could only sit there, alert, within their dugouts waiting in a state of suspense until they were routed. Then they fired and fought viciously, desperate and snarling, but it was too late. Once they got a foothold on the hill, the Americans quickly overpowered the defenders within their concrete walls and trenches, and forced them from the hill.

The 3rd Battalion remained there in the positions they had captured on Hill 154 as the attack was resumed with the 1st Battalion on the right and 2nd Battalion on the left. Here the 57 millimeter guns of the anti-tank company could be used to good advantage for the first time in support of the attack. Emplaced upon the southern slope of Hill 154, the guns delivered fire over the heads of the attacking battalions into the enemy lines, the bulk of it falling in the town of Plougastel.

On the right, the town of La Fresque stiffened its resistance by direct fire from 20 millimeter guns and mortars and artillery. In a two-day battle beginning August 26, a company of the 1st Battalion systematically reduced the settlement there and bagged 147 prisoners.

On the left, the 2nd Battalion encountered a similar pitched fight for Lesquivit. However, with the fall of La Fresque and Lesquivit the last real stationary defenses of the enemy seemed to have been broken. The mopping up of the peninsula, even the strong pockets of resistance at the town of Plougastel, was accomplished without exceedingly heavy fighting.

On August 30, the peninsula was pronounced cleared of its last scattered resistance. More than 3000 prisoners were taken, with an estimated 3,900 enemy troops on the peninsula when the operation started. Fifty great, ugly antiaircraft and coastal guns ranging up to 120 millimeters in size were captured, reducing by that number the array of weapons which could be turned upon the Division from the prepared defenses of Fortress Brest.

The 38th Infantry was now able to rejoin the 2nd Division on August 31 to continue the pressure toward the city proper. It had the sector nearest Daoulas north of the Landerneau River. Other elements of the Division were now fighting their way inward toward the city proper through its system of monumental fortified strongpoints—antiaircraft positions, old forts and earthworks, communication trenches, machine gun emplacements, and steel-reinforced concrete bunkers arranged in a perimeter defense with aprons of barbed wire and minefields. To the south of the Guipavas-Gouesnou Highway lay heavy flak positions, concrete bunkers and trenches, camouflaged weapons emplacements, wire and minefields protecting Brest Airdrome. In the west the line was anchored firmly to the emplacements in Bourg-Neuf and Fourneuf and along the Fourneuf Ridge. The area before these positions had been cleared to provide the maximum field of fire in all directions.

From August 20 through 24 the 2nd and 29th Infantry Divisions closed into this attack area with the task force



One of the concrete bunkers occupied by German paratroopers at Brest.

clamorous opposition to every attempt of the infantry to advance, and held firmly to their prepared main line of resistance.

At 0800 hours on August 28 the attack jumped off without artillery preparation while the enemy grimly covered every gap in the hedgerows from their defenses, echeloned in depth and well protected by their pillboxes, casements, and dugouts with firing slits cut at ground level.

Pinpoint artillery fire and mortars failed to dislodge the Germans, or to silence their deadly fire across the area of advance. They had cut fire lanes in all directions to their front and had established tracks of fire two and three fields deep and often interlocking. Any movement to the front set off a hail of fire.

Company A of the 9th Infantry was in position in the center of the Regimental sector 500 yards north of the fortified village of Kermao when the 1st Battalion of the 9th attacked. The group of buildings there had seemed to house a core of the enemy's first line of resistance dug in south of Brest Airfield.

This company was on the left, in charge of Capt. Cameron A. Clough. It had received heavy replacements and few of them knew how to use the bangalore torpedoes, flamethrowers, and pole and satchel charges which were vital weapons in this type of warfare. The attack seemed to be stalemated from the first. Morale was low; each man had to be placed in his position and told what to do and how.

To start the attack, Captain Clough called for a flamethrower to fire into the embrasures of an enemy machine gun emplacement in the next hedgerow. No man was left with experience in using that weapon; Capt. Clough strapped the flamethrower to his back, organized his fires to keep the enemy down as much as possible, and set out fearlessly across

the open field alone. He charged the emplacement single-handed and destroyed it completely, enabling his company to reach the line of resistance and push ahead, outflanking the positions which held up companies on either side.

Pushing ahead through the line which had stood persistent artillery bombardment for three days, his company advanced and seized the town of Kermao 600 yards away. With 96 men left, the company was ordered to hold.

At 1800 hours an American light tank inscribed with the swastika advanced up the road to the southwest, firing as it came. No antitank ammunition was available. Captain Clough directed four men in dragging up a captured 37 millimeter gun into position. The gun had no sight: the chances of hitting a moving target before complete exposure of the position were almost nonexistent. Captain Clough ordered his men to cover and routed the captured American tank by firing the captured German gun.

The enemy's methods of counterattack were well known, and he was certain to counterattack at Kermao. While organizing the all-around defense which his forward position demanded, Captain Clough was struck in the eye and shoulder by fragments of a hand grenade. He permanently lost sight of one eye. Although temporarily blinded, he refused to be evacuated with his company in its precarious position.

At 1900 hours the counterattack was launched between Company A and the 23rd Infantry on the left. A German patrol penetrated behind the Battalion CP and staged another smaller counterattack at the same time upon the Battalion's right flank.

"Refusing to be evacuated, he furiously led his men in a vicious assault," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads, "successfully repelling the counterattack. By his valorous devotion to duty, personal bravery and inspiring leadership, Captain Clough exemplified the highest traditions of the Armed Forces."

Company B, meanwhile, was twice repulsed with heavy losses. At 1500 hours on August 28, Lt. Col. H. K. Wesson, the 1st Battalion commander, moved forward to that company's sector and found its commanding officer severely wounded. A moment later his own S-3, who had accompanied him, was made a casualty. The situation was serious.

Of three rifle platoons that had been committed, one officer and 45 men now remained. As in other parts of the line, some of these were recent replacements. The men were exhausted and dispirited, disorganized by loss of their commander and apparently incapable of further effort. In the fields to which they now carried the attack, there could be no crawling back, and Company A was pushing forward in the sector to the right with an exposed right flank.

With utter disregard for his own life, and great concern for his battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Wesson walked back and forth among the company, past the deadly gaps in the hedgerows, reassuring the men and exhorting them, setting an example of cool fearlessness.

Reorganizing the battered, weary remnants of the group into two assault platoons, he prepared to move forward to bring the company abreast of other units of the battalion and at the same time to eliminate the strong point impeding their progress. A captured American tank wearing a swastika lumbered up and fired at him, but he paid no attention to it. Calling for a mortar barrage directly upon the next hedgerow to the front, he personally led the troops over one hedgerow and across a bullet-flayed field. Inspired by his exemplary courage, the men swarmed across the hedgerow and the intervening field with fixed bayonets.

When they reached the hedgerow a desperate hand grenade battle ensued. Lieutenant Colonel Wesson, first to reach the enemy dugouts, hurled the first three grenades and knocked out the first position, blowing the machine gun nest to bits. 14 of the enemy came out with hands above their heads.

Lieutenant Colonel Wesson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in one of the hardest battles fought at Brest. "The momentum of the vicious assault," his citation reads, "under the gallant leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Wesson, carried the company forward to its objective, thus completing the battalion breakthrough and ultimately leading to a disastrous defeat of the 7th German Parachute Regiment in this sector."

He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. The gallant officer died of wounds received in Germany in October.

During the three days August 25-28 the 9th Infantry advanced a scant 300 yards south of the airfield, against the heaviest opposition. Locating and destroying the enemy's well-coordinated pillboxes and positions occupied August 27. Some of these positions were small and had to

be flanked by small attacking forces with tank destroyer units for firepower plus pinpoint artillery support. The importance of maintaining heavy pressure against the enemy all along the line was stressed by higher headquarters, and the two regiments fought fiercely.

Squads charged the enemy positions again and again. As the fighting was too close-in for the extensive use of machine guns, the infantrymen often charged with hand grenades, the enemy reciprocating with the same weapon due to inability to depress their machine guns sufficiently to bring the attackers under fire. Even under the fiercest hand-to-hand assault the enemy paratroopers clung to their prepared positions and refused to be routed.

Key objective in the 23rd Infantry's sector was Hill 105, long impervious to attack, bristling with strongly manned fortifications up one slope and down the others. The only approach to the hill was defended by a series of well-prepared steel and concrete emplacements known as Battery Domaine.

The entire area was enclosed on three sides by a minefield 50 to 100 yards in depth, with a doublet apron of barbed wire entanglements on either side. The fourth side was a sunken road floored with Tellermines and trip wires, swept by heavy machine gun fire from emplacements in the bunkers.

Three times the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry charged this formidable bastion. Three times it was hurled back, with heavy loss of life on both sides. Then, on the night of August 28, patrols moved forward and succeeded in blasting four holes in the outer wall of its defenses, using pole charges. The fourth attack, a fierce assault on August 29, succeeded in breaching the line and troops swept forward through the thick defending hedgerow, across the sunken road, and into the fortification itself.

Attacking the approaches, Company I surrounded the strongpoint in which only 20 or 30 Germans now remained, fighting a delaying action, after the bulk of the defenders had moved out.

Evacuating German wounded from captured pillbox near Brest



Two assault platoons were well within the evacuated area and had crossed the Guipavas-Brest road which marked the boundary of the enemy's prepared defenses. As the first squad set foot within the first of the concrete bunkers, there was a loud explosion followed by three terrific blasts rocking the countryside for miles around.

Huge chunks of concrete and steel bigger than a man were torn from the emplacements and hurled high into the air. Craters 100 feet wide and as much as 50 feet deep appeared in the earth, and truck-sized boulders smashed the earthen walls of the hedgerows.

Debris fell in areas several hundred yards away. A demolition squad had blown up the first four bunkers with extremely heavy charges of ammunition and explosives cached there when the position became untenable. The defenders had withdrawn to the prepared second line of defense.

Although flying blocks of steel and concrete, some of them two feet square, had inflicted many temporary casualties and others had been caused by sheer concussion, the company commander gathered the remaining 22 men not too stunned to walk and pushed forward for 400 yards before coming to a halt. The 3rd Battalion rushed forward in their wake to secure the approach to bloody Hill 105. The squad which reached the first bunker had been, of course, wiped out. Only two members of that platoon's remaining squads were battle fit. Elsewhere the casualties were largely caused by flying debris and were not serious, although there were many of them.

The 23rd Infantry plus Company C of the 9th Infantry supported by the firing batteries in that sector controlled by Division Artillery now began the bitter task of pushing the enemy back over the hill step by step. Even P-47 planes seemed to have no great effect upon Hill 105: its taking was a heroic effort, with heavy fighting all the way.

Shortly after dusk on the day when Battery Domaine blew up, August 29, Sgt. John J. McVeigh was in charge of a 23rd Infantry heavy machine gun squad attached to a rifle platoon which, exhausted, was digging in for the night after an unflinching all-day attack. The enemy counterattacked suddenly in a barbarous descent, catching one company not yet dug in so that its defensive position, which it was just beginning to assume along a hedgerow, was pushed back and bent momentarily under the heavy fire of small arms and flak guns. The sagging of the line exposed a section of heavy machine guns holding a wide frontage without rifle protection. Enemy riflemen were atop the machine gun positions before the riflemen of the protecting company could rally to meet the head-on attack.

Sergeant McVeigh was fully alert to the danger to his men. Heedless of a tremendous volume of small arms and flak fire, he mounted a hedgerow and directed the quickly converted fire of his men upon the Germans until his position was all but overrun. He then drew his trench knife, his rifle being empty, and charged several of the enemy. In a

savage hand-to-hand encounter, he killed one German, stabbing him to death, and was advancing upon three others when he was shot down and killed by small arms fired at point-blank range.

"Sergeant McVeigh's heroic act allowed the two remaining men in his squad to concentrate their machine gun fire on the attacking enemy, then turn their weapons on the Germans in the road, killing all three," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "Fire from this machine gun and the other weapon of this machine gun section was almost entirely responsible for stopping the enemy assault, and allowed the rifle platoon to which it was attached to reorganize, assume positions on, and hold the ground gained during that day."

By such gallantry was the enemy's will to hold and ability to fight slowly but surely crushed and ground out in the long, hard advance toward Brest. On August 29, with the 9th Infantry still attacking to break the defensive positions around Brest Airfield, a squad assigned the mission of flanking and attacking a machine gun nest behind a hedgerow to knock it out was cornered. The squad, in moving to the flank, encountered enemy troops in the opposing hedgerow one field away. The enemy opened fire with machine pistols.

Sgt. Mike S. Rambago, lead scout of the squad, who was walking some five feet ahead of the other men of the party, saw a German concussion grenade come hurling through the air, aimed straight at the head of Sgt. Vernon Woody, acting squad leader.

Without hesitation and with selfless disregard for his own life, Sergeant Rambago leaped to one side and attempted to knock down the grenade, but could not touch it with his hands. It struck his chest and fell to the ground.

"Courageously, he dropped to the ground and smothered the grenade with his helmet to prevent injury to others nearby," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "Although wounded and shocked by the subsequent explosion, he heroically opened fire with his rifle toward the emplacement from which the grenade was thrown."

After aligning their units the two regiments pushed forward on August 29 to take 1,078 prisoners—an indication that the German line was breaking. They represented a heterogeneous mixture of paratroopers, naval personnel, and *volks deutsche* or foreign troops. In the last six days of August the Division moved forward 1800 yards against the stiffest opposition all the way, due in large part to the fortified areas of resistance at Bourg-Neuf and Fourneuf which elements of the Division now came up against.

The operations were conducted with frequently only one hedgerow field between the opposing forces. Territory gained was consolidated quickly. As the enemy was driven back, full use was made of his evacuated emplacements, concrete bunkers, communication trenches, and even barbed wire.

The 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry now found itself against the hard and seemingly unbreakable core of fortifications around the village of Bourg-Neuf. The position

was honeycombed with dug-in emplacements and fire trenches from which the enemy had a commanding view of every foot of the advance, yet could himself remain completely unobserved. The defenders showed a preponderance of paratroopers, fresh and assured troops, arrogant fighters, sworn to defend the position to death.

The enemy's main line of defense lay along a ridge to the village of Fourneuf, dominating the approach and providing the key to the entire sector. Advance elsewhere along the line was impracticable so long as these positions held because their commanding fields of fire rendered attempts to by-pass them useless.

There were pillboxes and heavily reinforced gun emplacements, well camouflaged, all the way to Bourg-Neuf and the Fourneuf ridge. Light machine guns, heavy mortars, and infantry operated in close conjunction. Resistance was not only full strength, it was ably reinforced.

The positions covered excellent fields of fire in three directions and took full advantage of every feature of the terrain. The enemy's outposts were concealed and invisible from hedgerow to hedgerow. Sunken lanes were utilized to provide covered routes of withdrawal and supply for the defending forces, and bloody deathtraps for the attackers.

Without the reduction of these points, the remainder of the line could not advance or even infiltrate without leaving dangerous gaps and exposed flanks, on which the defenders would be certain to concentrate and capitalize. The two towns could be flanked on the east and southeast, but this would be an open invitation to attack on the flank or rear of some units of the Division.

The 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry under Maj. William F. Kernan, was committed on the line to the right of the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry, up against the Bourg-Neuf fortifications, and was held in place by the enemy's foxholes and gun emplacements to the front and the enemy's excellent fields of fire to the north, east, and west; crossfire in three directions covered the approaches to the town. The 3rd Battalion moved out, receiving direct artillery fire from the high ground west of Bourg Neuf and being harassed by devastating fire from mobile guns on trails north of the village. Artillery fire from the same area blanketed the regimental command post.

Attacking on August 30, Major Kernan's 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry made a heroic four-day attack which won it a Presidential Citation for extraordinary valor and devotion to duty. "At a cost of 45 killed and 110 wounded," the Citation reads, "the 3rd Battalion captured the two principal strongholds of the German main line of resistance at Bourg Neuf and Fourneuf, thereby denying further use of positions of great value, positions which formed the pivot of all the German ground and fire organization in this sector."

Early on August 30 an artillery barrage was laid down along the enemy-held ridge. Then, under cover of the artillery, one company drove south toward the enemy positions;

it was assailed by heavy small arms fire, mortar and machine gun fire, making it necessary to bring up and emplace several mobile guns on the Bourg Neuf road. Unsuccessful in the attempt to make a direct assault upon the prepared defenses, the company tried harassing the enemy and attempted to by-pass the village of Bourg Neuf, but was met by mortar, artillery, grenade, and small arms fire.

Next morning it moved forward again to take Fourneuf. This involved advancing over a road guarded heavily by machine gun emplacements. Advance must be made over fortified hedgerows and across fields criss-crossed by deadly fire so arranged that a handful of men with weapons could hold off a large attack in force. Every advantage of position and intricately organized ground fire was utilized to the utmost by the enemy. Two assault platoons scaled a massive hedgerow and were advancing toward the next position when a squad headed by Sgt. Anthony Raimondo was pinned to the field by enemy machine gun fire.

He and two of his men rose from the ground and sprinted directly into the face of the enemy's fire. When they reached a point where enemy guns could not be depressed to bring them within range, they were assaulted with grenades. They in turn fought back with grenades.

Company L gained three hedgerows. Company K and Company I moved off toward Bourg Neuf under direct fire from mortars and automatic weapons, through fields strewn with Tellermines with antipersonnel pressure igniters and "schu" mines laid according to no design or pattern.

One platoon of Company I was completely wiped out in a single bayonet charge. Another charged the same small ancient hedgerowed field five times before it got across.

Smoke was used to screen the advance on Bourg Neuf as the infantry assaulted again and again to overpower their objectives. The enemy's tenacious grip upon that town was loosened only by hand-to-hand fighting from house to house and attic to cellar.

By the night of September 1 every house in Bourg Neuf had been cleared, wrested from the enemy one by one. The bulk of the enemy resistance had been crushed. That night, the Germans, broken and defeated, withdrew from the ground they held near Fourneuf on the ridge. They did not even attempt to evacuate their dead. Patrols at dawn revealed that all survivors had been removed. The enemy failed to make a comparable stand until the inner walls of Brest were reached.

The 3rd Battalion and the 23rd Infantry on the right were able to advance 1000 yards after the withdrawal.

This valiant and highly coordinated fight was, as the Presidential Citation points out, "the product of skillful leadership and relentless fighting. The highest personal bravery and self-sacrifice were demanded of the troops."

On the morning of September 1, Company I was given the mission of assaulting with the right platoon to make a frontal attack, jumping off from a sunken road to the east,



Troops dash across street in Brest after throwing white phosphorous grenades to cover their movement.

crossing an open field, then charging up the exposed terrain for 200 yards to the crest of the ridge. The right platoon was led by Tech. Sgt. Archie F. Averitte who divided it into two squads. They reached the nearest pillbox without casualties, then charged with fixed bayonets under a cover of smoke.

They leaped into the position with grenades. The Germans were wiped out in the assault. Then enemy reinforcements moved in by a sunken road.

"He killed three enemy soldiers with his bayonet, fearlessly pressed forward in an endeavor to establish contact with the left assault platoon, and assisted in wiping out several Germans defending an important tunnel leading to the road," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "The next day his body was found surrounded by three of the enemy he had killed single-handedly in a fight to the death." Bodies of 25 German soldiers were evacuated from the area. The platoon was wiped out as a fighting unit for the time being.

L Company, after several vicious encounters, had cleared houses and hedgerows to come up against a field zeroed in by fire. A barrage of 105-mm. artillery was laid down upon the enemy positions when one platoon leader brought his 14 remaining men into line along a hedgerow.

As the last shell fell, they dashed forward. An artillery observer and three of his men fell under the answering fire of enemy mortars. Four men of the platoon fell. The others struggled forward in line of skirmish. Only the officers and two men got through, but they built up a point of fire. By night a line with four machine guns in place had been built up from that point.

The smashing of Bourg Neuf and the withdrawal from Fourneuf served to breach the enemy main line of defense.

Although counterattacks restored some positions in part, it was a matter now of slow, painstaking advance before the fortified Old Wall was reached.

The 23rd Infantry waged a hand-to-hand and hedgerow to hedgerow fight to gain some 800 yards on August 30 and repulsed several counterattacks of platoon strength.

On August 31 the enemy line ran roughly from the Landerneau River through LeRelecq-Kerhuon, Lavallot, Creach Burguy, and Fourneuf. The enemy had maintained these positions through heavy concentrations of artillery, tank destroyer, and mortar fire thrown at them by the Division. Pyrotechnie de St. Nicholas had been evacuated to the northwest through LeRelecq-Kerhuon, which was heavily mined by the crack 2 Parachute Engineers. Much information, concerning minefields in particular, was available from the FFI groups who had helped contain the Germans in the peninsula prior to the arrival of VIII Corps.

About this perimeter of the city, as on Daoulas, some particularly diabolical contrivances were noted, frequently in concentrated nests. Charges ranging in size from one-quarter pound to 300 pounds were used. Some were fashioned of torpedo heads and antisubmarine mines rigged up with electrical and mechanical firing devices. Others were French 75-millimeter artillery shells with pressure igniters dug into the shoulders of the roads and approaches. Marine explosives were used lavishly; they were convenient because of the naval arsenal which had been located at Pyrotechnie de St. Nicholas.

The familiar Tellermine and S-mine were found in enormous quantities. Twice road junctions were found mined with charges of a ton in weight. Old defensive positions were death-traps with trip wires concealed by the overgrowing grass. The engineers and the mine platoons had the task of

pulling and dismantling some of the most disagreeable concentrations of explosives on the continent of Europe.

On September 1, last of the three days of heavy fighting for Bourg-Neuf and Fourneuf, the enemy's main line of resistance was broken. By the close of that day, the bulk of the enemy's resistance in that sector, and accordingly in the outer ring of fortifications around Brest, had been crushed.

"The victory was the product of skillful leadership and relentless fighting," the 3rd Battalion's Presidential Citation reads. "The highest personal bravery and self-sacrifice were exacted of the troops. The price was paid in the case of one platoon to the extent of almost 100 per cent casualties. . . .

"The 3rd Battalion's repeated and relentless assaults dealt a lasting blow to the morale of the enemy who failed to make a comparable stand until they were within the heavily fortified lines at the Old Wall of the City of Brest."

The 9th Infantry line advanced from 200 to 800 yards that day through the enemy's fortified line, and the 23rd Infantry advanced 800 yards toward Hill 105, advancing behind strong patrols against scattered rifle and artillery fire, encountering numerous mines and booby traps. The 38th Infantry attacked to secure a line of departure for its attack toward Brest, moving in from Plougastel.

Counterattacks partially restored the positions, but the tenacity of the enemy's grasp upon the entire outer perimeter of defense was loosened. Artillery units, which had proved highly instrumental in dislodging the enemy from his prepared entrenchments in Bourg-Neuf and along the Fourneuf ridge, could now displace to exert stronger pressure upon the hills and upon the suburbs of the city itself.

The 2nd Engineer Battalion, which had moved along with the infantry to deactivate the many mines and demolitions on the approaches, now had the additional task of clearing the wreckage and rubble of the enemy's perimeter defense fortifications.

With the fall of Bourg-Neuf on September 1 the outer defenses of Brest, so long impervious to assault, had at last been cracked. The outskirts of the city could be penetrated now, but it would be hard hand-to-hand fighting all the way. Hill 105, which gave a commanding view not only of the outskirts but down into the walled city itself, held out even under the assault of P-47's. Rifleman had to clear the slopes step by step up one side and down the other before Hill 105 was theirs.

On September 2 the 23rd Infantry attacked. One company, with great skill and considerable good luck, assaulted a strong-point where 50 to 60 Germans were holding out in well-entrenched positions to block all prospects of advance upon the hill. With mortar fire they blasted a flak-gun which was causing the delay and charged into the pitted sunken road positions with fixed bayonets and hand grenades, destroying machine guns and forcing the Nazis from their trenches.

With Hill 105 secured, other hills and high ground along the same ridgeline of the terrain, including Hills 100 and 90

and the town of St. Marc, were seized and secured in a veritable avalanche of destruction. When the men took up positions on Hills 105 and 100 they could see down into the heart of the city. As soon as the riflemen secured the slopes by direct and brutal frontal assault, the tanks and tank destroyers could move in, stabbing at other positions on the hills and in the outskirts of Brest, while Division Artillery lobbed observed fire and high explosives onto the ridges and into the outskirts of the city. They also fired smoke shells to mark targets for the fighter bombers which were then doing a magnificent job of close support bombing and strafing.

The steamroller was underway at last. Taking Hill 90, the enemy's second main line of defense, the 23rd Infantry moved on into the town of St. Marc with great rapidity, hard on the heels of the retreating Germans who abandoned their installations and command posts intact. Final victory, however still lay beyond a maze of thickly defended suburban streets and fortified buildings. Each building became a separate center of resistance in itself. Too, the streets of the outlying towns and suburbs were now so filled with rubble from the bombardment and artillery attacks that the debris had to be attacked first with bulldozers, last with brooms. Inside the city wall the wreckage proved to be even more fearful; virtually every street was impassible, rubbish lay in mounds fifteen feet high, and in some streets even a D-7 bulldozer had no effect upon the accumulation of wrecked masonry.


The parachute battalion which had originally formed the backbone of the defenses facing the Division were by now depleted by their heavy losses and replacements from troops within the city walls were being sent out to the front. Large unit organization had disappeared and the enemy fought in battle groups usually designated by the name of the commander.

On September 5 the 2nd Division officially became a part of the newly activated Ninth United States Army. The siege entered a brief softening-up period while the XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter bombers carried out missions over the suburbs of the city and Division Artillery and its attached units fired incessantly upon known and suspected enemy positions. Gun emplacements and bunkers were reduced by three-inch tank destroyer guns while 155 millimeter guns and mortars poured destruction into the city.

During this time loudspeakers gave instructions across the front as to how the Germans should approach the front line and surrender. Safe conduct leaflets were fired behind the lines. General Middleton called upon General Von Ramcke to surrender his garrison and save the endless destruction of his troops, but the German general declined. The rigid discipline of the Paratroopers over the garrison and the constant threat for those who tried to surrender, prevented any large-scale offer by German troops to give themselves up.

Once more the Division prepared to move forward, this time inward through the outskirts of the city directly toward the old wall.

THE FALL OF BREST



On September 8 the drive was renewed by the 23rd and 38th Infantry Regiments. That morning 72 planes of the XIX TAC flew six missions against enemy strongpoints and Division Artillery pounded the Germans with 27 missions, expending 647 rounds of ammunition, prior to an attack by the 38th Infantry toward the enemy main line of defense on Hill 90 and the prepared positions which the Germans occupied there after being driven from Hill 105.

The 23rd Infantry moved southwest from Hill 90 toward St. Marc, the largest town, with the exception of Brest, still in enemy hands. There the first of the house-to-house fighting began. It continued until the old wall of the city was reached. Two battalions moved in upon the town on the left and right of the zone and as darkness closed succeeded in setting up positions for the night. Water in the area had been contaminated by the retreating enemy. Meanwhile prisoners reported that the water system in Brest had been knocked out, and that all electricity was off except in General Von Ramcke's headquarters and the hospitals.

The 38th Infantry, on the right of the Division zone, moved off at 0900 hours with two battalions abreast and by the close of day had fought its way up to the outskirts of Brest. The 23rd Infantry, attacking with three battalions, occupied Hill 90 and moved on toward St. Marc. During the period Divi-

sion Artillery fired 181 missions and expended 7,380 rounds of ammunition. Thirteen missions were flown by the XIX Tactical Air Corps employing 156 planes against specific gun positions and fortifications behind the enemy lines.

By now the outer fringe of the defenses of Brest had been reduced. The first chain of strongpoints about the city had been pierced, penetrated, overrun, and finally overthrown completely.

The Division had taken 4,753 prisoners in the Brest campaign to date, including more than 400 officers of the Wehrmacht. A vast amount of materiel abandoned by the enemy in his retreat inside the city was gathered by salvage crews.

The enemy had heavily mined all the approaches, roads, areas, buildings, and possible bivouac grounds. Platoons of the 2nd Engineer Battalion moved up with the lead elements of the infantry and deactivated scores of mines and demolition charges. Several metal and wooden ramps captured by the Division were constructed to fire from one to four projectiles by an electrical charge. The mechanism was called a "DO" projectile by the troops, a Wurfgerate by prisoners of war. It fired high explosive rocket shells of 28 centimeters or oil-filled 32 centimeter missiles. Some landed in the 38th Infantry sector. Despite a range of 1400 to 1900 meters the odd weapons proved ineffective because of hit-or-miss accuracy:



A portion of Brest's 17th Century city wall and moat which the Germans modernized with pill boxes and gun emplacements.



Tank destroyers were used to blast through the buildings used as strongpoints by the enemy in the outskirts of Brest.

the only means of adjusting its range was by changing the inclination of the ramp.

On the night of September 9 Division Artillery fired 4,825 rounds, then laid down preparatory fires for the 38th Infantry Regiment which advanced fully 800 yards in the first day's operations devoted entirely to house-to-house fighting. The path of the 23rd Infantry was equally stiff, lying through St. Marc to the railway station, then to the city walls. The route all the way passed through streets that were organized as death-traps.

The 38th Infantry passed through Hill 100's anti-tank ditches and antiaircraft gun emplacements and on through Le Bot, where Regiment set up its headquarters in a maze of underground shelters. The 23rd Infantry advanced through the southern part of St. Marc, taking a hospital and a fort in their line of advance. Prisoners taken represented a mixture of naval, German Air Force, paratroop, and civilian personnel fighting as infantry.

Conventional methods of assaulting a house through the doorway and clearing it of snipers were quickly abandoned. The method adopted was to blast the walls straight through the middle of the block to the next street, affording cover to the assault groups which followed close upon the heels of the demolition squads. One platoon leader told how a squad trying to reach and destroy an enemy strongpoint blasted their way through the walls of seven different buildings, in one side and out the other, before reaching their objective. This method saved countless lives in the advance, for to venture into the open street was almost certain death.

Squads also entered buildings from the roof and worked their way down; coming up, the assault groups provided too good a target for showers of hand grenades and rifle fire from the upper stories.

Direct fire from the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion emplaced in the front lines knocked out many of the known strongpoints while the men of the 2nd Engineer Battalion

punched holes through the walls, bored their way through the buildings, and pushed through the piles of rubble and debris spilling out into the empty streets from hollow shells of buildings.

Surrounding the enemy's innumerable well-prepared strongpoints, outflanking him at every turn, working their way from block to block and house to house, the infantrymen pushed on. Sometimes knocking out machine gun nests from upper floor windows, sometimes engaging in grenade fights on the stairways of deserted houses, sometimes firing from dugouts and basements, designating targets for the tank destroyers to blast while they kept to the shelter of the gutted buildings, they continued the slow march from cover to cover, hemmed in by the death-dealing crossfire in the streets as they fought a barbarous enemy hand to hand.

Tenacious house-to-house fighting by the enemy before the city wall made September 11 one of the most difficult days of the campaign, although little actual progress was made. Each building and street presented a separate problem in reduction. All known methods of close-in fighting were employed before the day was over. The enemy gave up only after every conceivable method of resistance had been exploited and had failed. Typical of the resistance offered was that which elements of the 23rd Infantry had come up against the night before in a cemetery on the south edge of St. Marc. The Germans had set up dugouts and machine guns for crossfire on either side of the cemetery, some of them protected by the heavy ornate French vaults and tombstones with their filigree iron crosses and weeping figures.

One company maneuvered around this spot for hours, then wormed its way through a hole in the wall. Lead elements were forced back by crossfire, and tall buildings on each side had to be reduced before this strongpoint was cleaned out.

The 2nd Division and the 29th Division, on the flanks of the 8th Division, pinched out the latter in the advance converging on Brest. The 8th Division was sent around to the



The empty, death-like streets of the outskirts of Brest were swept by enemy fire

Crozon Peninsula to take that important objective and occupy it, reducing its bristling fortifications and neutralizing the threat of its heavy-caliber guns.

On September 11 the 9th Infantry was to relieve the elements of the 8th Infantry Division in the sector to the north of Brest. Leaving Gouesnou where they had been in reserve, the troops moved forward into an assembly area in the suburban district of Kerleger, Lambezellec, and Mesmerian, next day completing the relief of the 13th and 121st Infantry Regiments during the hours of darkness, and setting up the command post at Lambezellec on the outskirts of the city near the Penfeld River.

The 38th Infantry continued to maintain pressure on the enemy through the city streets with one battalion. Another was halted temporarily by an enemy strongpoint in the vicinity of St. Martin's Church. Some elements of the 23rd Infantry were still engaged around the cemetery in St. Marc. Others attacking toward the city wall came under heavy fire from the enemy inside the wall. The western edge of the town was cleared up to the Brest wall.

Through the next two days the clearing of the suburbs proceeded at a snail's pace. The 23rd Infantry used three-inch towed and self-propelled antitank guns, 155 millimeter self-propelled guns, and pole-and-satchel charges of TNT to blast its way through buildings, enemy installations, stone walls, and a variety of other obstacles. The 38th Infantry fought within grenade-throwing distance of the heavily forti-

fied area around the church. Enemy artillery and bombardment by the big naval guns turned inland continued to be heavy. Many fires were burning now in Brest. They lighted the scene at night. Division Artillery fired ceaselessly on harassing missions and in close support. Eight thousand rounds were dropped on the enemy on September 12 and 13, while the TAC planes dropped bombs on designated strongpoints within the city.

General Middleton of VIII Corps sent a message to General Von Ramcke pointing out the futility of further enemy resistance and asking for immediate surrender, but Von Ramcke declined. The Germans now were fighting on the theory that every bomb dropped on Brest was one less for the Fatherland, and that every day's delay kept American troops tied up on a front far from Berlin.

Casualties to the Division on September 12 and 13 were largely from sniper fire. The method of closing in upon the city was planned to save as many lives as possible. German prisoners frequently expressed wonder that the Americans did not close in by a swift and direct frontal assault. This method might have proved effective, but it would have cost American lives. By closing the trap slowly and inexorably, even against the stubborn and obstinate opposition encountered all the way, the objective was reached with a minimum of cost to the Division.

On September 14 the three regiments moved forward abreast once more to close in about the ancient wall of the



Brest looking toward the Penfeld River, with President Wilson Place in the foreground among the shells of buildings.

city, against determined forces. Buildings had to be cleared one at a time, first of troops, then of demolitions, then of booby traps. As in the approaches to the city, the engineers uncovered some fantastic devices. One type included a torpedo charge and several Tellermines all connected by a booster and wired to electrical detonators controlled by a cable leading out into a field some distance away.

The advance was now a macabre dance of death in a doomed city. The streets that were grim deathtraps, swept by machine gun and flak fire from guns set up at street intersections, were empty and silent until a gun cracked, a machine gun chattered, a shell descended and burst. At night parachute flares went up, making the scene even more eerie.

The men of the Division advanced by swarming over fences, up ladders, across improvised catwalks across the rooftops among the chimneypots. They slipped over garden walls and through kitchen doors, or scaled walls and attacked from the roof to the cellar to keep the Nazis from retreating to the top story and showering them with rifle fire and grenades.


By the end of the day of September 14 the wall was at arm's length for elements of the Division as the 23rd Infantry seized the high buildings dominating the railway sector and the 38th Infantry cleared the fortified buildings to its front against heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The 9th Infantry patrolled extensively between its area and the city wall. Blasting from house to house continued on September

15. Heavy machine guns were replaced with lighter ones to give the infantry closer support. Despite the probable lack of food, water, and shelter in the city, the Germans were infiltrating steadily behind the walls and continued to make a determined stand there.

Outside the wall the enemy continued to resist from buildings which had been bombed or burned out and from amidst the piles of rubble. The commanding entrenchments and bunkers with fire along the streets were particularly thick in the St. Marc area where the 23rd Infantry continued to fight from house to house after the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments had driven resistance in their sectors inside the wall to the north.

The city wall with its protecting moat was now the major physical obstacle to the advance. It could not be reduced by infantry alone, tanks could not get through the debris and rubble, the Germans obviously had no thought of surrendering as long as they could hold out behind it. Furthermore, they had sealed all entrances with antitank barricades, antitank guns, and machine guns.

In the 29th Division's sector on the far side of the Penfeld River, the situation was similar. A task force had cleared the St. Renan-Le Conquet area, the last garrison in that region surrendering on September 10. Strongpoints at Hill 103, La Trinite' and Fort du Minou had been reduced in the meanwhile, and the enemy had pulled back to a secondary line of defense.



Brest looked like this before the Germans could be blasted out

Fort Keranroux had fallen after an intense bombardment. The Germans fell back to a line through Fort Du Portzic, St. Pierre, Fort Montboney, an area thick with earthworks, bunkers, and concrete pillboxes. Bombardment and continuous artillery fire reduced the enemy's defenses and threw him into an advanced state of panic and disorder. Defenses in front of the wall in the suburb of Recouvrance collapsed.

On the Crozon Peninsula the German defense was based on a series of small hills across the middle of the strip of land, manned by troops of estimated regimental strength, including Russian personnel. After the 8th Infantry Division's initial attack, the enemy retired rapidly from the commanding ground into the town of Crozon.

Driven from that town, the bulk of the forces pushed on down into the peninsula of Pointe des Espannols, with smaller forces withdrawing into the Chevres and Camaret Peninsulas, necessitating a diversion of part of the attacking force.

The final stage of VIII Corps operations in the Brest area began on September 16 when the 29th Division succeeded in pushing elements into the walled city on the west bank of the Penfeld River. Enemy resistance in the sector was disorganized and the Germans surrendered in large groups. Resistance in the Fort du Portzic area and along the docks and the submarine pens which the Nazis had installed was more firm, and continued throughout the day.

In the 2nd Division's sector to the east bank of the Penfeld River, General Robertson in a letter of instruction on September 15 ordered that "within the limits of ammunition allowance, Division Artillery execute carefully an integrated fire plan to place 24-hour-a-day harassing fire on every position within the old wall of Brest." General Hays, commanding Division Artillery, directed that the fire be shifted continuously within assigned areas to give the maximum surprise and harassing effect. In addition, the infantry regiments would fire 81 millimeter mortars at a rate of one round per minute, and white phosphorus. Shells would be utilized to the maximum on point targets in assigned area, directed especially against the entrances and possible air ducts of the Germans' elaborate system of underground shelters.

On September 16 and 17 this bombardment was continued on a harassing basis as resistance was cleared up to the wall on

the right and in the center of the Division zone while house-to-house fighting continued in the heavily fortified and entrenched railroad area on the left. Fires of the Division's organic field artillery were coordinated so that at least one round of artillery was in the air at every moment. Infantry mortar platoons, chemical and cannon companies blasted away at assigned targets, with emphasis on ventilator systems, water supply points, and known enemy installations. This program continued without let-up until word was received that elements of the 29th Division had penetrated inside the walled city on September 17, when the target area was restricted east of the Penfeld River.

On the morning of September 17 the 2nd Division's sector extended from the harbor, around the wall, and up to the Penfeld River with the 9th Infantry farthest right in the Division zone, bounded on the right flank by the Penfeld River. The 38th Infantry was in contact with the wall in the center of the line, and the 23rd Infantry on the left was up against the installations.

The 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry, assigned the task of reconnoitering the wall in the continued effort of all units to find a means of breaching that obstacle, set out at 1000 hours on September 17 with combat patrols assigned to certain areas. If a patrol got through, it was to be followed by its platoon, then by the company and the battalion in turn.

One combat patrol moved out of the area around Kerele toward Kergoat where it was halted by machine gun fire from an emplacement in the outer wall. A second platoon followed the same route two hours later and used its fire to cover the first platoon while it withdrew from under the enemy's fire. One squad deployed along a hill to the left, one along the bluff bordering the Penfeld River to the right, through the canyon-like formation where the river cut the two steep banks of the outer and inner walls.

During the maneuver seventeen German soldiers walked out of their emplacements in the wall and gave themselves up. They left six machine guns so emplaced as to have full command of the canyon, the hill, and the approach to the bluff.

After this piece of sheer good fortune, fire from a machine gun still swept the canyon and had to be silenced, to prevent the patrol from being cut to pieces. Location of the gun was



Clearing the road to Guipavas



The Brest Wall

Pointe Ste. Barbe Bridge



Street scene: Brest



After the bombardment



Brest Harbor during bombardment

Through the wall at last



Quiet after fury





Inside Brest: Riflemen advance through the debris-strewn streets

finally determined to be a tunnel on the far side of the river. An antitank gun was brought up and fired two rockets straight into the mouth of the tunnel. The firing continued and machine gun bullets swept the corridor.

The company commander called for a grenade launcher. Then he called to the men of the 29th Division stationed across the river to clear their area, as the tunnel was to be blasted. At that, three of the enemy emerged with hands held high above their heads. No doubt they understood the substance of the exchange of shouts across the river. They were promptly sent back to fetch any of their comrades who might be lurking inside. This time more than sixty Germans emerged from the narrow mouth with hands stretched high above their heads. The 175th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Division came forward in its sector on the west side of the river and took the Germans in charge. Miraculously, a path through the wall had been opened and was clear of enemy fire.

Moving swiftly and yet warily, in column of platoons, the company moved up through the gap. Then remaining ele-

ments of the 3rd Battalion closed in. The deeply tunnelled, trench-lined wall disgorged so many Germans eager to surrender that the first platoon was swamped and passed them on to other units.

The Germans had been strongly entrenched, well supplied, and in superior numbers at this point. Why they gave up was never understood, but part of it must have been psychological. Some seemed dazed by the long bombardment and eager to capitulate. At any rate, the walled city could not have held out indefinitely. Brest had been ripe for surrender for some time. It was held back by the presence of grim-faced and fanatical paratroopers who watched the garrison with pistols, alert for signs of giving up.

Previously a one-platoon combat patrol of the 38th Infantry had advanced through a draw near the center of the wall in the Division sector only to be pinned down by fire near the main east gate. Heavy enemy fire prevented reinforcement of this platoon by a second patrol attempting to breach the wall to the south. The cut-off men held out against ferocious counterattacks in force until relieved by elements of the 9th Infantry inside the city at dusk. Next morning, as the 9th Infantry streamed through the breach in the wall on the Penfeld River, the 38th Infantry renewed the attack in the same sector. The defenders, finding themselves face to face with the Americans at both front and back, surrendered eagerly.

The 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry meanwhile staged a diversionary attack. The element of surprise succeeded admirably. The 9th Infantry pushed rapidly through the city against scattered, desultory, and thoroughly alarmed resistance.

A halt had been called in the artillery bombardment to allow the Germans to come forth from their shelters and surrender. After the merciless pounding, the barbarous shriek and clamor of the shells all day and all night, they gladly seized the opportunity.

Shortly after mid-day on September 18, a German parliamentary under a flag of truce approached the American troops in the Rue Emile, to which point they had penetrated in the south part of the city. They requested the commanding officer of the American troops in Brest to meet the German commanding officer in charge. Major Kernan of the 9th Infantry

Colonel Erich Pietzonka, commanding 7th Parachute Regiment and Sector East of Fortress Brest (lower left, back to camera); Major General Walter M. Robertson, and Colonel Chester J. Hirschfelder, commanding 9th Infantry Regiment (right, with goggles on helmet), confer in Place President Wilson, Brest, France, as Col. Pietzonka surrenders his command and the fortress to the 2nd Infantry Division on September 18, 1944.



with a group of five officers went with them to the command post of the 7th Parachute Regiment just off the main square, President Wilson Place. Here they met Col. Erich Pietzonka and his staff, and set a formal time and place for the surrender.

American officers, accompanied by German messengers, took the preliminary terms of surrender to other German headquarters in Brest. At the appointed hour, Colonel Pietzonka, commanding officer of the 7th Parachute Regiment, handed over his pistol to the commanding officer of the 9th Infantry in the public square.

The spit-and-polish of the German garrison, despite the long bombardment, was in sharp contrast to the bedraggled and exhausted appearance of the victorious American troops who had fought their way first through the hedgerows, then through the long days and nights of street fighting, and finally through the city wall.

On September 18 at 1020 hours, enemy resistance west of the Penfeld River ceased with the formal surrender to the 29th Division of General Von Der Mosel and all the forces under his command. The following day enemy resistance on the Crozon Peninsula collapsed and the former commander of the Brest garrison, General Von Ramcke, who had transferred his headquarters and all his activities across the bay before the fall of Brest, gave himself up to the 8th Division. At 2000 hours all resistance on the Crozon Peninsula had ceased. A small pocket of the enemy remained at Audiene on the Douarnenez Peninsula to the south. It was eliminated by a task force on September 20.

Evacuating wounded from German underground hospitals



During the Brest operation 37,382 prisoners were taken by VIII Corps. Of these some 11,000 were captured by the Division. Among the units represented most heavily were the 2nd Parachute Engineer Battalion, the 7th Parachute Regiment, the 2nd Parachute Artillery Regiment, the 2nd Parachute Antitank Battalion, the 851st Infantry Regiment, the 852nd Infantry Regiment, and a variety of naval units.

Fighter bombers operating on an air alert status were utilized by the Division for 97 missions involving 705 aircraft, in addition to the liaison planes of Division Artillery which flew observation missions. So close was the coordination between air and ground forces in the siege of Brest that planes bombed and strafed hedgerows and enemy strongpoints sometimes only two fields away from the front lines of the infantry.

The Division expended 1,758,000 rounds of small arms at Brest and 218,000 rounds of larger caliber ammunition. The fighter bombers dropped 360 tons of bombs on their 97 missions, not including aircraft directed through Air Support parties of other units operating in the area, or medium and heavy bombers.

During the Brest campaign the Division's entire advance was over a distance of only about eight miles or an average of one mile every three days. However, the first part of the advance was through heavily fortified hedgerows and fields crossed by fire, and the last part, approximately two and one-half miles, through a built-up metropolitan area where buildings had been converted into strongpoints all the way.

The fighting was deliberate, methodical, and aimed to keep the casualties as low as possible under the severe nature of the

One of the diabolical booby trap mines found at Brest



opposition encountered all the way; even so, the 2nd Division was in the Brest area only a little longer than a month.

As an exploit perfectly planned and executed, the reduction of Brest remains one of the high points in 2nd Division history. The defense of the fortress was as elaborate and expertly carried out as any encountered. General Von Ramcke and his parachute troops made every effort to hold the city as long as possible, carrying out their avowed intention of holding out to the bitter end. The fact that the end came in twenty-one days, not ninety, was due to the skill and determination of the operation carried out by the 2nd Division and its terrific artillery and supporting air bombardments, rather than to any weakness of the defenders, who were supplied for a much longer siege and had paratroop officers and non-commissioned officers who would not hesitate to shoot those seeking to give up either themselves or the fortress.

After the surrender of Fortress Brest on September 18, the Division moved into an assembly area between Guipavas and Landerneau where it remained from September 19 through 26. During this time men of the 2nd enjoyed a much-needed period of rest and rehabilitation; vehicles and equipment received their share of maintenance and repair.

A subtle change was felt immediately upon the city's fall. With the elimination of the enemy on the peninsula the blackout could be lifted. The Division could use lights at night for the first time since the departure from New York Harbor on October 7, 1943—almost a year of cautious darkness.

Too, the men could remove their heavy steel outer helmets for the first time since the landing on Omaha Beach. Being able to move about freely without their "tin hats" gave the men, literally, a light-headed feeling. Passes were issued to the nearby towns and villages where it was not now necessary to wear arms, a remarkable sensation in itself after some three and one-half months of being constantly armed.

In the clear, crisp days of early autumn, cries of "Batter up!" resounded through the air, now suddenly grown silent with the cessation of the big guns. Volleyball was second in favor as the special services officer broke out the athletic equipment. Movies, special shows, and indoor entertainment ran a slight second to athletics in popularity.

There were organized tours in trucks through the shell of what had once been a great European city, now reduced to a rubble heap by the fearful pounding it had taken due to the German orders to "hold out." German canteens were well-stocked for a longer siege, and stores of wines and liquors were plentiful. The elaborate tunnelled underground hospitals were well-stocked with medical supplies.

The batteries were somewhat awed by the havoc their guns had wrought, yet so fantastically were the Germans entrenched that it was not surprising that they had been able to hold out as long as they did under the bombardment.

From September 27 through 30, the Division was once more on the move. This time it made its longest march for change of front, through some 700 miles of recently liberated North France, northward to the Belgian-German border and the Siegfried Line.

Part of the Division made the journey in a motor convoy, travelling for part of the way over the Red Ball Highway, the famed supply route to the Allied front.

Other elements of the Division went by French railway boxcars similar to the immortal Forty-and-Eight boxcars of

the first World War. They did not seem to have changed materially since the first time the Division fought in France, except for the absence of the horses.

Those who travelled with the motor convoy had a fleeting glimpse of the outskirts of Paris en route to their destination. Those who went by rail became intimately acquainted with innumerable French railway yards.

In the last days of September and the first days of October, the Division closed into an assembly area in the vicinity of the town of St. Vith on the Belgian-German border. Bivouacing in the dense and lonely Ardennes Forest, the men now had their first glimpse of the vaunted Siegfried Line.

On October 4, after a lapse of 25 years, troops of the 2nd Division again set foot on German soil.

The following letter of commendation was received from Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commanding VIII Corps, the day following the surrender of Fortress Brest:

"To: All Officers and Enlisted Men Who Formed a Part of VIII Corps.

"In the capture of Brest and adjacent territory by the officers and enlisted men who form a part of VIII Corps, a chapter in history is made. By the elimination of approximately forty thousand troops from the German Army, our future task has been made easier. By securing Brest, an important Atlantic seaport is made available to the Allies.

"To single out the achievements of one unit in the task which has just ended would be difficult. The performance of all units has been magnificent. There has been no shirking of duty or responsibility. Each organization has shared in the undertaking. In the 2nd Parachute Division of the German Army, you met the best. You will meet no better troops in your future battles. We are better soldiers today than when we entered this engagement because of the fact that we have met and eliminated the best Germany has to offer.

"We have paid the price in casualties for the job we have done. Many of our comrades have died in the struggle for Brest, in order that we who live can share in the satisfaction that the job has been well done. We regret their passing—it is the fortune of war that they should die while we carry the torch to other battlefields.

"I desire to take this means of thanking all who have shared in this campaign for their fine work. It has been a privilege to command and work with you. Each officer and enlisted man should take pride in the fact that, as a result of your work before Brest, three German divisions and many other German troops have been erased from the troop list of World War II.

"Troy H. Middleton

"Major General, U. S. Army
"Commanding."

General Robertson endorsed this letter forward to his regimental and battalion commanders, unit commanders, company commanders, and commanders of attached units as follows:

"Forwarded to each unit and individual of the 2nd Infantry Division with just pride in your part in this historic achievement and renewed confidence in our ability to gain new victories ahead.


"W. M. Robertson

"Major General, U. S. Army
"Commanding."

B E L G I U M

CHAPTER X

S T. V I T H



During the first four days of October the 2nd Division moved in by infiltration to take up a 3400-yard front along the Belgian-German border in the Ardennes Forest. It occupied this sector from October 4, when it assumed responsibility, through December 12.

The Division was assigned the mission of holding the Belgian border and two salients into German territory made by a previous penetration of the Siegfried Line by American troops in September. The front was long, tenuous, and thinly held, a constant threat of hostile attack and penetration.

To the men of the Division, the change meant first a tran-

sition to a new type of combat. The sector was one of dense conifer forests, steep hills and sharp gullies, and extremely rough terrain. There were no more hedgerows, rolling orchards, and sunken farm roads.

Quickly the men settled down to solidify their positions, train replacements, and feel out the enemy strength and dispositions. They set about constructing shelters and entrenchments against the autumn rains and the coming cold weather.

Enemy action was comparatively light in the sector at this time. The Hun, however, was always dangerous and disagreeable, wherever he was encountered. Here the enemy positions lay along the border in a row of pillboxes part of



German gun position in the Schnee Eifel

which were held by the Division. The men of the Division soon discovered that in many ways a "quiet" sector could be as nerve-wracking as a "busy" one.

The task of keeping the enemy at a stalemate on a 30 kilometer front was no dull and routine assignment: it represented one of the important tasks assigned to VIII Corps by the Ninth Army at this time.


Combat elements of the Division were committed for the most part on German soil. It was a solemn moment when the 2nd Division once more set foot in German territory to

occupy positions against the enemy. Never more keenly had the men felt the justice of the cause which brought them twice in a quarter of a century to storm the strongholds of the German nation.

Other elements of the Division were committed in the Belgian district of Malmedy, which had been German territory prior to 1919 and was still somewhat pro-German, if not pro-Nazi, in its sympathy and loyalty. This involved an increase in the importance of security measures for the Division, and a new emphasis on counterintelligence. Especially was this true in view of the fact that the Germans had left behind an undetermined number of their agents in the district when they were forced to pull out some of their best troops for use in Normandy. Other agents had been sent into the area after the Allied troops broke through in the Seine Basin and to Paris. This border sector was a reputed hotbed of espionage activity.

Division Headquarters was first set up in the dense Belgian forest east of the town of St. Vith and later moved into the town. Here the Division had its first luxurious headquarters in Europe—luxurious, that is, to the extent of having running water and steam heat. Other units scattered along the thirty kilometer front made use of villages and farmhouses so far as possible. Houses in this section of the German border were usually provided with bombproof cellars by the inhabitants. Division Artillery also moved its headquarters into St. Vith after the rains of mid-October turned the forest trails into a quaking sea of mud.





*Top: Typical of Schnee Eifel is this well-built dugout in dense German forest.
The Division's "skyline" drive gets a camouflage in the Eifel
Center: Captured German pillboxes formed part of the Division's defense line.*

*Center: In the Schnee Eifel: "longest corduroy road built by an engineer battalion."
Top: Tobruk-type defenses against the rain and cold of winter in the Ardennes.
Bottom: 2d Engineer Battalion convoy on one of the boulevards of Paris.*

This sector of the Belgian-German border was known as the Schnee Eifel, taking the name from a long and densely wooded ridge which constituted part of the Division sector. In order to carry on the offensive elsewhere on the Allied front it had been made a defensive front in an extremely wide sector.

It was here that Von Rundstedt's great winter counter-offensive in the Ardennes struck first, cutting up the thinly held line and breaking through with armor, just five days after the 2nd Division had pulled out of the sector. One day later the counteroffensive struck the 2nd Division in its new sector in the Monschau Forest. St. Vith was the scene of a heroic stand by American armor in the Ardennes fighting later.

During the latter part of September, two salients had been pushed into this portion of the Siegfried Line, one in the Kobscheid area in the Schnee Eifel and the other at Kesfeld.

The German field divisions, engaged in a withdrawal from Northern France, had been considerably disorganized and incapable of manning their defenses properly in this part of the Siegfried line. Emergency measures to protect the Rhineland had taken precedence over the manning of the German-Belgian border at that time.

The Division relieved the American 4th Division and elements of the 28th Division in this sector, officially completing the relief on October 5. It was now one year since the men of the Division had boarded ship in New York Harbor, 120 days since they had waded ashore on Omaha Beach in Normandy.

The Siegfried Line in front of which the Division now took its stand in a defensive position was a continuous line of fortifications running generally adjacent and parallel to the Western border of Germany. It consisted here of a lightly

interlocking line of defenses plus the defensive power of mobile troops. The fortifications of the line itself in this sector included reinforced concrete emplacements and shelters, plus obstacles of concrete, steel, and earth. The emplacements were designed principally for machine guns and light antitank weapons. A few in rear areas were utilized for light field guns. Obstacles were chiefly antitank defenses—concrete dragon's teeth, earth ditches, road blocks.

The depth of the defenses varied with the importance of the area protected. In the Division's sector, known to the Germans as the Eifel, extending roughly from Losheim to Lutzkampen, Germany, defenses were relatively shallow. The area was largely rolling, forested upland, slashed by numerous ravines and valleys, generally unfavorable for the employment of large-scale armored formations.

It was here that the Division settled down to improve its defenses and at the same time keep the Germans in a state of suspense and constant harassment. Foxholes were constructed to provide maximum shelter and comfort for front line troops. Other units improved their acquired positions in evacuated border houses and villages. When the snow fell in November, the Division was quite comfortably housed and "holed in." Morale was good and little illness was recorded.

The water which seeped into foxholes and installations during the long October rains, was one problem. Camouflage, to enable the men to live from day to day under combat conditions and in contact with a well-emplaced enemy, was another. Both were handled successfully as shelters were converted from makeshift "holes in the ground" to cut and cover shelters, kitchen buildings, command posts, and elaborate dug-in installations constructed solidly and with Yankee ingenuity. When the 23rd Infantry Regiment moved its positions back from the former German pillboxes and installations in the Kesfeld breach to tighten the line of defense on the right flank of the Division, the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion and a supporting unit constructed a complete regimental defensive position, including kitchens, cut and cover squad shelters, communication trenches, and gun emplacements.

Tactical and protective wire was laid along the front, but the widely spaced outposts, in scalloped effect along the line, left extensive gaps which could not be covered by fire, and these were sewn with booby traps, antipersonnel mines, and trip flares; patrolling was carried on continuously by the infantry, by Task Force X, composed of tank destroyers and cavalry units, and by the 2nd Reconnaissance Troop.

In St. Vith the Engineer battalion took over and ran a civilian sawmill which cut more than 200,000 board feet of lumber in the Belgian forest for infantry shelter construction, plank roads, and a highway overpass on the main supply route. As the net of unimproved roads in the Division sector became a morass under heavy autumn rains, the battalion took over and ran seven different rock quarries to provide material for their road construction work. They also built roads of mine-tailings, planks, and brush on those thickly timbered

slopes of pines and conifers, to maintain the supply system on the wide and thinly stretched front.

As the Division "burrowed in," stoves were requisitioned, winter clothing and equipment was obtained, overshoes were given out first to those who had to be in the open, and skis and snowshoes were parceled out. Some units shifted their positions as cold weather came down in earnest upon the Schnee Eifel.

Camouflage was a problem both before and after the snow set in. Some 400 yards of supply road lay under direct observation of the enemy's positions and was subject to heavy shelling at any time when vehicles were moving back and forth. The 2nd Engineer Battalion set up a screening of German garnished chicken wire and American netting which screened vehicular activity from enemy terrestrial observation.

Division Artillery anticipated problems of massing fires due to the rugged and deep-gashed terrain, the tall close-growing trees, the defiladed German positions, and the nature of the defense which called for much harassing fire, counterbattery fire, and surprising of patrols and concentrations of troops. Much time and effort was spent trying to knock out the enemy's rocket installations in this area. Hostile mortar fire remained heavy, although intermittent, throughout the period, and artillery bombardment was not infrequent.

Machine gun, mortar, and 105-mm. howitzer fire were employed extensively to keep the enemy in a state of uncertainty, to cope with patrols, and to prevent pressure against or infiltration through the Division front. Division Artillery directed fire upon carefully selected targets and engaged to a more limited extent in harassing and unobserved fire, thus accumulating a reserve of ammunition despite the continuous fire program which the nature of the defense demanded.

Communication was a major problem on this wide and wooded front. The 2nd Signal Company strung its wires overhead. As W-110 did not prove satisfactory, W-143 wire was used and a switching central was installed in the village

The 2nd Division Band entertains the troops at the Division Rest Camp at Vielsalm, Belgium.



of Schonberg. The topography prevented extensive use of FM radio. To overcome this difficulty the artillery battalions used half-rhombic antennae while in St. Vith an SCR-610 radio was mounted in the cupola of a tall building. Division Artillery operated it by remote control. Within the Division line there were German pillboxes vacated by the enemy in September, forty-one of which were blown up when the 23rd Infantry Regiment pulled back its line. Then there were outposts expanded and strengthened into separate islands of defense, involving further problems of contact.

Corps and Division rest areas at Vielsalm, Belgium, and St. Vith were established and men and officers were sent back in rotation for relaxation away from contact with the enemy, hot baths, and entertainment, movies, and music.

Spirits remained high even when cold weather set in and men huddled over their fires, stood guard in falling snow, continuously chopped logs, worked at improving their shelters and dugouts, and patrolled the snowy forests by night, sometimes garbed in long white underwear pulled over their uniforms for camouflage. Some activities were carried on in three countries: Germany, Belgium, and the duchy of Luxembourg. Patrolling was often a strenuous detail, through darkness and snow or rain, up one steep hill and down another, over roads that were a mud-bath.

Along the section of the Siegfried Line confronted by the 2nd Division, the fortified defenses of the Line were now manned by a motley crew. Units hastily formed into battle groups, or Kampfgruppen, had been rushed into the threatened area. There were troops from replacement battalions, Home Guard units, convalescents from field divisions, scattered Luftwaffe and naval personnel. These battle groups, ranging from regimental to company strength, were committed under the control of a division, and were usually sandwiched among regular units of a division.

Controlling a sector from Ormont to Leidenborn, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" opposed the 2nd Division,

USO entertainer in "Madison Square Garden"—2nd Infantry Division rest center at Vielsalm, Belgium.



Music on records on the Siegfried Line

with members of its own 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Deutschland," the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Der Fuehrer," plus a miscellany of the battle groups described above. On the north, the 526th Division, temporarily assigned to a field role, controlled at least one battalion in the Division sector. The strength of all overlapping units in front of the Division when it officially took over on October 5 was estimated at some 8750 men and 30 tanks.

The German defense tactics in the area were typical. It was a system of defense by counterattack. In a breach of positions, the enemy would attack to regain lost ground. This was the mission given the troops in this area. They did stage counterattacks from time to time, but on a limited scale.

Few improvements had been made in the Siegfried Line since 1940 in this area. It was designed for the aggressive type of Hitler warfare, when a holding force had a comparatively minor role. Now, in 1944, the line had to be hastily reinforced with earthworks, shelters, and gun emplacements between the concrete bunkers of the Line, to hold against the advancing Allied Forces from the west. It was now the barrier to the citadel of the Reich.

Where the enemy still held the old fortifications intact, he was busy constructing exterior emplacements and communication trenches, having discovered that concrete pillboxes in themselves were no guarantee against the infiltration of assault detachments. Now, somewhat belatedly in this sector, he was throwing up concertina wire and massive roadblocks, and mining the approaches to gaps. The enemy at this stage patrolled vigorously. Many times enemy patrols penetrated the thinly held 2nd Division line, particularly on the northern flank. Sometimes these patrols were two or three men, sometimes as many as sixty.

Enemy artillery was quite active at the start, dying out to some extent later. Initially the bulk of the fires fell on the southern flank in the area of the Kesfeld breach. Later it



The Infantry's own air force. Mechanic working on artillery observation plane, type L-4.

was fairly well distributed along the Division front. On October 26 an exceptionally heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fell on the northern flank of the long ridge which formed the Schnee Eifel position, more than 1000 rounds falling in less than two hours. Mortar fires were generally moderate with both light and heavy weapons being employed.

Taking full advantage of the relatively stable positions, the enemy constantly shuffled his patchwork forces, endeavoring to form an organization of ordinary battalion, regimental, and divisional units. This apparently hopeless task went on during the entire time the Division occupied the sector, with battle groups merging into other battle groups or being absorbed by them. Some formations vanished completely, others were designated by different names in the effort to make them fit the conventional military pattern. Toward the end of the holding action, replacements were brought in and the German lines began to take on a more natural appearance.

During the night of October 6-7 a patrol of forty men infiltrated to the west of Kobscheid and laid mines along a road before being forced to withdraw. The next afternoon the attack of a force estimated to be one company was directed at the south flank of the Schnee Eifel and was held.

Prisoners taken indicated a shifting of units in the German lines and a few new replacements, confirmed by a raid upon pillboxes on October 8 and another on October 9. On October 9 and 10 a twenty-man patrol attacked the Division's outpost at Grosslangenfeld, withdrawing after it was engaged in a sharp firefight. At the same time, an attack of platoon strength was attempted in the Kesfeld area. This attack proved abortive largely due to an apparent ignorance of the Division's line and dispositions. A prisoner taken indicated that the mission of the attacking group had been to retake four pillboxes occupied by the Division, and that a special assault detachment had been trained for the purpose in a rear area.

The enemy attacked again at Kesfeld on October 11,

striking through a part of the breach there after an artillery preparation. They were thrown back with little difficulty.

After these minor efforts, the enemy engaged in only insignificant patrol activity through October 16, when an enemy combat patrol engaged Division troops at Kobscheid with considerable show of determination. Friendly artillery fire dispersed the patrol and terminated the engagement.

On October 17, prisoners of war confirmed the presence to the front of the Division of the 31 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion and several other new battalions of polyglot description. On October 18 a prisoner identified himself as a member of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, thought to be destroyed in Normandy, but apparently reorganized out of other units. The order of the enemy line was now completely changed, but the 2nd SS Panzer Division had not yet withdrawn all its units. On October 26, a total of nine infantry battalions were known to be engaged.

The enemy sent a force of an estimated 60 men to Lutzkampen, a village from which civilians had been evacuated, on October 29, apparently for the purpose of determining whether or not the place was occupied. After a brief exchange of fire with the Division's outpost there, the detachment withdrew.

On October 30 and 31 only minor patrolling action was undertaken by the enemy. One patrol, near Afst, contrived not only to enter the Division lines, but to cut a telephone wire, lay a number of antipersonnel mines, and post some propaganda leaflets. As the month ended first indications of the presence of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division were noted together with a conglomerate mixture of French, Belgian, Polish, Russian, Austrian, Yugoslav, and Czech troops. Even the once-elite SS troops showed a hybrid mixture now.

The 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments held the Kobscheid salient which now included most of the wooded ridge of the Schnee Eifel. The 23rd occupied the salient near Kesfeld. On the night of November 1 and 2, troops destroyed the concrete bunkers which they occupied in the breach of the Siegfried Line and drew back to a more advantageous prepared position from 1000 to 3000 yards to the rear. Forty-one pillboxes were destroyed in the Siegfried Line during the

A home on the Siegfried Line, Schnee-Eifel, Germany, December, 1944.



early morning and the protective forces left to protect the front until the main body of the Regiment drew back were able to withdraw to the new positions. A company of the 2nd Engineer Battalion destroyed the pillboxes which the Regiment vacated, using some 30 tons of explosives for the operation. Nine other pillboxes in the Siegfried Line were destroyed during the Division's period of occupancy. Explosives for these operations had to be hauled up at night on one-quarter ton trucks and trailers over rough mountain roads.

In the areas facing the two salients held by the Division, the enemy occupied log and earth field fortifications. Work parties were observed at times, digging new entrenchments and fortifications, laying mines and stretching wire. Once a group of Russian prisoners of war taken on the Eastern front escaped to the Division lines while digging ditches for tank traps. They were from the large German prison camp at Schonburg.

Pressure-type mines, Teller mines, potato masher grenades with trip wires attached were reported in the intervening space before the enemy's fortifications. It was obvious that intensive work was being carried on along the enemy's entire front to improve his positions as rapidly as possible. Not all the work was in the front trenches: interrogation of prisoners and aerial photographs indicated a defense being set up extending in depth all the way back to the Rhine River. The enemy was feverishly deepening his Siegfried Wall defenses, from ten to fifteen kilometers in depth, with the bulk of his effort being concentrated on towns and villages which could be fortified into strongpoints.

G-2 reports in early November indicated that the enemy now had a total of 64 Divisions on the Western Front, 14 of which were armored. Fifty-one German divisions were now committed in the line, including the 14 armored units. The reports also revealed that some 10,000 German civilians were being given daily military training in various provisional military camps in Alsace. Training in long-range firing with rifles, use of cover in firing rifles, and firing from moving vehicles were frequent subjects.

Facing the Division now were the 454th Replacement and Training Battalion with a strength of some 440 men including 17-year-olds, men with minor ailments, and one-fourth experienced men released from hospitals after treatment for minor wounds; the 18th Volksgrenadier Division with two regiments brought in from Denmark to replace the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich," and personnel from naval and destroyer units. Minor groups included the 11th German Air Force Battalion the 6th GAF Fortress Battalion the 31st Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, the 668th Replacement Battalion, and the 91st Infantry Airborne Division which had also been wiped out in Normandy and had been hastily reorganized on the Western Front with certain emergency combat units. The 91st Airborne Division was withdrawn by the end of November and the 18th and elements of the 26th Volksgrenadier Divisions furnished the backbone of the enemy



4.2" chemical mortar and crew. White phosphorous shells from these mortars were terror to Heinies.

troops. As these units moved into line patrolling became more brisk and dangerous.

Enemy artillery continued active throughout November, with mortar fire an accurate and troublesome nuisance. The Division likewise continued to fire a daily program of harassing fires as well as interdictory and counterbattery fires and occasional fires on call. On November 11 a tremendous TOT was fired across the German lines to celebrate the anniversary of the enemy's defeat 26 years before.

On November 15, a 15-man patrol which had infiltrated into the Division lines was engaged in a firefight west of Manderfeld and withdrew; this was the first since November 11 when a small patrol approached an outpost and threw 11 grenades while 20 rounds of light mortar were fired in support from the enemy lines. This skirmish was promptly terminated by machine guns.

In most patrol encounters the enemy withdrew without a firefight, as soon as he knew he was discovered. The Schnee Eifel bore the brunt of the interdictory and counterbattery concentrations fired at the Division. Villages to the rear of Task Force X, a group of the Division's supporting units, including tank destroyers, were pounded regularly by harassing fires.

V-weapons soon became commonplace to the man in the line; some 829 bombs and 26 rockets were recorded, most of them on their way to rear areas. 45 crashed near the forward units of the Division, 17 where they could be seen from the front lines. Two minor casualties, plus two damaged trailers, and one truck, were the toll taken by Hitler's vaunted secret weapons.

Prisoners at this stage, many of whom were deserters, included Slovenes, Austrians, Alsations, and Czechs as well as Germans. Impressed laborers occasionally made their way to the Division lines and gave themselves up. Many prisoners were disillusioned, some were still fanatical Nazi idealists, many cherished a hope for Hitler's so-called secret weapons to turn the tide of war.



Dug-in in the Schnee Eifel, a 2nd Division Infantryman writes Christmas cards to the folks at home.

Fall and winter brought low-lying mists as well as quagmire. Units were forced to move about without observation. There were days when the little town of Wascheid, Germany, received a staggering amount of harassing fire, simply because no other targets were in sight. Ammunition allotments were small: 60 to 90 rounds each day. Weaned on invasion quantities of ammunition, batteries set about accumulating "kitties" of ammunition. As a rule, the 15th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions fired in the north half of the Division sector, the 12th and 37th in the south sector. Most missions were given by ground OPS or were unobserved due to the poor visibility.

December found the Division face to face with an estimated strength of the equivalent of seven battalions of the enemy, all now of the Volksgrenadier type. "Volksgrenadier" was the ornate name given to a certain type of troops by Nazi propaganda to foster the impression that this was a "people's war." Units so designated were organized in mid-1944 and after. They differed slightly from the regular infantry division in that they were somewhat smaller in size, had more transportation and automatic weapons, and occasionally one bicycle company per battalion.

In early December much moving about was noted behind the enemy's front lines, but there was little aggressive action. Changes in the daily routine of the troops and deterioration of camouflage were noted, as were the use of the machine pistol instead of the standard infantry rifle and an apparent shortage of light artillery.

On December 4 and 6 local reliefs took place, and were confirmed by aircraft reconnaissance. On December 8 a major relief was begun with armored vehicles while artillery fire was extremely light.

Two days later, on December 10, the 2nd Division was relieved in this sector, its replacement by elements of the 106th infantry Division beginning. The 9th Infantry, with one battalion of the 23rd attached, with the 12th and the 15th Field Artillery Battalions, accompanied by a company of the 2nd Medical Battalion and a company of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, moved out for the march to Camp Elsenborn in Belgium. The remainder of the Division maintained its defensive positions and patrolling activities throughout the day, then on December 11 relinquished the sector held since October 4, to move on to a new front of the war. "Over the ridge" to Elsenborn did not seem far away to the men of the 2nd Division, but within a few days it brought the greatest transition of the war. As the Division moved out of its "quiet sector" to an offensive front and began to attack across the borders of the Reich, Von Rundstedt's great winter counter-offensive broke loose, and the Division made its historic stand at Elsenborn, "the hinge of the Belgian Bulge."

The next mission of the Division would be, at least temporarily, an offensive one. They would attack to the east to secure the Roer River dams, now holding up a great armored breakthrough to the east at the ancient Germanic city of Aachen which had fallen to American troops on October 20. Until that treacherous and stubborn little river, the Roer, was crossed, there could be no great breakthrough into the Rhineland. It was the Division's role to help secure the dams controlling that river so that the armored spearhead could pass through territory over which the Germans otherwise might at any time turn loose a torrential flood.

The 2nd Division, still a part of VIII Corps, passed to the control of the First Army on October 22 together with other units of the Corps. On November 12 Brig. Gen. George P. Hays, commanding Division Artillery, was relieved to return to the United States and assume command of the 10th Mountain Division. Brig. Gen. John H. Hinds became commander of Division Artillery. Col. Ralph W. Zwicker, commanding officer of the 38th Infantry, became chief of staff of the Division, and Lt. Col. Francis H. Boos, regimental executive officer, took over command of the 38th Infantry on December 2.

General Marshall, chief of staff, and General Eisenhower, Allied commander, both visited the Division Headquarters in St. Vith.

A Paris detail was drawn by the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry when it was attached to the Seine Base Section, Command Z, European Theater of Operations, on September 27, 1944. The battalion, considerably envied by other units at that time, was attached to the Seine Base Section for the purpose of furnishing security guards on trains moving for-

ward from the Paris railway yards. This was during the period when French and American renegades were looting cars of supplies of all kinds, with the help of not a few American service men who gave a black name to some operations and caused serious food and fuel shortages developing on the front as a result of their underhanded activities. The detail left Paris for the front on November 10.

The 2nd Reconnaissance Troop was active in a double capacity during the period, holding a wide sector of the front and at the same time patrolling to reduce the effectiveness of German patrols on the front and infiltrating through the gaps in the long, attenuated Division line. Task Force X, including antitank personnel, organized on October 2, was also extremely active, supporting other units of the Division in maintaining the defensive line and patrolling the area between the Division front and the Siegfried Line.

These units seemed to be special targets of enemy patrols and were frequently engaged in sharp firefights with German patrols or with assault parties attempting to infiltrate through the gaps. While "dead spaces" in the American defenses were covered by fire, with weapons placed to bring the thinly held stretches within effective range, the domination and the constant patrolling of the area between the two fronts was expedient in attacking German patrols, securing German prisoners for identification purposes, and setting ambushes. The work of these patrols likewise vastly reduced the effectiveness of German patrols operating against the Division's lines. At the same time these units gave support to the infantry in maintaining an unusually long front.

The Schnee Eifel, despite the fact that a state of defensive warfare was maintained throughout, with only 283 prisoners taken during the entire period and most of these deserters, is not to be underestimated in the Division's combat experiences in Europe. The enemy was always in contact, usually in sight. There were other factors, too, which made it memorable to the men.

Life in the Belgian forest, for the most part in Tobruk-type squad trenches with comforts provided by GI ingenuity, was both dangerous and disagreeable. Among the most disagreeable aspects were the plethora of barbed wire employed by the enemy all along his front and at every conceivable point, giving a large amount of trouble to patrols. Then there were minefields. The enemy seemed to be able to plant these almost as fast as they could be dug up.

From the time the October rains set in, there was always mud. To some men of the Division, the Schnee Eifel is remembered largely as a continuous operation in a sea of mud. Dampness and water seeped into the best prepared positions. Duckboard walks only partly solved the problems of getting about. Patrols literally floundered in mire. November brought more rain, ice, and snow. Overshoes and new-type sleeping bags of the thickness of two blankets were a boon to the front lines.

The rear echelon, in addition to its regular duties, operated a rest camp at Vielsalm, Belgium, where the men could go

on three day passes to rest, relax, take hot baths and see shows and movies, away from the mud and the ever-present Hun across the way.

Later a system of Stateside furloughs was worked out and an occasional "lucky Joe" among the men found himself on the way across the sea for a 30-day furlough at home under the rotation system. Morale remained high throughout the period, weathering even a threatened shortage of cigarettes in October; and illness was surprisingly low, even from the respiratory diseases which might have been expected in this area.


Buzz bombs, Hitler's widely heralded "V-1" which some prisoners professed to believe would quickly turn the tide of war, caused only a stir when they first began to go over in mid-October. By day the bomb looked like a small plane with a funnel mounted on the back of the fuselage, by night a trail of flame. At any time, it produced an ear-splitting racket like a badly-timed truck engine without a muffler.

After the capture of the "rocket coast" around Calais, robot bomb warfare had temporarily ceased. Now that the front had again become somewhat stabilized, the Germans set up numerous firing positions aimed at Liege, the great Allied supply base. Erratic behavior of the pilotless aircraft, as they were officially known, caused the occasional dropping of a bomb in the Division sector—and behind the German lines. Some were seen to reverse direction after passing over the area and head back to Germany. Others went into aerial acrobatics overhead which caused some anxious speculation as to their probable point of impact. It was somewhat surprising that the score or more of these "vengeance weapons" which dropped into the Division area caused no more material damage than they did.

Some time after the appearance of the first buzz bomb, about November 1, the first rocket trail was seen. This was "V-2" or the second of the mysterious weapons which were to turn the tide of victory for the fatherland. By day it appeared as a thick column of white vapor rapidly ascending on a vertical course, then thinning to a white vapor trail curving upward and disappearing to the northwest, vanishing in a few seconds. By night it was a ball of fire following the same course. As launching sites were many miles away, the rocket itself could be neither seen nor heard. These were the weapons which helped tear the heart out of British cities and Amsterdam; none fell in the Division area, or anywhere near the sector. Their chassis weighed 7200 pounds, the explosive 1600 pounds, the fuel nine tons, a gross of approximately 13.5 tons. The vapor column reached 20 miles in height in 60 seconds before the fuel supply was shut off by radio control. The column of vapor seen by day was of this height. The rocket attained a maximum altitude of 55 miles before it began to ascend in a thinning vapor trail. It had a range of up to 230 miles.

That these weapons had an effect upon German morale was fully attested by prisoners of the fanatical Nazi type taken on the German-Belgian border.

WEHLERSCHIED CROSSROADS



The 2nd Division passed through the 99th Division to make a major attack to the northwest to secure the Roer River dams, particularly Dam Number Five in the Urft chain of lakes, which the enemy controlled to hold up an armored breakthrough in the gap at Aachen. The possibility that the Germans might blow the dams and flood the country from the swollen Roer in the event of a crossing was sufficient to prevent an armored breakthrough toward the Rhine.

The best German shock troops held the area, which was heavily forested with narrow, deep-cut valleys and perilous ridges. A handful of villages dotted the forest, with little

open ground. The Siegfried Line ran through Hofen, Wehlerscheid, Udenbreth, and Scheid in the sector, with additional fortifications in depth at Wehlerscheid and along the Wehlerscheid-Dreiborn Ridge.

On December 11 the Division had relinquished its sector in the Schnee Eifel area to the 106th Infantry Division and had moved on northward to the vicinity of Elsenborn, Belgium, for the attack northeast to the Roer River. The 9th Infantry was followed by other elements of the Division as units of the 106th assumed responsibility for the border they had held since October 4. The Division CP was set up in the little

town of Wirtzfeld as the 23rd Infantry closed in last and the 9th Infantry prepared for the attack from the nearby town of Krinkelt.

In this operation the Division reverted to the control of V Corps from VIII Corps, and to the First Army from the Ninth Army. Great secrecy prevailed in all its movements now, for it hoped to push on through the Siegfried Line in a surprise attack along the Krinkelt-Dreiborn Highway and through the Monschau Forest.

The 9th Infantry attacked first, with the mission of seizing the Siegfried Line fortifications at Wehlerscheid, then swinging north inside the Line to take the town of Rohren, while the 38th Infantry would make the main effort through the Monschau Forst toward Dreibern. Artillery observation was limited all the way by steep and gashed terrain and thickly growing trees.

F. Wehlerscheid was not a village. It was a roadnet with a critical junction on the International Road and a custom-house surrounded by a particularly strong defensive position. In this portion of the forest where the roads were scanty, the roadnet was a vital point for any operation. Roadblocks had been erected and by-passes mined as the Division struck out toward the border in December. After the heroic fighting and the futile triumph there, the great successful offensive which pierced the Siegfried Line was called back because of the German breakthrough in the Ardennes Forest; the dough-boys called it "Hearbreak Crossroads."

No detailed information was available as to enemy dispositions in the area as the 9th Infantry Regiment closed in.

The Engineers mount bulldozer blades on a two and one-half ton truck, for snow-clearing Worr.



Contact with enemy troops was light, patrolling meager. The line was held by the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, with the 991st Infantry Regiment at Wehlerscheid and immediately to the north and south.

Positions were taken facing the snowbound Siegfried Line in deep, wet snow. In the unfathomable silence of the Belgian forest, the Division began its first offensive action since the fall of Brest.

The 9th Infantry jumped off at 0830 hours on December 13, moving in silence and without artillery preparation to preserve the element of surprise as long as they had heavy forest cover. The route, to use their own expression, was no push-over. A sudden thaw set ice-encrusted trees to dripping. Branches sagging under the burden of melting white brushed the faces and clothing of the men. Soon they were drenched to the skin.

Previous to daylight the lead troops of the Division had infiltrated up the dim forest trails to the village of Rocherath. From there, they moved up in force toward the squat pillboxes of the snowbound Siegfried Line at Wehlerscheid Crossroads, the first obstacle which must be overcome on the long wintry road to Rohren, lying to the north beyond the Monschau Forest.

The line of departure lay some 50 yards beyond the farthest outpost of the 99th Infantry Division through which the Second had to pass. The 2nd Battalion struck out through the woods to the east of the road, with the 3rd Battalion following in reserve. The 1st Battalion advanced west of the Rocherath-Wehlerscheid Road. Units of the 38th

Snow lay deep across the Siegfried Line toward Wehlerscheid.





Souvenir



Wehlerscheid

Infantry prepared to move up on the south flank of the Wehlerscheid position.

The enemy had cleared a large area to the front of their fortifications and filled it with massive and forbidding obstacles of concertina wire. Antipersonnel mines were sewn with trip wires attached, crisscrossing in all directions. The by-passes were sewn with antitank mines as well. At the far side of the clearing a final strongly prepared barrier had been erected.

When the Battalion reached this clearing and no longer had the secrecy and protective covering of the dense forest, intense fire blazed out from the pillboxes. Up to now, noon of June 13, no contact with the enemy had been made. Resistance was offered as soon as the Americans appeared before the enemy positions, however, and was extremely strong and fierce for a sector which was presumably thinly held.

Counterbattery fire began at once, as well as artillery for softening up the positions now that silence was no longer a factor. Shortly after, enemy mortar and artillery fire was raining down in tremendous volume upon the road before the pillboxes. It fell in terrific concentrations to curtain off the road by which the infantry must advance.

Soon this fire became general along the line. The 1st Battalion, to the left of the road, although not closest to the pillboxes, bore the brunt of the fire and was held up all day.

The pillboxes, set 20 to 30 yards apart behind approaches which were covered by an antitank ditch and a wide belt of barbed wire concertinas and thickly sewn antipersonnel mines, had been constructed to take advantage of terrain. They were impervious to quick attack; the only hope was to reduce them after extensive reconnaissance and elaborate preparation.

One platoon from Company E had advanced through five

separate aprons of barbed wire when it was pinned down by fire from the pillboxes. Bangalore torpedoes had been wet on the trek through the forest and the fuses would not ignite. One squad from Company G crawled patiently through and beneath the wire up to the enemy lines. Part of a second followed, neatly cutting a four-yard gap in the barbed wire as it went. The patrols were not in communication with their company. Furthermore, their company commander had been wounded and evacuated. Thus news of the penetration did not reach battalion headquarters at once.

At dark, the lead elements were ordered to break off the attack and be prepared to resume early the next day. That night was sheerest torture for the men. After the thaw, a bitter freeze set in, causing intense suffering among men whose clothing had been soaked with melting snow. A hot meal was brought up but could not be served due to the enemy's heavy shelling with direct artillery fire and concentrated mortar fire.

It was a relief to begin the attack next day. Artillery preparations began at daybreak and the forward push began at 0830. One company was exposed to fire on the main road and did not advance. Another was ordered to attempt a penetration through a shallow wooded area on the right flank, with another company in reserve behind it.

The gigantic wire obstacles were blasted by some 30 Bangalore torpedoes. Then as the first squad drove through, four men were wounded by machine gun fire, a fifth was killed by a mine.

Artillery had been called for but was not registering properly. Further preparation was called for at once. Because of peculiarities of that wooded, notched and serrated

terrain, artillery could not register effectively on designated targets. Repeated efforts were made for an hour or more, then orders came from Regiment for the lead troops to withdraw pending the employment of further artillery and an air attack to soften up resistance. With 50 men in forward positions as outposts, the Battalion was withdrawn to the rear of its CP.

December 15 found the weather still too hazy for the use of tactical bombing. No assault could be launched during daylight hours. Lt. Col. Walter M. Higgins, Jr., Battalion commander, thought he saw a chance to get through. He decided to exploit the gap made by the patrol on the previous day when they cut the wires. An eleven-man patrol was sent out with a sound-powered telephone, to cross into the German lines and report on enemy strength and alertness. In the black darkness, the patrol kept getting lost. One of the men from the patrol of the previous day found them by following their telephone wire and led them through the gap.

The patrol sent back word that it had surrounded a pillbox and that the occupants seemed unaware of its presence.

Lieutenant Colonel Higgins immediately ordered a Battalion thrust in strength.

One company moved through the gap and marked the way with engineer tape. Once inside, it began building up on the left of the opening. Another company quickly took its place on the right. Another company remained to guide the 3rd Battalion which was now swiftly moving up.

What happened next won a Presidential Citation for the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment. "Despite the obstacles presented by a dense forest, snow, steel and concrete fortifications, massed fire power, and a determined foe," the citation reads, "the 2nd Battalion spearheaded the Regiment in smashing the German stronghold, thereby seizing 24 pillboxes, capturing 161 enemy soldiers, and killing and wounding many more."

When that operation was complete, the 9th Infantry was able to seize and secure the Wehlerscheid-Zollamt road junction and pierce the Siegfried Line in a 3500-yard salient.

Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, who had crossed the gap with the company which took its position to the right, mounted a pillbox directly to the left of the breach and directed F Company in surrounding it completely, preventing the enemy inside from firing. The 3rd Battalion was sent immediately against the left wing, while F Company went along the line blowing in the door of one pillbox after another with beehive explosives and killing or capturing the occupants. Seven pillboxes were reduced in this manner.

The 38th Infantry was now moving up through the forest to the right. An F Company platoon was sent to neutralize a pillbox 500 yards to the east to facilitate their advance. While engaged in this manner the platoon was set upon by a 17-man German patrol. In the harsh firefight which followed four Germans were killed, four wounded, and four captured.

By infiltrating single-file through that gap in the tactical wire the Battalion established a bridgehead from which the entire position was reduced overnight. "By indomitable courage, dogged perseverance in the face of countless hardships, and skillful execution of a daring plan, the battalion enabled the 9th Infantry Regiment to accomplish its hazardous mission," the citation continues in its praise of "an epic of mass heroism to accomplish a great tactical maneuver."

Lieutenant Colonel Higgins received the Distinguished Service Cross for personally leading his battalion in this series of maneuvers resulting in the capture of a key position in the Siegfried Line defenses and for his "courageous leadership and heroic achievements" in directing the attack as his battalion poured through the narrow gap in darkness and captured the positions in bitter fighting.

At daybreak on December 16, the attack moved on. The lead battalions were now fighting well to the rear of the row of pillboxes captured during the night. Enemy resistance was stubborn: positions were yielded only after they proved untenable. Nevertheless, the attack was progressing where the enemy strongpoint had been penetrated up to the Monschau Forest. During the night, K Company had by passed five pillboxes and the customshouse at Wehlerscheid to seize the easternmost of the two road junctions at this point, reducing a pillbox guarding the junction. Company L followed, reduced two of the remaining pillboxes, and moved up to the customshouse where they took 77 German prisoners at dawn, without a single casualty.


After the last three pillboxes were reduced a firm defensive circle was formed about the roadnet. All units were well established and ready to push further when the tragic news came—the Germans had broken through the Ardennes Forest. The orders were to stand fast, consolidate positions and be prepared to withdraw.

The luster of the 9th's great exploit remains undimmed, however, by Von Rundstedt's great armored drive which cut it short before the ground thus gained could be exploited. Merging into the greatest defensive battle ever fought by the Division, that of the breakthrough in the Belgian Bulge, the action at Wehlerscheid Salient stands on its own merits in the fighting history of the 2nd Division.

THE ARDENNES FOREST

CHAPTER XII

THE WEHRMACHT STRIKES



The Roer River dams were impeding the First and Ninth Armies both by the flooded condition of the river and by the possibility that the enemy might decide to blow the dams near Schmidt and suddenly flood the countryside as the 2nd Division spearheaded a difficult attack from the south and south-east to secure this chain of dams and lakes inhibiting the progress of infantry and armor.

As has been seen, the 2nd Division struck through the Monschau Forest northeast of Rocherath on December 13 as part of this attack. Their mission was to pierce the Siegfried Line at Wehlerscheid on the International Road, the one accessible route in this sector, to secure the Dreibern Plateau and seize the Roer River dams from the south. As had been seen, the initial attack was eminently successful: it was an auspicious beginning. The customhouse at Wehlerscheid

was seized and troops were fighting their way up through the Monschau Forest when the German counter-offensive, the Wehrmacht's last great blow, struck in the Ardennes forest.

The Allied forces, in order to continue the attack elsewhere without allowing the Germans time to recover and recoup their successive losses, had left some sectors of the western front comparatively thinly held in order to mass strength for offensive action elsewhere. One of these sectors lay between Monschau and Trier in the area which the 2nd Division had just vacated.

It was here the German armies of the west under Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt and by orders of Hitler made their last desperate effort to stave off disaster and prolong the war in the west.

On December 16 the 9th Infantry Regiment was set to

attack to exploit its penetration to the northwest toward Hofen. The 38th Infantry continued its attack eastward toward the far edge of the Monschau Forest.

Then Von Rundstedt struck with 24 German divisions on the morning of December 16 when, after a period comparatively free of artillery, the massed concentrations of artillery fire began to fall in the Division sector, continuing through the afternoon and night. Because of a murky winter fog, the Germans had been able to assemble in force with greatest secrecy in the protection of this densely wooded area. When the blow fell eight German panzer divisions broke through the VIII Corps line along a 40-mile front. Diversionary attacks and artillery support assisted the main offensive, while paratroopers dropped in rear areas behind the Allied line.

Early morning of December 16 found heavy caliber artillery falling along communication routes in the Division rear areas. This presaged the beginning of the December counteroffensive when the hitherto quiet front from Monschau south to Luxembourg would flare into action as Von Rundstedt hurled two panzer armies at the attenuated sector in an all-out effort to break through to the Channel and the great Allied supply sources at Antwerp and Liege.

Reports came in early on that historic day from the 99th Division sector and from V Corps, telling of pre-dawn onslaughts against the center and both flanks of the 99th Division. Heavy caliber artillery pounded the 2nd Division main supply route at Wirtzfeld where the Division command post was located. As the day wore on the seriousness of the attack was readily apparent. Elements of two infantry regiments of the German 277th Infantry Division had succeeded in pushing deep salients into the 99th Division line. Elements of the German 12th Infantry Division were identified in heavy fighting on the south flank of the 99th Division at Losheimergraben.

The German 326th Division was identified at Hofen and at Monschau. To the south of Losheimergraben enemy armor and infantry penetrated deeply in the sector of the 106th Infantry Division, seized villages, and threatened to cut off all communication between the 106th and 99th Divisions.

On the afternoon and evening of December 16 orders for the 2nd Division from higher headquarters still designated that the units would continue their attack on December 17. In view of alarming reports, however, the Division's Commanding General prepared an alternate plan of disengaging and moving to a strong defensive position covering the main supply route. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion 23rd Infantry, preparing to aid the exploitation of the Wehlerscheid breakthrough, was ordered to take up positions immediately behind the 99th Division to counterattack through that thinly held line.

Interdictory fire caught the detrucking men but they took up positions behind the 99th, while the 1st Battalion 123rd Infantry occupied the town of Hunningen behind the 394th

Infantry Regiment. It was decided that units already committed were coping with the situation, however, and the counterattack was postponed until daylight. During the early hours of the night the situation of the 2nd Division remained static. Then V Corps issued warnings of paratroop descents, and word came of attacks with armor at Losheimergraben. Driving north from Lanzerath approximately thirty tanks and one battalion of armored infantry, part of a task force of the 1st SS Panzer Division, had attacked along a railroad going north to Bullingen.

At 0700 V Corps sent word that the force was approaching Bullingen having by-passed the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry in Hunningen, and service and engineer elements of the 2nd Division in Bullingen were deploying to give battle to the German force.


Fighting against tanks with rifles, machine guns, and a few rocket launchers, the hastily assembled forces inflicted considerable damage on the panzer spearhead before being forced back into Bullingen by sheer superior firepower.

A portion of the transportation, by quick action, was evacuated to the northwest under fire, and fuel supplies essential to the German armored force were destroyed. Some units of the Division forces stationed in the town made their escape; others set up strongpoints in the buildings and held out, harassing German troops and vehicles with small arms fire long after the town had been overrun and surrounded by enemy infantry and tanks. The Division airfield south of Bullingen had been by-passed by the enemy force, but heavy fire around the field kept pilots from getting to the planes. The pilots hid in Bullingen until nightfall, then made their escape to the Division lines, and the planes were destroyed by Division Artillery.

In Wirtzfeld the Division commander took immediate steps to cope with the situation. Troops were alerted. Command post personnel left their posts in kitchens, motor pools, and offices to form a defensive line about the town.

The 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, was ordered to move post-hast from its assembly area north of Roherath to positions south of Wirtzfeld and Krinkelt. Antitank Company, 23rd Infantry, and elements of the 741st Tank Battalion and the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, then north of Krinkelt, were ordered to move on Wirtzfeld. The tremendous proportions of the attack here were the only indication that the Ardennes counteroffensive had struck. Two regiments of the 2nd Division were now far out ahead of the enemy's line of attack. Rear echelons prepared to hold the line until the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments could pull back and establish a defensive line at Roherath and Krinkelt.

Disengaging action began as soon as word came that neighboring elements had been completely overrun. Withdrawal would be put into effect as soon as the operation could be coordinated. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, then in reserve southwest of Wehlerscheid, was directed to move at once to Krinkelt. The 9th Infantry would move all three battalions to form a new line south of Wirtzfeld. The 38th




Belgian railway bridge blown by the Germans near Butgenbach during their retreat behind the Siegfried Line.

Mid-winter fog like this enabled Von Rundstedt to assemble for his breakthrough on the Belgian border.



Fifty-caliber quadruple mounted antiaircraft machine guns fought with the 2nd Division to hold the German on this shoulder of the Bulge.

Doughboys dig in to stop Von Rundstedt's breakthrough in the Battle of the Bulge.



A mortar crew creeps forward through deep snow to set up a new position in the Ardennes.

An infantry patrol takes refuge in an abandoned barn near Wirtzfeld as the German panzer troops approached.

Infantry would follow with its remaining two battalions to positions around Rocherath.

Together with the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, these units would establish a continuous line from a lake west of Wirtzfeld to a point north of Rocherath. V Corps advised that the situation was chaotic and directed a withdrawal to Elsenborn, covering the Eupen road.

The 2nd Division's main supply route was the road from Elsenborn through Butgenbach, Dom Butgenbach, Bullingen, Krinkelt, and Wehlerscheid. Maps showed a road leading from Elsenborn to Wirtzfeld by a direct route, but this road had never been completed. Engineers were now at work making this route safe for one-way traffic and were directed to devote all their energies to opening the road as the main supply route had been cut by the enemy, at Bullingen. All vehicles except those essential to combat were ordered to move at once toward Elsenborn via Wirtzfeld using this one-way road.

At 0730 the 99th Division announced that it was forced to abandon its command post at Butgenbach at once and move to Elsenborn.

The 2nd Division's artillery headquarters, also in Wirtzfeld, directed the facing about of one medium battery and one light battery to meet the impending threat from Bullingen. Rocket launcher teams were called for to provide close-in antitank defense for the command post. Four quadruple mounted fifty-caliber machine guns mounted on half-tracks were called forth from the 462nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and were integrated into the defense of Wirtzfeld together with tank destroyers, antitank guns, and all available personnel.

At 0800 enemy half-tracks and tanks appeared closely followed by infantry, looming out of the mist on the ridge 800 yards to the south of Wirtzfeld. The combined fire of all weapons defending the town was turned upon the enemy force. In a 15-minute engagement the armor was destroyed and heavy casualties were inflicted on the infantry troops. The force was part of the 1st SS Panzer Division and had been a flank guard for the main body of troops passing through Bullingen. The ridge was seized by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment which had arrived during the engagement. No further enemy threat developed in this area for some time, although on several occasions enemy armor appeared to be massing in Bullingen for an attack against the ridge. Prompt, intense artillery fire delivered on concentrations of the enemy neutralized the threat each time it took form, and many German armored vehicles were lost as a result of this fire.

The threat to Wirtzfeld smashed, the Division commander ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry en route to Krinkelt to move into defensive positions southeast and south of that town while the regimental commander of the 23rd, minus two battalions attached to the 99th Division, would take charge of all rear echelon and miscellaneous troops then in Camp Elsenborn to form a defensive line and cover south of Elsenborn.



A German tank blazes at Rocherath after being knocked out by an American Sherman tank's artillery.

Leaving the command post General Robertson then moved along the main supply route toward Wehlerscheid issuing verbal orders. He had decided that it would be necessary to fight a delaying action to the east of Wirtzfeld and the south of Krinkelt to protect the only road to the rear, the newly constructed Wirtzfeld-Elsenborn road. A general defensive line was designated and the assistant division commander, General Stokes, was designated commanding officer of the Rocherath-Krinkelt sector. Colonel Ginder of the 9th Infantry was designated commanding officer of the Wirtzfeld sector.

The situation on the 99th Infantry front was growing steadily more critical. The 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry east of Rocherath which had expected to be committed in a counterattack was forced to hold fast to its positions. Heavy enemy attacks with infantry and armor were caving in the line. It was planned that the 393rd Infantry Regiment would pull back to either side of the 3rd Battalion to form a new line, but due to heavy pressure other elements became disorganized as tanks cut up the defending forces. No new line was ever formed. The battalion was left with both flanks exposed and in a highly unfavorable position for defense in column formation along the road.

The 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, taking up positions around Murringen in the dark, and covering an extremely wide front, discovered on December 17 that the armored spearhead had passed them and was roaring away to their rear. As morning wore on, broken units of the 394th Infantry withdrew to the north leaving the battalion far to the advance of friendly units. The enemy made no attempt, however, to dislodge the battalion from its position. Armored reconnaissance vehicles approached the troops but were dispersed by supporting artillery.

At noon the 395th Infantry was ordered to hold east of the Rocherath-Wehlerscheid road covering the flank of the Krinkelt-Rocherath positions until ordered to withdraw. The



Moving up to stem the German advance in a Belgian border village.



9th Infantry Regiment moves through Butgenbach, Belgium, to relieve troops of the 1st Infantry Division.

3rd Battalion of the 395th had been repeatedly attacked at Hofen by considerable forces of armor and infantry. Fire delivered by 2nd Division Artillery had been largely instrumental in breaking up the attacks before penetrations were effected.

At noon on December 17 word was received that the 1st Infantry Division was moving to positions south of Camp Elsenborn. Lead elements of the 26th Regimental Combat Team arrived at Camp Elsenborn at mid-day, and during the afternoon moved into the Dom Butgenbach area, thus providing the 2nd Division with some protection to its south and south rear. However, a gap existed between the northeast flank of the 26th Infantry and the south flank of the 2nd Division: it was not closed for three days.

Shortly after noon the first elements of the enemy were noted to the left flank of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry. German tanks and waves of infantry launched repeated attacks striking the unprotected flank. Due to the vagaries of the terrain artillery fire was not as effective as it might have been.

By now, however, V Corps was aware of the vast scale of the enemy attack. It was learned that the Germans had attacked in force along the entire front of neighboring divisions and away to the south to Luxembourg, and that troops had actually broken through defenses of adjacent elements to the right flank and the rear constituting a real and immediate threat to the Division.

Von Rundstedt did not take half-measures: he brought everything he had to bear upon the troops. The vast scale and tremendous strength of the attack hurled against the 2nd Division front was an indication of what was happening all along the line.

The 9th Infantry Regiment and the 38th Infantry Regiment were far out in German territory when the full storm

broke, and the feat of bringing these two regiments all the way back, fighting first a disengaging action and then withdrawing under hostile fire against countless hazards, is one of the great chapters in 2nd Division History.

COMMENDATION

"WHAT THE 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION HAS DONE IN THE LAST FOUR DAYS WILL LIVE FOREVER IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY"—Telegram from Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, Commanding the First United States Army, to the Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division, on December 20, 1944.

Hostile troops to the Division front included not only the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, a task force of which had burst through the 99th Division's south flank and rolled through the 99th Division's rear area through Honsfeld toward Bullingen. The 12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend was now identified in the 99th Division sector. These were elite troops, meticulously trained, who doubtless would be employed only in a section of the line where success was vital to the overall German strategy.

The 12th SS Panzer units were characterized by the British who fought them at Caen as "filthy beasts." Any other appellation would be flattering. They had progressed beyond the stage which is usually described as "fanatical." Their one aim was to kill, as brutally as possible.

Prior to the attack the division commander of the Hitler Jugend had addressed his troops as follows: "I ask of you, and expect of you, not to take any prisoners with the possible exception of some officers who might be kept alive for the purpose of questioning." This propensity of the Hitler Jugend for never taking prisoners if possible was well known from other sources than the prisoner of war interrogations.

They had been responsible for the slaughter of a group of Canadian prisoners in Normandy.

The objective of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in the winter offensive gradually became clear. Major Von der Heydte, commanding officer of a parachute force of more than battalion strength, revealed that their mission was to drop behind the 2nd Division lines on the morning of December 17 and cut the Eupen-Malmedy road. Major Von der Heydte, when captured and interrogated, stated that Sepp Dietrich, commanding general of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, had told him that his unit would be relieved by an unspecified SS division by 1730 hours December 17.


An enemy map captured at Stavelot by the 30th Division which showed the zones of advance of the 1st Panzer Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division bore out the fact that the Sixth SS Panzer Army was to cut through to the rear in this sector to the great supply dumps of the First and Ninth Armies at Liege.


The 1st SS Panzer Division was to advance west to Aywaille, thence north along the Meuse River, while the 12th SS Panzer Division would move northwest through Elsenborn to Verviers and Liege. One prisoner from the Hitler Jugend captured on December 17 stated that his unit's mission was to seize a bridgehead across the Meuse River.

The plan was to resupply the troops with materiel from

the First and Ninth Army dumps, then move on toward the Channel. En route they would supply themselves from Division dumps behind the lines. They failed to do this because the Division had placed its dumps considerably further to the rear than they had counted on. As a consequence this part of their plan fell through hopelessly. Von Rundstedt had counted on American gasoline, American trucks and tires, American guns and ammunition to keep his offensive going. All along the line the Americans guarded their supplies, destroying their dumps even after they had been abandoned, with bombers taking care of those the enemy seized intact.

A full-scale breakthrough to the rear of the First Army thus was indicated as the situation in the Division sector rapidly became more grave. At 1600, having learned that the state of the defenses east of Rocherath was deteriorating, the division commander prepared to protect the withdrawal route from Wehlerscheid to Rocherath down which the 38th Infantry column, far out in the Monschau Forest, had yet to march. Intercepting the 9th Infantry column north of Rocherath, he cut therefrom the last company of the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion and directed the movement of this force to a key road junction east of Rocherath. The reinforced battalion took up positions here at nightfall and organized its defenses despite chaotic conditions on the roads.





The 2nd Division played havoc with Von Rundstedt's crack armored divisions

Just as the position was organized and the fire plans drawn and while friendly elements streamed through the lines on their way to the rear, the first German forces approached in the murky dusk and thickly settling fog. Then a curious incident occurred, when in the hectic confusion and the dense obscurity of the scene, the German tanks accompanied by a platoon of infantry passed through the Division lines without being halted or engaged and were spotted some time later on a road to the rear. Artillery fire was called down on the road and approaches were mined. Troops were instructed to fire on all movement. The German force made its way into Rocherath where it was engaged by the 38th Infantry Regiment.

It was agreed and designated by Division and Corps commanders that the Division would hold and fight despite the fact that some units were still far out to the front of the line. All troops making their way back would pass through the line to the rear to serve as reserves.

The situation in the 99th Infantry sector had grown critical; the positions had no depth, and enemy infantry and tanks cut up the line into small islands of defense. These isolated islands of resistance deep in the woods were being surrounded by daylight, and as dusk fell those who still had freedom of movement were making their way back through the 2nd Division lines. At times the constant stream of remnants from units trapped out front of the main line of defense created problems of supply and traffic control.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 9th Infantry withdrew from Wehlerscheid to Wirtzfeld in the afternoon and with the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry went into position from the lake west of Wirtzfeld to positions on the Wirtzfeld-Krinkel road. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry meanwhile had moved to positions around the south and southeast sides of Krinkel. The 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry approaching Rocherath from the north at 1730 came under intense interdiction fire necessitating some reorganization.

The battalion went into position on the east side of Rocherath and Krinkel at 1900 hours and was immediately struck by an armored assault. The enemy infantry were beaten off but tanks penetrated the towns where vastly confused and vicious fighting ensued. In Rocherath, Service and Antitank Companies of the 38th Infantry fighting as riflemen, had already been twice engaged by enemy armor, driving them off. The 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, arrived in Rocherath at 2100 to relieve these elements.

The situation in Krinkel and in Rocherath remained extremely confused throughout the night of December 17-18. Enemy attacks launched while the infantry set up their positions got several tanks and some riflemen through into the towns. To the east of Rocherath the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, was hard hit by enemy armor at 2100 and during the next three hours a battle raged while enemy tanks penetrated the positions. Artillery fire called down to the front, the rear, and even on the positions eventually forced a German



House near Krinkel used as strongpoint by 2nd Division.

withdrawal, and left five enemy tanks ablaze in the area. This stand by the 1st Battalion of the 9th made it possible for the 38th Infantry to complete its movement into Rocherath where it took up positions.

With nightfall the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry defending Murringen and Hunningen was once more engaged by enemy troops. German infantry launched repeated attacks upon their thinly held defensive line. With the aid of artillery fire the positions held even though local penetrations took place at several times and places. Contact with the battalion was established by radio and by patrol, and it was ordered to draw back into Wirtzfeld. While the artillery fired defensive box barrages, the battalion disengaged itself from contact with the enemy by fighting a rear guard action in which the covering company was badly mauled and battered.

The foot troops made their way across the fields to Wirtzfeld, while the motors, suffering from artillery fire, reached Wirtzfeld by way of Krinkel and took up a defensive sector.

The 23rd Infantry Regiment, stop-gapping penetrations in the hard-hit 99th Division sector, now had its 1st Battalion in Hunningen and Murringen awaiting orders to close the hole in the south flank of the 99th Division. These two towns lay behind the lines. The 3rd Battalion moved into position east of Rocherath. Then the terrific and shattering barrage of the morning of December 17 signaled the opening of an all-out German offensive and any attempt at counterattack to restore the lines was out of the question. Long-range, heavy-caliber artillery rounds tore into rear areas blasting out communications and ripping up wire lines by the score, setting the sweating and cursing men to work hour after hour.

Armored forces broke through the adjacent sector to the south and rolled through the Division rear areas. At 0700 hours tanks entered the village of Bullingen, a vital point on both the Division main supply route and in the south flank defenses. Bullingen and its neighboring town of Butgenbach

which was also entered lay far to the rear of the Division's front fighting lines and posed a peculiar problem in defense.

Inside the town was the 2nd Quartermaster Company operating a number of supply and fuel dumps, Class III. Company B of the 2nd Engineer Battalion, elements of the 2nd Signal Company, and Division Artillery's airfield were at Bullingen. None of these troops had the slightest warning of a breakthrough. They simply awoke to find themselves literally staring into the muzzles of the enemy's 88-mm. guns, as the armor pushed into the outskirts of the town. A messenger from one of the supply dumps reported the situation to the Quartermaster command post and defensive positions were assumed at once. Immediate evacuation of vehicles was begun and preparations for the destruction of supply and fuel dumps were initiated. Butgenbach was chosen as the evacuation point.

The Engineers, alerted in the same manner, rushed to the southern approaches of the town with machine guns and bazookas to knock out the lead tank and establish a temporary roadblock.

The enemy, however, was fully prepared to overcome all resistance. The infantry dismounted from the tanks and brought murderously heavy fire to bear upon the Engineers. The defenders opened fire from whatever point they happened to be and with whatever weapons came to hand; they had no chance to set up an organized line of resistance. They fought furiously against the armored spearhead of Von Rundstedt's ruthless attacking force. With the support of their own .50 caliber machine guns, they fought until they had knocked out several additional armored vehicles, including tanks and half-tracks. Then they pulled back into the town to set up strongpoints in the buildings there. Part of the force made their way to the high ground east of the town. Here they reorganized and established contact with the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, setting up on their right flank.

From this position they later defended the town of Murringen against strong enemy armored reconnaissance patrols. Elements in Bullingen continued to hold out for three days before food and ammunition were gone and they were overrun.

The Quartermaster Company in Bullingen was facing German tanks which had moved into the center of the town, making the QM command post untenable. Pulling out, the personnel joined one of its groups guarding an ammunition and supply dump. As many vehicles as possible had been evacuated. As the pressure increased the men had destroyed all material possible, but still had to abandon much valuable supplies which might be of use to the enemy. They withdrew through the heavy snow toward Butgenbach where they contacted the nearest American troops until they could get back to the Division lines.

The Signal Supply and Repair Section, caught in their command post with all their gear, moved into the upper story. They directed small arms fire down on the milling enemy troops and tanks. A large caliber shell struck the building,

then an enemy 88 fired through it. They decided upon withdrawal to the basement. Before they left, however, one of their number emptied a parting clip of ammunition into the open top of a half-track personnel carrier, killing several of the enemy.

From their basement stronghold they continued to pour harassing fire into the passing enemy vehicles. Twice during the day the Germans searched the house thoroughly but failed to uncover their hiding place. Their mascot, a small dog of indiscriminate breed, threatened to give them away and they had to strangle him. Later under cover of darkness they got out and made their way to friendly troop areas, taking their direction from the buzz-bombs which were winging overhead to give the town of Liege a thorough going-over.

Overcoming the small Division force left in Bullingen, the Germans looted the American installations and set up headquarters in the town. Pilots of the Division Artillery air force there escaped with their lives and moved out by infiltration while the 37th Field Artillery Battalion swept the airstrip with 40-battery volleys to destroy the planes and deny use of them to the enemy. Artillery fire was also brought down on the tanks heard milling about in Bullingen, apparently with good effect.

The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry was moving up to seize the high ground between the town of Krinkelt and the enemy in Bullingen for the protection of the south flank of the Division when, crossing a small stream south of Krinkelt, they came under the fire of German tanks. Three of the tanks were knocked out by supporting friendly tanks. The German main effort had by now spilled over the top of the ridge toward Wirtzfeld where the Division command post was located. The 2nd Battalion successfully occupied the ridge between Bullingen and Wirtzfeld-Krinkelt while the enemy retired into the town of Bullingen to be harrassed consistently there by Division Artillery, which also played havoc with efforts to bring up armored traffic from the south. Each time the Germans formed for a movement the 37th Field Artillery Battalion laid in a barrage to scatter them, slowing down their drive considerably and harassing German traffic in the town.

Having alerted and instructed his forward combat arms, General Robertson took personal charge of organization of Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company for defense. He took clerks, MPs, orderlies, and cooks from headquarters group to establish an all-around defense of his command post against the armored spearheads thrusting at the lines in Wirtzfeld. These troops, armed with carbines and antitank guns, took their stand there in the snow of this cold and bloody front and held firmly as the enemy surged forward and broke against the stubborn tenacity with which these men defended their line. These troops knocked out a tank and an armored car. Supporting tank destroyers and artillery accounted for others.

Division Artillery Headquarters received word at 0640 on

December 17 that 30 enemy tanks and a battalion of armored infantry were attacking in the vicinity of Murringen and Bullingen. Division Artillery staff and all echelons were notified and action was taken to repel the German counterattack.

The direction of fire of two batteries, one light and one medium, was changed to meet the threat coming from the south. A telephone line from the command post to an observation post 100 yards away was laid and registration of the batteries began at once. When the enemy tanks and infantry approached Wirtzfeld and the headquarters installations there, and on the road toward the Division Command Post, fires were placed upon them at once.

Antitank Commanding Officer organized and dispatched the antitank platoons to meet the attack and personally placed them along that wide and blazing front where they could be effective in stopping tanks that entered the area by assault or infiltration.

A defensive line was established about 100 yards south of the Division Artillery command post and into this line went the available men from the rear echelon. These men were armed with carbines and were formed into teams for operation of .50 caliber machine guns and bazookas of the battery. Six additional bazooka teams from one of the artillery battalions and four half-tracks armed with multiple-mounted .50 caliber machine guns from the 462nd AAA (AW) Battalion were called to the command post and turned over to the battery commander to augment his defense. To coordinate the defense he established two forward observation posts equipped with radio and capable of directing artillery fire through Division Artillery Headquarters.

Additional ammunition of several types was needed for sufficient reserves for this line of defense, in any sustained action. A message was sent to the battery supply sergeant. Knowing but one route he proceeded through Bullingen between the fire of the enemy and that of the Division's guns and brought up ammunition to the Division Artillery Command Post.

The position soon came under direct observation of the enemy. A large volume of enemy artillery fire fell on the hill. Following the barrage the tanks moved forward with their accompanying groups of infantry. The attack was repulsed; tanks were knocked out by the tank destroyer units and a half-track personnel carrier was set afire by the machine guns. The infantrymen and the tankers who dismounted from their incapacitated vehicles were seen disappearing to the rear. At no time did a tank or infantry penetrate this iron-clad defense of Wirtzfeld. The enemy, probing for a soft spot, saw that this was not it and soon turned attention elsewhere.

Wire crews were constantly under fire by artillery and small arms in their difficult task of maintaining communications. Lines had to be repaired repeatedly under fire until a direct hit by a hostile shell rendered the switchboard useless. Then



German tanks knocked out by bazooka and rifle fire smoulder in the streets of Rocherath.

the reliance was placed in the radio net which had opened additional stations as the emergency developed. Due to the courage and skill of the communications personnel, the headquarters was never out of communication with its artillery units.

Before noon the situation was under control. When the time came for the establishment of the new V Corps defense line through Elsenborn, an orderly and controlled displacement of all installations and personnel was effected to the rear at Camp d'Elsenborn. Throughout the entire period of the Breakthrough, work was continued without cessation under heavy and frequent concentrations of enemy artillery. Widespread fire control in this sector of the front was maintained, and frequent quick shiftings of fire directions as the storm center of the attack veered from north to south and back again.

Massed artillery fire from the four organic battalions was used to greatest advantage attested by staggering losses to the enemy. In a large measure it helped to turn the tide of the German thrust.

When the enemy first struck the artillery battalions were supporting the attack through the Siegfried Line from extreme forward positions. In order to give supporting fire to the rear where the Division command post installations were under fire the 12th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions each turned one battery completely around to bring fire upon the enemy tanks and infantry within 800 yards of the command post. At the same time fires were maintained to support the disengaging action being fought far out in the Monschau Forest.

The 12th and 15th Field Artillery Battalions made repeated trips to an abandoned ammunition dump near the enemy lines under machine gun and rifle fire to recover several hundred rounds which enabled them to continue their devastating and continuous fires despite the loss of Butgenbach.

The 38th Field Artillery Battalion alone fired more than 5000 rounds on December 18.

The heavy, accurate fires brought down on enemy weapons despite the bitter cold, frozen ground, and necessary frequent trail shifts, secured the effectiveness of hastily installed positions as the Division moved into the Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld triangle. Any failure of artillery firepower, communication, or liaison could have spelled disaster.

The 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment east of Rocherath won its second award of the Presidential Citation thus one of the two units of the Division to receive a cluster to the Distinguished Unit Badge. The Battalion's first citation had been won at Daoulas during the siege of Brest.

The citation states: "The 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, moved into the Krinkelter Wald on the night of December 16 with instructions to prepare to attack to regain positions lost by another unit. After assuming positions in the dense woods during total darkness, and under a heavy artillery barrage, the battalion was informed on the morning of December 17 that it would not attack, but would hold present positions at all costs. The battalion position, several hundred yards in rear of another unit's defensive area, covered approximately 3000 yards and afforded very few natural terrain features which would favor the defenders.

"After breaching the defenses of the unit in front of the 3rd Battalion, the enemy struck first on the exposed left flank of the battalion position shortly after noon on 17 December. Swarming out of the woods, the enemy made six fanatical assaults upon the battalion. Each time the Germans were driven back after sustaining staggering casualties.

"Regrouping his forces, the enemy launched a seventh and final attack with both infantry and tanks. Braving point-blank tank fire which blasted men from their foxholes, the battalion held its positions, cutting down wave after wave of the Germans. Men of the battalion fought with bayonets and clubbed rifles, and many men sacrificed themselves to hold the enemy."

The positions were maintained despite two exposed flanks until a strong defensive line could be established to the rear. The action, against a numerically superior enemy force fighting with fanatical zeal and fury, was one which played a vital role in containing the enemy drive in the 2nd Division sector.

As the enemy, sustaining heavy losses from machine gun fire, overran the defenders and entered the positions with tanks, a section of heavy machine guns attached to Company I from Company M was taking great toll of the attackers. When tankers sighted the two positions, they immediately opened direct fire, killing or wounding all but three men of the section. They continued their enveloping movement, firing point-blank into the foxholes.

Pfc. Richard Cowan, one of the three men in the section still able to operate his weapon, continued firing despite the devastating blast from enemy tanks. As foxholes all around him were overrun, Cowan continued to cut down wave after

wave of the enemy in the deep drifted snow. His fire was an important factor in enabling Company I to draw back from its untenable position to the defense line which had been prepared.

Only 15 to 20 men of the company could be located to set up the defense line after the company had been raked with tank fire and overrun by the enemy infantrymen. These men formed along a narrow firebreak approximately 200 yards to the rear of the original Company I position. Private First Class Cowan, one of the last men to leave the original untenable position, carried his gun out alone and set it up in the firebreak.

The handful of men occupied shallow holes previously dug in the area and now scooped out of the frozen snow. There they attempted to make a stand against the horde of enemy infantry and tanks. Then a huge Tiger Royal tank bore down upon the tiny point of defense maintained by Company I, with the enemy's infantry fanned out behind it.

Cowan coolly opened fire and killed or wounded at least half the advancing group of 80 Germans before they had time to hit the ground and burrow in the snow. The tank promptly opened fire with its 88-mm. gun. The round crashed low over Cowan's head, but he continued to remain in position and man his gun.

Assuming that the burst had ended the resistance, a member of the tank command blew a whistle and the German infantrymen who were able rose from the snow and continued the advance. Again Cowan opened fire, and again he inflicted casualties with his murderous fire before the attackers could fall to the ground. By this time the Germans had directed three machine guns upon Cowan in addition to the tank's guns. Cowan loosened the traversing clamp, regripped the hand grip of his gun, and once again spat death into the enemy ranks as soon as the whistle sounded and the men scrambled up out of the snow.

An enemy rocket launcher fired a burst at Cowan which rocked him back, but did not deter him from the purpose of manning his gun. By this time, however, more enemy infantry had infiltrated around three sides of the Company's hastily formed line. The order was given to withdraw. Cowan was the last man to leave the position, covering the withdrawal of his comrades with his gun until his ammunition was exhausted. Then he slung his empty machine gun on his back and trudged his way out of the death trap, following the infantry into the town of Krinkelt. Out of ammunition and too exhausted to carry his heavy gun further, he was given permission to destroy it.

Picking up a rifle, he joined the ranks of the defenders who were digging in around the town of Krinkelt.

The Medal of Honor was awarded Cowan for his stand. "His heroic actions were entirely responsible for allowing the remaining men to retire successfully from the scene of their last-ditch stand," his citation for this honor reads.

Pfc. Jose M. Lopez, a machine gunner with Company M

of the 23rd Infantry in the same sector of the fighting around Rocherath on the afternoon of December 17, was likewise awarded the nation's highest honor, the Medal of Honor.

"Lopez's gallantry and intrepidity, on seemingly suicidal missions in which he killed at least 100 of the enemy, were almost solely responsible for allowing Company K to avoid being enveloped, to withdraw successfully, and to give other forces coming up in support the time to build a line which repelled the enemy drive," his citation for the award reads.

On his own initiative, Lopez carried his heavy machine gun from the position which he occupied on the right flank of Company K to the left in order to protect that flank which was in immediate danger of being overrun by the enemy's assault with infantry support by tanks. Taking up his position in a shallow hole which offered no protection above his waist, he calmly cut down a group of ten Germans.

Ignoring the heavy fire of an advancing tank, he held his ground and cut down at least 25 more of the enemy attackers attempting to turn his flank. To the right he saw a large force of enemy infantry swarming in from the front. Dazed and shaken by the enemy artillery fire which crashed into the ground around him, he realized that his position would be outflanked.

Alone, he carried his machine gun to a position to the right rear of the sector. Enemy pressure with tanks and infantry was forcing a withdrawal. He was blown over backward by the sheer concussion of enemy fire, but righted himself and reset his gun to hold to his position. Single-handed he held off the German horde until he was reasonably certain that the company had been able to effect its retirement. Again he loaded his gun on his back and in a hail of small arms fire dashed to a point where several of his comrades were attempting to set up some sort of a defense against the enemy. He fired at the onrushing force until his ammunition was exhausted. Still carrying his gun on his back, he fell back with this group to Krinkelt after accounting for more than 100 of the enemy.

The Distinguished Service Cross was awarded Pfc. Hugh M. Brady when a Tiger tank blasted his machine gun position four times and an enemy rocket set his ammunition on fire, yet he stuck with his gun until his comrades had reached a new position. In the same action of the memorable afternoon of December 17, as the German horde struck the left flank of Company I of the 23rd Infantry, threatening to envelope the company, Brady placed heavy machine gun fire upon the foe and held it there to cover a maneuver by the company.

The enemy had blasted these positions in six separate infantry attacks and now had brought up tanks to fire point-blank into the foxholes when Brady remained in his light machine gun position to cover a withdrawal to more tenable positions. When a Tiger Royal tank approached from the dense woods to a point within 100 yards of his gun, Brady ignored the monster and concentrated on the squad of riflemen accompanying the great lumbering armored vehicle. One of the Germans then fired the rocket which set his ammunition box on fire. Brady beat out the flames with his bare hands, burning them badly. He replaced the ammunition box

and continued firing until he had wiped out the squad around the tank.

The 88s blasted his position four separate times but Brady remained with his gun until the tank rolled to a point within twenty-five yards of his hole. Then he picked up his gun and walked out of the area unaided. Making his way to Krinkelt, he was unable to make contact with his company and fought with other units for two days before regaining contact with his unit. By covering the withdrawal and annihilating the tank crew he had dispersed the assault.

As the weight of the German offensive bore down upon the Krinkelter Wald the 3rd Battalion's lines were formed again and again, unable to hold the onslaught of the tank attacks. As darkness approached the battered remnants were ordered to pull back to Rocherath and Krinkelt where the survivors joined elements of other units in the towns to fight through the remainder of the engagement.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, defending Murringen, found itself in more favorable terrain. At mid-afternoon enemy tanks sortied up from the woods toward the front, but withdrew as a curtain of artillery fire was dropped before the defending battalion. Artillery continued to smash at the woods into which the enemy had withdrawn.

On the evening of December 16 Lt. Col. John M. Hightower III had led the Battalion to its positions near Hunningen to form a secondary line of defense behind the 394th Infantry in danger of attack by a large enemy force. When dawn came he emplaced his lines and weapons under an artillery barrage which became increasingly heavy as the 394th Infantry's line crumbled to the front beneath an overpowering enemy assault, leaving the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry manning the only defenses in the area.

At 1600 on December 17 the enemy loosed a devastating artillery barrage on the positions. Colonel Hightower hurried forward 500 yards to be with his line elements. Forced to abandon his jeep by a burst of fire, he continuing the remaining 200 yards running and crawling without cover until reaching one of his forward command posts.

Following the barrage the enemy launched a savage assault against the center of the line. Attacking first in battalion strength, the enemy made repeated efforts to storm the position. Six assaults were thrown back, and the seventh, launched shortly before darkness by an increased number of the 12th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, breached a portion of Company B's wide front and threatened the company command post.

Colonel Hightower, near Company B's command post, contacted an A Company platoon in a semi-reserve position north of Hunningen. Assuming command of this platoon, he led the men forward to the breach in B Company's line. Under small arms fire and with the enemy 30 yards away, he calmly placed the platoon and directed it in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. His presence inspired the men to greater effort and their tenacious defense prevented further penetration of the company position.

Returning toward Company B's command post he learned that the enemy was about to overrun another portion of the company front further west. Again he contacted an A

Company platoon, again he led them up into the threatened area through heavy small arms fire. Completely exposed to enemy observation, he placed his squads in position in the gathering darkness. When the enemy struck a bitter hand-to-hand fight ensued. He remained to direct the action until the enemy's ferocious strength subsided and the assault was gradually beaten off. The maniacal enemy failed to penetrate the company positions. Colonel Hightower was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action.

The 1st Battalion received a Presidential Citation for its outstanding performance of duty in action December 16 through 19 from the time it occupied the wide and frozen front, through the full fury of the German counteroffensive, and during the withdrawing action to pull back to a sturdier defense line.

"The gallant stand, until secondary defense lines could be established in the rear, denied the enemy a vital network of roads which would have isolated the 2nd Division and possibly would have broken through to the important supply center of Liege."

The action of December 17 in which the enemy charged the battalion positions in a frenzied assault, screaming their defiance, and afterward lay dead in the drifted snow all the way up to the American foxholes, was not repeated but the positions were subjected to intense artillery fire and strafing by enemy planes.

The pattern of German conquest was becoming clearer. One prisoner of war stated that Sepp Dietrich, commanding general of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, told the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 12th SS Panzer Division that the offensive was to be opened by Volksgrenadier divisions with a battalion of parachute troops dropped behind the Division lines. SS troops were to follow the initial attack, with the 1st SS Panzer Division on the south and the 12th SS Panzer Division on the north. The 2nd SS Panzer Division was to follow the 1st SS Panzer Division into the salient gained by the breakthrough, and the 9th SS Panzer Division was to follow the 12th SS Panzer Division.

A prisoner from the 277th Fusilier Company, 277th Infantry Division, captured by the 2nd Division on December 19 stated that the first objective of the 990th Infantry Regiment was Malmedy and the American supply dumps there.

The infantry and tank assaults had now opened a hole through the battered 99th Division line. The task force from the 1st SS Panzer Division previously mentioned had raced northwest to Bullingen. A flank guard of this same task force probed toward Wirtzfeld where it was wiped out. The main body then roared on to the west toward the Meuse River. The northern prong of the attack consisting of the 277th Infantry Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division smashed at the center of the 99th Division. The mission of the latter group was to advance on Liege by way of Elsenborn and Eupen.

For 56 hours this elite armored division of murderous inclinations assaulted the Krinkelt-Rocherath position of the 2nd Division head-on, while launching troops of the 277th Infantry Division in waves against the Division front. During the night December 17-18 they succeeded in getting both armor and infantry into the two towns and cutting the road from Rocherath to Wirtzfeld. Vigorous counterattacks by the 38th Infantry restored communications and contact with the Wirtzfeld sector, destroyed all enemy armor in the town, and dispersed the hostile infantry.

Thus at the end of December 17 the Division was in a

precarious situation. While attacking in a northeasterly direction and heavily engaged in action against the enemy, they had been confronted by an armored breakthrough in an adjoining sector which threatened to cut off the 2nd Division from the rear.

Withdrawing two regiments from close contact with the enemy and facing about to the south, the Division took up hasty defensive positions in the midst of an armored attack, mopped up enemy forces who had infiltrated into the area during the darkness and confusion, and repulsed the attacks of four German divisions through its lines. In addition, the 2nd Division permitted the withdrawal of the bulk of the 99th Division through its lines and secured the strategic Elsenborn Ridge area thus blocking the expansion of the German salient to the north.

As the 9th Infantry pulled back from its Wehlerscheid positions, pressure was heavy on the 99th Infantry Division and the enemy's armor was threatening to drive through the Division's flank and rear. The 9th was ordered to abandon its hard-won salient and move immediately to Wirtzfeld, which it did without loss of time and with all its equipment. With the enemy in Bullingen there was an immediate threat to the Division command post and the regiment was ordered to take up positions protecting the right flank of the Division.

Antitank Company and attached platoons were placed to meet the expected onslaught of the enemy armor. The first platoon of Antitank Company and an attached platoon of tank destroyers, with the mine platoon deployed as riflemen, engaged the enemy tanks and half-tracks, several of which were destroyed and the remainder forced to retire into their captured stronghold of Bullingen. Enemy infantry observed across the ridge were also engaged and dispersed with such effect that the assault was broken.

While the thrust at Wirtzfeld was being repelled, General Robertson moved on to encounter the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry which had reluctantly abandoned its pillboxes and Wehlerscheid and deployed in record time to a defense line northeast of Rocherath, to safeguard the east flank of the Division.

General Robertson diverted the 1st Battalion and Company K, directing them into defensive positions along a vital road junction where the enemy must strike to reach Rocherath, and which must be held at all costs if the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments were to hold Rocherath.

While the 38th Infantry deployed into Rocherath the men took their stand at this vital corner which would soon make history.

The men had not completed setting up their positions when the sound of tanks was heard. From dusk to midnight the men held off one assault after another by the enemy's infantry and tanks. In the dusk, the utter confusion and the chaotic traffic conditions of the crossroads, some infantry and armor infiltrated to the rear where it was later taken care of by elements of the Division. Throughout the night assaults continued all along the front and enemy artillery pounded the positions.

The 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment was cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on 17, 18, 19 December when the men and officers of the 3d Battalion successfully repelled the vicious enemy panzer attack that had successfully penetrated adjacent units, thus exposing the right flank of the 38th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to a defensive position south and east of Krinkelt, Belgium. Moving from attack positions in the

Siegfried Line, the battalion moved approximately six miles on foot to meet the panzer threat. The battalion hurriedly set up and outposted the area later to be occupied by the 3rd Battalion and the battalion on its left. Darkness was approaching and before a final consolidated position could be established the enemy pushed a vigorous tank-infantry attack into the left of the battalion.

"Only through outstanding courage, skill, and fearless initiative, demonstrated by all members of the 3rd Battalion, both individually and as a closely knit combat team, was the unit able to repulse the attack. Artillery, machine gun, rifle and bazooka fire deterred the enemy attack which was resumed the following day. Despite infiltrating enemy infantrymen's fire, the confusion that ensued and lack of communications, the 3rd Battalion successfully disengaged the enemy armor and infantry and covered the withdrawal of the entire regiment. In the three tumultuous days of fighting the 3rd Battalion suffered 111 casualties. Enemy casualties included 105 killed; an unknown number wounded, known to be heavy; 14 prisoners taken; four tanks destroyed by infantry and eight destroyed by artillery. The crews of the enemy tanks were annihilated as they emerged from the disabled armor in an attempt to assume firing positions. The courage, devotion to duty, and tenacity of each and every officer and enlisted man of the 3rd Battalion reflects the highest credit upon the armed forces of the United States" the unit citation reads in part.

The 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, is entitled to the citation streamer. The individuals assigned or attached to this unit on the occasion for which citation was awarded, are entitled to wear the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Unit Badge.

The cold and foggy morning of December 18 found the Germans hitting at the 2nd Division position from three sides. The men of the Division fought back with the courage, determination, and self-sacrifice which caused General Hodges of the First Army to say two days later: "What the 2nd Infantry Division has done in the last four days will live forever in the history of the United States Army."

All day enemy attacks varying in strength and size from one platoon to several companies probed at the Division lines, trying to find a soft spot for a breakthrough to the vital supply sector of Liege and Namur. That the enemy did not find a soft spot here was due to the fact that he was repulsed again and again by the Division's dogged stand. Had the enemy been able to break through the 2nd Division front here, he could have secured supplies for a drive to Antwerp and the sea, isolating the entire northern portion of the Allied Force.

A captured map showed five routes for this northern prong of Von Rundstedt's mighty effort. Two of these routes lay south of the 2nd Division sector. The other three routes, the 2nd Division blocked. By holding firm and fighting skillfully, General Robertson's men denied the use of these three ways of advance to the enemy.

As General Gerow pointed out on January 1: "General Von Manteuffel, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, stated in an address to his troops prior to the attack that 'Our ground mission must be continuous; otherwise we will not achieve our goal.' Due, in part, to the 2nd Infantry Division, this ground mission has not been continuous and he will not achieve his goal."

The fact that the 2nd Division held firm in this corner of the Bulge permitted the redeployment of the entire First Army. It limited the German effort to a futile and shallow

penetration which blunted itself against the Division line and then roared on to the west to dissipate its power and its last reserves of fuel in the Ardennes.

The morning of December 18 found the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry engaged once more by the Germans in heavy assault. From dawn until noon the Battalion fought off one infantry and tank assault after another, in vastly superior numbers. Two companies of the 1st Battalion were overrun and suffered heavy losses, yet fought on with indomitable spirit.

Friendly artillery interdicted the woodlands to the southeast of the Battalion's positions where tanks were heard maneuvering into position and milling about all night. The enemy attacked at 0845 hours after covering the Battalion position with interdictory fire throughout the period since the last attack of the night before.

During the night several of the tanks had maneuvered and infiltrated close to the Division front. Looming on the horizon in the mist, these opened fire to cover the advance of other hostile tanks and infantry. Friendly artillery fire came down on call to curtain the Battalion's flanks and front. Nevertheless the enemy attacked with fanatical savagery. The battle soon became a melee. Positions of Companies A and K were hardest hit; commanding officers called down their own artillery fire upon their own positions as the number of the enemy greatly exceeded that of their own men.

Meanwhile elements of the 38th Infantry were pushing out from Rocherath to set up a defensive front through which the elements of the cut off units of the 9th Infantry could withdraw. However, the position of the men was now so desperate that counterattack was necessary to enable the men to make a trial at withdrawal. Accordingly a platoon of tanks from the 741st Tank Battalion was brought up. Friendly artillery fired a 30-minute preparation to isolate the area of the scheduled counterattack.

The tanks moved up toward the crossroads from both flanks and destroyed two of the enemy's tanks before withdrawing to reorganize. At 1230 hours they attacked again and elements of the 1st Battalion were able to effect withdrawal.

The 1st Battalion, plus Company K, then numbering only 20 officers and 197 enlisted men, proceeded by way of Rocherath to Krinkelt under the command of the 38th Infantry. During the action east of Rocherath, 15 enemy tanks had been destroyed, an estimated 200 of the enemy had been killed and 500 wounded. Company A and Company K had been hardest hit: from the former unit ten men survived, from the latter one officer and five men.

For their action in these two great engagements at the crossroads near Rocherath, which the men thereafter called Purple Heart Corner, the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry received a Presidential Citation.

"The individual courage, gallantry, and esprit de corps displayed by the officers and men of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, successfully stemmed the enemy drive and exemplified the highest traditions of the military service," the citation reads.

Private William A. Soderman was operating a bazooka at the key road junction when the assault struck the 1st Battalion's positions. His assistant had been wounded in the artillery barrage, and he waited alone in the gathering dusk with his weapon ready as he heard tanks approaching. Five Mark V tanks bore down on his position, but he waited until they were at point-blank range. Then he leaped up,

disregarding the full firepower of the enemy which could be brought to bear on him, and launched a rocket into the lead tank, setting it a blaze and forcing its crew to flee. The other tanks withdrew before he could reload.

The bazooka gunner remained at his lonely post all night long enduring the severe artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire poured upon the road junction. The next onslaught of tanks materialized out of the murky gray light shortly after dawn on December 18 as five more tanks approached the positions. Running along a ditch to meet them, Private Soderman chose an advantageous spot, then leaped into the road in full view of the tank gunners. Calmly aiming his weapon, he fired a rocket which disabled the lead tank. The other tankers, unable to get past the incapacitated tank due to the deep ditch on the roadside, gave up the effort and withdrew.

Returning to his post, Private Soderman encountered an enemy platoon and approached to close range, then killed at least three of the enemy and wounded others with a round from his bazooka.

By this time Company K's position was untenable and orders had been issued for withdrawal under heavy pressure. Already in the assembly area, Private Soderman once more heard tanks approaching. Knowing that the elements of the Company had not yet been able to disengage themselves, he left the comparative safety of his position and set out with his bazooka to meet the tanks now bearing down upon his comrades at the crossroads. Once more he disabled the lead tank with a rocket. Before he could reach cover, machine gun bullets from the tank ripped through his right shoulder.

Unarmed and seriously wounded, Private Soderman dragged himself along a ditch until he reached the lines. He was evacuated. The gallant bazooka gunner was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his feat. His citation for the highest soldier award reads in part:

"Through his unflinching courage against overwhelming odds, Private Soderman contributed in great measure to the defensive of Rocherath, exhibiting to a superlative degree the intrepidity and heroism with which American soldiers met and smashed the savage power of the last great German counter-offensive."

During the morning of December 18 at the road junction near Rocherath a Tiger tank broke through and bore down upon a position occupied by T/Sgt. James L. Bayliss, who made his way forward under heavy machine gun fire to disable it neatly with his rocket launcher.

When later in the day the position was ordered to withdraw, Bayliss voluntarily covered the disengaging action with his fire. He displaced his gun to a vantage and exposed point in the midst of a fierce infantry-tank assault to cover the movements of his men.

As Company B moved out the German tanks and infantry closed in quickly. "Twice a German tank fired its cannon at point-blank range against the position occupied by Sergeant Bayliss, but he remained at his post, continuing his fire, until he was struck and killed by a third round from the enemy vehicle," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross, awarded him posthumously for the action, relates.

After the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry was ordered to move to Camp Elsenborn and take its place in the defensive line being formed there, the 3rd Battalion remained in positions covering the right flank while remaining units from the Wirtzfeld-Krinkelt-Rocherath triangle passed through the 2nd Battalion's positions. The subsequent withdrawal of the

3rd Battalion was rendered extremely hazardous by enemy shelling of the Wirtzfeld area as the enemy, suspecting the move, followed the withdrawing units with harassing fire, engaging them with small arms and machine gun fire as they fought their way back to the new positions.

General Robertson moved on to direct the defense of the Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld triangle. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his personal direction and participation in the fighting in defense of Wirtzfeld where he braved direct tank fire to supervise disposition of his troops and direct their fire, and for his direction in the diverting of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry to the critical road junction east of Rocherath on the afternoon of December 17. Finally he organized troops from his own command and remnants of other elements for the defense of the Rocherath-Krinkelt area.

"Constantly exposed to intense fire from tanks, machine guns, and small arms, Major General Robertson, by his personal direction and his calm and collected demeanor, successfully rallied his men to hold their ground tenaciously. His presence among the foremost elements of his command, his exemplary courage and his self-assurance were primarily responsible for knitting the scattered troops into a cohesive fighting force and checking the forward drive of the enemy spearhead," his citation reads.

The 38th Infantry was ordered on the morning of December 17 to deploy for the purpose of protecting the vital roadnet around Rocherath and Krinkelt, first breaking contact with the enemy in the Monschau Forest and making a six-mile march across the front of the enemy whose attack was now attaining full stature and momentum. One armored column had already penetrated far to the Division rear area.

Regimental Headquarters Company was in the process of establishing a command post far out in the Monschau Forest and laying wire lines to attacking battalions. Organizing an all-around defense, the company was ordered to withdraw to Rocherath. The only route was heavily interdicted by enemy artillery fire. Two German tanks forced the company to detour for two miles along strange roads.

Arriving in Rocherath just after dark on December 17, the company fought against the infiltrating enemy to set up its command post. Wire crews encountered hostile patrols at every turn and engaged in numerous firefights before reaching battalion positions.

On the morning of December 18 the company was attacked by five German tanks and one company of infantry. Abandoning their assigned and regular duties for the time being, the officers and enlisted men engaged the enemy at close range, killing 30 and destroying three tanks. The remainder of the attacking force retired in great confusion.

Contact with the 3rd Battalion was lost and the positions were in danger of becoming isolated. A patrol of kitchen personnel, truck drivers, and clerks moved up through enemy held positions and established contact with the battalion, conveying vital information as to enemy strength and dispositions. The company was awarded a Presidential Citation for outstanding performance of duty, fighting as a front-line unit throughout the three-day period and "contributing immeasurably to holding the position and preventing the enemy from reaching vital supply installations, in addition to functioning as an efficient headquarters organization."

The 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, not in direct contact with the enemy, had been the first to move out. Heavy traffic made the going difficult by foot, and enemy aircraft

attacked one company of the column en route. The battalion moved to Rocherath and took up positions around the town to the southwest, south, and east, suffering a further attack by hostile elements during the process. Meanwhile Antitank Company and Service Company, both in Rocherath were alerted and moved up to protect approaches to both towns. A surprise attack developed in the sector from the south.

"Holding the central hub and main supply route for the 38th Infantry Regiment, men of Antitank Company deployed in a defensive position," the unit's Presidential Citation for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy reads.

"At dusk, an intense enemy artillery barrage battered the area, and as it lifted some 20 minutes later, approximately 20 enemy tanks followed by 300 enemy infantrymen entered the area.

"Employing floodlights, the enemy tanks traversed the area firing at friendly positions point-blank. Courageously, members of the Antitank Company held their positions and inflicted approximately 65 casualties, forcing the enemy to withdraw, after having run through the friendly positions.

"Fighting furiously, the Antitank men softened the attackers and enabled friendly troops to occupy Rocherath. On December 18, because of the critical situation, Antitank Company was assigned to a sector of defense covering 400 yards. The Germans with ten tanks attempted a breakthrough. Despite overwhelming odds the company stopped the attack, holding the line as rifle troops until 19 December when the regiment withdrew to Berg, Belgium. Men of Antitank Company, though having suffered 28 casualties, three of whom were killed, nine wounded, and 16 missing, succeeded in destroying nine tanks, killing 56 Germans, and wounding an additional 100."

Cannon Company, in an assembly area at Kalterherberg, was not yet committed due to lack of positions, and half of its personnel were engaged as litter-bearers with the forward elements and as wire men with the supporting artillery, leaving only minimum gun crews in the town. When the attack struck several of the men serving as litter-bearers and wire men were wounded while some seized rocket launchers in an effort to stop onrushing enemy and others aided the artillery gun crews in changing position and establishing communications.

In the town the remainder of the company organized an antitank defense with the organic howitzers under incessant shelling by the enemy while hostile aircraft bombed and strafed the town. The enemy dropped parachute troops between the company's positions and the front lines. The company maintained its positions here and its liaison with supporting field artillery until December 20.

The infantry division on the right of the sector broke under the weight of the German assault and remnants of crushed elements streamed past the hastily organized 38th Infantry front toward the two villages. Enemy foot troops and tanks infiltrated to the road harassing southward movement of the regiment.

With approaching dark the enemy appeared in strength to the east of Rocherath where troops of Service Company held a critical road junction and fought the enemy advance to a standstill.

The 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry reached Rocherath at 1730 hours after breaking contact with the enemy and entered the village through intense artillery and nebelwerfer

fire, taking up positions to the east of Krinkelt and southeast of Rocherath extending the line of the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion followed the 1st Battalion south to Rocherath and was likewise forced to engage in firefights with the infiltrating enemy in order to occupy its assigned sector north and east of Rocherath. An enemy attack in the area had been blunted only a few hours before by the men of Antitank Company. At 2100 the enemy struck again east of Krinkelt but was repulsed by friendly artillery and mortar fire and the infantry riflemen in the area.

At another point a force of three tanks and a company of enemy was engaged and eventually driven out by the 3rd Battalion. Regimental Headquarters Company entered Rocherath after an extremely hazardous motor trip to find the intended command post occupied by Germans who had to be cleared out by assault squads armed with grenades and small arms. With the arrival of the infantry units Service Company resumed its normal functions and moved regimental supplies and equipment to Wirtzfeld under enemy fire, coming through with the loss of only one vehicle. Antitank Company likewise was relieved but continued to man guns on the critical approaches.

During the night a heavy force of enemy infantry and tanks began assembling south of Krinkelt. Heavy artillery and mortar fire broke up an impending attack and set two tanks afire. In the villages tanks which had broken through and infiltrated behind the front lines were systematically hunted down and destroyed and the groups of infantry in the towns reduced. The close-knit operation of the elements in the towns was maintained despite the great confusion and the darkness and the enemy was thwarted at every turn in tumultuous fighting.

On December 18 the German attacks on Krinkelt and Rocherath continued through the day and again on December 19. These attacks took the form of successive impulses of enemy armor, occurring about every two hours. These armored attacks were canalized to the roads, and were followed by infantry.

Division Artillery, reinforced by Corps Artillery, dropped curtains of fire on all approaches, destroying enemy infantry and armor, and effectively preventing German reinforcements from reaching the scene of the attacks. From time to time the enemy armored thrusts and infantry assaults penetrated this screen, and were repulsed. In the sector around the two towns during this 56-hour battle, 78 enemy tanks were knocked out, with none claimed at ranges in excess of 150 yards.

The 395th Infantry had effected its withdrawal north of this sector late on December 17 and now some 2000 men had been incorporated into combat elements of the 2nd Division. These remnants of combat element which had been shattered in the enemy's initial thrust fought on tenaciously in the Rocherath-Krinkelt sector and provided manpower to maintain 2nd Division units at effective strength.

Attacks were repeated by the enemy in the Hofen area on the morning of December 18. The presence of German paratroopers between Kalterherberg and Hofen led to the formation of a task force to protect the north flank of the Division. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion was called upon to give all possible support to the troops in the Hofen area. One-half the guns of the Battalion were shifted to the north. For two hours one-half the Battalion's guns were engaged in defensive fires to repulse enemy armor and infantry in the Hofen area. The remaining guns continued their screen of

fire on Rocherath where they had been engaged in heavy interdictory fire since the preceding day.

At 0740 the enemy renewed the assault on Rocherath in such fury that all guns were shifted to the south to neutralize artillery and hold off the enemy infantry and tanks. An hour later the enemy renewed the assault in force on Hofen and the guns were shifted to the north again. At 1200 hours the situation in the Hofen area became critical and a task force was formed under the command of the commanding officer of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion and including also elements of the 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, 9th Infantry Cannon Company, and a provisional infantry company formed of members of miscellaneous shattered units in the area, with the mission of protecting the left flank of the Division. The task force took up its position astride the Kalterherberg-Elsenborn road.

At first light of December 18 another task force had been formed of elements of the 23rd Infantry, rear echelon personnel of the Division and attached units, personnel from anti-aircraft units of the 462nd AAA Battalion, and remnants of disorganized units making their way back through the lines.

In two battalions the task force commanded by Col. Jay B. Lovless, commanding officer of the 23rd Infantry Regiment. One battalion commanded by Major Frank Hoke, Division Special Service officer, was composed entirely of rear echelon personnel.

On the morning of December 18 these two battalions moved to positions on Elsenborn Ridge near Berg, Belgium, with Hoke Battalion on the right near Berg and Turner Battalion on the north. Both battalions turned at once to setting up defensive positions which the Division could occupy as units withdrew under fire from the untenable Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld triangle. While engaged in the arduous task of hacking foxholes and defensive installations out of frozen ground the men were under enemy artillery fire and suffered repeated strafing attacks by enemy planes. An increased use of aircraft by the enemy was characteristic of the entire period as activity in the air had been comparatively quiet in recent weeks. Long-range machine gun fire also fell on the laboring troops.

Early on December 18 the enemy resumed their thrusts at the 38th Infantry positions in the Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld triangle with strikes in the 1st and 2nd Battalion sectors. The strength of the armored attack east of Rocherath broke down antitank defenses and inflicted many casualties. Breaching the main line of resistance, the tanks broke through to Battalion Headquarters of the 1st Battalion. Company B plus a platoon from Company G accounted for the infantry. Five tanks were knocked out by Companies A and D. Subsequent attacks were directed at Company C and the right flank of Company A, the former resulting in the loss of three tanks by the enemy.

Later in the day an enemy force estimated at one battalion with a large force of supporting armor was observed moving up through the woods toward the front for a new assault. Enemy armor and troop concentrations were broken up by artillery fire and smaller concentrations in the battalion sector were dispersed. No attack was able to develop until mid-afternoon.

At 1500 hours, twelve tanks with accompanying infantry initiated a vicious assault against the left flank of Company A. Machine guns took a heavy toll of the panzer troops in the deep snow. A close-in artillery barrage knocked out four tanks and large numbers of the foot troops within 100 yards or so of the front. Shortly after another such attack

was initiated in the sector: it too was smashed by artillery.

The 1st Battalion was awarded a Presidential Citation for its role in throwing back these panzer attacks and for extricating elements isolated by the enemy penetrations. Later the unit fought a fearless disengaging action to allow troops to withdraw successfully to Berg.

"In three tumultuous days of fighting," the citation reads, "the 1st Battalion suffered 296 casualties, which included 12 killed and 162 wounded. Enemy casualties included 126 killed, an unknown number wounded (known to be heavy), 27 prisoners taken, eight tanks destroyed by the infantry, and seven destroyed by artillery.

"The crews of the enemy tanks were annihilated as they emerged from the disabled armor in an attempt to assume firing positions. The courage, devotion to duty, and tenacity of each and every officer and enlisted man of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, reflect the highest credit on the armed forces of the United States."

The Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to Lt. Jesse L. Morrow for action when the 1st Battalion was moving into its defense positions near Krinkelt. The enemy attacked with a force of one tank with infantry, penetrating the line successfully and thrusting inward as far as the 1st Battalion CP, as at that time no defense of the area had yet been organized. Lieutenant Morrow, exposing himself to direct close-range fire as he directed the organization of command post personnel into a line of defense, personally engaging the enemy from time to time with any weapon that came to hand.

"As one of the tanks directed its fire upon him, First Lieutenant Morrow advanced boldly, fired a rifle grenade and knocked the tank out of action," his citation for the second highest soldier honor reads.

On the following day the enemy attacked again with five tanks and supporting infantry. Lieutenant Morrow fought at close range despite a wound in his left arm and was engaged in firing antitank grenades at close range when he was seriously wounded in the neck and received two wounds in the head and four in the chest. His action was held responsible in large measure for the destruction of the tanks and infantry which were totally destroyed in the fighting.

Once the men of the 1st Battalion had cleared out the enemy in close fighting from basements, attics, and deserted buildings, all efforts to penetrate the positions' interior failed and access to the vital Rocherath-Krinkelt roadnet was denied the enemy.

The 2nd Battalion meanwhile repulsed a day-long series of attacks on December 18. Twelve enemy tanks led by a Sherman tank with American markings smashed at the left flank of Company E under the smoke of burning buildings. The Sherman tank was within 100 yards of the position when it opened fire. The weight of the attack broke down the antitank defenses and the company suffered heavy casualties, but inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy. Company E was forced to withdraw 200 yards but reoccupied their positions under the very guns of the enemy tanks to fight on despite the confusion which reigned in the area.

Near the regimental command post Company G engaged a force of one company supported by armor when rocket launcher teams destroyed three enemy tanks and annihilated their crews. Two other tanks were knocked out by tank destroyers. A counterattack by Company G caused 35 casualties to the enemy flank and the attackers withdrew the battered remnants of their armor and foot troops.

A route of withdrawal was cleared for friendly troops by

Company F, advancing by means of assault fire over terrain devoid of cover. The attack reached its objective but was met by infiltrating enemy troops which had broken through the unit to the east. Rocket launcher fire dispersed the enemy who recoiled and smashed again at the company line. Heavy casualties were caused in the enemy ranks by an attached platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H. The tanks infiltrated through to the rear but were mopped up by friendly units.

The enemy attacks continued into the night when the tanks brought searchlight into play to locate American firing positions, as the tank crews raked the area with machine gun and cannon fire.

The 2nd Battalion was awarded a Presidential Citation for "outstanding courage, skill, and fearless initiative demonstrated by all personnel." It killed and wounded 500 of the enemy making those fanatical thrusts and held the positions despite penetrations of the MCR.

Early on December 19 the Commanding Generals of the 2nd Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 9th Infantry Division formulated plans for a coordinated defense of Elsenborn Plateau, a long natural ridge and a far tighter and more defensible position than the scattered roads and villages of the border. To cooperate in this plan of defense the 2nd Division had to pull its entire line back some four or five kilometers to the rear on December 19-20. The plan, approved and executed by V Corps, involved an after-dark move of tremendous scope by the Division still under repeated attack of German units.

During that night the 2nd Division, plus the 395th Infantry Regiment and elements of the 393rd Infantry Regiment, executed a daring night withdrawal over the one-way secondary road just completed by the 2nd Engineer Battalion. All roads in the area were drifted high with snow. In some places it was necessary to clear new roads to connect portions of existing routes.

As the withdrawal of the troops was accomplished the engineers sent elements to erect road blocks and place mines at critical points along the roads as the area was vacated. Enemy tanks had already entered Krinkel as the engineers began to mine that town, and the men came under direct tank fire as well as artillery and small arms fire. Nevertheless an effective blockade was formed and held against the enemy armor. The withdrawal was made in good order.

Phase by phase, the withdrawing action was effected all along the line. The men took up positions in the partially organized and dug-in defense line. Except for heavy interdiction fires, the withdrawal movement encountered no enemy reaction. By the morning of December 20 the northern shoulder of the German Bulge was firmly established at Elsenborn. The Division held a strong and continuous position along the ridge and was in contact with units on either side. Attempts of the enemy to break through to the vital Elsenborn-Eupen road had been frustrated: the Division had stood resolutely in the path of the most frenzied panzer assaults and hurled them back again and again.

Repelled here in the first critical stages of the Ardennes Offensive, the German armor moved on to seek elsewhere for an outlet but it was too late. The Third Army threw its weight against the southern flank of the salient and by December 22 was attacking on a two-corps front in a brilliant shift from Saar to Luxembourg. The weather ceased to favor the enemy shortly afterward and tactical air forces struck terrific blows at the Germans' armor and supply columns.

The great gamble had been lost when, in four days, Elsenborn Ridge and the road to the primary objectives of Verviers, Liege, and the Meuse had been denied them. The German penetration was thus limited to a futile and impotent drive through the comparatively valueless Ardennes.

During the three-day engagement the Division and its attached units had destroyed more than 100 armored vehicles, inflicted correspondingly heavy losses on the panzer troops, and reduced the 12th SS Panzer Division and the 227th Infantry Division to strategic uselessness and depleted strength.

The salient, which extended more than 50 miles at its point of deepest penetration into the Allied Lines, included no great important objective. The enemy had lost the offensive on which every effort had been brought to bear when he failed to shake loose the units which fought tenaciously and valiantly to hold the critical shoulders of the bulge.

Only 225 prisoners were taken in the defensive fighting: few prisoners were taken from Von Rundstedt's men. The Division's losses were by no means light, but the cost to the Germans and their failure to seize any really important objective represented a failure so great that the "hinge of the bulge" at Elsenborn could be counted a complete and unquestionable victory.

The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion received a Presidential Citation for its outstanding performance of duty in keeping with "the highest traditions of the Corps of Engineers and the United States Army," the citation covering the entire period from the invasion of the Siegfried Line on December 13 through the establishment of the Elsenborn positions December 20. In its initial assignment the battalion had to remove the heavy roadblocks, obstacles, and minefields covering approaches to the Siegfried Line, under heavy artillery fire and the most adverse weather conditions.

Then as the German counteroffensive in the west struck the sector, one company fought in tragic Bullingen where pocketed elements held out for three days until finally overcome. Other elements were twice thrown into the line as infantry reserves against the rear flank pressure of the enemy. Another company set up road blocks and obstacles behind the withdrawal. In addition the Engineers had the mission of keeping open the only escape route for the Division.

"This was a newly constructed one-way road across swamps and hills, which, despite severest conditions of melting snow and drizzling rain, was kept passable for the unending columns of tanks and trucks for the major part of two divisions which had to withdraw over this route," the citation reads in part. "The men of the battalion worked unceasingly, night and day, until the last vehicle of the Division was extricated. All through the days of attack and withdrawal, the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion skillfully, speedily, and courageously executed their tasks to assist and protect the 2nd Infantry Division in its combat missions. Through the seven-day period, the battalion worked and fought continuously, suffering approximately 25 per cent casualties."

Instances of individual heroism and self-sacrifice in the battalion were many.

The Congressional Medal of Honor went to T/4 Truman Kimbro of Company C of the Engineers who gave his life on a muddy road near Rocherath on December 19 during the withdrawal of the 38th Infantry and miscellaneous units from the town of Rocherath during the night. Kimbro was lead scout in a squad given the mission of mining and blocking a vital crossroads near Rocherath.



Chemical troops preparing ammo for 4.2" mortar, while supporting attack on villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath, Belgium.

At first attempt to reach his objective, he discovered that it was already occupied by the enemy with a tank and a force of at least 20 infantrymen. Driven back by withering fire, Kimbro made two more determined efforts to lead his squad up to the crossroads. All approaches were covered by intense enemy fire.

Warned by the infantrymen of the vast danger involved in the project, he left his squad in a protected place and made his way alone, laden with deadly mines, toward the crossroad positions necessary to the defense of the Division's withdrawing action and now firmly occupied by the enemy.

"When nearing his objective he was severely wounded," his citation for the nation's highest soldier award pointed out, "but he continued to drag himself forward and placed his mines across the road.

"As he tried to crawl from the objective, his body was riddled with rifle and machine gun fire. The mines laid by Technician Kimbro's act of indomitable courage delayed the advance of enemy armor and prevented the rear of our withdrawing columns from being attacked by the enemy."

When the enemy broke through the 99th Division lines and rolled through the Division rear to Bullingen he cut the routes of all three collecting companies of the 2nd Medical Battalion to the clearing station. The advance clearing station at Butgenbach came under heavy fire. At 0730 the station's position there became untenable and the platoon in charge moved into Elsenborn.

As the enemy force pushed out to the north toward Wirtzfeld and to the northeast toward Krinkelt, all traffic to the west was halted by the enemy threat and members of the ambulance platoon of Company A set out to open another route to Elsenborn through deep-drifted snow and fences. Meanwhile casualties of the heavy fighting poured into Rocherath and Krinkelt from all units of the 2nd Division and parts of the 99th Division. Heavy fire was falling in both towns. Company B in Murringen was in a similar state, under enemy shelling and strafing by hostile planes. A collecting company from an adjacent unit operated in the town but the company continued to care for its wounded.

When the route from Wirtzfeld to Elsenborn was open for one-way to the rear during the strategic withdrawal to the Elsenborn position, the men opened their own route and continued to operate over that route as well as over the route

maintained by the Engineers when it was opened for two-way traffic again. Company B accomplished its withdrawal to Elsenborn with its wounded and the bulk of its equipment.

Company C, in Krinkelt on December 18, was in the thick of the fighting in that town. At 0930 hours the engineers' route was opened to Elsenborn and vehicles and personnel which had been unable to get back to Krinkelt now returned to evacuate the wounded. Due to the urgent need of transportation it was necessary to leave behind most of the equipment.

The clearing company continued to operate in Elsenborn despite heavy shelling by enemy artillery and bombing and strafing of that crowded area. When the Division vacated the Rocherath-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld area and moved to Elsenborn, the clearing company moved its station behind the new defensive line into the town of Sourbrodt, Belgium.

The Distinguished Service Cross went to T/3 Clarence L. Hiner, an intrepid member of the Medical detachment with the 38th Infantry. Hiner, during a powerful enemy assault, went forward in the face of heavy fire and moved about in the devastating fire, calmly evacuating the casualties.

"Although his unit was withdrawing," his citation reads, "he voluntarily remained behind to aid a fallen soldier lying directly in the path of the enemy advance. The calm and profoundly courageous attitude which Technician Third Grade Hiner demonstrated in aiding the stricken men of his company, and his self-sacrifice above and beyond the normal call of duty in order that a comrade might benefit by his efforts, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army."

So many wounded were brought in—1,030 patients were treated during the three days of December 17, 18, and 19—that jeeps and ammunition trucks had to be commandeered for use without the benefit of Red Cross markings. Shells blew down walls of aid stations. One hit an ambulance broadside in Krinkelt but did not explode. The men used footpaths, back roads, trails to get the wounded through. They shoveled snow so that ambulances could get by to make their rounds.

The Second Signal Company received a citation for outstanding performances of duty in action during the four days December 16 to 19 when the men not only performed their duties under enemy assaults but fought in the front lines as infantry, inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy.

On December 16 the enemy's heavy shelling of rear areas ripped wire communications as fast as they were replaced and destroyed wire contact between Division and subordinate headquarters. Working in exposed positions and under incessant enemy fire, the men reinstated circuits in record time after they were blown and disrupted by German shells.

Then on December 17 came the enemy assault threatening to envelop company positions in Wirtzfeld as well as the Division command post in that town. Telephone operators, radio operators, messengers, clerks, and cooks of the 2nd Signal Company took up positions in the face of heavy fire from tanks and small arms. Shoulder to shoulder here in this frozen sector these units fought with other service troops of the Division to repel attacks upon the command post and the vital installations there.

Armed with antitank guns and small arms, the units threw back fierce attacks and kept their installations. Meanwhile the 2nd Signal Company maintained the urgently needed wire and radio communications which were under constant threat from hostile fire.

On December 19, as the Division fought a withdrawing action to the stronger Allied front, this movement was facilitated and immeasurably expedited by a well-coordinated wire communications net.

"Personnel of forward radio and switchboard centers were the last to leave the command post," the company's citation reads, "regardless of heavy shells infiltrating tanks and infantry. The courage, skill, and valor conspicuously exhibited by the personnel of the 2nd Signal Company exemplified the highest traditions of the armed forces." At Elsenborn the Signal Company men went to work again at once to set up the communications which would serve the command in that area.

The attached units fought as members of the Division during the crisis and deserve equal credit for heavy fighting under the most severe winter conditions. The 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion had its command post in Wirtzfeld, Company A at Hofen, Company B in Honsfeld, and Company C attached to the 99th Division. Company A fought bitterly in stemming German penetration efforts in the Hofen area and was awarded a Distinguished United Citation for its valiant fighting.

Company B was overrun early on December 17 by German armored forces which burst through the lines of the 99th Division attempting to effect a breakthrough in the sector. Later the remnants of this unit fought in direct support of the 23rd Infantry after making their escape to the Division lines. Company C was released from its attachment to the 99th and was attached to the 26th Infantry to hold defensive positions at Butgenbach until December 19 when it entered the fight for Rocherath and Krinkelt in direct support of the 38th Infantry.

Personnel of Battalion Headquarters participated in the bitter fighting at Wirtzfeld on the morning of December 17 and contributed to the saving of Division headquarters there. The Battalion command post was moved to Elsenborn when the Division set up its new defensive line. Both B and C Companies were heavily engaged during the action. Company B was credited with the destruction of numerous enemy armored vehicles at Honsfeld before being overrun.

Lt. Robert A. Parker, executive officer of the reconnaissance company of this Battalion, received the Distinguished Service Cross for fighting with the Division. As seven enemy tanks assaulted Rocherath at 0945 on December 18, Lieutenant Parker quickly organized rocket launcher teams. Securing a rocket launcher himself, he made his way to a ruined barn and set up his gun to score a direct hit on one of the ugly vehicles. Working his way down the street as the enemy's armored drive advanced, engaged in hide-and-seek among the fireswept buildings, he approached within 40 yards of the line of vehicles. Opening fire again, he scored two direct hits, setting one tank ablaze, disabling the other.

"Although subjected to devastating 75-mm. gun and machine gun fire," his citation for the DSC reads, "he continued to fire rapidly and damaged three more tanks before being wounded by enemy machine gun fire. His ammunition exhausted, he made his way back to his unit headquarters where he organized two rocket launcher teams and directed them in the elimination of the remainder of the hostile tanks."

Companies of the 741st Tank Battalion, with the exception of Company B, were initially attached to the infantry regiments and fought with them. Company B was initially employed to halt the enemy assault on Wirtzfeld. It assisted



Rocherath after the Breakthrough

in the destruction of several German armored vehicles in that engagement.

As units were redeployed to halt the enemy's attempts at breakthrough in the sector, the tanks fought wherever they were needed most to stem the tide of the attack. Two tanks supported the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry in its battle east of Rocherath and were destroyed by the fire of the heavier Tiger tanks. All crew members but one were killed in this action.

Three tanks assisted Service Company, 38th Infantry Regiment, in repelling a German tank assault on Rocherath on the night of December 17: they destroyed one Tiger tank but were themselves destroyed in bitter close-in fighting. Command tanks of Battalion Headquarters and Company A scored in knocking out five Mark V and Mark VI tanks in Rocherath on the morning of December 18 without suffering a single loss to themselves. Tanks of the Battalion covered the withdrawal action on the night of December 19 and were among the last elements to leave the town of Krinkelt before it was abandoned to the enemy and shelled by Division Artillery. They engaged enemy armor and infantry in that tricky withdrawal action although they had fought continuously, without sleep, and under incessant enemy fire.

The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company B, had been attached to the Division for the offensive through the Siegfried Line at Wehlerscheid and remained to fight with the Division through the Breakthrough. Company A was attached to the 9th Infantry, Company C less one platoon to the 38th Infantry. Battalion Headquarters and one platoon of Company C were attached to Division Artillery. Company A moved to Wirtzfeld with the 9th Infantry during the afternoon of December 17. There they engaged in the defense of Wirtzfeld.

On the night of the withdrawal action December 19, the tank destroyers of Company A covered the withdrawal action of the 9th Infantry as that unit moved out of Wirtzfeld. The 9th Infantry was the last regiment to leave the area, and in their wake the company set off prepared demolitions on the bridges and mined the approaches before withdrawing in turn, all the time under intense fire from nebelwerfers which set nearby buildings ablaze and thus illuminated the scene of their operations.

Company C made its way back from the Monschau Forest



Infantrymen of the 2nd Division pass tank destroyers as they move through heavy fog and rain into the town of Krinkelt.

area of the Wehlerscheid Salient with the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, last unit to withdraw from that sector. They blocked off the route of the withdrawing action during the disengagement and the march to Rocherath. At the road junction two kilometers north of Rocherath the tank destroyers went into position temporarily. Under heavy fire they repelled several tanks in the heavily wooded area to the east, and by aggressive action prevented the enemy's armor in this spot from cutting the Division's main supply route.

Retiring into Rocherath as they were relieved by elements of the 99th Division, they defended Rocherath and Krinkelt in the three-day battle for those towns and destroyed many enemy armored vehicles during the fighting there.

Batteries of the 462nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion were attached to organic battalions of Division Artillery with A reinforcing the fires of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, B with the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, C with Headquarters Division Artillery, and D to the 12th Field Artillery Battalion. A Battery at Kalterherberg was part of the vital northern flank defenses of the Division. It was constantly under intense artillery fire throughout the enemy attacks on Hofen. Its members were engaged in countless skirmishes with German parachute troops.

Several quadruple-mounted 50-caliber machine guns engaged intensively in the defense of Wirtzfeld on the morning of December 17. On December 19 when the enemy staged an air raid on the Division command post in Camp Elsenborn plus numerous bombing and strafing raids throughout the Division area, the Battalion claimed a total of 11 German planes shot down and eight probables.

The 987th Field Artillery's A and C Batteries were attached to Division Artillery and reinforced the operations against the Siegfried Line with their long range fire from 155-mm. self propelled guns. When the German counteroffensive struck the Division, these batteries were integrated into the

ground fire plan by wire communications and survey under the fire direction center of the 12th Field Artillery Battalion. Throughout the three-day engagement they fired practically incessantly, their fire power greatly bolstering the fire of Division Artillery and being most urgently needed.

The Breakthrough tested the ability and courage under fire of the attached units as well as that of the Division, and the mettle shown by these men greatly abetted the defense of this blazing corner and the skillful and successful disengaging action which followed as the troops set up defenses on Elsenborn Ridge.

The following communication was received by General Robertson from Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, commanding general of V Corps, on January 1:


"I wish to express to you and the members of your command my appreciation and commendation for the fine job you did in preventing the enemy from carrying out his plans to break through the V Corps sector and push on to the Meuse River. Not only did your command assist in effectively frustrating that particular part of the plan, but it also succeeded in inflicting such heavy losses on the enemy that he was unable to carry out other contemplated missions in other sectors of the Allied front.

"General Von Manteuffel, commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, stated in an address to his troops that prior to the attack that 'our ground mission must be continuous: otherwise we will not achieve our goal.' Due in part to the 2nd Infantry Division this ground mission has not been accomplished, and he will not achieve his goal.

"My sincere thanks for all that you have done for the Allied cause during 1944, and best wishes for even greater and more decisive successes during 1945."

General Von Manteuffel himself paid one of the highest commendations to the 2nd Division when he said: "We failed because our right flank near Monschau ran its head against a wall." That wall was the men of the 2nd Division.

E L S E N B O R N A N D T H E P A S S



Snow lay deep along the Siegfried Line as the remnants of Von Rundstedt's panzer divisions were repulsed, leaving the 2nd Division to the comparative quiet of occasional bombing and strafing by the German Air Force and heavy almost daily concentrations of artillery fire and considerable nebelwerfer fire on the positions along Elsenborn Ridge.

After the Elsenborn positions were taken up and consolidated, there was no further threat of a breakthrough in the area. The lines held firm from the time the withdrawal to Elsenborn was completed. All enemy attacks were firmly repulsed, giving way to heavy artillery duels as the German counteroffensive roared off to meet its nemesis at Bastogne.

As the 23rd Regimental Combat Team prepared for a new offensive through the Ondenal-Iveldingen Pass in mid-January, other units improved their Elsenborn positions and consolidated the line along the border while preparing for a new offensive across the Siegfried Line and into Germany.

Between December 21 and 29 the enemy's heavy artillery

from all types from 88-mm. to 240-mm. guns pounded the crowded areas behind the Division front lines at Elsenborn. Approximately 70 batteries of big German guns poured fire into Division elements, with the rear installations and their personnel bearing the brunt of the artillery onslaught. Extensive casualties were suffered a considerable distance behind the front.

Enemy aircraft appeared in greater strength than they had showed for months to give the Division command post and rear areas a thorough going-over with repeated bombing and strafing runs. Characteristic of this later stage of the Battle of the Bulge in the Division area, the air activity constituted a constant threat.

Division Artillery and attached antiaircraft units fired with stamina and tirelessness to overcome these threats. Their counterbattery fire in particular was extremely effective. Continuous fires of remarkable accuracy were made possible by the intrepidity of forward observers. Efficiently functioning



Standing watch: Elsenborn Ridge defensive



Visiting between foxholes during a quiet interlude on Elsenborn Ridge.

wire lines and command channels contributed immeasurably to the effectiveness of the Elsenborn Ridge defensive despite the enemy's heavy use of artillery and air power.

Thus Division Artillery continued to fire in all directions to the front of the Elsenborn positions, trail-shifting in deep mud, sleet, and snow. As the first and most immediate danger to the Elsenborn line was overcome, the men constructed Tobruk-type huts against the bitter cold which frequently froze the clothing to their bodies as they slogged through snow waist-deep in this rough, exposed terrain. Before the cold weather broke, the snow was two feet deep in open areas and collected in drifts and gullies knee-deep to waist-deep.

The freezing weather and the rugged nature of the terrain made it necessary to blast foxholes into the stony, frozen earth with explosives. The Division command post was located at Camp Elsenborn, a one-time famed Belgian winter resort popular with tourists fond of ice and snow sports. This spot with its chain of resort hotels had been converted by the Germans into a huge camp area. Its natural hills and ridge line provided the 2nd Division with a second main line of defense when Von Rundstedt's 20 infantry and tank assaults crashed into the line.

From December 19 to January 29, units of the First Army stationed in the Elsenborn area on the north flank of the German salient went from the defensive to the offensive in succession by units from west to east, gradually pressing the enemy to the south and east, eventually closing him back inside his Siegfried Line defenses.

From January 1, when the arrival of the New Year was celebrated with a TOT upon the German forces in Bullingen, through the middle of that month, air strikes continued. On January 1, 11 enemy planes strafed and bombed the Division area. Several planes were shot down by anti-aircraft units, and one of the pilots was captured. Artillery fell in moderate amounts. On January 2, 15 planes operated over the Division sector. Division Artillery destroyed a self-propelled gun, and artillery fire was light. January 3 found three patrols of the 38th Infantry operating toward Wirtzfeld and the north and south with varying success. Eighteen

prisoners were taken. There was little shelling, but mortar and small arms fire was received.

On January 12 the enemy began using nebelwerfers, six-barrelled rocket-propelled artillery pieces, to shell the Division lines and rear. Enemy parties were observed on January 16 laying more of their heavily laced booby traps and abatis, their fiendishly ingenious minefields which were cleared only by the sheer determination of mine details when the offensive was resumed across the Siegfried Line. Reliefs in the enemy lines were noted late in the month from time to time as the enemy adjusted his line from Bullingen through Wirtzfeld and to the northeast through the forward edge of the Monschau Forest. German outposts continued to hold forward of the main line in the vicinity of the border villages.

From Elsenborn Division Artillery continued to direct the fires of the 1st, 9th, and 99th Division Artillery units until the demand for massed firepower had ceased. During the latter part of the Elsenborn Ridge Defensive, targets became scarcer, but pinpointing of targets played havoc with enemy tanks and infantry columns which appeared within the range of fire and observation.

In mid-January the 23rd Infantry Regimental Combat Team moved away from Elsenborn to engage in a separate and important action in conjunction with a 1st Infantry Division drive, spearheading a Corps offensive against German-held St. Vith, scene of the breakthrough on the Belgian-German border. Final objective assigned the 23rd Regimental Combat Team was the Onderval-Iveldingen Pass, seizure of which was vital to allow the passage of the 7th Armored Division, heroes of St. Vith, attacking south to recapture that town.

This was the main effort of V Corps in that bitter January weather in the Ardennes, and part of a wide swing to wipe out the Belgian Bulge, the hinge of which lay in the Elsenborn Ridge positions of the 2nd Division. While Division Artillery and patrols harassed the enemy's supply system and tied down a considerable portion of his reserves at Elsenborn, the combat team moved out on January 13 from its position in reserve in the northern hinge of the defensive line against the Ardennes Salient.

Moving south in sleet and cold against the enemy's minefields in this corner of the Bulge, the combat team made its way through deep snow to the vicinity of Weismes, Robertville, and Ovifat. There the troops completed relief of elements of the 16th Infantry and moved the regimental command post to Bruveres despite heavy, fairly constant mortar and artillery fire. The 16th Infantry lay to the left of the sector, the 120th Infantry to the right, as the combat team made ready to attack early on January 15 toward the first objectives.

It was raw courage and spectacular individual effort which carried the 23rd Infantry and its attached units through these days of bitter fighting January 15 through 20 in this shoulder of the Bulge, while the First and Third Armies pounded away savagely at the enemy salient created in December, wresting the initiative away from the panzer troops to shrink the Bulge to the vanishing point from its 60-mile penetration at Christmas.

Spearheading the Corps attack, the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry won a presidential citation for its gallant action and its role in the reduction of the enemy's obdurate resistance at Ondenvall-Iveldingen Pass.

Immediate objectives of the 23rd Infantry were the towns of Steinbach and Remonval and the junction known as "Crossroads 68," originally in the 30th Infantry Division sector. The 2nd Battalion was to seize Remonval and the crossroads, the 1st to take Steinbach. Both encountered stiff resistance from strongpoints maintained tenaciously by elements of the 9th Parachute Regiment of the 3rd Parachute Division. The company attacking Steinbach was initially pinned down on the north edge of that town, receiving heavy fire, from the houses to the front, from the crossroads to the right flank, and from Steinbach on the left.

Meanwhile another company moved to the right to take the crossroads, which had stood repeated assault for two days from a battalion of another division. When one platoon became pinned down by heavy machine gun fire, Capt. John M. Stephens, Jr., commanding the company, moved two tanks of an attached armored battalion and the remainder of his company to the west and prepared to advance upon the objective in a flanking movement.

He called for artillery fire and fire from the guns of the

Firewood was free for the cutting here in the snows of Elsenborn.



Blasting foxholes in the frozen ground at Elsenborn


tanks upon the road junction and upon the small cluster of houses which stood about it, in the center of a vast snow-swept plain. Proceeding with the tanks and directing their fire, he led two platoons of riflemen over the open plain for a quarter of a mile in an old-fashioned infantry charge, assaulting the objective in a close firefight and taking 37 prisoners. Thus the long-resisting and deeply entrenched crossroads in a field of snow which offered no cover was reduced before noon and the action was a complete success.

While the company was preparing to proceed to the pass which was to be cleared and made available to armor, orders were received for the company to move east and reinforce the attack upon the snowed-in town of Remonval which the Germans were defending ferociously. Shortly after 1300 hours the company moved out across the open snow-covered terrain through vicious and cunningly-laid minefields, managing to skirt most of them.

Meanwhile, Steinbach had been cleared of the enemy in the face of obdurate resistance. One company took 34 prisoners and remained to occupy the town, while two others passed through them toward a hill to the southeast.

The company now approaching Remonval was pinned down by machine gun fire until one of the tanks silenced the position. The company moved on toward Remonval with Captain Stephens leading the assault elements. Placing the company in a somewhat sheltered position southwest of the town, he crossed a field 150 yards in length and heavily mined, to reconnoiter his next objective. Having formulated a plan of attack, he ordered his platoons forward to positions his own location, on a hill overlooking the town. No sooner had they reached the positions than they were pinned down by fire from two machine guns emplaced in houses within the town.

Captain Stephens crawled along a ridge for 100 yards under a hail of machine gun fire until he reached a position from which he could signal the tanks to move forward. Placing



them where they could cover the houses within the town with fire, he ordered another assault by the rifle platoons, across the long forward slope of a snow-mantled hill barren of cover and concealment. Because they were wary of the heavy volume of fire that had been pouring from the town, the men were inclined to be dubious of their ability to reach the objective without being mowed down, until the company commander took his place with one of the tanks, ordering the other to act as a base of fire with a rifle platoon, and led an assault force of one tank and two rifle platoons over the slope of the hill and into Remonval. Darkness was falling and it was necessary to move with all possible haste. Rounding the corner of a house, the captain saw an enemy gun and three men not 15 yards away. He drew his pistol and advanced. The enemy surrendered before he could open fire.

The right flank platoon cleared four houses from which resistance was offered on the opposite side of the street and the company set up a defense on the southern edge of the town, having taken 71 prisoners and killed 40 of the enemy in and around the town.

The two companies which had pushed on after the clearing of Steinbach, after being held up in the early stages of the advance, continued to press forward after dark, over deep snow and whipped by cruel winds, in total darkness. Despite the difficulties of their situation the two companies retained their contact and worked in excellent coordination, although they had to stop to coordinate their movements and renew attack every 50 to 100 yards. They had reached and secured their objective in the high ground by 2040 hours.

More than 130 prisoners were taken that day, all members of the same regiment of the 3rd Parachute Division, grim and voracious fighters, experts in this type of hand-to-hand fighting and fanatical in their zeal.

On January 16 Captain Stephens and his company, as the attack jumped off toward Onderval on the south, encountered slight resistance in the town and moved on swiftly to take

high ground to the southeast. Captain Stephens led two platoons and two tanks some 250 yards under small arms fire to the line of departure south of the town, then attacked at 1230 under the fire of the other two tanks which had been stationed on high ground. Both platoons encountered heavy fire from machine guns as they attempted to cross a draw in the zone of advance, and only one was able to withdraw, the other remaining pinned down in the draw by machine gun fire throughout the afternoon. The captain joined the tanks on high ground and directed their fire upon the heavily defended positions from which the enemy was firing on the platoon which was pinned down. When darkness fell he moved into the draw with another platoon and formed a protective line which allowed the trapped men to escape, remaining to direct the operation until the wounded were evacuated.

This company remained in Onderval for two days, then on January 19 attacked again, this time with the mission of seizing the western half of the town of Eibertingen. The company moved into the town against stiff resistance from the enemy ensconced in houses and behind walls along each side of a sunken road. The two lead platoons became engaged in a sharp firefight with the enemy in both rows of houses. After a half-hour of savage fighting and barbarous fire from the houses on both sides, the platoons were running low on ammunition.

When Captain Stephens heard of their plight by radio, he loaded two tanks with ammunition and set out to the rescue. Advancing with his pistol in his hand, the Texas-born officer coolly set off to aid his beleaguered men.

The enemy opened fire with small arms upon the tanks at a distance of 30 to 50 yards. Captain Stephens nonchalantly used his pistol to force the startled rocket teams back from the windows of the houses. He continued to move up the road, protecting his tanks from rocket launchers, until the lead platoons were reached and ammunition distributed. As



Winter on Elsenborn Ridge

a result, the men overcame resistance shortly and cleared the town. Having risked his life with calm disdain for danger three times, Captain Stephens was still unruffled and unwounded.

"Captain Stephens was a tremendous driving force and inspiration to his troops during five days of bitter fighting," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "His daring and regard for the welfare of his men were instrumental in securing three objectives of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry."

On the afternoon of January 17 two companies of the 1st Battalion attacking abreast moved down upon the Rohr Busch, a densely wooded and snowbound area, encountering machine gun fire from the thick underbrush which stopped both units momentarily. In the company on the left flank, withering heavy automatic and small arms fire pinned the assault platoons to the ground, in deep snow. First Lt. Samuel J. Murray, in command of the left flank platoon, had been instructed to keep his unit moving as rapidly as possible in order to protect the left flank of its battalion. Realizing that his men, in open ground, could remain pinned down forever, by fire which poured from thick protecting woods, he rose to his feet and ran forward 20 yards to the front of his platoon. The only man fully visible, he drew a terrific hail of machine gun and small arms fire upon himself from 100 to 200 yards to the rear, but he ran upright in front of his platoon, then turned his back to the enemy and called to the men to follow him.

The men rose immediately from their positions in the snow and followed him into the face of the enemy's fire. As the determined platoon bore down upon the woods, the enemy broke and ran. The men calmly continued to move forward until their objective in the Rohr Busch was reached that evening.

Early on January 18, a unit of another battalion filed through the platoon to continue the attack to the south and east. As they left the platoon area and advanced a short distance toward their objective, a tremendously forceful enemy counterattack struck them in full strength. A number of the men were pushed back through the platoon area. Using them to fill a gap to the left of his own platoon, Lieutenant Murray quickly organized a line. An enemy tank approached to a point within 50 yards of the newly organized positions and began firing into them point blank, using two machine guns and a 75-mm. gun.

Under the blasting fire, the men clung to their foxholes. The enemy infantry was able to advance virtually unopposed from the front. Braving the tank fire, Lieutenant Murray

moved through the heavy fire from foxhole to foxhole, exhorting and encouraging the men to repel the counterattack, until he had built up enough power to hold the enemy temporarily while he organized a flanking movement and pushed through the woods.

"Then, calling for volunteers, he led a rocket launcher team in an attempt to destroy a hostile tank which had spearheaded the attack," his citation for Distinguished Service Cross reads. "Although observed by the tank gunners and brought under the full force of the tank fire, he courageously advanced toward the tank until he was struck by enemy fire and severely wounded. Carried to his foxhole, he was again wounded by a bursting shell, but with great determination, he retained his consciousness and directed his men in repelling the hostile attack."

The line which he had organized fought on and repulsed the enemy with heavy casualties.

Fighting in dense woods and snow, with low-hanging clouds and a heavy ground haze, the men slogged through the ice and snow like ghosts in the Belgian forest, constantly cold, hungry, and exhausted. Yet their fighting spirit was burning high, and undoubtedly contributed vastly to the unqualified success of the entire operation, a battle which was successful not only in its outcome but in every phase of the action.

In no phase of this terrific fighting under the most trying weather conditions and usually under devastating enemy fire did the men fail to carry out the stringent tasks assigned to them as one objective after another was attained.

On that same eventful day, January 17, another company attacking to secure a portion of that wild and tangled stretch of winter woodland came upon three houses which the enemy had converted into strongpoints, each containing a machine gun sighted to sweep the entire expanse of open ground to the north over which the company must advance in order to approach its objective. As the men moved over the open ground in two feet of level snow, the two assault platoons encountered fire from the three machine guns and innumerable small arms which made further advance suicidal without the protection of supporting fire. Both platoons lay flat, pinned to the ground, while First Lt. Marvin H. Prinds, company commander, radioed for tank support. Soon two tanks were in the neighborhood ready to reinforce the attack in a frontal assault.

In order to assure his men the maximum protection while they covered the 250 yards intervening between the spot where they were pinned down and the woods ahead, Lieutenant Prinds leaped upon the tank which he had designated for close supporting fire and stood upon the hull, directing the fires upon



Three Americans, killed in the fighting for Ondenva, Belgium, lie side by side on a road in the town.

the three enemy strongpoints concealed in the houses. Needless to say he furnished a most conspicuous target, and the enemy guns quickly shifted their fire from his platoons to himself.

With disdain for the murderous fires which glanced off the tank in all directions, he calmly directed the fire of the tank's two machine guns and 75-mm. gun upon the enemy, then signaled for the men to follow. Still standing atop the tank, he continued to direct fire until he was struck in the stomach by machine gun fire and fatally wounded.

His men, inspired by his courageous actions, continued the attack with renewed fury and soon neutralized the two strongpoints, thus reducing a strongly defended area in a manner which was a large factor in the success of this entire operation. The officer who drew the fire of three machine guns upon himself to enable his men to emerge from a trap was awarded the DSC.

A battalion of the 18th Infantry meanwhile discovered an enemy strongpoint on the northern slope of the hill northwest of Iveldingen after sending out several patrols, and assumed defensive positions along a firebreak on the northern slope establishing a road block and cutting the north-south road which offered the enemy in the area his only route of escape.

On the preceding night a mine-clearing detail under the antitank company commander, using a tank dozer, was removing snow and thick-laying mines from the road when it confronted at least two platoons of the enemy, led by an officer. The group, which included only the mine platoon and several members of the 2nd Engineers Battalion, took three prisoners in hand-to-hand fighting, killed the enemy officer and seven of his men, succeeded in turning their tank dozer around, and escaped under a barrage from an enemy antitank rocket launcher, which struck the tank but did no damage.

On January 18 the attack was to be continued with one battalion of the 23rd Infantry striking south and one battalion of the 18th Infantry attacking north while defending the area to the south, all in one operation. At first light the attackers were counterattacked from the east, south, and west with the enemy striking swiftly with an estimated 400 men, eight tanks, and assault guns. It was a viciously fought engagement in

the dense pine woods, falling snow, and bitter wind as the enemy infiltrated rapidly through gaps in the positions and the area so well covered by well-placed tanks and machine guns that even evacuation and resupply were impossible until noon. By 1400 hours the enemy had been beaten back without loss of ground, but only by the fiercest action on the part of the defenders. Ninety-nine prisoners were taken and more than 300 enemy dead were counted in the Regiment's sector of the Roer Busch when the attack subsided.

On January 19 the attack was launched early under the most indescribably adverse weather conditions, toward Iveldingen and the village of Eibertingen. The 23rd Infantry was hindered at first largely by the weather, lack of visibility, and numerous mines and booby traps. One company moved into Iveldingen without encountering resistance and quickly secured it against token resistance. West of the town the company reduced a railway strongpoint in a frontal assault with tanks and took nine of the enemy who were eager to be prisoners.

Eibertingen, on the other hand, offered strong resistance from houses well converted into strongpoints. An enemy tank was knocked out by supporting tanks. Another enemy tank and one assault gun were driven out of the town. After the tanks arrived bringing ammunition and blasting the strongpoints, a column of enemy troops was seen leaving the town at 1500 hours. Artillery fire was brought down upon them with telling effect, and upon another column a little later, with more than 200 dead counted, largely along the sunken roads.

Two companies entered the town of Montenau, where a strongpoint was encountered but was reduced by supporting tanks. Fighting through snow and ice all the way, the combat team had now secured its objectives operating with consistent success. Clean clothes and hot food were immediately rushed forward as the area was cleared of the enemy.

The Regiment improved its positions next day and the 1st Battalion of the 18th Infantry was detached from the combat

This German pillbox, at Heartbreak Crossroads became part of the Division CP as the 2nd Division once more breached the Siegfried Line.





Back through the snowbound Belgian Forest toward the Siegfried Line move the soldiers of the 2nd Division.

team while contact patrols struggled with the deep snow. All road blocks, tanks, mines and other obstacles in the area were cleared by 0730 hours to permit the passage of the 7th Armored Division. The Regiment began moving back toward Elsenborn after having taken seven kilometers of enemy territory, hotly contested all the way. It had taken 373 prisoners, virtually all Paratroopers, and had killed 500 of the enemy and wounded many more, decimating the 8th Regiment of the 3rd Parachute Division.

The 2nd Battalion received a Presidential Citation for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy when it "moved on foot seven miles under severe enemy shelling, then launched a seven-day attack against stubborn enemy resistance. Blizzards, minefields, and bitter cold failed to stop the dogged advance. Casualties, in many cases, were covered with snow as they fell and froze to death, despite night-long searching by exhausted, cold, and hungry troops. Vigorous hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting broke out repeatedly before the defending paratroopers could be overcome and the objectives gained."

The "outstanding heroism, determination, and raw courage demonstrated by all personnel" of the battalion was commended in the action which spearheaded the corps attack upon the Belgian-German border.

A Presidential Citation also went to Antitank company for its action, in battle honors of the Twelfth Army Group, for a four-day assault which it made with lead combat elements January 15 through 18.

"Antitank men fought as riflemen in bitter hand-to-hand struggles before resistance by defending paratroopers could be smashed," the citation points out. "Other antitank personnel removed mines under fire and knocked out machine gun nests and tanks with bazooka fire."

As the combat team, its mission completed, pulled out to return to its place with the Division at Elsenborn, the full effects of the artillery operating in close support could be observed. The bodies of hundreds of Germans killed by the tremendous volume of artillery fire lay in the woods in groups of tens, twenties, and more, some with their frozen arms flung up as if to protect themselves from the rush of the screaming shells.

Two changes of command were made in the Indianhead Division during January. Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder, who had commanded the 9th Infantry Regiment since June 10, 1942, was relieved on January 10 by Col. P. D. Ginder. In the 2nd Engineer Battalion, Lt. Col. Robert B. Warren was relieved on January 17 by Lt. Col. Robert E. Snetzer.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE RHINELAND

CHAPTER XIV

THROUGH THE SIEGFRIED LINE



Mines were sewn thick in this corner of the Belgian Bulge

The 2nd Division, on January 24, 1945, received orders for a new attack in conjunction with the First Army's renewed offensive toward the Roer River, to the west of which the Germans still held a strongly fortified and garrisoned sector; the objective of the attack was to be the U-shaped chain of dams of the Roer and Urft Rivers, holding up the armored advance through Aachen gap into the Rhineland and the industrial areas of the Reich.

The mission of the 2nd Division at this time was to spearhead an offensive to cross the swollen rivers and secure the dams, thereby facilitating an armored breakthrough to the Rhine.

Attacking once more the critical borders of the Reich proper, the Division set out again in icy weather to breach the Siegfried Line. The first objectives were the tragic border

villages which were scenes of the December fighting in the Ardennes—Wirtzfeld, Rocherath, and Krinkelt. Then the Division would advance down the International Road to Wehlerscheid and the scene of the ill-fated salient at "Heart-break Corner" which was won and then abandoned when the men took their stand at Elsenborn to thwart the German counteroffensive in this shoulder of the Belgian Bulge.

The attack was set for January 30, the Division moving east toward the three snow-bound villages and Hill 629 one-half mile northeast of Bullingen. The attack was launched in bright, clear moonlight and deep snow after the engineers had worked all day to clear the ice-blocked roads through ghostly Bullingen and the deadly minefields laid by both the Allied Forces and the Germans in this sector of the Ardennes Forest, now buried under soft, innocuous-looking snow.

The 6,000 - pound, wide - tracked, snow - going "weasels" (M29C) which the Division had tested on winter maneuvers were pressed into service for the march. The going was slow at first as minefields of tremendous depth filled with explosive devices of the ugliest and most vicious sort complicated the advance. The task of pulling these and stacking them was staggering. The gently drifted snow now only concealed them: it rendered mine detectors useless. For weeks they had been lying there in wait, concealed and treacherous and death-dealing, until the Division started the slow trek back up through the Monschau Forest, past the scattered hulks of abandoned vehicles and blackened, acrid-smelling woodland. This time there would not be a turning back.

The drive to secure the Roer River dams, made in conjunction with the 9th and 78th Divisions, was launched with the primary aim of permitting the 9th Armored Division to cross the river and attack Cologne. The Germans' blowing of the sluice-gates of the two major dams bogged down the move and cost an additional ten days delay.

An interesting acquisition of this day was Ordensburg Vogelsang, a sort of SS West Point, which the 9th Division took and turned over to the 2nd as division sectors were shifted when the 9th moved to cross the river and attack toward Cologne. The institution lay well within the inner barriers of the Siegfried Line.

This grim Wagnerian pile, set high upon a hill overlooking the Urft lakes, shrouded in mist and frowning down upon the countryside, had been a school for the incubation and nurture of fanatical young Nazis. Its classrooms, dormitories, and assembly halls were still littered with the schoolboy possessions of the Hitler youth.

To the men of the Division, there was a distinct satisfaction in taking over this hotbed of fanaticism and breeding-place of lawless and aggressive war.

Extensive planning and reconnaissance had paved the way for the advance through new snowdrifts sometimes chest-high. The 9th Infantry moved in to occupy the wasted town of Bullingen without resistance. The enemy had evacuated it shortly before midnight of the preceding day.

When the advance elements came under fire from Rocherath

and Krinkelt, a planned artillery preparation was laid down, with 3200 rounds fired into the towns. Assault platoons closed up to engage in firefights along the borders of both towns. Although halted by deep snow and minefields several times, parts of two tank battalions moved up with the assault elements. White phosphorus shells and direct fire from tanks drove the enemy from their strongpoints in the towns.

The infantry fought their way into Rocherath and Krinkelt where the enemy's dead still lay unburied due to the swiftness of the assault. Nevertheless, the Germans continued to resist from house to house and had to be dug out from the cellars. The 9th Infantry encountered considerable resistance from houses northeast of Bullingen, but succeeded in occupying Hill 629 where they remained until next day.

Contact was made at dawn on January 31 along the defensive line the advancing infantry had drawn up overnight. Clearing of the towns began at first light as the Germans were flushed like quail from houses and cellars. One battalion of the 38th Infantry advanced to the north from Rocherath, mopping up an enemy now somewhat subdued. Heavy resistance was encountered at Rocherath Barracks a half-mile north of that town. One battalion of the 9th Infantry passed through the 38th Infantry and advanced north along the road toward Wehlerscheid and the German border. One battalion of the 23rd attacked along the road toward Hellenthal.

Hellenthal lay outside the Division's boundaries on the south bank of the Olef Creek, where higher authority had fixed the Division boundary after the Division front had been extended considerably forward. In early February the 38th Infantry, would be assigned to clear out this sector so that the 99th Division on the right could continue its advance. Meanwhile the Division would return through Wehlerscheid and Heartbreak Corner, to take the towns of Schoneseiffen, Harperscheid, Bronsfeld, Scheuren. Advancing over the barren ridges near Dreibern where enemy positions were buried in deep snow, the men would quickly reach the Roer in an auspicious start of the breakthrough to the Rhine.


On January 31 the advance was pressed up cautiously across the Siegfried Line and into Germany. One battalion of the 9th Infantry continued its advance to the north until it was

"Weasels" played an important part in supply and evacuation during the winter campaign. This one belongs to the 38th Infantry medics.



German prisoners watch at Wehlerscheid as the 2nd Division moves through Heartbreak Crossroads once again. The cage once held American captives.





The 105's of Division Artillery support the second battle for the Siegfried Line.

The 2nd Signal Company digs in its radio station and installations at Wehlerscheid.

They hit the snow: near Krinkelt

met by antitank fire half way between Rocherath and Wehlerscheid and had its lead tank knocked out.

By midnight lead elements of the 9th Infantry were nearing Wehlerscheid and the road junction, scene of their bitter triumph of December 16. They held no ceremony, but every doughboy was remembering, and silent tribute to the fallen comrades was paid in the still of night along that grim road back. The Germans, now instead of offering bloody resistance, were for the most part cowering in their pillboxes and foxholes until taken.

The 23rd Infantry established positions on the Rocherath-Hellenthal Highway and was engaged there at the close of day with an estimated two companies of the enemy which continued stubbornly to resist from dug-in positions. Despite small arms and fire from self-propelling guns, the 23rd took its objective.

While the 9th Infantry Regiment was approaching Wehlerscheid, the 9th Infantry Division approached and took that position from the rear, thus allowing the Regiment to pass through the Siegfried Line without frontal attack, and without any repetition of the fearful fighting it saw on the Wehlerscheid-Zollamt road not six weeks before. The 9th Infantry Regiment continued to attack east along the Wehlerscheid-

Harperscheid road on February 2, meeting stiff resistance from mortars and machine guns, and small arms fire. Artillery, then tank and infantry assault, reduced this opposition and the troops moved forward to a Y-shaped road junction near Schonesseiffen, north of which one battalion of the 9th Infantry encountered a strong position which gave trouble to the end of day. The attack swept on to Schonesseiffen despite assault guns and light flak guns, taking the town by 1700, then moving on to Harperscheid, clearing it of an enemy now apparently becoming disorganized.

Bursting through the Siegfried Line, the Division gained more than 8000 yards that day, capturing some 379 prisoners in this initial breakthrough, somewhat avenging the suffering of their first offensive upon the Reich's soil.

Deep snow, extreme cold, and rugged forest made the going rough. Antipersonnel mines and antitank mines were thickly implanted on all possible approaches and stretches of road. The Germans fought until their only choice was between surrender and death, and Nazi suicide squads haunted the upland forests. Identifications secured indicated a hodgepodge of troops, indicating that the merest fragments of all available units had been rushed to the front to assist in the defense of the Gemund-Schleiden area.



To Schleiden, Hellenthal, and Schonesseiffen—the 2nd Infantry Division is on its way.

This grinning captive taken at Bullingen does not seem sorry that his fighting is over.

The muddy roads of the Monschau Forests are lined with the ghosts of German panzer divisions thrown back in the Battle of the Bulge.

Wire crews were kept busy during the long strides of the advance into Germany.

On February 3 the 23rd Infantry continued the attack toward Brönsfeld, clearing the town after moderate resistance. Ettelscheid and Berescheid were occupied by the 9th Infantry after offering resistance in the initial stages of the attack. No enemy was encountered south of Bronsfeld to the Helles Bach, although they roamed the woods northwest of Hellenthal. The bulk of the prisoners taken were of the 89th Infantry Regiment of the 12th Infantry Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division.

Early on February 5 the Division launched a mighty push to clear the Schleiden-Gemund positions and reach the Roer River. The 38th Infantry jumped off at dawn to begin its operation to reduce the strongly held town of Hellenthal, in the 1st Division's zone of action, encountering an almost adamant foe established in well-fortified positions.

Two battalions of the 38th Infantry jumped off after extensive reconnaissance, one with the mission of seizing the high ground northeast of Hellenthal, the east end of the town itself, and the high ground to the southeast of the town. The other battalion would advance on the right down the

main road into Hellenthal, clear the west end of the town, and occupy high ground to the southwest. Hellenthal lay in a deep and well-enfiladed valley. High, dense woods and soft, wet earth made trouble for both infantry and armor, and minefields were abundant.

Both battalions crossed the line of departure at 0300 hours and both had advanced to a point within a thousand yards of the northern border of the town by 0500. Both came up against the northern branch of the stream known as the Olef Bach, or Creek, which ran through the north edge of town, and were established there by dawn. By 0715 hours, both battalions had separately come under fire from small arms, machine guns, and mortar guns enveloped within the town. Some fire was coming from behind the row of Siegfried Line defenses known as the inner West Wall and the Rembrandt Line, the last belt of which was hinged on Gemund and Schleiden.

Fire, intense and accurately observed, continued to rake the north bank of the stream, the sharply defiladed slopes, and the open approaches to the town. This lasted throughout the day and hindered every movement of the attacking batta-



A "weasel" in winter camouflage passes an abandoned German 40-mm. flak gun in Harperscheid.



Through bombed-out Harperscheid the men of the Division slog their way.

lions. Lead elements crossed the stream into the town by mid-morning, but found their positions untenable.

Efforts to move supporting tanks forward to the edge of the creek were frustrated by marshy ground and some peculiarly vicious minefields, among the worst encountered in the campaign. Division Artillery, emplaced in marshy and wooded areas around the town, succeeded in bringing fire upon attempts of the enemy to bring reinforcements into the town.

By noon, one company of the 38th Infantry succeeded in getting an assault platoon into the northwest corner of the town. The platoon was immediately cut off and rendered ineffective by fire from a pillbox. It remained cut off until contact was established with a company fighting its way into the town. Efforts of patrols to infiltrate were thwarted briskly and with grim determination.

A coordinated assault at 1430, following a ten-minute burst of heavy artillery preparation, failed to obtain more than a fingernail hold upon the grimly possessed town. One company cleared a factory and houses west of the town, another company was forced to withdraw from the south side of the

stream by concerted enemy tank-infantry action. At 1830 hours the cutoff platoon was contacted by a company fighting its way forward foot by foot.

A meeting of regimental and battalion commanders was held at 1945 hours to formulate plans to establish a bridgehead and clear the west end of the town during the oncoming night. A battalion crossed the stream and promptly came up against a wall of fire from a pillbox, half-track assault gun, and riflemen. These elements were cleared in rough-and-tumble fighting, and elements of the 2nd Engineer Battalion advanced to build a steel treadway and timber bridge during the night while another company cleared the approach of its heavy minefields and replaced blown stream crossings. Still another company threw a 70-foot Bailey bridge across the Olef Bach under cover of darkness. They were unable, however, to construct a bridge for armor into the town in time for the attack. All this mine-clearing and bridge-building work was accomplished under extremely heavy and accurate mortar fire.

Dawn found one battalion clearing the south extension of the town, and another moved elements into the buildings north and west of the town during the morning. At 1100 hours one company sent a combat patrol into the part of Hellenthal extending to the east, to clear up scattered resistance remaining in that area. The patrol captured 19 Germans, bringing the PW count to 128 for the operation, but received heavy enemy artillery fire east of the town occupied during the night.

During the night of February 5-6 the bulk of the town's defenders had withdrawn leaving a delaying force, which continued to offer token resistance until overrun.

The 9th Infantry Regiment incurred stiff opposition moving against Scheuren but had secured a foothold on the western edge of the town by the night of February 5. During the night the enemy withdrew from his positions here also, and the town was occupied next day against only light resistance. The 277th Infantry Division, its regiments and trains, were identified among the prisoners in the Hellenthal area. Prisoners from the 62nd Infantry Division, the 12th Infantry Division, and the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division were taken by the 9th Infantry in the Scheuren area.

Patrol action brought quick contact with the enemy on February 6 for both the 9th and the 23rd Regiments, as the

The 2nd Division moves through shell-rocked fields to Schoneisiffen.





A German blockhouse provides an observation post for the use of a radio-telephone at Wehlersheid.



German prisoners taken in the drive on Schoneseiffen guarded by men of the 2nd Division.

38th consolidated its positions in Hellenthal. Two more patrols were fired upon from behind the west wall of the Siegfried Line.

Much enemy material had been captured in the advance to the Hellenthal-Schleiden area—guns, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, ammunition, Flakvierlings and Panzerfausts, tanks self-propelled guns, weapons carriers, half-tracks, personnel carriers, passenger cars, even a steam engine and an air compressor.

On February 8 the 9th Infantry cleared the ridge northeast from Bronsfeld to Schleiden against moderate resistance from small arms, artillery, mortar guns, and other weapons. Extensive patrolling indicated that the sector was cleared to the south of the ridge, the enemy having withdrawn within his fortifications on the east bank of the Olef Bach from Schleiden to the south.

A patrol moved onto Hill 525 south of Hellenthal on February 7 and encountered a holding force upon the hill supported by mortars from a slope opposite. The patrol withdrew after receiving heavy small arms and mortar fire. Elements of the 38th Infantry moved in and took the hill at midnight on February 8, wiping out the defending force from the 1076th Security Battalion.

The enemy meanwhile consolidated his positions along the Schleiden-Hellenthal line and set out reconnaissance patrols. Such patrols were encountered on February 10, 11, and 12. On February 13, a reconnaissance in force was attempted along a line west of Oberhausen and Blumenthal. After an hour of harassing fire by the Division, about 30 men and four mortars appeared suddenly and began firing. They disappeared under a hail of artillery and mortar fire from the Division. Friendly patrols encountered other enemy reconnaissance groups in the vicinity of the Division sector.

An outpost was reporting missing on February 13 near Hill 525, but little aggressive enemy action was noted until February 16. On that day, an attempted reconnaissance with firepower took place in front of the 38th Infantry's sector. It was repeated the following day south of Bronsfeld and Hellenthal with medium long-range arms, followed by mortars and artillery. Friendly mortar and artillery fire discouraged whatever plan the enemy may have had in mind in these abortive efforts.

From February 18 through 23 the enemy remained largely on the defensive with weaker demonstrations of aggressive spirit. On February 21 the Division relieved elements of the 9th Infantry Division and on February 24 extended north to a sector from the high ground west of the Olef Bach northwest to the Urft River in an area lying to the west of Malsbeden. The Division front line ran along the south bank of the Urft River to the confluence of the Roer and the Urft. The 28th Division replaced the 2nd in the line from Schleiden to Hellenthal.

Enemy action was relatively quiet, consisting largely of patrols along the Olef, to Gemund, and to Malsbeden. On February 24 prisoners taken from the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division stated that the division was about to be relieved. This was confirmed by the appearance of new conglomerate units to the 2nd Division front, plus reports of 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division activity in front of other portions of the Allied line, mainly in the Ninth Army sector.

Artillery ranged from light to heavy in the areas of

These enemy antiaircraft guns were abandoned as the 2nd Division advanced through Schoneseiffen in a heavy fog.





*Top: Breaking out "K" rations in Germany
Bottom: The roads got muddier and muddier as the heavy vehicles plowed their way across the Siegfried Line.*

*Tanks knocked out by Division Artillery must be pushed off the road by a tankdozer in the advance.
Bottom: Digging in a heavy machine gun while artillery fire falls on German positions in the distance.*

Kerhahn, Bronsfeld, Hellenthal, and the Dreibern Ridge, and was reported frequently from Scheuren. Interdictory fire fell heavily upon roads in these areas, and flat trajectory fire was noted near Hellenthal. Mortar fire was sporadic throughout the period, and was sometimes covered by small arms and automatic weapons fire in an effort at concealment. Rocket flights were observed frequently, but most of the V-weapons winged their way over going to the area of Oberhausen where the armored units were more fully engaged.

The following letter of commendation was written by Maj. Gen. C. R. Huebner, commanding V Corps, to General Robertson, commanding the 2nd Division:

"1. On 13 December, 1944, while the 2nd Division was in the midst of an offensive operation aimed toward the capture of Dam No. 5 on the Urft River, the now historic German Counteroffensive struck a formidable blow on the V Corps front. To the northwest, in the Monschau area, heavy enemy attacks were received on 16 December, and to the south the 99th Infantry Division was attacked by powerful armored and infantry forces. Serious penetrations were made in the 99th Infantry Division sector in the Krinkelt, Bullingen, and Butgenbach area. It became necessary to suspend your attack and to intersperse 2nd Division units with elements of the 99th Infantry Division along the general line, Rocherath-Krinkelt-Bullingen-Butgenbach.

"2. Due to the rapid movement of the 2nd Infantry Division units into the line and stubborn and courageous fighting

on the part of all troops engaged,, the Elsenborn hinge of the Corps front, "Purple Heart Corner," was held against a series of furious enemy assaults. This spirit of courageous defense was demonstrated all along the line and the desperate enemy efforts to break through and seize control of the Elsenborn plateau and the important road net extending to the north and northeast were frustrated.

"3. Following the defeat of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes Salient, the 2nd Infantry Division resumed the offensive on 30 January, 1945, retaking the towns of Wirtzfeld, Krinkelt, and Rocherath and generally restoring the line as it was prior to 16 December, 1944. The attack was continued successfully, resulting in the capture of Harperscheid, Ettelscheid, Bronsfeld, Hellenthal, Scheuren, and the high ground along the west bank of the Urft River overlooking Schleiden. The operations of the 2nd Infantry Division during this period contributed greatly to the success of V Corps in capturing the series of dams on the Roer and Urft Rivers.

"4. During these actions, the 2nd Infantry Division inflicted upon the enemy heavy losses in personnel and equipment. The magnificent stand at "Purple Heart Corner" blunting the fury of the hostile attack and protecting the critical Eupen-Malmedy Road, cannot be praised too highly.

"5. My personal thanks and appreciation to the 2nd Infantry Division for its noteworthy and commendable achievements during the period 12 December, 1944—12 February, 1945."

GEMUND AND TO THE RHINE



The Ninth United States Army crossed the Roer River on February 23, as did VII Corps of the First Army. Two days later III Corps of the First Army followed them. V Corps crossed that stubborn and troublesome river on February 28.

The First and Ninth Armies then began their epic race to the Rhine River. The armored spearhead reached the Rhine on March 2, one day before the 2nd Division began its attack upon the German positions at Gemund and the last belt of fortifications of the inner Siegfried Line defenses, with garrisons maintained at Olef, Gemund, and Malsbenden on the east bank of the Olef Bach and the Urft River.

The 2nd Division's sector lay south of the Urft Reservoir, a scenic U-shaped chain of lakes which included the uppermost of the Roer and Urft River Dams. To the north lay the Kermeter Peninsula, that strip of land between the Urft and the Roer Rivers. To the front lay the Olef Bach, flowing into the Urft and joining that stream at the West Wall bastion of Gemund, which was now the objective of Task Force Stokes which had the mission of crashing this last fortified redoubt before the Rhine.

The enemy now held a line along the east bank of the Olef Bach from the garrisoned village of Olef to the stronghold of Gemund, then following the north bank of the Urft River to the confluence of the Urft and Roer Rivers southeast of Rubercy. The sector was quiet as the Division took over and prepared for the last assault on the Siegfried Line. No patrol action was encountered and artillery fire was meager from behind the grim line of concrete pillboxes and emplacements. The time was ripe for the destruction of the German

forces west of the Rhine as the Division prepared to attack on March 3.

The assault on Cologne, already in ruins from repeated aerial bombardments, had begun at midnight on February 27 after a delay of ten days or so caused when the Germans blew the sluice-gates of the two major Roer River dams. On March 7, that great German industrial city was in Allied hands.

On March 2, the day before the attack on Gemund by Task Force S, the 45th Division pushed out patrols in its sector to the northwest and north of Dam Number Five of the Urft Chain without making any contact with the enemy. However, observation parties saw and heard enemy activity within the towns of Gemund, Nierfeld, and Olef. The Germans had retreated well within their fortifications and were prepared to offer what resistance they could to the Allied advance from inside their battered wall.

Little aggression was noted anywhere in the vicinity. Elements of the 102nd Cavalry which had crossed the Roer River in the area south of Ruerberg reported that the enemy had withdrawn throughout that sector. There would be savage fighting ahead, but no great battle, as the Division prepared to break through the West Wall and plunge on to the Rhine.

The unmistakable signs of dissolution and disintegration of the German defenses west of the Rhine were all too apparent even before the barrier was breached. A piecemeal falling apart of the fortress of the Rhineland had begun even as the Division prepared to continue the attack. For one thing, the German transportation and supply system had been shattered by bombings, while behind the First and Ninth Armies



Bridge constructed by 2nd Engineer Battalion at Hellenthal



"Pulling" Riegel mines is a hazardous task

the ever-extending supply lines were secure and would soon thrust out in long firm tentacles across the Rhine.

The 38th Infantry, operating with its attached units as Task Force S had passed through the zone of III Corps, crossed the Roer on a bridge constructed by the 78th Infantry Division at the village of Heimbach, and moved south to the vicinity of Kloster Mariawald, passing through elements of the 311th Infantry which was to secure the ground south of that point on the Kermeter Peninsula. The task force was to seize Gemund in a wheeling movement of envelopment and secure a bridgehead there for the 2nd Division.

With the establishment of a bridgehead by the task force and the taking of the U-shaped chain of the Urft lakes in the north portion of the V Corps zone of action, the Division would be ready to push onward to the Rhine.

Advancing with a brief halt at Kloster Mariawald to coordinate their movements, two battalions of the 38th attacked abreast to the south on March 3. They made their first contact with the enemy within the hour, at Wolfgarten I, where the enemy occupied a number of strongly defended houses for three hours until they were outflanked, outguessed, and forced to disperse.

Mine-detectors were kept busy



Working their way through difficult terrain and fiendish minefields, one battalion secured Wolfgarten and the high ground on the northeast corner of their objective west of the road into Gemund. Another company seized a trench system north of the row of pillboxes which formed part of the Siegfried Line defenses west of Gemund. Houses along the north bank of the Urft River occupied by the enemy were cleared by midnight of March 3.

Elements of the 23rd Infantry moved in to occupy the fortified village of Malsbenden one kilometer northeast of Gemund. Other elements occupied high ground overlooking the defenses of that town.

On March 4, the 23rd Infantry probed the defenses of the town of Nierfeld, but was forced to withdraw under heavy frontal fire, plus fire from both flanks. Tank Force S moved on to clear the pillboxes in the west end of the town of Gemund against slight organized resistance, on the north bank of the Urft, and then continued mopping up operations, moving forward in column of battalions, for more than 4500 yards within the wall of defenses.

The 9th Infantry crossed the Urft and cleared the pillboxes on the side to the northeast of Gemund, then pushed on into the town. They encountered very little resistance, but all approaches to the town were strewn with deadly variations of the antitank and antipersonnel mine. Abatis were thickly booby-trapped.

One area yielded up a veritable harvest of the deadly "schu" mine, buried in deep, soft mud so that they were virtually impossible to detect. Engineers, mine platoons, and even the supply platoons worked endlessly, in the melting snow clearing the mines from battle areas and supply routes among the deserted fortifications. The road into Gemund was cleared of mines and opened before the town was cleared of the enemy.

The 38th Infantry completed the establishment of its bridgehead to the south of the Urft River by dark. It was expanded steadily under sporadic mortar fire and well-placed fire from small arms. Scouts invaded the stream here and found a partially blown bridge which served for the crossing of foot troops.

With Gemund in the hands of the 9th and 38th Infantry



Regiments, the 38th continued the attack on March 5. Task Force S mopped up the last battered pillboxes of the inner Siegfried Line extending along the high ground to the south of Gemund. The area between Gemund and Nierfeld, stubbornly defended against the attack of the day before, was cleared against obstinate but ineffective delaying action. A great many prisoners were taken in the operation, including units of the 89th Infantry Division—infantry, engineers, and replacements. It was evident that the 89th Division had been assigned the mission of creating resistance by delaying actions in this sector, although elements of the 62nd Division were also captured.

V Corps was to protect the right flank of III Corps during its major offensive toward the Rhine. The Division now set out to leapfrog its elements laterally along the boundary of the Corps. Then they would strike out on a tangent to the southeast in the direction of the Ahr River, the next water barrier before the Rhine.

With the breakthrough accomplished in the north part of the V Corps zone, the Division extended its bridgehead to the northeast, and then burst out of the bridgehead to the southeast and raced the 55 kilometers to the Rhine River in five days against a desperate but disorganized enemy.

The breakthrough to the Rhine, after the belated crossings of the Roer River, was made swiftly and in bold advances which left the enemy stunned and helpless. The rapid pressure upon his defenses and the sustained attack prevented the enemy from making another organized or firm stand in the Division sector until the Rhine was reached.

Clearing the last vestiges of resistance from the positions around Gemund, the Division extended its area to the northeast on March 4, then attacked to the southeast on March 5 as the 38th Infantry completed cleaning out the Siegfried Line pillboxes. On March 6 the enemy was in flight with the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments in full pursuit. Contacts with elements of six German divisions were made as the regiments pushed on rapidly through one village after another in compliance with V Corps orders to maintain contact with the enemy.

The 23rd Infantry reached the enemy's next line of with-

drawal along the Ahr River on March 7. The men quickly overpowered resistance as fast as it developed and closed up to the river. As the 9th Infantry closed up to the river two bridgeheads were established.

On that same day, as the Division moved to the Ahr and Cologne fell, a Combat Command of the 9th Armored Division moved up the left bank of the Rhine, through the old town of Bonn and to the small town of Remagen. Here, by the strange fortunes of war, they found the bridge across the Rhine intact. As the men swarmed on to the bridge a charge went off, but caused only slight damage. The Americans carefully removed the demolitions and detonators and claimed the bridge. They had accomplished the fantastic; they had taken a Rhine bridge intact. This marked the beginning of the famed Remagen bridgehead which the First Army would exploit promptly. Seizing the initiative, the First Army quickly established the first Allied bridgehead across the Rhine.

South of the Urft the task force encountered little fire, but some of the ghastliest and most treacherous minefields it had yet experienced. Lead elements came under bursts of machine pistol fire from Voissel, and supply vehicles were harassed by long range small arms fire.

German prisoners: Gemund





An M-4 tank crosses a treadway bridge in Dumpelfeld 35 minutes after the Engineers went to work on its construction.



Regimental Combat Team 38 moves across a Bailey Bridge constructed by the 2nd Engineer Battalion across a river.

The 9th Infantry occupied Bergbier, Bleibuir, and Glehn without resistance except for a sudden hail of mortar fire in the last-named village. Patrols from the 2nd Reconnaissance Troop entered Kestel and Roggendorf and came under fire on the outskirts of Hechernich.

The 23rd Infantry occupied the towns of Berg, Floisdorf, and Eichs, previously reconnoitered and patrolled, encountering artillery fire, light in both caliber and volume. They met no large concentrations of fire. General harassing fire continued. The Division CP moved up into the ancient German town of Kloster Mariawald.

On March 6 the wild race to the Rhine began over the bomb-cratered roads, with the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments jumping off abreast and moving so rapidly that their artillery had to displace twice the first day to keep up with them and frequently thereafter to keep them within range.

Watch on the Rhine



A general enemy withdrawal to the southeast was now strongly indicated, with many areas giving up easily; the Germans fought brief and disorganized delaying actions on the approaches and in the towns as they withdrew ever backward, now virtually in full flight, toward the Rhine. Where the enemy fought on, there was now no uniformity of action and a disruption of the order of battle was easily discernible.

Mechernich, where patrols were stopped by fire, was now taken with no show of resistance. Then contact was broken entirely until late in the day when the 9th Infantry came to Weyer, approaching from the west and encountering a small, reluctant delaying force which was quickly overcome. At the end of the first day of the breakthrough to the Rhine there was not one single sign of enemy resistance anywhere to the Division's front. At Pesch a group of 272 prisoners were captured, including members of the 89th Infantry Division.

March 7 was the day when the 9th Armored Division seized the still-undestroyed Ludendorf bridge over the Rhine at Remagen, thus giving the Allied forces a wide-open back door into the Reich. On that day, in the 2nd Division sector, the 23rd Infantry was closing rapidly in toward the Ahr, overcoming resistance with the help of continuous firing by Division Artillery to open the way for the swift infantry advance. There was contact with the enemy fighting a strong delaying action at Eicherscheid, and firefights at Schonau, but Buir and Holzmulheim fell without resistance, although mobile guns came up to fire at the lead elements at both Eicherscheid and Schonau, giving close support to the delaying groups in the towns after the Division had penetrated them.

A brief contact was made at Effelsburg as the diehard Germans surrendered with reluctance, and at Kreuzberg where small arms and automatic weapons were encountered with artillery support.




The race to the Rhine was swift and devastating. (1) The 105's displaced rapidly supporting the advance. (2) German civilians help the doughboys move a roadblock. (3) Directing movements. (4) Administering aid in the field during the rapid dash. (5) Villages fell in swift succession; this was Scheuren. (6) This was a pleasant Rhineland town until the Germans "held out" here.

The next two days, however, saw German organized resistance west of the Rhine collapse and crumble. German troops streamed past the boundaries of the Division sector while the 9th and 23rd Regiments deployed to either side to gather them in. The town of Liers fell with moderate opposition, Ohlerath with sniper fire, Dumpelfeld with mobile

guns and machine guns which forced patrols to withdraw. Friendly forces attacking Waldorf in the night received considerable fire but the enemy had pulled back out of the town by morning.

The Division collected vast quantities of materiel which kept the 702nd Ordnance Company busy scouting German



Supermen, young and old, fanatical and indifferent



One village after another unfurls white flags from windows and housetops.

ammunition dumps and carloads of supplies. Vehicles captured ranged all the way from prime movers to carts, wagons, and bicycles. The Division even captured an entire map depot of the 5th Panzer Army near Kirschahr.

On March 10 Division Artillery began firing in protection of the Remagen Bridgehead which was now in the process of formation on the far side of the Rhine, while the Division was to hold to the west bank to protect the crossing and to reinforce the troops engaged in expanding and exploiting that bridgehead by protecting their supply lines.

Units of the Division advancing to the river on March 10 found the town of Koningsfeld dug in on a perimeter defense supported by antitank guns on high ground to the south of the town. Friendly elements cleared half the town of Niederbreisig against small arms fire and automatic weapons. A patrol to Oberbreisig at 1700 hours received heavy fire from small arms from the deeply gullied terrain east and south of the town. Lead elements were fired upon from Dedenbach

Troops of the 38th Infantry cross the Rhine to reinforce the Remagen Bridgehead.



during the preceding night, but that town and Gonnersdorf were in the Division's hands by 1000 hours on March 10.

Troops moving from the latter town offered stiff resistance two kilometers to the east where bazooka teams were dug in along the highway and delayed the Division's advance to the outskirts of Rhineck.

Overcoming resistance by small arms at Oberbreisig, at Rhineck, and at Niederbreisig, but encountering no artillery or mortar fire, the Division closed in on the west bank of the Rhine to form the north facet of a huge pocket holding the trapped remnants of several German divisions being compressed west of the Rhine along the cratered and traffic-laden roads. Organized resistance in the Division sector west of the Rhine was cleared on March 11 with the elimination of troops pocketed at Niederbreisig and Brohl. Artillery fire was light in volume and interdictory in nature, with only small concentrations noted.

Prisoners of war taken in Rhineck included delaying forces who sought to retain control of a ferry site, a conglomeration of units of the 5th Parachute Division, the 18th Infantry Division, and the 89th Infantry Division.


Throughout the next day, enemy stragglers to the west of the river and enemy snipers and machine guns on the east bank of the river kept the Division busy. At times escaping Germans sought to cross the river in boats but were retained. On March 19, the 9th Infantry captured an island in mid-stream in an amphibian operation, securing a small strip of land which might provide a means of floating explosives downstream to the Remagen bridge.

Behind the Division across the Rhineland lay a trail of captured villages in which bedsheets flew over the rooftops and chimneys, a trail of charred tanks, disabled guns, and quantities of German equipment all in the wildest disorder. Civilians displayed no active hostility.

The Division would stay here, defending the right flank of V Corps and of the First Army, maintaining contact with the



Troops of the 2nd Division seek cover on a flat approach from devastating fire in Germany



The Germans left their guns as they retreated behind the water barrier of the Rhine.

Third Army, until March 21. It used a strongpoint system of defense, the points being established several thousands yards back from the river, with guns emplaced along the river's edge and batteries of 60-mm. mortars firing flares at intervals through the nights. The artillery observers chose advantageous spots, usually the towers of ancient Rhenish castles overlooking the enemy on the east bank as well as the winding valley on the west bank. They were, in their own parlance, looking right down the enemy's throats, with an excellent view of all that went on in the towns on the lowlying east bank. As they supported the growing bridgehead with their fires and at the same time eliminated batteries and positions making life uncomfortable for the Division, the deadly rain of crossfire across the valley ceased.

The Division CP for the defensive period was located at Bad Neuenahr a few miles west of the Remagen bridge, where the men enjoyed rest and rehabilitation while conducting their "watch on the Rhine."

As the Division had moved out into the broad and winding Rhine valley, the picture had changed once more. This was a storybook country with its gray historic turreted castles, its sprawling sunny vineyards and gentle slopes, as unlike the pine forests of the Ardennes as a land could be. Ban Neuenahr was one of the chain of old-time spas where well-to-do Germans and their families had vacationed for generations. The men enjoyed the famous baths and relaxed for a box-seat view of the scenery and the dogfights over Remagen Bridgehead, while carrying out their duties. Some had the experience of operating from castles which might have been straight out of the pages of Richard Coeur de Leon, although the present occupants of the castles and the dough-boys shared an almost universal dislike and distaste. Batteries held their breath while sight-seers viewed the scenery from their observation towers with field glasses slanted into the sun.

This part of the Rhineland, fought over in so many wars, was undisturbed by the Wehrmacht and showed few signs of ravage except at bombed-out rail centers. In the meanwhile the bridgehead grew and the men watched with lively interest the German efforts to bomb the bridge. At first, the Luftwaffe was inclined to be careless with the towns in the Divi-

sion sector, but the antiaircraft battalion, which had been somewhat confined in its efforts since the Belgian Bulge, had a field day and soon put a stop to that. Enemy bombers learned to confine their efforts to the bridge.

As the Third Army closed in along the river, the mission of the 2nd Division came to an end and the men prepared for their own crossing with mingled eagerness to be on with the fight and regret at leaving a pleasant sector. Some 2586 prisoners had been processed by the Division during its dash to the Rhine, and 207 others while they were occupying the positions, making a total of 2793 for the operation.

The stage was now set for the final smashing of Germany on her own soil as the Division moved in and crossed the Rhine, most units using a pontoon bridge at Linz just south of the Ludendorf bridge. The next few days would see crossings in force by the Ninth Army to the north of the Ruhr Valley and on the First Army's right flank by tanks and infantry, uniting for an eastward dash which would ultimately create the great double encirclement of the enemy trapped in the Ruhr Pocket.

Messages of congratulation poured in. General Eisenhower sent this message: "The whole Allied Force is delighted to cheer the First US Army whose speed and boldness have won the race to establish the first bridgehead over the Rhine. Please tell all ranks how proud I am."

General Hodges, commanding the First Army, said: "To the men of the First US Army who won this race, I extend my congratulations. I share the pride of the supreme commander in their fine achievement."

James Forrestal, secretary of the navy, sent this message: "The United States Navy joins the nation in admiration for the feats of the armies under (General Eisenhower's) command and particularly sends its congratulations to the First United States Army on its historic crossing of the Rhine."

Speaker Rayburn of the United States House of Representatives sent this message: "At the request of the House of Representatives unanimously expressed, I send to you, the officers and men of all services under your command, our congratulations and thanks for the magnificent victories recently achieved on the Western Front."

CROSSING THE RHINE



On March 21 the 2nd Division, with its mission on the west bank of the Rhine completed, began crossing the river with the enemy comparatively inactive and taking up positions in a new sector in the Remagen Bridgehead. Roads in the sector ran at right angles to the direction the advance must take, complicating transportation and supplies: The tactical solution for the solution of this problem was an attack on the bias, with units leapfrogging one another laterally as they advanced.

For several days the Division remained in the romantic Westerwald country with its scenic rolling hills and forests, its mellowed castles and one-time exclusive resorts and spas. Then, alternating periods of intense activity and movement with times for waiting for the roads to clear, the units would move on in the wake of the armor fanning out from the bridgehead to come to another halt a few days later, while the Ruhr pocket was neatly sealed off by crossings in force by the Ninth Army and on the First Army right flank by tanks and infantry.

The 38th Infantry Regiment was alerted for movement on

March 20 as a combat team, with its supporting units, to relieve the 18th Cavalry Squadron and the 394th Infantry in a position at the south end of the Remagen Bridgehead in the vicinity of Honningen. That afternoon a reconnaissance detail crossed the river to make plans for the relief.

The mission of the 38th Combat Team was to relieve elements of the 99th Infantry Division, then attack to the southeast to secure the line along the Wied River, securing a bridgehead for the 2nd Division and preparing to hammer down the Nazi defenses in the area and break out through the crust of German fortifications and defenses around the Remagen bridgehead.

The Third, the First, the Ninth, and the Seventh American Armies were now in full pursuit of the Wehrmacht across Germany. The resistance in their path was crumbling, breaking up, falling apart in large sections all along the line, the exception being the industrial area of the Ruhr into which more and more German units and scattered remnants were now being compressed by the advance. The Ruhr would be



Crossing the Rhine



Motor column crossing pontoon bridge over the Rhine at Sinzig, Germany.

the last to go, after the crossing of the Rhine sealed off the pocket. Some 300,000 German troops would be taken out of that pocket alone.

The Russians, too, were building up for the final thrust toward Berlin and were fighting for Vienna, as the 2nd Division moved into its reconnoitered sector across the Rhine.

The 38th Infantry moved on rapidly south against delaying action, then southeast toward the Wied. On the morning of March 22, they crossed the Weid and established a bridgehead against light resistance as the enemy, largely remnants of Volksgrenadier and infantry divisions and the 5th Parachute Division which had fled across the Rhine, fought a tricky but somewhat disorganized rear guard action, surrendering or withdrawing under pressure.

The advance was made doubly difficult, however, by thickly wooded terrain gashed by gullies and ravines, which together with the fact that the Germans had blown all the bridges in the area made progress slow to this point. All units of the Division crossing the Wied in the vicinity of Altwied and Niederbieber Segendorf came under small arms fire from east of the river, and 20-mm. gunfire at Segendorf. Other units reached the river north of Altwied without meeting resistance and crossed with no opposition. Light opposition was encountered as Niederbieber-Segendorf and Datzeroth were occupied.

Prisoners were mostly emergency battle units improvised from remnants of the 26th Infantry Division, battle groups from fragments of the 272nd Infantry Division, and scattered elements. Most of these were vastly ignorant of the enemy's plans or dispositions.

Artillerymen who had been forced to leave their weapons and their vehicles on the west side of the river, abandoned in their headlong flight, now fought with these emergency battle units as infantry.

On March 23, the enemy offered resistance to the Division's advance on Elscheid and Rengsdorf with a fine display of small arms and machine gun fire and some supporting artillery. Stubborn opposition was encountered at Altwied, and delaying

action toward Melsbach, supplemented by heavy minefields as the Division continued its relentless road marches through the liberated towns, over a route generally east and literally swarming with liberated impressed labor, displaced persons, and weary pedestrian civilians. Germans were now surrendering to all units, proving a nuisance to artillery squads protecting the columnar advance, who were not equipped to process them.

On March 24 the Division pressed on to Heimbach and Gladbach under small arms fire and later under intense fire from rifles, machine guns, and small arms encountered west of Gladbach and mobile guns which came up north of the town. Oberbieber was taken in the face of heavy small arms fire, then the advance continued against light resistance. A strongpoint manned by 20 Germans in a 15th century castle southwest of Anhausen at Braunberg put up an 18-hour fight.

Direct fire, land mines, and exceedingly rugged terrain limited the maneuverability of artillery in this area. Heimbach and Rommersdorf were occupied by 0700 hours on March 25 against negligible resistance, but flat trajectory weapons were encountered from Bendorf and Bendorf-Sayn. This

Infantrymen load onto the tanks at Giessen to form a fighting team in the breakout in Central Germany.





was territory already hallowed in 2nd Division history. Part of the area taken was a part of the sector occupied by the Division during its tour of occupation duty in the Rhineland just following World War I. With a reminiscent salute to the men of the Division who had known these hills and rivers intimately more than 20 years before, the attacking troops pressed on. They were almost ready now to burst out of the Remagen Bridgehead.

Moderate resistance was encountered at Isenburg, Nauart, and Stromberg, and none at Caan. At Grenzhausen the advance was delayed by a heavy volume of small arms and machine gun fire. Resistance was smashed and the town seized and secured by 1830 hours.

Artillery during this advance fell mainly on the forward units. Concentrations were moderately heavy, the caliber of ammunition used was light. Flat trajectory weapons also were

employed. Armor had been relegated by the enemy to a supporting role. A few self-propelling guns and tanks appeared from time to time. These were quickly dealt with, and withdrew under pressure from foot elements and fire from friendly artillery.

On March 26, the breakout of the bridgehead began. Units were stripped down and all transportation utilized to the limit for a rapid advance. Hilgert and Baumbach were taken quickly with light resistance. Hohn Grenzhausen and Alsbach were occupied with the attacking elements unopposed. Abatis, felled trees, and Riegel mines were encountered by some elements toward Alsbach. Ransbach fell without offering opposition.

After the village of Baumsbach was passed, the 38th Infantry Regiment mounted the vehicles of the 9th Armored Division, passed through the forward elements of the 2nd Division, and broke out to the east. Following the broad Cologne-Frankfurt autobahn, they tore forward, having broken the crust and brought the war in Germany to a new phase.

Some 1229 prisoners were taken by the Division in the period from the crossing of the Rhine to the breaking out of the bridgehead at noon on March 26.

The 38th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Armored Division had now broken out of the southeast edge of the Remagen Bridgehead. It was now possible for these units, and other armored units under V Corps control, to push on almost unhampered and uninhibited in a gallant pursuit, by-passing opposition so far as possible and leaving it to be cleared away by succeeding units.

The 38th Infantry roared on to Gladbach and to Elz near Limbourg on March 26, a move of more than 50 kilometers, contacting few of the enemy who offered opposition, but far too many of them who flocked to the autobahns in droves of

Scene of German "mercy killings" at Hadamar





The infantry loaded on the armored vehicles

thousands to give themselves up. In order that they might not impede the progress of the pursuit, these were hastily disarmed and told to march to the rear where they were taken in hand and processed by following units.

For the remainder of the month of March the Division followed the armored spearheads, closely advancing on the heels of the 9th Armored Division in a wide encircling movement, part of that which created the far-famed double encirclement of the enemy's troops within the Ruhr pocket. Tactical elements of the Division were pressingly engaged in mopping up the by-passed enemy groups and combing the woods and villages for those who held out grimly.

A few miles north of Ela at Hadamar where the antitank company was on outpost duty the counterintelligence corps personnel attached to the 38th Infantry Regiment uncovered one of the hideous and notorious Nazi "murder factories," designed for "mercy killing" by gas, in what had been appropriately enough an insane asylum.

The last days of March were spent in trying to keep pace with the armored spearheads. On March 29 the 38th Infantry motor-marched 98 kilometers, on March 30 a total of 54 kilometers, on March 31 a total of 56 kilometers, ending at Wethan a few miles northwest of Kassel. Diehard Nazis offered firefights now and then.

The Division closed into an area north of the Ederstausee after a 200-mile march from the Rhine in which they took 5173 prisoners, 2110 of them after the completion of the Rhine crossing, 891 after the breaking out of the bridgehead. 84 prisoners taken on March 31 represented 53 different German units.

Meanwhile the men had learned the meaning of the roadside signs, "Huns cleared to hedges." Artillery batteries learned to fight hand-to-hand and cope with snipers almost without leaving their positions, as the great columnar advance of armor, vehicles, and men moved forward relentlessly, not allowing any incident to stay its progress.

As April began the route of advance swung north in a wide sweep to close and bolt the trapdoor on the Ruhr pocket. The Division, with its CP at Sachsenhausen, was disposed

generally to the rear of the 9th Armored Division and was moving forward in the V Corps zone through the area of Willie-badessen, Bergentrech, and Warburg. On the right of the Division sector the 6th Armored Division had advanced approximately 10 kilometers northeast of Kassel.

By April 3, the 69th Infantry Division was concentrating in the gap created by the thrust of the 6th Armored Division to the northeast. On the Division left, the 104th Infantry Division continued to clear the sector in the area of Medebach, Usseln, and Brilon.

On the night of April 3, a dark and rainy night some 216 miles from the Rhine, as the Ruhr encirclement was expeditiously completed, the 2nd Division immediately turned east into the German province of Hesse, leaving behind a trail of villages flying white flags, wrecked or abandoned German armor, captured German materiel.

The 38th Infantry had been counterattacked in force near Warburg while attempting to set up a defense of the autobahn from Lindenhofshausen to Idstein, to prevent the escape of some 10,000 to 20,000 Germans in a pocket to the west formed by the advance.


Vehicles were ambushed and knocked out by machine gun and antitank fire, after which an estimated 15 vehicles and 200 German troops broke through the gap thus made. They were counterattacked and repulsed with heavy losses. During the morning five positions were subjected to sporadic long range machine gun and small arms fire. Toward midnight extensive enemy movement seemed to indicate another breakthrough attempt. The column raised white flags, however, and 186 prisoners, a truck, a 75-mm. gun, four motorcycles and eight horse-drawn carts were taken. Early the next morning two jeeps and a tank were ambushed on the autobahn. The tank's fire broke up the attack and one jeep proved salvageable.

In the V Corps sector, the German field army in the West was now virtually all overrun, by-passed, pocketed, or destroyed outright. The armor would press onward, leaving the 2nd and 69th Divisions to mop up and crush occasional flashes of resistance, taking a large miscellaneous assortment of prisoners all the way.

CENTRAL GERMANY

CHAPTER XVII

PURSUIT



Leaving strong forces to contain and reduce the elements of 18 German divisions now encircled and trapped in the Ruhr pocket, the First and Ninth Armies broke out to the east again toward the line of the Weser River. Driving due east, the 2nd Division launched a new offensive on April 5 as the First Army turned from the Ruhr and streaked toward the Weser.

Extensive mopping up operations in the Division sector during the first four days of April had been attended by sharp firefights and close bouts with an enemy which held out fanatically even when doomed. At Hofgeismar on April 5, lead elements of the Division met small arms and mortar fire on the western approaches to the town. As the forces entered the town there was a brief but sanguinary encounter as elite SS troops resisted with rifles, machine guns, and self-propelled antitank guns. Himmler's SS troops, fanatical fighters, frequently held out after the backbone of resistance was crushed.

The town was wrested from its defenders by 2100 hours, but the enemy continued to resist from a railway underpass east of the town with flat trajectory weapons and heavy weapons and heavy machine guns emplaced so as to offer the

maximum effective opposition to troops using the highway. Reconnaissance patrols on the division north flank advanced through Liebenau to the east and met small arms and panzerfaust fire in the woods one kilometer southwest of Ostheim. In the south half of the Division sector there was no opposition until the troops reached Immenhausen, where the doomed town was quickly cleared against small arms and panzerfaust fire.

Patrols sent out to the east drew fire from a crossroads two and one-half kilometers north of Holzhausen and two of the enemy were captured, together with a machine gun and mortar. The road block and two abatis laced with fire did not hold up the inexorable armored advance eastward. Here, almost in sight of the River Weser in the vicinity of Hanover-Munden, an engineer platoon was removing roadblocks in the dead of night for the advancing infantry when enemy patrols encircled them and blew abatis across the road just to their rear. In a sharp and vicious firefight which followed, all vehicles of the platoon were damaged by panzerfausts and several casualties were suffered, but the engineers fought their way out of the ambush and killed and captured many of the enemy.

Prisoners taken in the Hofgeismar area included members



Crossing the Weser River at Veckerhagen

of an emergency unit formed six days before, of stragglers and youngsters 15, 16, and 17 years old drafted directly from their homes into the front lines by the commandant of the town. In second-hand uniforms and carrying Czech rifles, the youth were placed in foxholes where they lay dazed and waiting to be killed or captured and unable to do nothing about it. Many were still trembling from the first battleshock when they reached the Division prisoner of war enclosure.

By daylight of April 6 the group of desperate Nazis encountered at the railway underpass had been wiped out and troops advanced to Karlsdorf, where they were engaged by enemy tanks to the north. One tank was knocked out northeast of Hofgeismar. Three tanks accompanied by German infantry in the same area were fired on by artillery. Another

tank succumbed to supporting tank destroyer fire of the Division as the enemy armor was moving westward from this point in a vain effort at delaying action. Only small arms fire was received by elements moving from Karlsdorf to the eastern edge of Hombresson, but at that town enemy tanks engaged the troops from the south slope of a hill lying one kilometer to the northwest.

In the late afternoon a counterattack by enemy infantry was repelled by machine gun fire. Small arms fire lacing roadblocks in the area delayed the advance to Veckerhagen on the Weser only briefly. This was the river, the "Weser flowing deep and wide", of Browning's poem "The Pied Piper of Hamelin."



The Weser crossing caught the Germans completely off

Vehicular ferry across Weser River



Troops of the 23rd Infantry Regiment making assault crossing of the Weser River.





guard. It caught the enemy helpless. The 23rd Infantry simply moved up to the river, got into assault boats, and went over, encountering no opposition; it was a highly successful operation. During the night the 23rd Infantry established a firm bridgehead. Reconnoitering and displacing rapidly, the artillery conducted heavy fire missions. The 5000-yard range at this point permitted strong support; enemy interdiction of bridging operations was halted by counterbattery fire.

To the Division's left and right flanks, the armor of the Ninth Armored and the infantry of the 69th Division established similar bridgeheads across the Weser, while the 9th Infantry Regiment turned north, crossed the Vickerhagen bridge, then moved east again.

A total of 4944 prisoners were taken from the jump-off on April 5 to the Weser, and through the establishment of the bridgehead. In lightning moves, spearheading the Allied offensive, the First and Ninth Armies headed for Leipzig.

Across the Weser, opposition was slack. First enemy contact made was two kilometers east of the river when patrols proceeding east from Hemelin met small arms and grenade fire coming from both sides of the highway at that point. Machine gun fire also was received from the river road one kilometer north of Hemelin. A series of delaying actions from hastily organized and futile pockets of resistance was encountered and overcome as friendly elements cleared a village one kilometer northwest of Hannover-Munden and advanced to secure high ground to the west.

No further resistance was encountered west of the river, but from Hannover-Munden and Gimte the enemy poured furious small arms fire into the positions. Ten rounds of light caliber artillery fire also fell on the high ground to the northwest of Gimte during the afternoon.



Prisoners taken were from the 28th Panzer Engineer Training Battalion and the 1st SS Panzer Replacement and Training Regiment, comprising half of the 317 Germans captured by the Division that day.

Small arms fire of unabated intensity at scattered points between Hemelin and Ellershausen was encountered as the Division advanced east from the Weser bridgehead on April 7. On the north flank, fighting developed south of Glashutte and units moving north secured Bursfelde. A counterattack on the latter town was launched by the enemy infantry attacking in strength but without supporting weapons at 1330 hours. The Division's artillery caught the enemy columns in a stretch of open terrain and halted the counterattack.

The town of Ellershausen was defended by the enemy with small arms and light antiaircraft guns, while several self-propelled guns in the vicinity of Imbsen gave supporting fire. Enemy troops in Bühren also resisted with rifle and antiaircraft fire, but advancing elements secured these towns without delay and proceeded on to the east, closing in around Lowenhagen and Varlosen.

The pursuit had reached full stride now, with advances of ten, 20, and even 30 miles per day. The Division roared on through Gimte, Volkmarshausen, Dankelshausen, Nieder Scheden, Ober Schöden, and Meensen with one town after another captured against light resistance in quick movements expeditiously carried out. Troops advancing toward Altmunden engaged the enemy employing rifles, machine guns, and antitank guns on the high ground east of the town. This area fell the following day.

Veckerhagen and a treadway bridge site at that town drew three concentrations of light caliber artillery fire totalling





51 rounds during that afternoon and evening. Some long range harassing fire also was recorded at Ellershausen during the day.

None of the opposing troops east of the Weser were regular combat formations. Replacement battalions furnished the bulk of the troops. The largest number of any single group of these were from a stomach ailment battalion. Stomach and ear battalions were made up of personnel all suffering from one ailment, generally able to man a machine gun in a pillbox, and usually in the final stages of recuperation. They were extremely low-grade fighters and their morale seemed uniformly low. Replacement battalions were here thrust into the line as they were instead of being distributed among other fighting units as ordinarily they would have been.

Volksturm units from the towns of Hannover-Munden and Volkmarshausen were identified as elements of Brigade West. Combat groups formed in several ways from scraps and remnants of unrelated units, SS school personnel, stragglers, and rear echelon personnel, usually taking the name of the leader of the group, were captured.

After the engineers had ferried assault elements across the Weser, two companies constructed and operated ferries to cross essential infantry vehicles and elements of the 1340th Engineer Battalion supporting the 2nd Engineer Battalion constructed a steel treadway bridge.

A heavy volume of small arms and machine guns fire delayed the capture of Kl. Wiershausen on April 8, but little resistance of any sort was met at Sattmarshausen, Ellershausen, Olenhausen. Both Grone and Gottingen were occupied without opposition and small arms fire by harried enemy elements was quickly cleared at Geismar and Diemarden.

In Gottingen complications of a different sort were met. In securing that town, the Division acquired also 22 military hospitals containing both Allied and German patients. On the northwest outskirts of the town they took over a Luftwaffe airfield intact. It had been hastily abandoned by the enemy who did not take time to destroy the installations. An investigation of the facilities revealed several Allied planes, including an American P-47 and a P-51 which had been de-

corated with German markings. An estimated 350 aircraft engineers were taken captive.

The bulk of the prisoners of war taken represented administrative units previously attached to outfits stationed in Gottingen. In addition, some 3200 military hospital patients were found in the town. It was believed that with the many convalescents stationed in private homes throughout this city, which was a rest center, the Division took at least 8000 men.

In the southern part of the Division sector, progress of friendly elements east to the autobahn was contested by small arms and tank fire as the units swept on to take Erlkerole, Reinhausen, and Ballenhausen. An enemy tank, a tank retriever, and a truckload of gasoline and ammunition were destroyed.

In the Mackenrode—Kl. Lengden area, the Division collided with two enemy columns. In the ensuing firefight an enemy counterattack supported by flak guns was repulsed with heavy losses to the disillusioned, disheartened, and still fanatical Huns. Material captured included sixteen Flakvierlings or four-barrelled 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, an 88-mm. gun with a halftrack prime mover, two trucks, three tractors, and three wagons.

On April 9 the advance continued in rapid strides to the east encountering resistance at only two points: at Weissenborn, where a sharp engagement resulted in destruction of two enemy tanks and a mobile gun, and at Etzenborn, where officer candidates engaged the troops with small arms and panzerfausts while a self-propelled gun gave them support before withdrawing.

Scattered small arms fire was met as the Division continued to advance and Neuendorf, Westerode, and Reinholterode fell to friendly elements. No resistance was met at Duderstadt, Teisttungen, Berlingerode, and Steinbach.

At Westerode the tail of an east-bound enemy column of horse-drawn equipment was contacted. Tank destroyer and artillery fire dispersed the column and took three 150-mm. guns, while innumerable horse-drawn vehicles were smashed and destroyed. Capture of Duderstadt yielded four antiaircraft guns, five artillery pieces, a truck, and 50 horses. At Westlingerode a warehouse with 200 new 20-mm. antiaircraft guns was captured complete.

At Duderstadt, a prisoner of war camp of Allied soldiers captured in the Ardennes fighting was taken, liberating 600 Allied fighting men, 100 of whom were Americans. Some 44 Americans were reported to have died in the camp during the preceding 30 days from starvation and the conditions forced upon them.

On April 9, prisoners were taken from a motley group of German units—the 507th and 509th Army Flak Battalions, 64th Flak Replacement Battalion, 281st Stomach Ailment Battalion, 234th Infantry Replacement Battalion, 6th March Company of the 276th Infantry Division, 29th Panzer Engineer Replacement Battalion, not to mention home guard units, combat groups, and Volksturm.

Early on April 10 the 9th Armored Division passed through forward elements of the 2nd Division with the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry riding the tanks and armored vehicles. They shook loose from the First and Ninth Army Lines and broke out to the eastward as rapidly as transportation would permit. Organized resistance scattered as the long armored spearhead thrust deep into Central Germany, mopping up only major opposition as they went and leaving the pockets for clearing by the footsoldiers. The German radio screamed the warning "Achtung! Panzer!" and white flags flew from scores of towns and villages.

The Germans surrendered in droves and the First Army for the sake of speed, took only as many prisoners as was necessary. During one week of the advance the First Army and the Third Army took 87,000 prisoners.

As the long, serpentine line of armor thundered on toward Leipzig, the infantry followed, taxing its organic transportation to the utmost, with the mission of mopping up and taking prisoners. Several isolated enemy groups in the Division zone fought grimly for a time, then scattered when hit by the Division's firepower. None gave serious trouble or impeded the rapidity of the advance.

An enemy force of estimated company strength defended a roadblock in a wooded area south of Sonderhausen on April 11, losing 40 enemy killed and 35 taken prisoner in a fight of short duration. Another hospital and a large munitions works were part of the day's haul in Sonderhausen. On April 12 the enemy armed with panzerfausts fired upon a friendly column passing through woods northeast of Ziegelroda. The largest single group of prisoners taken was from Combat Group Nord hastily improvised at an experiment station which tested V weapons and antiaircraft guns.

The Germans were not fighting hard at this time. They included home guard units with foreign or obsolete rifles and even men 55 years of age who after one night of facing the Americans in the line had 25 per cent or more too ill and shattered to continue. The 3106th Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, the 55th Antiaircraft Replacement Battalion, the 9th Panzer Replacement Battalion, the 300th Assault Gun Battalion, the 55th Antiaircraft Regiment, ammunition workers, and a non-commissioned officers' school at Halle reputed to contain three regiments of 1000 men each were represented among the prisoners taken.

Mines were encountered again near Leipzig for the first time in many days. The Nazis were fighting now with more skill, insistence and fanaticism. Against the enemy's disordered but tricky rear guard action, the advance was approaching the great industrial area of Leuna and Merseburg. Here resistance stiffened suddenly as the Division encountered the "flak alley" leading up to Germany's vital synthetic gasoline and rubber plants, the bombed-out ruins of which were

still guarded by more than one thousand antiaircraft guns emplaced for groundfire and capable of being used against infantry, tanks, and other ground targets.

Aerial bombs used for demolition purposes were discovered on the main road west of Behra, with roads, bridges, and installations prepared for demolitions. Infantry troops moved the demolitions without loss and proceeded.

The great pursuit was over. It had posed tremendous problems for all units of the Division, with often 150 miles between military police posts. Bomb lines of tactical aircraft had to be changed every 20 minutes at the peak. The rapid motor marches made motor maintenance difficult for the 702nd Ordnance Company, who performed feats of keeping the vehicles in condition to press on, under combat conditions in addition to difficult terrain, bad and unimproved roads, cold and wet weather. In addition the ordnance company had the task of reconnoitering the staggering quantities of enemy material captured by the Division.

Signal and supply units likewise performed superhuman tasks during the rapid advance. The 2nd Quartermaster Company, in addition to transporting the tremendous quantities of gasoline needed to keep these hundreds of vehicles rolling many miles each day, had to transport thousands of prisoners to the rear. In addition to carrying its own personnel and supplies, the company had the task of transporting infantry troops forward in the rapid advance and of moving up Division Headquarters to keep pace with the rapidly displacing forward elements.

Often supply dumps were located behind the armored spearhead of the advance and ahead of the infantry engaged in mopping up operations. Truck drivers covered as much as 400 miles per day under strenuous conditions.


In the V Corps sector the German field army had been entirely overrun, by-passed, pocketed or destroyed. The armor pressed on toward the Elbe River to establish bridgeheads there, crushing occasional flashes of resistance en route. The 2nd and 69th Divisions followed, fighting and mopping up where it was necessary, taking a vast number of prisoners who imposed a heavy problem for transportation and intelligence. Even the artillery units, who were unequipped for processing prisoners, were besieged by Germans trying to surrender, a nuisance on long marches.

After scattered fighting, the armor by-passed the heavy flak belt of the industrial area around Leuna, Merseburg, and Leipzig. Moving south toward the Elbe, the armor uncovered the Division as it deployed into a broad plain to tackle the "flak capital" of Western Europe.

Liberated civilians, impressed labor, displaced and dispossessed persons, and weary aimless wanderers jammed the roads at times and made the going difficult. These people were uniformly hungry, often diseased, and infinitely pitiable. Despite the fact that this was combat, many a GI slipped a portion of his packaged rations to some wanderer trying to make his way back to his home and family.

CHAPTER XVIII

T O L E I P Z I G



The 9th Armored Division spearheading the attack of V Corps to the east swung downward to the southeast on April 13, turning aside on the approaches to the Leuna-Merseburg-Schkopau area and uncovering the 2nd Division which moved on to the east to the built-up defenses along the Halle-Weissenfels railway. Here the Division encountered one of the heaviest concentrations of anti-aircraft guns on the Continent of Europe.

This corridor of anti-aircraft artillery had been emplaced to protect the vital rubber plants and synthetic gasoline works. Now, depressed for ground fire against the advancing infantry, they were employed against the 2nd Division and friendly elements. There were approximately 1000 of these guns, ranging in size from 88 to 128-mm., encircling the industrial area. These heavy guns were supplemented in each battery

by light guns. Then the entire emplacement was surrounded by a communication trench, making each position a small island of defense. Other heavy guns were mounted on railway flatcars in the Halle-Weissenfels area.

The enemy utilized 16 batteries of 88-mm. guns, 10 batteries of 105-mm. guns, 10 batteries of 128-mm. guns, nine batteries of light anti-aircraft guns, and 13 positions for headquarters installations to oppose the Division's advance. Many multiple-barrelled 20-mm. guns in particular were used to augment the fire of the heavy batteries. In some cases superbatteries had been formed three times the size of ordinary batteries. As many as 40 guns were sometimes discovered in a single location.

The guns were firmly emplaced, generally in pits consisting of brick walls with dirt embanked against them to a

Germans sometimes fought fanatically. This one paid with his life.



Flak gun—Merseburg





An MP directs traffic at Sondershausen

Bottom: Typical flak positions around industrial Leuna and Merseburg.

Top: Typical gun emplacement before Leipzig blasted by Division Artillery.

Bottom: German towns were silent, desolate on the road to Leipzig.

thickness of several yards. Around these embankments the communication trenches had been dug.

Upon the approach of hostile ground forces the enemy used these flak positions as strongpoints, initially employing the antiaircraft guns as artillery, then utilizing the lighter guns as the battle grew closer to the position. Fighting as infantry, the gunners fired from the communication trenches surrounding their gun pits as the attackers closed in.

On the flat terrain tanks had to move with great discretion and air observation planes could not fly within miles of the front lines. The heavy fire equipment and expert control of the Germans enabled them to deliver withering volumes of fire and air bursts on almost any object. Utilizing the flatness of the approach to the fullest, the enemy placed direct fire upon supporting armor and employed air bursts against the infantry troops. Despite the formidable nature of this defense, the Division approached to find that the defenders lacked outposting and organization. Despite air bursts, the flat trajectory fire of AA guns was not strikingly effective against ground troops, or in knocking out the Division's only slightly enfladed guns. Furthermore, in the final stages of combat, the AA gunners did not always show much taste for close-in, hand-to-hand fighting.

The Division capitalized upon these things fully. They pounded away at their emplaced positions with howitzers. They moved at night when the flatness of the terrain was not a disadvantage. They assaulted the enemy swiftly, forcing him into close fighting. Sections where the heavy antiaircraft guns were arranged in superbatteries, or where the gun positions were almost contiguous, succumbed to the Division's vicious assaults after night maneuvering.

This dazzling battle of antiaircraft guns versus artillery continued until hundreds of the enemy's gun emplacements were knocked out by Division Artillery, firing with amazing accuracy, extremely wide range, and good effect on a broad front.

In all, from April 13 to 19 troops of the 2nd Infantry Division captured or destroyed 505 heavy antiaircraft artillery pieces of 88-mm., 105-mm. and 128-mm. caliber, as well as innumerable lighter antiaircraft weapons. At the same time they took a total of 9,111 prisoners, representing more than 30 flak battalions, including battalions of German women trained as gunners.

Counterbattery fire proved most effective in reducing these positions, as a direct hit on a gun pit often succeeded in disabling the gun. At times, however, the antiaircraft gunners



The devastated factory area of Merseburg, one-time producer of vast quantities of synthetic gasoline for the Nazi war machine.

fought fiercely and with fanatical zeal until routed from their positions and overpowered and blasted from the pits with hand grenades.

On April 13 the Indianhead Division troops moved up into the fourteen mile stretch of bitterly contested territory before Leipzig. At the village of Grossgrafendorf, the enemy employed panzerfausts at close range and self-propelled guns from positions east of the town against the advance. The town was cleared against moderate resistance. Tanks were observed north of Schotterey by air observation planes directing artillery fire. Resistance increased as troops fought their way through Bad Lauchstadt and cleared the town of Dorstewitz against small arms and mobile gun fire. The greatest part of the resistance throughout the day, however, came from the antiaircraft guns which opposed further efforts of the Division to advance with an intense artillery barrage, principally air bursts on Dorstewitz.

Other units attempting to advance near Milzau met fire from heavy AA guns in the area two kilometers to the southwest of Reinsdorf. Milzau was cleared after house-to-house fighting, with self-propelled gun fire and antitank fire falling heavily from the southeast upon the troops. After clearing

Machine gunner in Leipzig



the woods at Bundorf under small arms fire, elements advanced to Knapendorf, where they came under fire from the AA guns emplaced west of Merseburg.

Small arms fire and a few rounds of artillery were received by friendly patrols at Lutzendorf. Large numbers of enemy riflemen resisted the advance at Bendra but were rapidly eliminated.

During the advance through Dorstewitz, Capt. Keith G. Van Neste set out with three volunteers to lay a vitally needed wire line between the regimental and battalion command posts.

"Although the area was swept by intense hostile 105-mm. fire, he fearlessly continued his mission and completed the circuit," his citation for the Distinguished Service Cross reads. "When enemy action created a break in the line, he courageously started out alone to repair it but was mortally wounded by an enemy shell."

In the northern part of the Division zone a small force captured the town of Delitz in a night operation across a plain too flat and well-observed for daylight approach. Reconnaissance patrols set out north of Delitz, encountering a heavy volume of machine gun and flak fire near Benkendorf. To the south a combat group of tanks and infantry came under artillery fire as they entered Cracau and again at Nieder Clobicau.

Heavy fire came from positions in a strongpoint known as Hill 157, located about two kilometers southeast of the latter town. The hill itself was captured later in the day against extremely heavy opposition from the AA guns emplaced there, as well as from guns in an area one and one-half kilometers northwest of Blossien. A reinforced gun position on Hill 102, two and one-half kilometers south of Schkopau, surrendered after a heavy pounding by Division Artillery. Dug-in tanks whose fire bolstered and increased the firepower of the numerous antiaircraft guns were discovered in the area of this position.

In the area around Merseburg, troops met considerable small arms and direct 105-mm. fire from antiaircraft artillery. The town itself was defended by an estimated 2000 Volksturm, supplemented by Luftwaffe and impressed labor troops. It was the first time the Division had encountered Volksturm in force. The town was cleared without difficulty.

Attempts to move east of Merseburg were met with sustained rifle and machine gun fire from troops dug in along

the levee on the east side of the Saale canal. On the night of April 14, a company of the 2nd Engineer Battalion made an assault crossing of the Saale River and the Saale Canal at Merseburg, transporting elements of the 23rd Infantry who attacked to secure a bridgehead. After the crossing a tread-way bridge was built while the engineers were three times driven from the site by artillery fire. When the enemy's assault grew too hot to bear, the engineers dived into the nearest ditches or whatever cover presented itself, then coolly came out and resumed their work as soon as the attack decreased in fury. In this manner they completed the task in time for essential transportation to cross immediately behind the assault elements of the infantry.

Resistance by flak guns and small arms at Wernsdorf and Naundorf was cleared. The Division advanced to Frankleben and Runstadt, encountering a heavy volume of small arms fire together with heavy artillery fire from the east and northeast.

Machine gun fire was received by friendly troops northeast of Leuna and Lossen, which were defended by small arms as the enemy in the area east of Merseburg was cleared in another night operation. Enemy troops manning a 24-gun position just south of Pretzsch withheld fire until the forward elements were at point-blank range. Then they opened fire with heavy flak and automatic weapons, continuing to offer obstinate opposition until overrun. Remnants of the enemy's troops withdrew prior to noon of April 16 and were observed digging in on the hill east of their positions.

Kayna was cleared against the same sort of obdurate opposition. As troops approached Kotschen, a group of 50 Germans who moved through the Division's positions was dispersed by artillery fire. Throughout the day AA guns fired to the enemy dug in along the Blossien-Geusa-Atzendorf line to impede the Division's advance. An estimated 30 to 50 guns of 105 and 128-mm. caliber were discovered.

Stiff resistance from anti-aircraft gun positions continued on April 15 throughout the Division zone, and more of the murderous fast-shooting guns were knocked out by counter-battery fire. Being stationary, the AAA positions furnished perfect targets in this tabletop terrain. Artillery units scored many hits allowing the infantry to overrun positions. Thousands of rounds of counterbattery were fired, including the dread "posit" shells. The terrific expenditure of ammunition and the length which ammunition supply trains had to travel

to the ammunition supply points at times depleted reserves somewhat.

The men improvised gun crews to man the heavy ackack guns abandoned undamaged by enemy crews: the ammunition supply was unlimited and at hand, and the Americans had a field day pouring hundreds of rounds of German fire into the Germans' own positions.

Machine gun fire was received by friendly troops northeast of Leuna and Lessen. After the all-night-long fighting on the bitterly contested strongpoint on Hill 158 two kilometers south of Kayna, an enemy counterattack was repulsed after 50 Germans engaged the troops in a severe fight. The position, which proved to be elaborately booby-trapped with trip-wire grenades, yielded 12 105-mm. AAA guns, two flak Vierlings, ten machine guns, and quantities of fire control equipment. The Germans clung to their firing positions and communication trenches until routed out with hand grenades.

A further cache of 12 105-mm. guns were taken in an undefended position just north of this area. After the attacking units moved on toward Leuna, the enemy infiltrated behind the lead elements and occupied gun positions to their rear. Another vicious firefight resulted before the area was cleared.

Leuna, chief manufacturing source of synthetic gasoline for the Reich, as Merseburg was of synthetic rubber, was also taken on April 15. It was a shambles of twisted steel and shattered masonry.

The town was entered in a double movement from the north and south and was cleared of small arms fire, although sporadic artillery continued to fall within the town and its outskirts and in the vicinity of its several bridges from AAA emplacements in the sector not yet overrun. Weissenfels was entered in a wide flanking movement intended to facilitate the crossing of the Saale, after artillery units had pounded the area on an extremely wide range and broad traverse. Having reached Dehlitz, forward elements continued to the northeast and received heavy fire from AA guns west of Gniebendorf. They also received some fire from the vicinity of Kriechan.

Units reached Oebles-Schlectewitz and Rippach after receiving small arms fire in the vicinity of the latter town and flak from positions to the northeast.

Troops moving up from Kayna encountered a brief but severe fight in the built-up area of Am. Br. Korbetha, where 85 prisoners were taken. Wengelsdorf and the area to the

On the road to Leipzig



Jeep hit by flak shell



Hitler youth watch American soldiers moving up.





"Fighting had practically ceased," the reports said, but this knocked-out Sherman tank and its driver tell a tragic tale in Leipzig.

south were cleared against only moderate resistance, as were Possendorf, Tagewerben, and Reichartswerben.

Scores of small pockets of resistance were cleaned out in the Leuna area, both during the establishment of a bridgehead in the town and during the final move to assault the backbone of

Machine gun position in Leipzig window



the resistance. Harrassed by antiaircraft fire all the way, the troops received an estimated 1000 rounds of heavy AA fire on several days, while other AA fire ran as high as 200 rounds per day in addition to fire from antitank and self-propelled guns.

With the industrial area of Merseburg and Leuna reduced and occupied the way was clear for the advance on Leipzig.

Long an air target because of its significance to the German war machine, the great plant at Leuna had been turning out 10,843,373 gallons of gasoline each month before repeated air missions first cut its production, then halted it entirely. It had employed 28,000 persons, 10,000 of them slave laborers. A subsidiary of I. G. Farben, it produced gasoline from coal and coke. It manufactured nitrogen and coal alcohol in smaller quantities.

The great synthetic rubber plant at Schkopau had been in actual operation as late as April 11. It had employed 12,000 laborers of mixed origin, and covered one square mile in area. At the time of its seizure from the enemy, the plant held approximately 500 tons of finished Buna rubber and 15,000 gallons of the semi-finished product, together with much raw material.

Thirteen Focke Wulf 190 planes bombed and strafed the area during these operations. Friendly units claimed two destroyed and one probable. An airdrome was taken at Merseburg with 29 planes in good condition and numerous motors.

Prisoners taken in the area were largely members of the many flak units stationed in the area. According to prisoner of war statements, the 14th Flak Division, with headquarters



Dodging snipers in the railway station, Leipzig

in Leipzig, was responsible for the defense of the area, but innumerable flak battalions were encountered, together with the 21st Flak Brigade with headquarters in Leuna, and other assorted battle groups. Personnel were captured from searchlight units, flak Vierling units, light flak battalions, replacement battalions and batteries, as well as Luftwaffe members and stragglers who had been thrown into the line for the defense of Leipzig. Members of women's training units were encountered, and young Polish boys impressed into the German army to handle ammunition.

The chain of command in the 14th Flak Division, allegedly responsible for this hodgepodge, underwent frequent and drastic alterations prior to and during the Division's operations in the area. It was impossible to determine its strength and dispositions at any time.

With the pincers closed on Leuna, there was no time for rest. On April 16, the 9th Infantry cleared the towns of Dohlen, Quesitz, Gohrens, Kulkwitz, Garnitz, Seebenisch, and Rehbach. The 23rd Infantry attacked to clear Meuschauc, Venenien, Neninardt, Tragarth, Lapitz, Wallendorf, Kriegsdorf. Elements of the 38th Infantry attached to the 9th Armored Division tanks protecting the area, made long motorized strides; attacking elements prepared to advance upon the heart of Leipzig. This city, Germany's fifth largest, was the Division's next large objective.

Most of the heavy fighting about Leipzig was done in the area of the anti-aircraft guns before the city. Once the industrial sector was breached, the going would be easier as the city itself was reached.

The part of the 2nd Division in this operation would be to

advance to the Weisse-Elster Canal, which separates the western portion of the city, about one-third of the total area, from the remaining portions. It would also seize and protect bridges which it found intact. The 69th Division had the mission of entering the city from the south and occupying the main portion.

Battalion wire crew



During the night of April 16-17 units moved in closer, mopping up pockets of resistance and clearing the external defenses of the city before entering by the bridges. The 69th Infantry Division had been operating to the south of the 2nd Division during the approach to the city and had swept south of Leipzig in the wake of the armor to turn north and strike at the city from the east.

No field forces defended that great city. The numerous flak units in the area were abetted by Kampfgruppen and similar low-grade units who fought erratically, even whimsically, until cornered. Groups of these enemy troops were picked out and dispersed by Division Artillery, some units of which were firing their last rounds in battle as they pounded their way in toward Leipzig and its valuable bridges.

Continuing to advance on April 17, units met no resistance in the northern part of the Division zone as they quickly thrust out tentacles through several towns and villages, overrunning two foreign labor camps at Wallendorf and Zeschen. In the southern part of the sector, the enemy resisted with rifle and machine gun fire at a crossroads two miles northeast of Lutzen, until forced to withdraw. Rifle fire was also encountered in Thronitz, Dohlen, and Quebsitz, where the enemy retired to cellars and fought on until daybreak, in most places, however, the enemy was growing more eager to cease fighting.

At Markranstadt the enemy turned AA guns mounted on flatcars upon the advancing troops, but the town was cleared early that morning. Patrols advancing to the east late that afternoon encountered small arms fire at Lindennaundorf and observed signs of enemy activity to the east. Only scattered small arms fire was met in the Zohlitz-Ehrenburg-Leutzsch area and in Knauthain. A short firefight drove resistance out of Lausen. Some 20-mm. antiaircraft fire was received from guns at Knautnaundorf.

The worst of the flak belt with its grimly insulated fortifications was passed now as the last vestiges of organized resistance were cleared from town after town. Great numbers of prisoners were passing on into the Division stockade at Merseburg.

However, a large force of enemy troops fought fiercely to retain the factory area to the east of Gundorf on April 18, employing small arms fire in staggering quantities. During the early hours of the day the enemy surrounded advance elements of the Division and held them in a precarious position until the advance of friendly elements somewhat relieved the situation.

Down through the steep wooded hills of much-shelled Schonau the Division pushed against an enemy which held out all night long with rifle and machine gun fire. The town was cleared next day. In the meanwhile, units entering the western part of Leipzig were met by a large volume of small arms fire from enemy troops entrenched on the east bank of the Weisse-Elster Canal. At Dehbach also the enemy defended its positions with small arms fire and some flak.

In moving eastward to the southwest outskirts of the city of Leipzig, troops met considerable small arms fire in crossing the river on that side.

At Bosdorf a heavy volume of flak continued to fall even after the town was captured against small arms fire. Knautnaundorf and Zitschez fell without resistance, Klein Dalzig with small arms fire. This brought the Division up against the defenses of Leipzig proper.

The assault upon Leipzig, fifth largest of Germany's cities,

was later described as an expertly coordinated and executed operation, carried out with inexorable determination, with four bridge crossings being made simultaneously into the town. The attack had been timed so that all units would reach their objectives within a few hours. The city's defenses crumpled against the indomitable spirit of the attack.

By midnight of April 18 the Division occupied a line generally following the Weisse-Elster River and Canal in the western part of the city. They had been contacted by elements of the 69th Infantry Division advancing through the city from the east. On April 19 the 69th Division cleared the city except for one small pocket, while elements of that division attached to the 2nd Division cleared three suburban villages.

On April 18, as lead elements fought their way across the Zeppelin Bridge during the entering of the city, S/Sgt. Ernest L. Barber won the Distinguished Service Cross when he fearlessly continued across the bridge after his company was thrust back, and killed two of the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. The sergeant fell wounded and friendly artillery and mortar fire raked the area, believing him to be dead or captured.

Then Sergeant Barber went on a one-man rampage through the enemy line, against the defenders of the bridge. Leaving his partial cover which he had sought in his first mad rush, the blood-spattered soldier assaulted two machine gun nests and a 20-mm. flak gun position single-handed, all some distance apart, killing the crews of each with rifle fire.

Barber then captured five startled Germans and forced them to serve as a shield while he withdrew from the enemy's territory and returned to the bridge, where he met his company, which had been enabled to cross by his one-man tour of destruction. Hailed by his comrades, he gave the company commander a detailed account of enemy positions and despite his loss of blood, had to be restrained from accompanying the attackers forward once more.

"Sergeant Barber's indomitable fighting spirit and unswerving devotion to duty are in keeping with the finest traditions of the armed forces," his citation reads.


Establishing contact with the 69th Division, which had met sharp resistance from SS troops, notably at the City Hall and Napoleon Monument in the public square, at noon on April 18, the Division came to a halt once more, but only momentarily. Resistance within the city ceased on April 19 and next day the 9th Armored Division established a wide, sweeping front along the Mulde River.

In Leipzig, the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion faced a backbreaking job. undefended road blocks at numerous points had to be removed. Rock-filled street cars, piles of debris, and entanglements of trolley wire had to be cleared. This task was begun before the infantry had cleared the town of ackack defenses.

The 702nd Ordnance Company quickly resumed its practice of obtaining material from civilian sources where the army was unable to supply them quickly. Essential equipment unavailable during the heavy marches through Germany was bought and requisitioned from civilian sources and maintenance was begun on worn and battered equipment.

The two-day drive from Merseburg to Leipzig through the deadly crossfire of the flak guns which had to be neutralized one by one was the last great offensive in the 2nd Division sector in Central Germany. No such hard fighting was entailed on the Mulde River or the offensive into Czechoslovakia in May.

THE MULDE RIVER



On April 20, 1945, the 2nd Division began to relieve elements of the 9th Armored Division along the line of the Mulde River. During the last 10 days of April the Division would occupy this sector on the west bank of the Mulde south of Dessau, operating patrols across the enemy's sector to the front. Enemy troops in the area consisted of combat groups, one of an estimated 600 men and two of 100 men each, replacement units including German Air Force replacements, and remnants of units.

Here the Division held to its line by order of higher headquarters, expecting contact with the victorious Russian troops daily. The Russians, however, had halted some 20 miles away along the Elbe River. A patrol of the 69th Division was the first to spot Russian patrols across the river. A little later, at Torgau on the Elbe, two dust-covered groups of

soldiers met to shake hands and exchange congratulations. This was the historic moment for which two great armies had fought half-way around the world. This meeting came on April 25.

Enemy activity was quiet along the Mulde River as the 2nd Division moved into its sector on April 20. A show of resistance by 20-mm. antiaircraft guns was made at Grimma, but was quickly silenced by artillery. Rear installations continued to be harassed, however, and in some sections of the rear a vast confusion reigned.

An officer of the 69th Division was ambushed in woods south of Naunhof from which prisoners of war had already been taken. A Polish informer stated that SS elite guard troops were seen in Threna and Grossposna in civilian clothes. Another Pole reported that four SS men in an American jeep



Germans fleeing from the Russian crowd the east bank of the Mulde River, seeking to enter the American lines. The only Germans admitted were soldiers who became PW's, but many displaced and liberated persons were received here.

had fired on Polish refugees in Rohrbach. The burgermeister of Kossern, aiding American troops, was kidnaped by German police.

The German high command, significantly, diverted no troops from its eastern front to face V Corps, and the Division established bridgeheads across the river, which were later withdrawn as the Russians moved into the sector.

The Germans were making frantic efforts to round up their stragglers and combed the towns of Hartha, Leiswig, and Dobeln, as well as others, east of the Mulde River looking for deserters to be sent back to the front and for men able to bear arms against the Russians.

Gestapo, SS troops, and Werewolf personnel constantly threatened the deserters. With the memory of Stalingrad which the Russians were determined to avenge, these factors made the American prisoner of war cage seem a haven of refuge, and thousands were seen literally looking for a place

where they could give themselves up. Prisoners of war proved useful to the Division in this stage, on several occasions yielding information which led to the quick capture of a town, battery, or pocket, and which proved of help in procuring and billeting.

During the occupation of the Mulde River sector the Division took some 3565 prisoners in all, including high-ranking Nazis and a large percentage of officers, with practically no fighting in progress. In the 38th Infantry sector, the regiment placed ladders across the blown bridge across the Mulde to permit displaced persons and those seeking to surrender to cross. The ladders were pulled in each night.

Where German soldiers once had donned mufti to facilitate their efforts to escape, German civilians now put on uniforms to assure their being captured by American troops and gain entry through the American lines. The Division's stay in the pleasant principality of Saxony afforded the weary men

little time to rest due to the duties imposed by the closing of the Elbe-Mulde vise.

German soldiers attempted several times to get through the Division lines in the guise of displaced persons. Friendly patrols had bloody encounters with panzer grenadier elements now fighting as combat groups. Skirmishes behind the lines against fanatical groups of Nazis were frequent and resulted at times in casualties to the Americans, always in the rout and capture or elimination of the Germans. Flak, radar, and searchlight units were most heavily represented.

A German attack drove Division troops from Hill 194 on April 22 but a counterattack restored the positions. Division patrols and friendly patrols across the Mulde River reported no contact with the enemy. From April 23 through the end of the period of occupation little contact with the enemy was made.

On April 25, as contact with the Russians was established by the 69th Division to the north, the 2nd Division was kept busy turning back dispossessed civilians and trying to sift these unfortunate persons from former members of the Wehrmacht whose principal thought was escape from the advancing Russian troops.

Conditions were so chaotic that only certain categories of these wanderers of a score of nations were allowed to get through. Military government workers aided S-2 personnel working under their direction to regulate the flow of refugees, a flow which gradually slackened as the Russians cleared their zone of occupation and cut off the flow of both prisoners of war and refugees from the east. During the month of April the Division had taken some 19,143 prisoners of war, plus 8000 more in hospitals overrun by the Division forces.

Scores of Germans, both civilians and members of the Wehrmacht, had fled across the Mulde before the swift ad-

vance of V Corps as the German field army in the west was overrun, captured, or destroyed. Now these troops, even more fearful of the vengeful Russians, were trying to return. The policy was firm; the soldiers could come back as prisoners of war, civilians must stay in the Russian zone of operations.

Meanwhile on the heavily trenched approaches to Berlin, webbed and girdled with foxholes and communication ditches, the Russians had routed the German troops and burned them out of their nests with withering fire. In clouds of dust and smoke and under a hot sun, Berlin surrendered to the Red Army. Far behind the First and Ninth Army fronts in the Ruhr, where the trap had been closed in early April, mopping up operations were completed on a gigantic scale. More than 300,000 prisoners were taken in this fighting far behind the western front of the First and Ninth Armies, and squarely astride their lines of supply and communications.

The Wehrmacht had disintegrated all along the line; the end was near. There was every indication for a time that the 2nd Division might spend the remainder of the war in Europe on the Mulde River, to sit tight until the Nazi collapse was complete and final.

The fortunes of war, however, decreed one more campaign for the 2nd. On the first of May the Third Army was advancing into Czechoslovakia on a 100-mile front south of the city of Asch. The 2nd Division was swiftly transferred from the First to the Third Army to seize and secure the territory behind the rapid armored advance. A 200-mile motor trip would transfer the Division to a sector along the Czechoslovakian border to begin a new campaign.

Along the Danube the Third Army continued its campaign and the armored spearheads reached Linz in Austria on May 5. Next day, May 6, Pilzen fell to the 16th Armored Division and the day following that, May 7, the 2nd Division took over Pilzen as its last combat assignment in World War II.


Correspondents with the 23rd Infantry awaiting contact with the Russians were disappointed



THE LAST CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER XX

CZECHOSLOVAKIA



The last campaign in Europe found the 2nd Division moving south from its sector on the Mulde River east of Leipzig, leaving the 9th Armored Division and the 69th Infantry Division in Thuringia, as V Corps advanced to clear the pocket of German troops now backed up into Czechoslovakia. Once more the long serpentine line of motorized troops of the Division moved out, this time to thrust 200 miles south into the western part of the redoubt of German-held Czechoslovakia, one of the last corners left in German hands after the piecemeal falling apart of Central Europe.

The motor march was made during the first few days of May in unseasonable cold and snow, in long strides down the autobahn to Bayreuth in Bavaria, then swinging southeast across the Czech frontier.

The Third Army in its swift advance had left only a light

containing force around the Czech pocket as it pushed across the mountains to the limits of the Bohemian Forest, sending out long tentacles into Bavaria and Austria. Some 60 German divisions, one-fourth of which were armored, had been trapped there as the Third Army completed the encirclement and rushed on toward Linz in Austria.

Moving up to its line of departure through a pleasant, prosperous countryside of lush farms and sleek villages, the 2nd Division was committed along and across the old Czech boundary in the area called the Bohemian Bastion, with some units still on German soil. The attack was made along a front of 42 kilometers. It largely followed the roads and highways, as resistance was light, by-passing the hilly forested areas, hammering to the front against scattered roadblocks and futile minor efforts at resistance.

Soviet Russia was the foe most feared by the Germans. The unmistakable signs of complete collapse and disintegration were everywhere now. Unit by unit, the Germans were surrendering, some in a desperate plunge toward the American lines to avoid being taken by the Russians, some in apathy and bewilderment, some only after dealing a last blow, however hopeless, in a final burst of fanaticism.

A large-scale movement of the enemy to the southwest was noted by the Division during the first days of the drive into Czechoslovakia; this enemy movement was believed to be an unavailing and belated effort to postpone, if not prevent the inevitable separation from Austria.

Facing the Division now were battle groups of the most incongruous descriptions, Home Guard units, service troops, battle-exhausted units of one-time high quality branches of the Wehrmacht. These were somewhat loosely controlled by the staffs of the 403rd and 413th Mobilization Divisions in the north, the 2nd Panzer Division in the center, and the 11th Panzer Division in the south.

Out of the rolling forested hills and pleasant countryside of Bavaria, units in the northern part of the Division sector on May 5 through 7 passed through the Sudetenland for most of the way. Here surly looks and sullen faces met them as the Germans walked with eyes looking to the ground, refusing to take cognizance of the victors. Units in the southern part of the Division sector came out almost at once into Czechoslovakia, where the people welcomed them with shouts of joy, hailing the men as liberators, almost hysterical with the sense of freedom after six years under the Nazi yoke. Division Headquarters moved along the boundary, passing through portions of both areas.

The Sudeten Germans wore yellow arm bands by orders of the Czechs and went about with eyes averted. Czech villages burst out with red, white, and blue flags hoarded for this day, and set up triumphal arches of greenery. They

decked the armored cars with lilacs and turned out en masse for dancing in the streets.

The Division relieved the 90th and 97th Infantry Divisions on the front and entered on an operation large in scope despite the dissolution of the enemy's power to resist. All objectives on the march up to the line had been attained with ease. Sufficient transportation was available to motorize all elements. The enemy's defenses consisted largely of roadblocks and minefields despite the fact that the terrain was ideally adapted to defensive warfare and a handful of determined troops could give a vast amount of trouble.

Due to the rapidity of the Third Army's advance through the Bavarian uplands, a great many enemy troops had been pushed back into the wooded stretches which lay to the rear of the Division lines. These were mopped up and the woodlands cleared without a major struggle, but with many instances of sabotage and ambush. One enemy group uncovered through an informer held a concealed and well-defended position in the forest in an area that had been combed for by-passed enemy troops.

On May 4, in relieving the 97th Division in the line, the 2nd Division took over the task of accepting the surrender of the 11th Panzer Division, terms of which had been made with the 97th prior to the relief. Beginning at 2100 hours on May 4, this once-great German division began its movement through the lines of the Division, to the rear. It was a mass capitulation of a panzer division virtually intact, surrendering with all its personnel and arms.

Men of the Division looked on with unsuppressed interest and curiosity. It was a rare opportunity to see what a full-fledged elite division looked like in the flower of its full strength and arrogance. Well-shaven, uniforms pressed, the troops moved up in a long line of vehicles and big weapons, still in fairly good condition. In order, they lay down their arms and passed through into the Division's prisoner of war

A V-E Day Scene in Pilsen



Pretty Czech girls threw flowers to troops of 2nd Infantry Division as they enter Pilsen on May 7, 1945.





Pilsen

enclosure. Division rear areas were dotted with the neat stacks of rifles, grenades, and other equipment which they arranged in meticulous order as they marched through into captivity.

Fantastic scenes took place in Czechoslovakia in these days, with haughty German staff officers in polished staff cars looking for someone to whom they could surrender, and others, weary and bedraggled, trying to get through the lines in the guise of displaced persons with false papers. In addition to the officers and soldiers of the Wehrmacht desperately struggling to escape the closing Russian-American vise, there were displaced persons of a score of nations trying to find their way back to their homes, without means of food or transportation, clogging the roads with masses of humanity. Among the prisoners of war there was so much confusion that commands and units became vague and indistinguishable as the troops were processed and sent to the prison camps.

May 5 found the Division attacking once again, after four days spent in reaching and taking positions in the line. The units moved forward on a 42-kilometer front against almost negligible resistance and an advance of 12 kilometers was made along the entire front. There was no resistance noted

in the southern part of the Division sector where the Czechs were taking over, and no artillery or mortar fire. The enemy was driven from the last stretch of highway between the border and Horsovesky Tyn. That town, Domazlice, and Kdýne were cleared and 1075 prisoners taken.

Exploiting the lack of organized resistance, elements of the 16th Armored Division passed through the 2nd Division lines on May 6 to make a dash for the great Czech city of Pilsen. Following in the wake of the armored spearhead, the Division pushed on rapidly toward the city without encountering opposition. By now enemy units in the Division zone were surrendering with alacrity and en masse. Among the larger units taken as a whole were the tank regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 3rd Railroad Engineer Replacement Battalion, the 929th Field Command, Luftgau Pilzen, and an entire artillery school with those in training. Smaller units were of many types and a diversity of descriptions.

Three hospitals and their inmates were taken on the way to Klatovy, an ammunition factory located partly under ground and engaged in manufacturing shells by impressed labor was captured at Holysov. Other miscellaneous items

collected were a payroll of 90,000 Kronen, wagons, horses, and several hundred vehicles of varying types.

The 2nd Division moved in to occupy the city of Pilsen on May 7, taking also under its control the territory to the north-east and the southeast. At 2100 hours on May 7 came the announcement of the unconditional surrender of Germany to the Allied and Soviet forces. Closely following this eagerly awaited news came that of cessation of hostilities in Europe and the order to halt all aggressive action. The end of the war had come at Rheims where General Eisenhower's headquarters received emissaries of Admiral Doenitz offering the unconditional surrender of Germany's stricken military forces wherever they were fighting.

The pocket in Czechoslovakia was one of the few spots left on the continent of Europe where bloodshed was spared by the surrender. The 2nd Division, which had come ashore in Europe one day after D-day, was still advancing on the enemy when the last shot of the war was fired.

The surrender document was signed in that brief, formal, and stage-managed conference in a schoolhouse at Rheims. From the White House President Truman said: "The Allied Armies, through sacrifice and devotion and with God's help, have won from Germany a final and unconditional surrender. The Western World has been freed of the evil forces which for five years and longer have imprisoned the bodies and broken the lives of millions upon millions of free-born men . . . Our armies of liberation have restored freedom to these suffering peoples, whose will and spirit the oppressors could never enslave." May 9, 337 days after the Allied Invasion landings on Normandy Beach, the war was over and Victory in Europe Day was proclaimed.

During the nine days of hostilities in May the Division took 23,100 prisoners and vast quantities of enemy material. Climax of the last campaign was the entry into Pilsen through streets which were almost blocked by cheering throngs and each battle-used vehicle was welcomed with passionate joy by liberated Czechs.

The 16th Armored Division had officially liberated Pilsen the day before the 2nd Division's triumphal entry. Only minor action had taken place and opposition came largely from snipers in buildings around the city square. Pilsen, as home of the famed Skoda works, had been bombed thoroughly and effectively by the AAF in April. The doughboys discovered sadly that the Pilsen Brewery, world-famed makers of pilsener, had been bombed too. Their plant was too close to the railway station. Nevertheless, the natives offered hospitality with glasses of the native brews, together with wine and cakes and pastries, as they fell upon the men with tears and kisses in an ardent celebration which left no room for doubt that the war was really over.

The Division was ensconced in choice billets and was wined and dined both officially and unofficially, en masse and as individuals. Security lines were built up and a period of rest

and rehabilitation began as the men joined the emotional Czechs in singing and dancing in the streets, entertainments, and general frolicking.

The last campaign brought mixed emotions to the men of the Division. To some it seemed in many ways an anticlimax to all that had gone before. To all it was a joyful and welcome release from the long and arduous labors of warfare. As in all campaigns, there were some men who suffered physical ordeals and mental stress, for every battle claims its victims, the last one as well as the first one.

The Division had spent 320 days in combat since coming ashore on D-Day plus 1 in Normandy. It set a new record of consecutive days in line in Normandy, with 71 straight days of fighting, then smashed that record by remaining in the line for 217 days in Germany.

Five great campaigns since the 2nd Division rolled up like an avalanche of steel upon the beaches of Normandy had passed. The total disintegration of German strength and military prestige in Czechoslovakia had now come as the final retribution. Many valiantly fought battles, countless gallant skirmishes had now grown into one big cumulative picture of the war. Rapidly pyramiding events had brought the 2nd Division to the end of its second epic struggle against German military might.

In itself, the current battle often seems the hardest, the ordeal and the hardships entailed at the time seem the hardest to bear. Each man of the Division had his own "hardest battle," sometimes perishable, sometimes not even set down in the black and white of the battle reports. In Normandy or at Brest, in the Ardennes or the Rhineland, in Central Germany or in the last heroic push toward victory, the men of the Division lived countless absorbing stories in each operation. As General Robertson pointed out, these things would be "forever a source of pride, to our country, to our Army, and to each individual who had participated in their making."



CHAPTER XXI

P I L Z E N

During the month following V-E Day, the 2nd Division Command Post was located in a modern office and apartment building facing the main square of Pilzen. The Division rear echelon was located in a technical school a few blocks from the center of the city.

The command posts of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 38th Infantry Regiment, the 12th Field Artillery Battalion, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, the 2nd Engineer Battalion, the 2nd Medical Battalion, Headquarters 2nd Division Artillery, the 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, the 2nd Signal Company, the 2nd Quartermaster Company, the 702nd Ordnance Company were all located in the city. The 38th Infantry's headquarters were in the world-famed Pilzen Brewery.

The 9th Infantry's command post was in the small town of Rokycany, northeast of Pilzen, a former Czech army post. The 15th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions were located in the towns of Ejpvovice, Krimice, and Prichovice.

Life in Pilzen was tumultuous in these first days of liberation. Political parades and assemblies filled the city square. The entry of the Czech Brigade on the evening of May 8 was one of the most emotional of these occasions. The troops had been holding the Germans in Dunkirk on the Channel. The city went wild with celebration as their national heroes returned.

Convoys of displaced persons including liberated Czechs from every corner of Europe streamed through Pilzen in a tidal wave for many days. For the first week or so, displaced persons too were received with ardent celebration. After that the novelty wore off, and the Czechs had many other things to celebrate.

Men from the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion erected a bandstand on one side of the main public square. Here on the first Sunday of the occupation, May 13, the Division Band staged a concert. More than 7000 Czechs jammed the square and surrounding boulevards to listen despite a blistering sun and hot pavement. Girls, and even a few of the men, appeared in elaborate and colorful national costumes of Bohemia. When the band broke into national Czech airs, applause was thunderous. The concert was a great success, and after that the band played every Sunday to enthusiastic crowds.

The industrious Czechs set to work to clear up their war-torn city. They borrowed prisoner of war labor gangs from the Division camps to clear away bomb damage and debris. They got their trolley system to working again in a short while. Trains once more began running between Pilzen and Prague.


Engineers from the Division directed several thousand German prisoners daily in this task of clearing the wreckage of war from Pilzen and rehabilitating the bombed-out railway lines and installations. They supervised the working of the vast Zbuch coal mines by prisoners and maintained the water supply, as water in the area had largely been contaminated by the Germans.

Other elements of the Division also were hard at work after V-E Day. Security lines were built up and maintained while rest and rehabilitation were carried on. The problems of peace were numerous and perplexing.

Karl Hermann Frank, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, SS Obergruppenfuhrer, was discovered trying to enter the American lines in an automobile in the guise of an ordinary displaced person. His identity was readily established despite the excellence of his forged credentials. Under special guard he was hustled off to the Twelfth Army Group for safekeeping.

The daily trains, principally those from Prague, brought in thousands of English, French, Polish, Dutch, Czech, Hungarian, Belgian, Russian, and Yugoslavian people. This great backwash of war gave the Division an exhausting and exacting task of handling civilian population as well as German military personnel.

The war was over, but not the labors of the 2nd Division infantrymen. At one time the 9th Infantry operated three camps for captured German soldiers, one at Ejpvovice, another at Blovice, a third at Klatovy. In addition they maintained two centers for displaced persons at Rokycany under the jurisdiction of the military government officer. The three camps for prisoners of war originally housed respectively 13,000 men, 1700 men, and 1900 men. Then the Germans began to stream into the lines by the thousands as they moved ahead of the Russian occupation force into the American zone. Contact with the Russians was established by the 2nd



Battalion parades were frequent in Pilzen Public Square

Division on May 9 and, after the Russians established their occupation troops up to the boundary, this influx was reduced to a trickle.

The 23rd Infantry also operated three prison camps when it assumed responsibility from the 16th Armored Division in addition to setting up road blocks and restraining lines in cooperation with the Russians. Few of the prisoners taken were like the soldiers of the 11th Panzer Division who were obviously picked troops with a rolling arsenal of Mark IV tanks, self-propelled guns, hundreds of camouflaged troop carriers, trucks, kitchens, and horse-drawn vehicles. Most were bedraggled, dirty, hungry, and often diseased, the routed remnants of the once-great Wehrmacht in its lowest manifestation.

The 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry at Crast, nine miles east of Pilzen, set up a camp for German prisoners with an initial population of 24,000. The Military Police Platoon evacuated 5000 repatriated Allied military prisoners of war through Pilzen Airport. After the camps were cleared of displaced persons making their way from the Russian zone of operations, they had to be held in readiness for Russian soldiers and civilians waiting to be repatriated.


Administration of these camps was a major undertaking involving a host of problems of which the average soldier had

little or no experience. Some 52,000 prisoners of war were processed by the 2nd Division after V-E Day, not to mention the hordes of civilians whose problems were handled by the men of the Division.

Yet there was a spirit of exhilaration abroad, despite the fact that one enemy remained unconquered and in those days no one knew whether or not they would have to fight again.

Refurbishing of equipment was accomplished and battalions

Czechs throng the main square of Pilzen to hear a concert by the 2nd Division Band the Sunday after V-E Day.





General Robertson decorates General Salvan, CG of Russian 5th Tank Corps, with Legion of Merit.



Ceremony in main square of Pilsen, at which Russian and American forces exchanged decorations. The flag to the left of the National Colors is that of the Soviet Union.

held parades in the public square of Pilsen. The blackout was lifted on May 10 and once more the feeling of constraint, annoyance, and constant irritating inconvenience resulting from the inability to use light at night was banished. Once more, too, the heavy combat helmet was discarded. Troops stationed in Pilsen and those on pass in the city wore fiber helmet liners and moved about freely without arms.

The show "Two Down and One to Go" was staged in Pilsen and was compulsory for men of the Division. The Russians were entertained formally and officially with many decorations awarded. They in turn offered formal and lavish hospitality. In addition there was informal mingling of officers and enlisted men from both sides.

During breathing spells the doughboys shopped for souvenirs, including the famed Bohemian glass and lace, costume jewelry and native handicrafts. The Czechs delighted in pressing handsome gifts from their homes on the men of the Division. In brief, the Czech played a decided role in the social life of the Division in these days. Their ebullient behavior, more than anything else perhaps, kept reminding the men of the Division that the war in the ETO was over, that this was not just a lull in the pounding of the German guns.

Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, commanding general of the 2nd Division from Normandy through V-E Day, and Brig. Gen. John H. Stokes, Jr., assistant division commander, were transferred to XV Corps as commanding general and chief of staff of that corps.

On June 2, 1945, as General Robertson relinquished his command of the 2nd Division, he addressed the following letter of commendation to officers and enlisted men of the Division with which he had served throughout the war in the European Theater of Operations.

The message reads:

"1. Upon relinquishing command of the Division I feel impelled to express my deepest appreciation to each of you for your loyalty to the Division and to me personally. Your unselfish, unswerving devotion to duty has been largely responsible for the brilliant and impressive combat record which you have compiled. This record will be forever a source of pride to our country, to our Army and to each individual who has participated in its making.

"2. In parting I wish to leave with you my best wishes for those unfinished tasks which may come your way, and my complete confidence and assurance that they will be performed as only you can do them. No greater honor has or can come my way than to have been your commander and comrade in arms during the campaigns which have just closed.

"3. For the last time I salute you in reverence, respect, and pride.

"(signed) W. M. Robertson

"Major General, US Army

"Commanding."

General Huebner, commanding officer of V Corps, sent the following message to the commanding officer of the 2nd Division on May 29:

"1. The 2nd Infantry Division was part of V Corps at the time of the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944. It rejoined this command 13 December 1944 and continued to serve with the V Corps until the cessation of hostilities on 9 May 1945.

"2. The brilliant accomplishments of your troops have been a source of pride and pleasure to everyone who has served with them. The heroic stand of the 2nd Infantry

Division at the Elsenborn Corner during the battle of the Ardennes in December 1944 will be numbered among your greatest achievements of the European campaign. The personal efforts of yourself and of the officers and men of your command in that battle greatly influenced the tide of subsequent events and operations on the Western Front.

"3. The skillful execution of operations by the 2nd Infantry Division in capturing the Schleiden-Gemund position enabled the V Corps to break the German defensive dispositions west of the Rhine and vitally contributed to the success of the First and Third Armies in their advance to that great river. The operations of your command preliminary to the V Corps breaking out of the Remagen Bridgehead, its subsequent support of the 9th Armored Division in the race to close the Ruhr pocket, the advance on Leipzig and finally the march into Czechoslovakia, were executed in a manner characteristic of the work of masters in the art of warfare.

"4. We do not know what the future holds, but I sincerely hope that any coming combat operations which may be in store again will find the wearers of 'The Indianhead' with the V Corps.

"(signed) C. R. Huebner
"Major General, US Army
"Commanding."

As the War in Europe drew to a close and Germany was defeated the Army began full-scale redeployment. The citizen army had been recruited on the basis of individual fitness for military service and comparative essentiality in the nation's economic system. An Army-wide survey was made to determine the consensus of opinion as to the best basis for determining discharge status. The opinion was that men who had fought the hardest, served the longest, and who had families should be permitted to leave the service first. Accordingly the point system for the return of men for discharge was evolved.

The system gave credit for length of Army service, service overseas, certain decorations, battle stars, and children under 18 years of age not to exceed three. Points were computed from September 16, 1940. The point system was frequently modified to keep the process steady and in order.

The overseas commanders had the responsibility of the selection of soldiers eligible for discharge. As troops returned they were sent to disposition centers near the embarkation ports, then in groups to army stations near their homes. Here they received the final screening and release by the separation center.

As the point system went into effect the men of the Division eagerly added up their points and calculated their chances of getting home soon.

Military Mass in Pilsen for the Division's dead



Crowds thronged Pilsen streets



CHAPTER XXII

A N D H O M E A G A I N

During the first week in June the men of the Division moved out from Pilzen and its vicinity for staging preparatory to returning to the United States. All units closed into an area in southwestern Czechoslovakia around the towns of Domazlice and Kdyne.

The Division had been designated a Category II unit, to be deployed through the States to the Pacific, to take part in the pending assault upon the Japanese mainland. Large numbers of high-point men were transferred to various units remaining in the European Theater of Operations, at least temporarily. Corresponding numbers of low-point men were received.

The Division command post closed in Pilzen on June 8, after a stay there lasting one month. It opened in the town of Kdyne on the same date. Initial preparations for shipment were completed.

On June 18 the Division began its rail and motor movement to an assembly area near Rheims in Northern France. The long motor march was accomplished in four days. The Division bivouaced in a forest area near Ansbach, Germany, on the night of the first day, after passing through the ruins of Nurnberg. The second night's halt was called along the autobahn west of Kaiserslauten in the Saar Basin. The third night's stop was made at a transient camp near Nancy where kitchens, tents, cots, and other conveniences were supplied by service troops.

The Division closed in at Camp Norfolk, Assembly Area Command, 40 kilometers southeast of Rheims, on June 21 following a motor march of 507 miles.

Since the preceding June 7 the Division had fought its way over 1665 miles and traveled back some 500 miles to Northern

France. In 11 months of combat Division Artillery had fired some 556,000 rounds.

Camp Norfolk was one of several large tented camps of the Assembly Area Command at Rheims. The camp was still under construction when the 2nd Division arrived; this was the first major unit to occupy the camp.

Further preparations for the journey were made here. Vehicles were turned in, together with most of the equipment. Personnel passed through a processing system.

Most of the time, however, was devoted to recreation—athletics, camp shows, movies, passes to Rheims and other French cities.


On June 25 the Advance Detachment, 2nd Infantry Division, left Camp Norfolk and sailed from Le Havre on the SS *Sea Robin*. The detachment disembarked on July 6 at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and moved on to Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. There they dispersed to reception stations for recuperation periods.

The Division left Camp Norfolk on July 5 and moved by rail to Camp Old Gold near Yvetot, France, in the vicinity of the Channel Coast arriving there on July 6. Here the final preparations for shipment were made.

On July 12 the units embarked at Le Havre, France. Sailing on board the SS *Monticello* were Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Infantry Division, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 38th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, the 2nd Quartermaster Company, and the Military Police Platoon.

On board the United States Army Transport *General Richardson* were the 9th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Field

*The 2nd Division heads for home, July 12, at
Le Havre, France.*





*Troops on the SS Monticello enter New York Harbor
July 20, 1945.*

Artillery Battalion, the 2nd Engineer Battalion, the 2nd Medical Battalion and the 2nd Signal Company.

The SS *Marine Panther* carried Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2nd Infantry Division Artillery; the 12th Field Artillery Battalion, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 702nd Ordnance Company.

The *Richardson* sailed from Le Havre on July 12 and the *Monticello* on July 13, both for New York City. The *Marine Panther* sailed from Le Havre on July 13 for Boston, docking there on July 19. Troops from that ship debarked and moved to Camp Miles Standish for processing prior to movement to reception stations throughout the country where they would be granted periods of recuperation. The *Richardson* docked at Camp Shanks, New York, on July 20 and the troops from that ship went to Camp Shanks for processing. The *Monticello* docked at Pier 59, Hudson River, New York City, at noon on July 20 and the troops moved to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, for processing.

As the ships moved up the bay in New York Harbor and thence into the Hudson River, they were met and greeted by a host of harbor craft bearing welcoming parties. Some of these had bands for the occasion. A dirigible floated overhead.

Office workers in the tall buildings near the Battery hung from their windows to shower the troops with ticker tape and paper. Large signs bearing the legend "Welcome Home" or "Well Done" flew from vantage points.

All eyes were riveted on the Statue of Liberty as it emerged from the haze overhanging the harbor. On the piers volunteer workers appeared to serve fresh milk—the first in almost two years for many of the men—and ice cream, chocolate bars, and cookies to the troops.

Upon arrival at their camps the troops first received orientation on the processing they would undergo. Then they were led to messhalls where they ate a "welcoming" meal of steaks, milk, and the fresh foods they had missed most overseas.


On the trains en route to the camps all eyes remained fixed on the windows to feast on American advertising signs, buildings, hamburger stands, soda fountains—all the galaxy of things which meant home—and American girls.

The weather was hot, with the midsummer heat of America unlike any the men had seen in months. Cotton uniforms issued next day were more than welcome. Long distance telephone centers in the camps were jammed far into the night as thousands of homesick soldiers now near their goal sought to renew by telephone some contact with their relatives and friends.

Within two days, the men were on their way via troop trains to the various reception stations where they would again be processed, issued clean cotton uniforms, and sent off to their homes at Government expense for a period of thirty days for recuperation.

Beginning August 28, the first elements of the Division began to arrive at Camp Swift, Texas, 40 miles east of Austin, which would be the permanent station of the 2nd Infantry Division.

Talk ran high in speculation concerning the possibility that due to the impending surrender of Japan, the Division might remain in the States indefinitely instead of proceeding to the Pacific Theater after a short period of training. On September 8 the assembly of the Division was complete. On the same day orders were received changing the status of the Division from "Alerted for Shipment Overseas" to that of "Assigned to Strategic Striking Force."




CWO MARVIN W. FJELD
Bandleader
June 6, 1944—September 8, 1945

Organized at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, on August 10, 1943, the Band, 2nd Infantry Division, was formed from the personnel of the inactivated regimental bands of the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments. Entraining on October 2, 1943, for the New York Port of Embarkation, the Band paused briefly at Camp Shanks, New York, before boarding the USAT *Thomas H. Barry* for overseas service. After an uneventful Atlantic crossing, the Band disembarked at Belfast, North Ireland, on October 19, 1943, and proceeded to its first European station at Armagh.

After six months of pre-combat training in Ireland, the Band sailed again, crossing the Irish Sea to Wales. After a stay of one month in the southern Welsh town of Tenby, the Band entrained for marshalling areas in southern England, where final pre-combat touches were added. Sailing from Southamp-

ton, England, the Band crossed the English Channel and landed on Omaha Beach on June 22, 1944, near St. Laurent-sur-Mer in Normandy.

Participating in the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns as a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, the Division Band earned the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for superior achievement and performance of duty during 11 months of combat. Forsaking their instruments on many occasions, personnel of the Band engaged in such essential battlefield tasks as litter-bearing, guard and fatigue details, and in the opening phase of the Ardennes campaign assisted in the construction of defensive positions. Five enlisted men of the Band became casualties while engaged in these tasks.



The Company Guidon of Headquarters Company, 2nd Infantry Division, by its two colors, is symbolic of the two fighting arms of the Division organization—blue denoting the infantry

elements and red denoting the field artillery elements. On the staff of the guidon are five silver bands, signifying participation in five campaigns in World War I.

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(Picture Unavailable)

CAPT. FREDERICK A. PALMER
Commanding Division Headquarters Company
June 6, 1944—May 16, 1945


CAPT. PAUL J. LEMM, JR.
Commanding Division Headquarters Company
May 17, 1945—September 8, 1945

Headquarters Company, 2nd Infantry Division, was redesignated as such on July 22, 1942, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In November, 1942, the Division moved to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it engaged in winter training, followed by winter maneuvers at Watersmeet, Michigan. After a period of pre-combat training, Headquarters Company entrained for Camp Shanks, New York Port of Embarkation, and sailed on October 7, 1943, on board the USAT *Thomas H. Barry*, for the European Theater of Operations, arriving at Belfast, Ireland, on October 19. The company was stationed at Armagh, North Ireland, until April, 1944. After a six-month period of acclimatization and further preparation for combat, the company crossed the Irish Sea on board the USAT *Marine Raven* to a new station at Tenby, Wales. Here final equipping and water-proofing took place. In late May the company moved to a Welsh marshalling area, and was stationed at St. Donat's Castle. On June 4 the company embarked again on the *Marine*

Raven for its trip across the English Channel. Following closely on the heels of the combat elements of the Division, Headquarters Company landed on Omaha Beach on June 9, 1944, near St. Laurent-sur-Mer, Normandy, France.

In the ensuing 11 months Headquarters Company, as part of the 2nd Infantry Division, fought in France, Belgium, Germany and Czechoslovakia, earning battle participation credit for the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns. Members of the company were awarded a total of ten Purple Heart Medals and 26 Bronze Star Medals; two members of the company were killed in action during the five campaigns.

In World War I, Headquarters Detachment of the 2nd Division, A.E.F., predecessor of the present Headquarters Company, participated in five campaigns in France, in token of which the company's distinctive red and blue guidon bears five silver bands on its staff.




MAJ. WILLIAM F. NORTH
Commanding Military Police Platoon
June 6, 1944—September 8, 1945

The Military Police Platoon, 2nd Infantry Division, was activated as a special unit of the Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on July 1, 1942. The unit continued training at that station until November, 1942, when it moved with the Division to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. After several months spent in winter training and maneuvers, the platoon underwent a period of intensive training for combat. Moving to Camp Shanks, New York, in October, 1943, the platoon sailed from New York on October 7, and 13 days later arrived at Belfast, North Ireland. The platoon was stationed in the town of Armagh during the succeeding six months, engaging in training and equipping for the European campaign soon to open. In mid-April, 1944, the platoon was shipped from Ireland to a new station in Tenby,

Wales, and one month later moved to a marshalling area in southern Wales to waterproof vehicles and await embarkation orders. In the early days of June the platoon embarked in the Bristol Channel, sailed around Land's End, and on June 8, 1944, landed on the shores of France at Omaha Beach, near St. Laurent-sur-Mer in Normandy.

Through France, Belgium and Germany and into Czechoslovakia at the war's end, the Military Police Platoon served with the 2nd Infantry Division, earning battle participation credit for the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe. For its excellent performance of duty and high achievements, the platoon was awarded the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque.



CAPT. LOUIS S. MUCOCH
 Commanding Officer
 702nd Ordnance Company
 July 1, 1945—September 8, 1945



LT. COL. ALEXANDER STUART, JR.
 Division Ordnance Officer
 June 6, 1944—September 8, 1945

(Picture Unavailable)

CAPT. OTTO H. ALLEN
 Commanding Officer
 702nd Ordnance Company
 June 6, 1944—June 30, 1945

The 702nd Ordnance Light Maintenance Company was formed on September 29, 1942, to furnish the 2nd Infantry Division with third echelon ordnance maintenance and supply.


On October 7, 1943, the company left Camp Shanks, New York, on the U. S. S. *Arundel* enroute to Belfast, Ireland, where it landed on October 18, 1943. On April 17, 1944, the company boarded the U. S. S. *Marine Raven* from which it disembarked at Newport, England, on April 18, 1944. From Newport the company moved by rail to Pembroke County, Wales. The time in Ireland and Wales was spent in preparing personnel and equipment of the Division for the invasion of France. During this period large quantities of equipment were procured and issued to organic units. Training was also conducted on the preparation of vehicles and equipment for a landing operation.

Landing at Omaha Beach in small parties between June 9, 1944, and June 29, 1944, the company continued to maintain

a high level of ordnance service throughout the five campaigns in which the 2nd Division participated. On December 16, 1944, a robot bomb (V-1) landed in the company area causing the following battle casualties: One enlisted man killed, four officers and 35 enlisted men wounded.

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque was awarded to the company for outstanding performance of exceptionally difficult tasks during the period January 1 to August 1, 1944. On May 23, 1945, a star to the Plaque was awarded to the company for continued superior performance.

On July 11, 1945, the 702nd Ordnance (LM) Company left Le Havre, France, for the United States on the S. S. *Marine Panther*, arriving at Camp Shanks, New York, on July 20, 1945. The members of the company were given leaves and furloughs, rejoining the Division at their new home at Camp Swift, Texas.



(Picture Unavailable)



(Picture Unavailable)

LT. COL. JAMES H. CARUTHERS
Division Quartermaster
June 6, 1944—January 20, 1945

LT. COL. OLIVER J. GAYTON
Division Quartermaster
January 20, 1945—September 8, 1945

CAPT. JUAN H. HINOJOSA
Commanding 2nd Quartermaster Company
June 6, 1944—December 3, 1944

(Picture Unavailable)



CAPT. FRANCIS LACY
Commanding 2nd Quartermaster Company
December 3, 1944—January 21, 1945


CAPT. RAYMOND BRIMMER
Commanding 2nd Quartermaster Company
January 21, 1945—September 8, 1945

The 2nd Quartermaster Company traces its history through several organizational changes to the 2nd Supply Train, organized at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on October 1, 1917. As a unit of the 2nd Division, A. E. F., the 2nd Supply Train participated in the Lorraine, Aisne, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns in World War I. Returning to Fort Sam Houston in 1919, the Supply Train was redesignated the 2nd Division Train; in 1936 the unit was again redesignated as the 2nd Quartermaster Regiment. Reorganized as the 2nd Quartermaster Battalion in 1939, the unit was finally reorganized as the 2nd Quartermaster Company on October 21, 1942.

In November, 1942, the 2nd Quartermaster Company, as a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, moved to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it engaged in winter training, followed by winter maneuvers in Michigan. In October, 1943, after several months of pre-combat training, the company entrained for the

New York Port of Embarkation. Halting briefly at Camp Shanks, New York, for processing, the company sailed on October 8, 1943 for Belfast, North Ireland. The company was stationed in the historic old town of Armagh until April, 1944, at which time it shipped across the Irish Sea to a new station at Tenby, Wales. Moving to the marshalling areas in late May, the company waterproofed its vehicles and made final preparations for combat. Crossing the English Channel as a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, the 2nd Quartermaster Company landed on the shores of France on June 10, 1944, near St. Laurent-sur-Mer in Normandy.

Fighting across France, Belgium and Germany, the company entered Pilsen, Czechoslovakia 11 months and five campaigns later. The company received battle participation credit for the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns, and was twice cited in Division orders for the Meritorious Service Award.



CAPT. GENERAL P. HEFLEY
 Commanding Officer, 2nd Reconnaissance Troop
 July 5, 1944—September 18, 1945


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CAPT. CHARLES E. TRAPP
 Commanding Officer, 2nd Reconnaissance Troop
 June 6, 1944—July 5, 1944

The 2nd Reconnaissance Troop was organized August 19, 1940, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, from a cadre furnished by the 5th Cavalry Regiment, to fill a need in the 2nd Infantry Division for a highly mobile and flexible means of reconnaissance. The troop participated in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941 and 1942, receiving commendations for accomplishing difficult reconnaissance missions. Moving to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, in November, 1942, the troop underwent a period of intensive winter training, followed by winter maneuvers near Watersmeet, Michigan. Intensive pre-combat training followed, preparatory to shipment overseas. On September 25, 1943, the troop left Camp McCoy, moving by rail to Camp Shanks, New York, for processing prior to embarking for overseas duty. On October 5 the troop went on board the USAT *Edmund B. Alexander*, and sailed for the European Theater of Operations. Disembarking at Belfast, Ireland, on October 19, the troop

moved by rail to the town of Armagh, their home for the next six months. On April 12, 1944, after further pre-combat training, equipping and acclimatization, the troop embarked on the USAT *James Parker*, and crossed the Irish Sea to a new station at St. Clears, Wales. On May 17 the troop moved to the staging area at St. Donats, Wales, where vehicles were waterproofed and last-minute preparations for combat were made. On June 3 the troop embarked on the vessels *Louis Kossuth*, *Helas* and *Marine Raven*, and sailed down the Bristol Channel for the invasion of France.

Landing on Omaha Beach, Normandy, on June 9, 1944, the troop was immediately committed to combat. During the ensuing 11 months, as part of the 2nd Infantry Division, the troop saw action in France, Belgium, Germany and Czechoslovakia, and received battle participation credit for the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns.



(Picture Unavailable)

LT. COL. KENNETH E. BELIEU
Division Signal Officer
June 6, 1944—June 16, 1945

(Picture Unavailable)

MAJOR GEORGE W. FISK
Division Signal Officer
June 17, 1945—September 8, 1945
Commanding Officer, 2nd Signal Company
June 6, 1944—August 20, 1944



CAPT. KEITH E. HALL
Commanding Officer, 2nd Signal Company
August 21, 1944—June 24, 1945



1ST LT. WALTER F. BURKHEAD
Commanding Officer, 2nd Signal Company
June 25, 1945—September 8, 1945

The 2nd Signal Company was organized in 1922, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division. During the following two decades the company pioneered many communications methods and devices which are now standard throughout the United States Army. As part of the 2nd Infantry Division, the company participated in large-scale maneuvers in Texas and Louisiana in 1941 and 1942. In November, 1942, the company moved to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it engaged in intensive winter training, culminating in division-scale maneuvers in northwestern Michigan. Returning to Camp McCoy, the company underwent several months of pre-combat training, being alerted for overseas shipment in mid-summer. In late September, 1943, the company moved by rail to Camp Shanks, New York. After final preparations for shipment, the company sailed on October 7th from New York.

Arriving at Belfast, North Ireland, on October 17, the

company proceeded by rail to the town of Armagh, its station for the next six months. In April, 1944, after a period of acclimatization and further pre-combat training, the company crossed the Irish Sea to southern Wales, and took up a new station in the seacoast town of Tenby. In late May the unit moved to a marshalling area along the Bristol Channel. Embarking in early June for the invasion of France, D-Day found the company sailing across the English Channel, bound for Omaha Beach. Commencing its landing on June 7, 1944, the company immediately began its mission of supplying signal communication to the units of the 2nd Infantry Division.

During the ensuing 11 months, the company earned battle participation credit for the campaigns of Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe, and the Distinguished Unit Citation for its actions during the German breakthrough in mid-December, 1944.



INSIGNIA OF THE SECOND ENGINEER BATTALION

The Battalion insignia, a shield bearing an anchor and crossed oars, stems from the badge of the Engineers and Pontoniers of the Army of the Potomac in the Civil

War. The five-bastioned fort in the crest was the badge of the V Corps in the Spanish-American War, and indicates the battalion's participation in the Cuban campaign.

MOTTO

Ardeur et Tenacite
(Ardor and Tenacity)

The motto is taken verbatim from the second citation of the organization for the Croix de Guerre in World War I, for the action near Soissons, France, July 18, 1918.

BATTLE HONORS

Civil War
Peninsula
Antietam
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Virginia 1863
Wilderness
Spotsylvania
Cold Harbor
Petersburg
Appomattox

Spanish-American War
Santiago
Philippine Insurrection

World War I
Lorraine
Aisne
Ile de France
Aisne-Marne
St. Mihiel
Meuse-Argonne

World War II
Normandy
Northern France
Ardennes
Rhineland
Central Europe



LT. COL. ROBERT WARREN
Commanding Officer, 2nd Engineer Battalion
June 6, 1944—January 16, 1945




LT. COL. ROBERT E. SNETZER
Commanding Officer, 2nd Engineer Battalion
January 17, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE SECOND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

The history of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion begins in 1861, with the organization of the 2nd Battalion of Engineers. The Battalion earned Civil War battle honors for the Peninsula, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Virginia, 1863, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg and Appomattox campaigns. The Spanish-American War brought additional honors for Santiago and the Philippine Insurrection. In July, 1916, during the Mexican Punitive Expedition, the Battalion was expanded to form the 2nd Regiment of Engineers. Moving overseas in 1917, the Regiment joined the 2nd Division, and fought in the campaigns of Lorraine, Aisne, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. Cited twice in orders of the French Army for outstanding valor in the battles of Soissons and Mont Blanc, the Regiment was awarded the Fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre. After serving as occupation troops at Enger-Am-Rhine, in 1919 the Regiment returned to the States, with station at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Trans-

ferred to Fort Logan, Colorado, in 1927, the Regiment was reorganized in 1939 as the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion and returned to Texas.

In November, 1942, the Battalion moved to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and engaged in winter training and winter maneuvers. In October, 1943, the Battalion moved to the New York Port of Embarkation, sailing on October 8 on the *S. S. Hawaiian Shipper*. Landing at Belfast on October 18, the Battalion was stationed for six months at Drumbanagher Castle, North Ireland. In April, 1944, the Battalion crossed the Irish Sea to Wales, and in late May moved to the marshalling areas to prepare for the invasion of France. Landing on Omaha Beach, Normandy, on June 7, the Battalion fought through four countries as a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, earning the Distinguished Unit Citation and battle honors for the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns.



INSIGNIA OF THE SECOND MEDICAL BATTALION

The blood-red shield bearing a white cross was designed during the post-World War I period as the insignia of the 2nd Medical Regiment, and descends to the 2nd Medical Battalion as successor to the Regiment. The fleur-de-lis terminals of the cross represent the service of the 2nd Sanitary Train in France.

The crest, a green cross, bearing a white star charged with an Indian head, represents the shoulder patch worn by troops of the 2nd Sanitary Train while serving with the 2nd Division, A. E. F., in World War I.

The motto, "We Serve That Others May Conquer," is particularly expressive of the mission of the 2nd Medical Battalion in combat.



LT. COL. CECIL F. JORNS
 Commanding 2nd Medical Battalion
 June 6, 1944—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE SECOND MEDICAL BATTALION

The lineage of the 2nd Medical Battalion goes back through many organizational changes to the School of Instructions, Hospital Corps, organized in 1894 at Washington Barracks, D. C.

Designated Company of Instruction No. 1 in 1902 and two years later as Company A, Hospital Corps, the unit finally became known as Field Hospital and Ambulance Company No. 1. Later the unit was split to form Field Hospital Company No. 1 and Ambulance Company No. 1. In November, 1917, the two companies left Fort Bliss, Texas, and sailed for France to join the 2nd Division as the nucleus of the newly activated 2nd Sanitary Train.

The Train earned World War I battle honors for the Lorraine, Aisne, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns, and was awarded the Fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre. After serving with occupation troops at Enger and Sayn, Germany, the Train returned to the States in 1919, and was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

In February, 1921, the organization was redesignated the 2nd Medical Regiment. With the streamlining of the 2nd Infantry Division in 1939, the unit was reorganized as the 2nd Medical Battalion.

Moving to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, in 1942, the Battalion engaged in winter training and maneuvers, and in October moved to Camp Shanks, New York, for shipment overseas. Sailing on October 8th on the S. S. *Anne Arundel*, the Battalion landed at Belfast, Ireland, ten days later. After six months in Ireland, the unit moved to southern Wales to prepare for the invasion of France. The Battalion moved to the marshalling areas on May 18, embarked early in June, and landed in France on D plus 1. Arriving in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, 11 months later, the Battalion had earned battle honors in five campaigns—Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe—while serving with the 2nd Infantry Division.



THE COAT OF ARMS OF THE NINTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY

Surrounding the famous Indianhead insignia of the Second Division is the French Fourragere, which every member of the Regiment is entitled to wear so long as he remains a member of the 9th. The Fourragere was awarded to the Regiment in 1918. The horizontal bar below this is the blue-and-gray furred streamer representing the 9th's participation in the Civil War. In the shield proper the

Dragon stands for the fighting in China in 1900. The Sun is the familiar Mexican-Aztec symbol which was added to commemorate the Mexican War. The curved bar is the Bloody Bend of the San Juan River in Cuba. The Tepee represents over 400 campaigns against the Indians, which the 9th fought through the 19th Century.

THE NINTH INFANTRY INSIGNIA

The 9th Infantry distinctive insignia which incorporates the five toed Imperial Chinese Dragon holding the number "9" has been officially recognized in War Department

orders. It is worn as a belt buckle or as a cap decoration, probably a unique distinction in the U. S. Army today.



COL. CHESTER J. HIRSCHFELDER
 Commanding Officer, 9th Infantry Regiment
 June 6, 1944—January 17, 1945



COL. PHILIP DEWITT GINDER
 Commanding Officer, 9th Infantry Regiment
 January 18, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE NINTH U. S. INFANTRY REGIMENT

The 9th Infantry—the Manchu Regiment—is one of the reknowned American military organizations. It has participated in every war in which the nation has been engaged for the last 148 years.

Sackett's Harbor, Chickamauga, San Juan River, the Boxer Rebellion, Meuse-Argonne, Normandy, Brittany, Belgium, Germany—these are some of the great chapters.

The Regiment was first formed in 1798 when it was organized in Maryland "for and during the continuance of differences between the United States and the French Republic." In succession the 9th Infantry engaged in the War of 1812 under command of General Winfield Scott, in the war with Mexico, in the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and Philippine Insurrection.

The Regiment gained its motto, nickname, and its most prized trophy, The Liscum Bowl, during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. In the battle of Tientsin Colonel Emerson G. Liscum, then Regimental Commander, gave the command that has been kept alive in the Regimental motto. The color sergeant had fallen. Colonel Liscum picked up the Regimental colors, only to be mortally wounded himself. His last words were "Keep up the Fire."

The Regiment returned to the Philippines for campaigns against Aguinaldo and then back to the United States for Mexican border duty.

After sailing to France in 1917, the Regiment was assigned to the 2nd Division. During World War I the Regiment participated in many of the great campaigns, being cited by our own leaders as well as the French. Included in the honors is the French Fourragere for having been cited twice in Orders of the French Army.

The 9th Infantry, as part of the 2nd Division, sailed to Ireland in 1943 in preparation for the invasion of Fortress Europe. On June 7, 1944, "D plus 1," the Regiment's greatest mission began when it landed on Omaha Beach in Normandy with Allied invasion forces. In 11 months that followed the 9th Infantry engaged in the Normandy campaign, battle for Brest, battle of the Ardennes, and fought through Germany and into Czechoslovakia.

The 9th Infantry, embraced in the hearts of her officers and men, is reflected in her 24 battle streamers bearing names of 37 major campaigns.



COAT OF ARMS OF THE 23RD UNITED STATES INFANTRY REGIMENT

The Regimental Crest of the 23rd Infantry is symbolized by a shield with the colors white and blue. Service in Alaska is portrayed by the totem pole with the Russian bear, the old owner, and the American eagle, the new owner, with a plate between them denoting the feast given the eagle by the bear. The totem pole is encircled by the French Fourragere, a unit decoration presented the Regiment for service during the First World War.

The Maltese Cross represents the Civil War V Corps with which the 23rd Infantry served in the Army of the Potomac. Philippine service is denoted by the sea lion of the Pacific.

The distinction of being the first American Regiment to circumnavigate the globe is indicated at the base of the shield by a globe and two steamships. World War I service and commemoration of the Mont Blanc campaign of October, 1918, is shown by the outline on the lower half the shield.

The Regiment's motto is: "We Serve."



COL. HURLEY E. FULLER
Regimental Commander
June 6, 1944—June 16, 1944



COL. JAY B. LOVLESS
Regimental Commander
June 17, 1944—June 17, 1945



L.T. COL. FRANK T. MILDREN
Regimental Commander
June 18, 1945—August 30, 1945



COL. JOHN H. CHILES
Regimental Commander
August 31, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE 23RD U. S. INFANTRY REGIMENT

The 23rd Infantry was first organized by Act of Congress on June 26, 1812, taking part in 13 battles and skirmishes in the War of 1812, including Sacketts Harbor, Lundy's Lane and Fort Erie. In 1815 the regiment was consolidated with other units to form the present 2nd Infantry. The regiment then remained inactive until the Civil War.

The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, bringing with it battle honors for the Peninsula Campaign, Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Virginia Campaign of 1862 and 1863, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor and Petersburg, was redesignated as the 23rd Infantry on September 21, 1866, making the birthday of the present 23rd Infantry Regiment.

The regiment won battle honors for the Arizona campaign of 1866, the Idaho campaign of 1868 and the battle of Little Big Horn as a result of its participation in the Indian Wars. In 1869 the regiment furnished the first garrison for the newly acquired Alaskan territory.

In the Spanish-American War the regiment won battle honors in the Manila campaign, the Malolos campaign and a special streamer for the capture of Manila. Return-

ing from the Philippines via the Suez Canal, the regiment gained the distinction of being the first United States Army unit to circumnavigate the globe.

Two more tours in the Philippines, including the punitive expedition against the infamous Moro chieftain, Datu Ali, preceded World War I.

In World War I, as part of the 2nd Division, the regiment won battle honors for the Lorraine, Aisne, Ile de France, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. In addition, the regiment was presented the Fourragere by the French government for its part in the Meuse-Argonne and Aisne-Marne campaigns.

From 1919 to 1942 the regiment was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, with the 2nd Infantry Division. In November, 1942, the regiment began its World War II trek to Czechoslovakia and back to Texas via Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, Northern Ireland, Wales and Omaha Beach in Normandy. In World War II the regiment, as part of the 2nd Infantry Division won battle honors for the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns.



INSIGNIA OF THE 38TH UNITED STATES INFANTRY REGIMENT

The insignia of the 38th Infantry Regiment has a shield with a clear field of blue, representing loyalty, steadfastness and devotion to the principles of right and justice. This shield is cut diagonally by three clear-cut white stripes which symbolize the three major operations of World War I in which the 3rd Division (of which the 38th Infantry was a part) participated. A broken chevron, its right wing parallel to the diagonal stripes, originates from each of the upper corners of the shield. This represents the German attack broken at the Marne by a "Rock" which surmounts the crest. Upon a ribbon below the shield are inscribed the words, "The Rock of the Marne."



COL. WALTER A. ELLIOTT
Commanding Officer 38th Infantry Regiment
June 6, 1944—June 22, 1944



COL. RALPH W. ZWICKER
Commanding Officer 38th Infantry Regiment
June 23, 1944—October 17, 1944



COL. FRANCIS H. BOOS
Commanding Officer 38th Infantry Regiment
October 18, 1944—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE 38TH U. S. INFANTRY REGIMENT

The 38th Infantry Regiment was activated at Syracuse, N. Y., in 1917, took its first training together with three other regiments at the Syracuse Fair Grounds and Camp Green, N. C. At this time the regiment was a member of the 3rd Infantry Division. On March 21, 1918, the regiment debarked at two ports in Europe; one battalion at Glasgow, and the other two at Brest, France. It was during this war that the 38th won its name the "Rock of the Marne" in the battle on the banks of the Marne near Chateau-Thierry.

After the Armistice, the 38th served as occupation troops for eight months before leaving for home and Camp Merritt, N. Y. During the post-war reorganization the regiment was stationed at Camp Pike, Ark., and in 1922 was divided up into battalions. The 2nd and 3rd went to Ft. Douglas, Utah, while the 1st Battalion went initially to Fort Logan, Col., and then went to Fort Sill, Okla., as demonstration troops with the 29th Infantry.



Joining the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments in 1940, the 38th became a member of the 2nd Division, and was

moved to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. There, with the threat of war in the air, the 38th began intensive training and participated in the large-scale Louisiana maneuvers of '40 and '41, and also had Airborne training in Texas.

In November, 1942, the entire regiment moved to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where they took training for winter warfare.

The 38th was alerted for overseas duty, and moved to Camp Shanks, N. Y., where they left for Europe. This was in October of '43. Upon their arrival in Newry, Ireland, they took six more months of training, to ready themselves for the coming battles.

The regiment received its first "Baptism of Fire" on D-Day plus one when they landed on Omaha Beach under enemy fire. The 38th proved themselves to be "second to none" when put to the test. With this as the beginning, the 38th Infantry participated in five campaigns as part of the 2nd Infantry Division. The 38th was in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia when the war in Europe ended.



DISTINGUISHING FLAG DIVISION ARTILLERY AND GUIDON HEADQUARTERS BATTERY DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

One of the few units of the Infantry Division not authorized a unit crest by custom of the army, the tactical headquarters of the division artillery is identified by the relatively new distinguishing flag and guidon shown above.

Initially authorized by AR-260-10, the dimensions of the distinguishing flag are three feet on the lace by four feet fly. The yellow stripe horizontally in the center is made ten inches in width. Arabic numeral designating the unit is red.

The unit guidon is proportioned in accordance with the distinguishing flag and is similar in design and color scheme but retains the standard and familiar indented side away from the fly.



COL. RICHARD SEARS
Executive Officer, Headquarters Division Artillery
June 6, 1944—June 10, 1945



LT. COL. DONALD C. LITTLE
Executive Officer, Headquarters Division Artillery
June 11, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS BATTERY

Activated in the United States in the fall of 1917, personnel and equipment of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters were assembled and started functioning in France in the spring of 1918.

Prior to entry into action on the Western Front a three month intensive training period was conducted behind the lines.

Serving with distinction throughout the war with the 2nd Division, the Brigade returned from Germany in 1921 and was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

During the long stay at Fort Sam Houston the Brigade Headquarters was located in the old Cavalry post buildings on New Braunfels Avenue.

Because horses were the prime source of motive power for the artillery it was only natural that many famous horsemen and polo players should serve with the unit during the years 1920-1940 and the annual horse show was


an event which attracted famous horsemen from all army posts in the southwest.

The 2nd Ammunition Train which had been with the unit since its formation in France was detached in 1926 and ordered to the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill where it remained until 1940 when reorganization of the army deleted this unit from tables of organization.

Partial motorization of the Brigade headquarters was begun in the early '30s when it became increasingly obvious that greater mobility was required and the unit became one of the first in the division to be completely motorized.

In October, 1940, the old Brigade Headquarters was deactivated and became Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2nd Infantry Division Artillery.

Personnel for the new organization came from the Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Field Artillery, and from the 15th Field Artillery, retaining only the Metro section from the old brigade headquarters.



COAT OF ARMS OF THE 12TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The motifs of the crest, still called the "Regimental Crest" are symbols of the 12th's service in World War I and the parent organization. A single Fleur-de-lis is taken from the arms of the city of Soissons where the regiment performed such distinguished service that it was cited by the French in orders of the Army, shown by the pendant Croix-de-Guerre. The regiment had its baptism of fire near the city of Verdun, the arms of which have one Fleur-de-lis crowned with gold. The crown on these arms is for Verdun. A green Aztec war banner on the canton is from the Mexican War service of the parent organization, the 3rd Field Artillery. The background is Field Artillery Red.



LT. COL. RICHARD C. CARPENTER
June 6, 1944—July 11, 1944



LT. COL. ALVAN M. MULDROW
July 11, 1944—February 19, 1945



MAJ. THOMAS W. DONNELL
February 19, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE 12TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The 12th Field Artillery with non-commissioned officers of the 3rd FA as nucleus, was organized at Fort Meyer, Virginia, June 7, 1917, as a light regiment, 3" guns, horse drawn. After six months' intensive training, the regiment was sent to Camp Merrit, N. J., where it remained until January 10, 1918, when it moved to Hoboken and thence via the *S. S. Olympic* to Liverpool. After remaining in Liverpool from January 19, 1918 to January 26, 1918, the outfit arrived in France on January 31, 1918.


The period between January 31 and March was spent in training at Valdahon where all work was with French material. The 12th then served as an integral part of the 2nd Division throughout the World War, seeing service in various sectors as follows: Toulon sector, March 25—May 13, 1918; Aisne, June 1-5, 1918; Chateau Thierry, June 6—July 16, 1918; Aisne-Marne, July 18-25, 1918; Marbache Sector, August 6-22, 1918; Meuse-Argonne

(Champagne sector), September 29 to October 27, 1918; Meuse-Argonne, October 30—November 11, 1918.

Following the Armistice, the 12th was part of the Army of Occupation until July 21, 1919. The Regiment returned to the United States in August 1919 and was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, between World Wars I and II.

The 12th Field Artillery, having been cited twice in battle orders of the French Army for its fine conduct in the face of the enemy during World War I, was awarded the Fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre by the French Minister of War.

The Battalion Standard carries battle streamers for World War I for Aisne, St. Mihiel, Lorraine, Aisne-Marne, Meuse-Argonne, and Ile-de-France. For World War II it carries Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland, Central Europe.



COAT OF ARMS OF THE 15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The crest of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion as shown above, represents a history and almost legend of the accomplishments of this unit. On the shield itself, is shown in the upper left corner a small copy of the shield of what was then the 4th Field Artillery Regiment, and which furnished the cadre for the 15th. The red of the shield represents the blood of the valiant members of the unit that was spilled in the winning of World War I. Each silver stripe denotes a river that the Regiment fired in support of, crossed, and assisted in holding; the Aisne, Marne, Oise, Meuse, and Rhine Rivers. At the top of the crest is shown the traditional weapon of Field Artillery with a 2nd Infantry Division shield superimposed on the wheel. At the bottom of the Crest is a scroll with the inspiring motto of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, "Let's Go."



LT. COL. ROBERT C. CASSIBRY
Commanding 15th Field Artillery Battalion
June 6, 1944—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE 15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION


The 15th Field Artillery was organized at Syracuse, N. Y., June 1, 1917, from a cadre from the 4th Field Artillery, trained at Pine Camp, N. Y., and on December 11, 1917, sailed for Le Havre, France, by way of Liverpool, England, aboard the S. S. *Adriatic*. On June 1, 1918, the regiment occupied positions northwest of Chateau-Thierry and on July 14 were relieved by elements of the 26th Division in order to prepare for the July Soissons counter offensive.

During July, August, September, and October the regiment not only supported the 2nd Division in operations in Soissons, Marbache and Champagne, but fired for the French 78th Division and the American 36th Division. On November 10 the regiment fired in support of the Meuse River crossing and three days later crossed the Rhine River at Remagen for occupation duty. The regiment sailed from Brest, July 12, 1919, aboard S. S. *Lukenbach* arriving at Fort Sam Houston, August 16, 1919.

While at Fort Sam Houston the regiment participated in many War Departments tests, to include motorization of Field Artillery, the organization and functioning of the triangular division, large scale maneuvers, and airborne artillery training.

On October 10, 1940, the regiment was reorganized into three light battalions, the 15th, 37th, and 38th. All records, standards, honors, and decorations of the original regiment were passed on to the 15th F. A. Battalion.

On October 16, 1942, the battalion was ordered to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, for winter training and while there performed tests for the War Department with clothing and equipment designed for Arctic conditions. The battalion departed Camp McCoy September 24, 1943, passed overseas requirements at Camp Shanks, N. Y., and sailed by the Statue of Liberty October 8, 1943, aboard the *Hawaiian Shipper* bound for Ireland, Wales, and eventually D+1 landings in Normandy, France.



COAT OF ARMS OF THE 37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The crest of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion was conceived in October, 1942, by Mrs. Richard Sears, the wife of the battalion commander at that time. Inasmuch as the reactivation of the organization occurred at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, the former home station of the 2nd Infantry Division, and since the old clock tower was a familiar sight to all original members of the battalion, the design has rare originality and real significance.

The red shield has imposed thereon the old clock tower in gold and black, with the hands of the clock pointing to seven minutes after three for the 37th. The motto, "On the Minute," inscribed on a furred banner beneath the shield, is indicative of the promptness and perfection that guides the battalion in its mission of supporting the infantry. Heraldry will soon be incorporated in the crest to represent the campaigns in Europe of World War II in which the 37th Field Artillery Battalion participated.



LT. COL. WALTER G. HOPKINS
Commanding Officer, 37th Field Artillery Battalion
June 6, 1944—June 10, 1944



LT. COL. TOBIAS E. EASTMAN
Commanding Officer, 37th Field Artillery Battalion
June 11, 1944—April 26, 1945



MAJ. EARL HURT
Commanding Officer, 37th Field Artillery Battalion
April 27, 1945—September 8, 1945




HISTORY OF THE 37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The 37th Field Artillery Battalion was originally designated the 37th Field Artillery Regiment in August, 1918, at Camp Lewis, Washington. Later demobilized in 1919, it was reconstituted as an inactive regular army unit in 1933.

On October 1, 1940, when the 2nd Infantry Division was triangularized, the present 37th Field Artillery Battalion was activated. Personnel and equipment were transferred intact from the 2nd Battalion of the old 15th Field Artillery Regiment.

Becoming a light battalion in the 2nd Division Artillery, the 37th began its training at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. During the period 1940 to 1943, the training included maneuvers in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana, school troop duty at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, airborne training, and operations in the snow and extreme cold.

On D plus 2, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion landed on Omaha Beach as a part of the 2nd Infantry Division, and served continuously throughout the five campaigns of World War II in Europe.



INSIGNIA OF THE 38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

Shield: Gules, three pallets accosted by eight shells or.

Crest: On a wreath or and gules the peak of Mt. Rainier proper charged with a mullet gules.

Motto: Steel Behind the Rock.

The background is the traditional red of the artillery; the vertical golden stripes and the eight golden shells represent the numeral 38 and designate the Battalion as an artillery unit. At the top is the snowy peak of Mt. Rainier with the Lone Star of Texas superimposed upon it to indicate respectively the locations where the Battalion was organized and reactivated.

The motto—"The Steel Behind the Rock," was chosen when the Battalion was reactivated and made a part of the 38th Combat Team whose Infantry is the old 38th Regiment, "The Rock of the Marne."



LT. COL. DONALD C. LITTLE
Commanding Officer, 38th Field Artillery Battalion
June 6, 1944—June 10, 1945



MAJ. CECIL L. SMITH
Commanding Officer, 38th Field Artillery Battalion
June 11, 1945—September 8, 1945

HISTORY OF THE 38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The 38th Field Artillery was first organized as a regiment on August 17, 1918, at Camp Lewis, Washington, and was demobilized there on February 10, 1919. Subsequently, on October 1, 1933, the 38th Field Artillery Regiment was reconstituted as an inactive unit of the Regular Army.

On October 10, 1939, the 15th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was reorganized and given a third battalion which was reconstituted as the 38th Field Artillery Battalion on October 1, 1940, as a result of the triangularization of the 2nd Infantry Division.

For the next two years the 38th remained at Fort Sam Houston as part of the 2nd Division. The time was passed in garrison training, Louisiana maneuvers in 1941 and 1942, experimentation in the use of liaison type aircraft for Field Artillery, airborne training, and two short tours as school troops at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

On November 24, 1942, the 38th arrived at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it was to take part in training for warfare in conditions of extreme cold. Three months of such training, including a two-weeks' maneuver in Arctic temperatures, preceded final training and preparation for overseas movement.

The Battalion departed from Camp Shanks, New York, on October 7, 1943, and arrived in Belfast, North Ireland, after 12 days of rough water. The battalion remained at Gosford Castle in North Ireland until April 16, 1944, when it moved to Velindre, Wales, for pre-invasion preparations.

Leading units of the battalion embarked at Swansea on June 2, 1944, and on June 6, D-Day, the battalion was in the English Channel off Omaha Beach.

After landing on D plus 1, the battalion as part of the 2nd Division, fought actively in five campaigns, ending the war in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia.

STATIONS OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION

- 1919-1942—Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
27 Nov 1942—Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.
2 Oct 1943—Camp Shanks, New York.
17 Oct 1943—Armagh, County Armagh, North Ireland.
19 Apr 1944—Tenby, Wales.
18 May 1944—St. Donats, Wales.
21 Jun 1945—Camp Norfolk, Somme-sous, France.
8 Jul 1945—Camp Old Gold, Yvetot, France.
8 Sep 1945—Camp Swift, Texas.

DIVISION COMMAND POSTS

- 7 Jun 1944—St. Laurent-sur-Mer, Normandy, France.
9 Jun 1944—Formigny, Normandy, France.
10 Jun 1944—Le Molay, Normandy, France.
15 Jun 1944—Cerisy la Foret, Normandy, France.
30 Jul 1944—St. Jean des Baisants, Normandy, France.
2 Aug 1944—Larveniere, Normandy, France.
5 Aug 1944—Les Rairies, Normandy, France.
10 Aug 1944—Coulances, Normandy, France.
13 Aug 1944—Maisoncelles - la - Jourdan, Normandy, France.
20 Aug 1944—Ploudaniel, Brittany, France.
22 Aug 1944—Kersaint-Plabennec, Brittany, France.
30 Sep 1944—St. Vith, Belgium.
12 Dec 1944—Wirtzfeld, Belgium.
17 Dec 1944—Camp Elsenborn, Belgium.
3 Feb 1945—Wehlerscheid Customs House, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
22 Feb 1945—Erkensruhr, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
5 Mar 1945—Kloster Mariawald, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
6 Mar 1945—Vlatten, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
7 Mar 1945—Mechernich, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
8 Mar 1945—Munsteriefel, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
9 Mar 1945—Bruck, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
10 Mar 1945—Bad Neuenahr, Rheinprovinz, Germany.
22 Mar 1945—Honningen, Westerwald, Germany.
25 Mar 1945—Niederbieber-Segendorf, Westerwald, Germany.
27 Mar 1945—H o h r Grenzhausen. Westerwald, Germany.
29 Mar 1945—Hadamar, Germany.
30 Mar 1945—Homberg, Germany.
1 Apr 1945—Sachsenhausen, Germany.
5 Apr 1945—Oberlistingen, Germany.
6 Apr 1945—Greibenstein, Germany.
7 Apr 1945—Veckerhagen, Germany.
8 Apr 1945—Dransfeld, Germany.
9 Apr 1945—Wollmarshausen, Germany.
11 Apr 1945—Obergebra, Germany.
12 Apr 1945—Bad Frankenhausen, Germany.
13 Apr 1945—Barnstadt, Germany.
17 Apr 1945—Schladebach, Germany.
19 Apr 1945—Mark Ranstadt, Germany.
21 Apr 1945—Bad Lausick, Germany.
2 May 1945—Oberviechtach, Bavaria, Germany.
4 May 1945—Rotz, Bavaria, Germany.
5 May 1945—Klenec, Czechoslovakia.
6 May 1945—Horsovsky-Tyn, Czechoslovakia.
7 May 1945—Pilsen, Czechoslovakia.
8 Jun 1945—Kdyne, Czechoslovakia.

The following is the first field order issued by the 2nd Infantry Division in Normandy:

HQ 2ND INF DIV
ST LAURENT SUR MER (662893)
082400B June 1944

FO 2

MAP: FRANCE, 1/50,000, GSGS 4250.

1. a. See msg this Hq dated 082300B June 1944.

b. V CORPS, supported by Air and Naval gun fire, advances at 091200B June 1944 from D-Day position with divisions abreast to seize and organize for defense in depth ISIGNY-NEULLY LA FORET-LISON-LE MENIL-BALLEROY-LA DROINE RIVER. Formation right to left: 29TH INF DIV, 2ND INF DIV, 1ST INF DIV.

2. 2ND INF DIV, supported by 1340 Engr C Bn, and with Co B 747 Tank Bn and Co A 635 TD Bn attached making main effort of V Corps, advances from line shown on overlay attached to seize and organize for defense in depth portion of Corps objective in 2nd Inf Div zone.

3. a. 9TH INF:

Atchd: 1st Plat Co B 747 Tank Bn.

(1) 1 bn relieve 1st Bn 18th Inf on ENGRANVILLE position at 0730.

(2) 1 bn relieve 3d Bn 18th Inf on MANDEVILLE position at 0730.

(3) Advance at 1200 from LD to seize portion of Div objective in Regtl zone, not less than one rifle Co reinforced by one HW MG Plat each in ENGRANVILLE and MANDEVILLE positions to remain in defensive positions and to move only on Div order.

(4) Upon reaching final objective, organize sector for defense in depth.

b. 38TH INF:

Atchd: 2d Plat Co B 747 Tank Bn.

(1) Advance at 1200 from LD to seize portion of Div objective in Regtl zone.

(2) Upon reaching final objective organize sector for defense in depth.

c. 23D INF (less detachments): Be prepared to function as Div reserve upon becoming operational.

d. ARTILLERY:

(1) 15th FA Bn in direct support of 9th Inf.

(2) 38th FA Bn in direct support of 38th Inf.

(3) Div Arty less 15th and 38th FA Bns—in general support of Div.

e. 2ND ENGR BN: Support Div advance by execution of engineer work in and in rear of regtl areas. Div Engr will contact Corps Engr relative to specific work to be taken over by Corps Engrs.

f. CO B, 747 TANK BN (less 1st and 2nd Plats): Assemble in vicinity FORMIGNY in Div reserve.

g. CO A, 635 TD BN: Assemble by 1200 in vicinity FORMIGNY in Div reserve.

x. (1) Contact between units will be established and maintained from right to left. 9th Inf will establish and maintain contact with 1st Inf Div.

(2) 9th Inf will have priority on roads over 38th Inf until 0730.

4. V Corps DAO and ASP: 668898. Draw ammunition direct.

V Corps clearing station: 674895. Coll Co evacuates direct to Corps station.

5. SIGNAL ANNEX:

a. Curent SOI is in effect.

b. Axis signal communications:

Div - 638863 - 642840 - 660772 - 636734.

9th Inf—Initial location in vicinity of SURRAIN—to be reported.

38th Inf—Initial location in vicinity of FORMIGNY—to be reported.

ROBERTSON

OFFICIAL:

CHILES

G-3

1 Incl—
Overlay

INDIAN HEAD ROLL CALL OF COMMANDING OFFICERS



Commanding General

MAJ. GEN. WALTER M. ROBERTSON, to June 2, 1945.
BRIG. GEN. W. H. HARRISON, from June 3, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Division Artillery Commanding General

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE P. HAYS, July 1 1942 to November 14, 1944.
BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. HINDS, November 14, 1944 to September 8, 1945.

Assistant Division Commander

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS L. MARTIN, June 10, 1942 to July 2, 1944.
COL. JAMES A. VAN FLEET, July 4, 1944 to October 15, 1944.
BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. STOKES, JR., October 15, 1944 to June 9, 1945.
COL. JAY B. LOVELESS, June 14, 1945 to September 17, 1945.

INFANTRY REGIMENTS

9th Infantry Regiment

COL. CHESTER J. HIRSCHFELDER, June 10, 1942 to January 10, 1945.
COL. P. D. GINDER, January 10, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

1st Battalion

LT. COL. H. K. WESSON, February 7, 1944 to October 14, 1944.
LT. COL. WILLIAM D. MCKINLEY, October 14, 1944 to February 21, 1945.
LT. COL. LLOYD J. PTAK, February 21, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Battalion

LT. COL. WALTER M. HIGGINS, JR., June 7, 1944 to February 28, 1945.
LT. COL. FRANK E. BALL, February 28, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

3rd Battalion

LT. COL. P. V. TUTTLE, June 6, 1944 to July 31, 1944.
MAJ. LLOYD J. PTAK, July 31, 1944 to August 3, 1944.
LT. COL. R. E. BELL, August 3, 1944 to August 6, 1944.
LT. COL. W. F. KERNAN, August 6, 1944 to February 14, 1945.
MAJ. V. T. ADLER, February 14, 1945 to March 3, 1945.
LT. COL. W. F. KERNAN, March 3, 1945 to April 11, 1945.
MAJ. H. M. MERRITT, April 11, 1945 to May 13, 1945.
MAJ. V. T. ADLER, May 13, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

23rd Infantry Regiment

COL. HURLEY E. FULLER, January 14, 1942 to June 16, 1944.
COL. JAY B. LOVLESS, June 16, 1944 to June 4, 1945.
LT. COL. PAUL V. TUTTLE, June 5, 1945 to June 9, 1945.
LT. COL. WILLIAM A. SMITH, June 10, 1945 to June 15, 1945.
LT. COL. FRANK T. MILDREN, June 16, 1945 to August 31, 1945.
COL. JOHN H. CHILES, September 1, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

1st Battalion

LT. COL. WILLIAM HUMPHRIES, June 7, 1944 to June 15, 1944.
LT. COL. JOHN M. HIGHTOWER, June 15, 1944 to March 10, 1945.
LT. COL. WILLARD W. MORRIS, March 10, 1945 to April 17, 1945, and May 18, 1945 to September 8, 1945.
LT. COL. MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY, April 18, 1945 to May 17, 1945.

2nd Battalion

LT. COL. RAYMOND B. MARLIN, July 13, 1943 to July 26, 1944.
LT. COL. LEWIS F. HAMELE, July 27, 1944 to December 2, 1944.
MAJ. WILLIAM R. HINCH, JR., December 5, 1944 to December 22, 1944.
LT. COL. WILLIAM A. SMITH, December 23, 1944 to January 27, 1945, February 1, 1945 to June 10, 1945.
LT. COL. PAUL T. CLIFFORD, January 27, 1945 to January 31, 1945.
MAJ. VERN L. JOSEPH, June 11, 1945 to July 11, 1945.
MAJ. THOMAS H. MULLER, July 11, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

3rd Battalion

LT. COL. JOHN B. NASER, commanding to July 26, 1944.
CAPT. CHARLES E. TRAPP, July 27, 1944 to July 30, 1944.
LT. COL. PAUL V. TUTTLE, July 31, 1944 to February 1, 1945.
LT. COL. MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY, February 1, 1945 to February 7, 1945.
LT. COL. PAUL V. TUTTLE, February 7, 1945 to February 16, 1945.
LT. COL. PAUL T. CLIFFORD, February 15, 1945 to March 13, 1945.
LT. COL. MARTIN B. COOPERSMITH, March 13, 1945 to May 25, 1945.
LT. COL. MORRIS B. MONTGOMERY, May 26, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

38th Infantry Regiment

COL. WALTER A. ELLIOTT, March 16, 1943 to August 7, 1944.

COL. RALPH W. ZWICKER, September 4, 1944 to October 18, 1944.

COL. FRANCIS H. BOOS, December 2, 1944 to September 8, 1945.

1st Battalion

LT. COL. FRANK T. MILDREN, commanding to March 14, 1945.

LT. COL. THOMAS C. MORRIS, March 14, 1945 to June 22, 1945.

MAJ. CHAUNCEY L. HARRIS, June 22, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Battalion

COL. JACK K. NORRIS, May 16, 1943 to April 26, 1945.

MAJ. CARL A. MARTIN, April 26, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

3rd Battalion

LT. COL. MALCOLM R. STOTTS, December 24, 1943 to June 13, 1944.

LT. COL. FRANCIS H. BOOS, June 13, 1944 to June 14, 1944.

LT. COL. OLINTO M. BARSANTI, June 14, 1944 to March 29, 1945.

LT. COL. ROBERT L. UTLEY, March 29, 1945 to June 1, 1945.

MAJ. GEORGE D. CALLAWAY, June 1, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

12th Field Artillery Battalion

LT. COL. RICHARD C. CARPENTER, commanding to July 11, 1944.

LT. COL. ELVIN M. MULDROW, July 11, 1944 to February 19, 1945.

MAJ. THOMAS V. DONNELL, February 19, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

15th Field Artillery Battalion

LT. COL. ROBERT C. CASSIBRY.

37th Field Artillery Battalion

LT. COL. WALTER G. HOPKINS, June 6, 1944 to June 10, 1944.

LT. COL. TOBIAS C. EASTMAN, June 10, 1944 to April 26, 1945.

MAJ. EARL HURT, April 26, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

38th Field Artillery Battalion

LT. COL. DONALD C. LITTLE, June 6, 1944 to June 10, 1945.

MAJ. CECIL L. SMITH, June 11, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

SPECIAL UNITS

2nd Engineer Battalion

LT. COL. ROBERT B. WARREN, commanding to January 17, 1945.

LT. COL. ROBERT E. SNETZER, January 17, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Medical Battalion

LT. COL. CECIL F. JORNS.

SPECIAL TROOPS

Headquarters Company

CAPT. FREDERICK A. PALMER, commanding to June 7, 1945.

CAPT. PAUL J. LEMM, June 17, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Signal Company

CAPT. GEORGE W. FISK, May 2, 1944 to August 22, 1944.

CAPT. KEITH E. HALL, August 22, 1944 to June 11, 1945.

1ST. LT. WALTER F. BURKHEAD, June 11, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Reconnaissance Troop

CAPT. CHARLES E. TRAPP, commanding to July 4, 1944.

CAPT. GENERAL P. HEFLEY, July 4, 1944 to September 8, 1945.

2nd Quartermaster Company

CAPT. JUAN H. HINOJOSA, commanding to October 17, 1944.

CAPT. FRANCIS H. LACY, JR., October 17, 1944 to January 21, 1945.

CAPT. RAYMOND A. BRIMMER, JR., January 21, 1945 to present.

702d Ordnance (LM) Company

CAPT. OTTO H. ALLEN.

Military Police Platoon

MAJ. WILLIAM F. NORTH.

Band

C. W. O. MARVIN W. FJELD.

ATTACHED UNITS

741st Tank Battalion

LT. COL. ROBERT W. SKAGGS.

462d AAA Battalion

LT. COL. NORMAN R. STULTZ.

612th Tank Destroyer Battalion

LT. COL. JOSEPH M. DEELEY.

DIVISION GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff

BRIG. GEN. JOHN H. STOKES, JR., June 6, 1944 to October 17, 1944.

COL. RALPH W. ZWICKER, October 18, 1944 to June 20, 1945.

LT. COL. DONALD P. CHRISTENSEN, June 21, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

LT. COL. ARTHUR M. SHERWOOD, III.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

LT. COL. DONALD P. CHRISTENSEN, June 6, 1944, to June 20, 1945.

MAJ. JAMES H. KING, June 21, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

COL. JOHN H. CHILES, June 6, 1944 to December 12, 1944, and May 23, 1945 to August 30, 1945.
LT. COL. DANIEL WEBSTER, December 13, 1944 to May 22, 1945.
LT. COL. FRANK T. MILDREN, August 31, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

LT. COL. HOMER S. REESE.

DIVISION SPECIAL STAFF

Adjutant General

LT. COL. MORRIS BRAVEMAN.

Division Chaplain

LT. COL. LUTHER W. EVANS.

Division Chemical Officer

LT. COL. EDWARD W. WOOD.

Division Engineer

LT. COL. ROBERT E. WARREN, June 6, 1944 to January 16, 1945.
LT. COL. ROBERT E. SNETZER, January 17, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Division Finance Officer

LT. COL. LENSON BETHEL, June 6, 1944 to January 16, 1945.
LT. COL. JOHN R. TUCKER, January 17, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Inspector General

LT. COL. SAMUEL H. LADENSOHN, June 6, 1944 to May 1, 1945.
LT. COL. EDGAR A. WILKERSON, May 2, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Judge Advocate General

LT. COL. HARRY H. SCHULTZ.

Division Ordnance Officer

LT. COL. ALEXANDER J. STUART, JR.

Provost Marshal

MAJ. WILLIAM F. NORTH.

Division Quartermaster

LT. COL. JAMES H. CARUTHERS, June 6, 1944 to January 17, 1945.
LT. COL. OLIVER J. GAYTON, January 18, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Division Signal Officer

LT. COL. KENNETH E. BELIEU, June 6, 1944 to June 16, 1945.
MAJ. GEORGE W. FISK, June 17, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Division Special Service Officer

MAJ. FRANK A. HOKE.

Division Surgeon

LT. COL. WALTER R. COOK, June 6, 1944 to March 10, 1945.
LT. COL. DAVID F. WEAVER, March 11, 1945 to September 8, 1945.

Headquarters Commandant


LT. COL. MATT F. C. KONOP, June 6, 1944 to May 21, 1945.
LT. COL. MARTIN B. COOPERSMITH, May 22, 1945 to September 8, 1945.



PRESIDENTIAL CITATIONS

Awarded Units of the Second Infantry Division

From D Plus 1 to V-E Day



3RD BATTALION, 23RD INFANTRY

(With Cluster)

3RD BATTALION, 38TH INFANTRY

(With Cluster)

1ST BATTALION, 9TH INFANTRY

2ND BATTALION, 9TH INFANTRY

3RD BATTALION, 9TH INFANTRY

1ST BATTALION, 23RD INFANTRY

2ND BATTALION, 23RD INFANTRY

1ST BATTALION, 38TH INFANTRY

2ND BATTALION, 38TH INFANTRY

2ND ENGINEER BATTALION

ANTITANK COMPANY, 23RD INFANTRY

ANTITANK COMPANY, 38TH INFANTRY

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 38TH INFANTRY

2ND SIGNAL COMPANY

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR



SERGEANT JOHN J. McVEIGH, 23rd Infantry
STAFF SERGEANT ALVIN P. CAREY, 38th Infantry
TECHNICIAN FOURTH GRADE TRUMAN KIMBRO, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RICHARD E. COWAN, 23rd Infantry
SERGEANT JOSE M. LOPEZ, 23rd Infantry
PRIVATE WILLIAM A. SODERMAN, 9th Infantry

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS



MAJOR GENERAL WALTER M. ROBERTSON	CAPTAIN JOHN M. STEPHENS, JR.
STAFF SERGEANT GAYLN CLAY	SERGEANT MIKE S. RAMBAGO
COLONEL CHESTER J. HIRSCHFELDER (Two Oak Leaf Clusters)	LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER M. HIGGINS, JR.
STAFF SERGEANT ERNEST L. BARBER	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS LEE D. STROUP
MAJOR LLOYD J. PTAK	FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN I. JENSEN
STAFF SERGEANT MARCELO M. SOLIZ	SECOND LIEUTENANT EWELL L. SMITH, JR.
CAPTAIN OMERY C. WEATHERS	LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND B. MARLIN
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS ALFRED A. CANNON	FIRST LIEUTENANT GEORGE R. MITCHELL
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN M. HIGHTOWER, III	FIRST LIEUTENANT GEORGE W. REYNOLDS
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS BYRON B. DICKENSON	PRIVATE JOE M. MAREZ
STAFF SERGEANT JOSEPH S. POMBER	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS THEODORE MISTER
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS HUGH M. BRADY	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JOSEPH A. ELWELL
TECHNICAL SERGEANT ARCHIE F. AVERITTE	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JULIAN GONZALES
FIRST LIEUTENANT JESSE L. MORROW	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS LAWRENCE GEORGEATOS
LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. K. WESSON	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RICHARD VON PATTEN
CAPTAIN CAMERON A. CLOUGH	CAPTAIN KEITH G. VAN NESTE
FIRST LIEUTENANT MARVIN H. PRINDS	TECHNICAL SERGEANT JAMES L. BAYLISS
FIRST LIEUTENANT SAMUEL J. MURRAY	TECHNICIAN THIRD GRADE CLARENCE L. HINER

STATISTICS

Campaigns	5
Days In Combat	337
Days In Contact With The Enemy	320
Longest Period Continuously In Contact—Days	209
Miles Traveled In Combat—Omaha Beach To Pilsen	1,750
Prisoners Captured	70,307
Battle Casualties	15,066
Killed In Action	2,999
Missing In Action	109
Wounded In Action	10,924
Prisoner of War	1,034
Presidential Citations	16
Awards To Individuals	12,048
Medal of Honor	6
Distinguished Service Cross	37
<i>(And Clusters Thereto)</i>	
Distinguished Service Medal	1
Soldier's Medal	10
Legion of Merit	20
Silver Star Medal	642
<i>(And Clusters Thereto)</i>	
Bronze Star Medal	5,921
<i>(And Clusters Thereto)</i>	
Purple Heart Medal	5,193
<i>(And Clusters Thereto)</i>	
Air Medal	102
<i>(And Clusters Thereto)</i>	
Awards by Foreign Governments	
French	88
British	7
Russian	13
Czechoslovakian	8

ROSTER OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION KILLED IN ACTION*

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION

PVT. JOHN W. PARKHURST, 27 Aug 1944.

2ND CIC DETACHMENT

TECH. SGT. NELSON S. RAE, 12 Jan 1945.

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

PFC. ANTHONY ONICA, 26 Dec 1944.
PFC. JOE T. SILVERIA, 14 Sep 1944.
PFC. ANGELO M. WATZNAUER, 21 Feb 1945.
T/4 DONALD G. WHEELINGTON, 3 Sep 1944.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION BAND

T/4 LOUIS O. BOOKS, 2 Sep 1944.

702D ORDNANCE COMPANY

PVT. R. G. YOUNG, 16 Dec 1944.

2ND QUARTERMASTER COMPANY

1ST LT. OVE H. NIELSEN, 21 Dec 1944.
CPL. DENVER E. NORTH CUTT, 21 Jun 1944.

2ND RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

T/4 FRANCIS F. ANDERSON, 29 Dec 1944.
SGT. WILLIAM A. BATES, 16 Jul 1944.
PVT. ANTHONY BLASS, 29 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WILLARD F. COPE, 1 Aug 1944
PVT. JERRY D'AMORE, 12 Aug 1944
T/5 BERNARD DOLAN, 24 DEC 1944.
PFC. ROBERT M. FEGELY, 29 Dec 1944.
1ST LT. SAMUEL J. FOOSHIE, 29 Dec 1944.
SGT. FRED H. HARMS, 25 Feb 1945.
SGT. MARVIN E. HAYS, 2 Sep 1944.
CPL. STEVE G. HOFFMAN, 9 Sep 1944.
CPL. JACK R. HOLLAND, 10 Oct 1944.
2ND LT. RAYMOND S. McCANN, 16 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. EDWARD A. MEYER, 29 Dec 1944.
T/4 DAVID E. MOORE, 8 Nov 1944.
T/5 CARL V. PANGLE, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. EARL L. SCHAEFFER, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWARD D. SHEHORN, 29 Dec 1944.
PVT. ROLAND H. SMITH, 10 Oct 1944.
PFC. HARVEY T. TAYLOR, 29 Dec 1944.
T/5 FREDIE A. THOMAS, 29 Dec 1944.
CPL. JEROME F. UNGER, 1 Aug 1944.

2ND SIGNAL COMPANY

PVT. ROBERT G. BOTTS, 2 Sep 1944.
T/5 LAWRENCE BURSEY, 21 Dec 1944.
PFC. JACK KAPLAN, 12 Aug 1944.
T/4 EUGENE W. LAMPHIERE, 24 Dec 1944.
SGT. HAROLD G. McILLHENNEY, 24 Dec 1944.

2ND MEDICAL BATTALION

PVT. DONALD L. BALL, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. WOODROW R. BLASE, 16 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. EVERETT W. COOPER, 27 Jul 1944.
T/5 SIDNEY HARRIS, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDWARD G. HAVEN, JR., 27 Jul 1944
T/5 ERNEST G. McILLWAIN, 27 Jul 1944.
CPL. DON V. MERICO, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. DALE NICHOLSON, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROBERT A. OUELLETTE, 3 Feb 1945.

2ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION

PFC. FELIBERTO C. ATKINSON, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. DALE BAILEY, 19 Dec 1944.
T/5 DANIEL BERTY, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. PINLEY M. BLAIR, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOE W. BLAKEY, 20 Jun 1944.
T/4 ROY F. BROW, 23 Jun 1944.
T/5 JAMES P. BULL, 19 Dec 1944.
T/4 RAY O. COFFEY, 23 Jun 1944.
T/4 RICHARD L. COLBY, 19 Dec 1944.
T/4 RAY CONATSER, 19 Dec 1944.
T/4 TOBIE COOLEY, 19 Dec 1944.
PVT. JAMES A. COTTRELL, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. MELVIN D. DIXON, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. OTTO E. EICHHOLZ, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH A. ELWELL, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. FERDINAND EPPSTEIN, 11 Jan 1945.
PVT. RODRICK G. FILLMORE, 6 Oct 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. GRADY, 24 Jun 1944.
T4 ROBERT B. GRAHAM, 19 Dec 1944.
PVT. HARRY E. HARRISON, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. HERTEL, 3 Mar 1945.
T/5 EARNE E. HODGSON, 19 Dec 1944.
CPL. JIM T. HOLCOMB, 17 Jun 1944.
SGT. HAROLD M. HUMPHREY, 4 Sep 1944.
T/5 BOBBY G. HUNTER, 19 Dec 1944.
CAPT. LEON R. HUTHNANCE, 23 Jun 1944.
CPL. ALEX KANIUK, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. BILLY J. KARR, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT A. KEMMERLING, 11 Jul 1944.
T/5 OTTO A. KRISTYNIK, 19 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. ROBERT V. LEE, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND LEPORT, 12 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. JAMES D. LEPPER, 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. CARL MANDEL, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. DANIEL P. McNAMARA, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILFRED J. MILLER, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM H. MILLIORN, 21 Dec 1944.
T/5 KENNETH J. NEWCOMER, 9 Oct 1944.
PVT. WILBUR C. PATTERSON, 23 Jun 1944.

PVT. CELEDONIO H. PINEDA, 21 Dec 1944.
PFC. RICHARD T. PLUMMER, 17 Jun 1944.
SGT. SAMUEL G. RAYES, 4 Jan 1945.
PVT. PAUL L. RIDINGS, 6 Apr 1945.
M/SGT. THOMAS E. RILEY, 19 Dec 1944.
PVT. MOODROW W. ROGERS, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM D. RUSSELL, 13 Aug 1944.
T/5 EDWARD J. SLOWIKOWSKI, 3 Mar 1945.
PFC. CLAUDE P. SMITH, 14 Jun 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM E. SMOTHERS, JR., 3 Mar 1945
T/5 ROBERT H. SNYDER, 5 Mar 1945.
PFC. HARRY M. THORALDSON, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRANCIS W. TICE, 5 Mar 1945.
PFC. LOUIS VILLANUEVA, 9 Oct 1944.
CPL. ROBERT B. VILLEGAS, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. CHARLES F. VOSBURGH, 20 Jun 1944.
CPL. LEROY WHITE, 28 Jul 1944.
T/4 THOMAS J. WONDERLY, 19 Dec 1944.
2ND LT. SAMUEL H. P. WRIGHT, 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. JULIAN B. YOUNG, 13 Aug 1944.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEAD-QUARTERS BATTERY, DIVISION ARTILLERY

PFC. HAROLD H. BARNES, 31 Jan 1945.
PFC. LESLIE W. McCASKILL, 31 Jan 1945.
T/4 JOSEPH T. SVIGEL, 17 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. LEE R. TOPPEL, 10 Jun 1944.

12TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

1ST LT. ELLIOTT H. BEALE, 11 Jun 1944.
T/5 CLOFUS R. BUNCH, 11 Jun 1944.
PFC. SYLVESTRO J. DELPESCHIO, 31 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. WALTER R. DUNNAHO, 11 Jun 1944.
T/4 ROBERT H. HERTZ, 21 Dec 1944.
2ND LT. CALVIN H. LEAND, 21 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT A. LAYNE, 11 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. VICTOR I. MAY, 20 Oct 1944.
T/4 WILLIAM J. McCANN, 11 Jun 1944.
PVE. BILLIE J. MONTGOMERY, 31 Jul 1944.
CPL. GARLAN L. NORMAN, 13 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. MERLYN B. PHILLIPS, 10 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE W. PLATT, 11 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. FREDERICK S. WILSON, 10 Aug 1944.

15TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

1ST LT. RUDOLPH A. ARDLEAN, 10 Aug 1944.
PVT. ELMER CURLEY, 25 Mar 1945.
T/5 MARTIN E. DAVIS, 10 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES H. DODD, 7 Jun 1944.
PFC. CARL R. ENMAN, 3 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. LESLIE E. EVANS, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. HAROLD F. FROST, 7 Mar 1945.
T/4 CORNELIOUS W. GAMMILL, 30 Jul 1944.
SGT. EARL J. HOLMES, 28 Aug 1944.
T/4 EDWARD E. HONEA, 29 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. DONALD E. JOHNSON, 11 Aug 1944.
T/5 ARNOLD A. KRYSCH, 16 Dec 1944.
PFC. EDWARD KUBA, 15 Apr 1945.
PFC. ARTHUR H. LANE, 13 Aug 1944.
CPL. GORDON U. LAWRENCE, 25 Feb 1945.
CPL. HERSHEL E. McCLUNG, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY W. MARLOWE, 28 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. FRANK M. MARSON, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. SAM MINEO, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. WALTER J. PIANOWSKI, 21 Oct 1944.
T/5 NORMAN A. PITTMAN, 30 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. HARRY J. SIMON, 15 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. EDWIN T. STANARD, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. SIDNEY J. TORRESSEN, 28 Aug 1944.
T/5 MARVIN I. VIGRAN, 3 Feb 1945.
SGT. WALTER S. WARD, 3 Feb 1945.
CPL. WALLACE B. WATKINS, 26 Jan 1945.
PVT. B. D. WIGINTON, 25 Mar 1945.
T/4 HARRY G. WINDHAM, 10 Aug 1944.

37TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

PVT. VERNON D. BOONE, 5 Sep 1944.
PFC. BRYANT BURNETT, JR., 1 May 1945.
SGT. WILLIAM R. COLE, 11 Sep 1944.
LT. COL. TOBIAS C. EASTMAN, 26 Apr 1945.
CPL. DEWEY L. EVANS, 14 Apr 1945.
PVT. CARL E. FAUST, 28 Dec 1944.
PVT. JEROME A. FOX, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. PERCY S. GEORGE, 20 Jun 1944.
CPL. ALTON T. GIBSON, 6 Apr 1945.
PFC. ELMER D. HUDSON, 3 Feb. 1945.
PFC. MARVIN D. JOHNSON, 3 Sep 1944.
T/5 MARVIN KATZ, 3 Sep 1944.
PFC. MAX KATZ, 3 Sep 1944.
CPL. ARNOLD R. KELLEY, 21 Jun 1944.
2ND LT. ALLAN R. MacPARLAND, 6 Mar 1945.
PVT. EDWARD MERRIMAN, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. RAYMOND P. MONIZ, 20 Dec 1944.
CPL. BASIL ROBERTS, 13 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. MILTON ROSENBERG, 18 Dec 1944.
T/5 VIRGIL R. SEEBER, 20 Nov 1944.
T/5 TOM W. SHELTON, 5 Feb 1945.
CAPT. LEE M. SOMMERS, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. NED V. STALDER, JR., 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. THOMAS C. WEAVER, 30 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. MAX WEISS, 25 Mar 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM C. WENNINGER, 31 Aug 1944.

38TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

PVT. NELS A. W. ANDERSON, 24 Dec 1944.
2ND LT. GEORGE ASTOR, 10 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. EDWIN L. BOEHMKE, 24 Dec 1944.
PFC. RUSSELL J. CAMPBELL, 9 Nov 1944.
PFC. LEO E. CHEEK, 29 Dec 1944.
PFC. OTHA E. CLAUNCH, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. WALTER J. CLEMENTS, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWARD L. COURTNEY, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLIE W. CRABTREE, 3 Aug 1944.
SGT. MOODY C. GODWIN, 29 Jul 1944.
SGT. CHARLES L. HAYWOOD, 4 Aug 1944.
CPL. LLOYD G. HUGHES, 30 Jan 1945.
2ND LT. JOSEPH M. KENNY, 28 Dec 1944.
PVT. JOHN F. KNEE, 29 Jul 1944.
CPL. CLAUDE LAWRENCE, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. CLAUDE McCOY, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE A. McFADDEN, 3 Sep 1944.
CPL. ELMER L. MOORE, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. CLIFFORD C. NIEMESH, 24 Dec 1944.
PFC. SEVERIN V. PAVLAS, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. ANTONIO M. PONTES, 30 Jul 1944.
SGT. CLINTON J. POOLE, 28 Dec 1944.
PFC. ROBERT E. RAHN, 26 Aug 1944.
SGT. DALE M. ROBERTS, 9 Nov 1944.
CPL. J. C. ROBINSON, JR., 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. GLENN M. ROWE, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. HOWARD O. WHITE, 28 Jul 1944.

9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

PFC. RUFUS ABERCROMBIE, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. TED ACKER, 13 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ALLEN A. ADAMCHIK, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. LOUIS J. ADAMIK, 13 Nov 1944.
PVT. HILARD C. ADAMS, 10 Jun 1944.
PFC. NORMAN ADKINS, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. NORMAN J. AHRENS, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. HUBERT AKIN, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. SAMUEL J. ALBANO, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. EARL F. ALEXANDER, 25 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. HOLLIS M. ALFORD, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. LAWRENCE C. ALLES, 31 Jul 1944.
PVT. PAUL H. ALTIZER, 5 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM J. AMBROSE, 2 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. JAMES K. AMEND, 5 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES C. AMERINE, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. ROY C. ANDERSON, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ALFRED K. ANSTICE, 1 Jul 1944.
PVT. ELMER A. ANTONELLI, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. ARNOLD D. ARONOFF, 8 Aug 1944.
PVT. PEDRO S. ARRELLANES, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. ERNEST D. AROCHA, 29 Jul 1944.
PVT. THOMAS W. ARTHUR, JR., 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. ARCHIE H. ASHWORTH, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. GILBERT R. AUSTIN, 29 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. ARCHIE F. AVERITTE, 2 Sep 1944.
2ND LT. DELBERT R. BACKHAUS, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. OSCAR V. BACKUS, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. CLAUDE E. BAILEY, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES N. BAKER, 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. JOHN R. BANUELOS, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. GEORGE E. BARKER, 3 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. WILSON BARNARD, 12 Apr 1945.
T/SGT. LAWRENCE A. BARNETT, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH F. BARNETT, 14 Dec 1944.
PVT. THOMAS E. BARRACLOUGH, 26 Oct 1944.
PVT. HARRY BARRILLEAUX, JR., 29 Aug 1944.
CAPT. EDWARD P. BARROWS, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM T. BARTON, 17 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT L. BASKE, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. EARL E. BATES, 1 May 1945.
PVT. PATRICK R. BAUR, 3 Sep 1944.
T/SGT. JAMES L. BAYLISS, 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. BAYRAMSHIAN, 11 Aug 1944.
SGT. HOWARD W. BEALE, 14 Dec 1944.
PVT. SLIVIN BEARD, 23 Jul 1944.
PVT. EUGENE F. BECK, 20 Feb 1945.
PVT. ANDREW A. BEJNARSKI, 7 Mar 1945.
PVT. JAMES BEECH, 2 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. BURNLEY BEECHEM, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. MATTHEW N. BEISSMANN, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. R. L. BELL, 10 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM E. BELL, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. PAUL W. BENTS, 25 Jul 1944.
SGT. PAY F. BERCAW, 6 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. GEORGE J. BERG, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. ELMER L. BERGWALL, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. HERBERT E. BERNHARDT, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. PETER BIDOCKHA, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. CASMIR R. BIELECKI, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELMER S. BILLINGS, 14 Apr 1945.
1ST LT. CLAUDE B. BISHOP, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOE M. BIZZELL, 29 Jul 1944.
PVT. IVAN C. BLACK, 29 Jun 1944.
PVT. JAMES W. BLACK, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. J. C. BLANTON, 5 Jun 1944.
PVT. MERIL F. BLUEDORN, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. CHARLES BOBIAK, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. MILTON H. BODAN, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM W. BOGAN, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. PAUL BOIM, 27 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. JOHN O. BOLAND, 14 Apr. 1945.
SGT. LUTHER L. BONE, 26 Aug 1944.
SGT. ROBERT A. BONNEVILLE, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. FREDERICK W. BOOTES, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM G. BORBELEY, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. CLAYTON A. BORGER, SR., 30 Aug 1944.

*Compiled from the official histories for the years 1944 and 1945 of the units listed. List includes those who died of wounds.

S/SGT. LESTER W. BOROWSKI, 17 Sep 1944.
PVT. JEFFERSON D. BOULWARE, 19 Aug 1944.
PFC. BLANTON BOYD, JR., 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. HENRY E. BRASSFIELD, JR., 2 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. LOWELL A. BREADY, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. LUTHER E. BRENN, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. ANDREW L. BRELAND, 2 Sep 1944.
SGT. THOMAS F. BRESNAHAN, 10 Mar 1945.
PVT. JESS R. BREWER, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. EZRA BRICKER, 14 Dec 1944.
PVT. SALVATORE F. BRIDGEMAN, 28 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. HARRY G. BRINK, 25 Aug 1944.
SGT. HARRY R. BROKHOF, 20 Feb 1945.
PVT. EARL L. BROWN, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. EDWARD J. BROWN, 9 Aug 1944.
SGT. PAUL L. BROWN, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT O. BROWN, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. WALTER F. BROWN, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANDREW J. BRUBAKER, 14 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. FREDERICK W. BRUDERLY, 10 Aug 1944.
PFC. HARVEY E. BRUNSWICK, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. ELTON C. BRYAN, 2 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES A. BRYANT, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. LOREN V. BUCHANAN, 13 Feb 1945.
PVT. CLARENCE R. BUCKLER, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. THOMAS P. BUCKLEY, 2 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH A. BUECHNER, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. RALPH C. BURDETTE, 12 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. HERMAN E. BURK, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. DONALD BURKE, 1 Sep 1944.
SGT. WILLIAM W. BURKETT, JR., 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. OTIS E. BURKS, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. OBIE N. BURNS, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES A. BURRELL, 25 Aug 1944.
SGT. CLETUS L. BURREIS, 14 Sep 1944.
SGT. FRANCIS BURTON, 20 Feb 1945.
SGT. CLARENCE A. BURTON, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. RICHARD BURTON, 1 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. DONALD R. BUSHLEY, 14 Aug 1944.
T/5 ROY L. BUSS, 3 Aug 1944.
SGT. DAVID B. BUTLER, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. L. C. BYERLY, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES M. BYERS, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. CAFFANO, 6 Mar 1945.
T/SGT. WAYNE F. CALDWELL, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. LAWRENCE D. CAMPANA, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. RAEFORD L. CAMPBELL, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. RALPH J. CARTER, 16 Apr 1945.
2ND LT. PHILIP M. CARPENTER, 29 Jun 1944.
PFC. THOMAS F. CARPENTER, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. JULIUS N. CARR, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES A. CARROLL, 14 Oct 1944.
PVT. HAROLD R. CARWRIGHT, 10 Aug 1944.
PVT. SALVATORE J. CANTAVIA, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. GERARD CENAMMO, 28 Jun 1945.
PFC. OLIVER W. CHAPMAN, 10 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH R. CHEGEZY, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. LEONARD CHESTER, JR., 15 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. JESSIE C. CHILDERS, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. LAWRENCE W. CHILSON, 21 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. RAYMOND J. CHRISTOPHER, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOHN W. CHVATAL, 20 Feb 1945.
PFC. SIMON J. CIGANEK, 6 Apr 1945.
PFC. ANDREW L. CLARK, 14 Aug 1944.
1ST SGT. JOHN H. CLARKE, 8 Jun 1944.
PFC. CHARLES E. CLEMENS, 16 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. EMERALD A. CLEMENT, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. LUTHER H. CLEMONS, 2 Apr 1945.
PFC. ELWOOD O. CLINE, 22 Aug 1944.
PFC. VERNON H. CLINE, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSE O. COBOS, 16 Apr 1945.
PFC. DALE W. COCHRAN, 1 Sep 1944.
SGT. LLOYD N. COCHRAN, 1 Jul 1944.
PVT. CLINTON C. CODDINGTON, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDWIN M. CODY, 3 Aug 1944.
DVT. JOHN R. COFER, 26 Oct 1944.
PFC. BEN A. COLEMAN, JR., 4 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOHN L. COLEMAN, 16 Jun 1944.
T/5 LENNIE B. COLEMAN, 24 Jun 1944.
SGT. JAMES P. CONLON, 12 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. TOM CONN, 2 S p 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM S. COOK, 11 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. EDWARD C. COOPER, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. ANTHONY J. COPPA, JR., 31 Aug 1944.
SGT. ARTHUR A. CORNELIUS, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. DANIEL CORTEZ, 16 Dec 1944.
CPL. WALTER L. CRAIG, JR., 20 Aug 1944.
PFC. MICHAEL J. CRONIN, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. VICTOR W. CRUDER, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. DONALD R. CULEY, 8 Mar 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM J. CURRAN, JR., 23 Aug 1944.
T/5 AARON CUSHER, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. BRUNO F. CZACHOR, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. SAMUEL R. DAILEY, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. JACK DALE, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. SHERMAN W. DALEY, 28 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. CARSON R. DALTON, 5 Mar 1945.
PFC. EVERETT L. DANA, 29 Aug 1944.
SGT. CHARLES A. DANEK, 14 Dec 1944.
PVT. TOMMY DAVIDSON, 2 Aug 1944.
SGT. AMOS W. DAVIS, 1 Nov 1944.
PVT. ELDON DAVIS, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE T. DAWSON, 1 Oct 1944.
PVT. THOMAS A. DE CESARE, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. PAUL W. DE LIMA, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOSEPH R. DE MINT, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. AMERICO D. DE VINCO, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES DEESE, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROY A. DEYONCHE, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. LIBERATO J. DI STEFANO, 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. JAMES M. DICKERSON, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES F. DIECKMAN, 26 Mar 1945.
PFC. CHARLES L. DIFFEY, 12 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ROBERT W. DIFFEY, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND A. DIMAS, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. KEITH M. DIRCKSEN, 15 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. JOHN P. DOBRAN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. MACEY C. DODD, 16 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE J. DOMIN, 15 Dec 1944.

PFC. FRANCIS J. DONOVAN, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALFRED A. DONROE, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. CALVIN C. DOWNS, 4 Sep 1944.
CPL. LEONARD R. DOYLY, 28 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. CHARLES R. DRACOLE, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH E. DRISCOLL, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. VERNON L. DU VALL, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. W. L. DUCKWORTH, JR., 7 Oct 1944.
PVT. FRANK J. DUFFE, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. CLEO H. DUNCAN, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. CHARLES L. DUNLAP, 20 Feb 1945.
PVT. FLOYD W. DUNNING, 10 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALLEN DURHAM, JR., 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. WASYL DYNOK, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRED H. DYSART, 10 Aug 1944.
CAPT. PHILIP B. EDELEN, 10 Jun 1944.
SGT. ARTHUR R. EDWARDS, 8 Mar 1945.
PVT. AUBREY L. EDWARDS, 27 Aug 1944.
CAPT. WILLIAM B. ELDER, JR., 9 Aug 1944.
PFC. ERNESTO ELIZONDO, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. MELVIN A. ELLERMAN, 24 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES H. ELLIOTT, 28 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. JOHN G. ELLZEY, 17 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELBERT R. ENGLAND, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. RUSSELL C. ENLER, 11 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. ROBERT K. ERIKSEN, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHN H. ERWIN, 10 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JOHN ESCALERA, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. CIRO P. ESPOSITO, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. WESLEY C. ESTES, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. L. J. EUBANKS, 28 Jul 1944.
CPL. JOHN F. FAHEY, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. CLARENCE FAIRBROTHER, 27 Jul 1944.
CPL. FRANK J. FASELLI, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. ERNEST J. FENSTERBUSH, 18 Sep 1944.
PFC. NIKOLA FERETIC, 12 Jun 1944.
SGT. KYLE B. FERGUSON, 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. DANIEL W. FERNSTROM, 11 Mar 1945.
CPL. THOMAS W. FIELD, 1 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. VERNON W. FIELD, 7 Aug 1944.
PVT. HAROLD A. FIELDS, 3 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. CHARLES R. FINLEY, JR., 8 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JOSEPH F. FITCH, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. LESLIE FITZGERALD, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. WOODROW W. FITZWATER, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. BALLARD S. FLANARY, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. ALVIN W. FLECKE, 5 Oct 1944.
PVT. MALCOLM D. FLETCHER, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. FORREST K. FLINN, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JUSTUS S. FLINT, 2 Sep 1944.
SGT. FRANK U. FLORES, 31 Jul 1944.
PVT. HAROLD M. FLOWER, 11 Aug 1944.
PFC. MICHAEL D. FODICE, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND A. FOGARTY, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. FOLDS, 17 Jun 1944.
SGT. JAMES J. FOLEY, 16 Jun 1944.
CPL. ROBERT L. FOLGER, 7 Feb 1945.
SGT. EDWARD L. FOLGER, 2 S p 1944.
PVT. GERALD D. FOSTER, 20 Feb 1945.
PVT. ORVAL H. FOTENAIN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. EARL E. FRAIM, 11 Aug 1944.
SGT. EDWIN H. FRANKLIN, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. EDD C. FRAZIER, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN C. FREEMAN, 6 Jun 1944.
PFC. KNUT FRIBERG, 30 Aug 1944.
T/5 JEPHTHA W. FRUNK, 3 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES E. FULLER, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILLARD FULTZ, 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES A. FUTCH, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. HAROLD T. GACCIOTTA, 18 Mar 1945.
PVT. HARVEY I. GADD, 11 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES J. GAFFNEY, JR., 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES K. GALLOWAY, 3 Aug 1944.
SGT. ALFREDO GARCIA, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. ELIAS D. GARCIA, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. DONALD GARDNER, 8 Sep 1944.
PVT. RAY P. GARDNER, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM B. GARNER, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. MALCOLM H. GARRETT, 28 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. CANDELARIO GARZA, 2 Feb 1945.
PVT. FRANK J. GAVERN, 12 Aug 1944.
PFC. HARRY B. GEISSER, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. JAMES V. GERACI, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. PETER GIACALONE, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALBERT F. GIANFELICE, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN J. GILLARD, 15 Mar 1945.
PVT. CHARLES GILLESPIE, 20 Feb 1945.
PFC. PAUL W. GILTS, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. HENRY B. GLOSSON, JR., 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. GEORGE W. GLOVER, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM A. GLOVER, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. SAM GOBY, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH J. GOETZ, 8 Oct 1944.
PVT. EMANUEL GOLDBLATT, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. FRANK J. GOLDSCHMIDT, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES J. GOLDSTEIN, 14 Dec 1944.
PVT. MAURO A. GONZALEZ, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDWARD W. GOODMAN, 17 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. HARRY V. GRABER, 4 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. ANTHONY J. GRAHAM, 29 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. MELVIN R. GRAHAM, 5 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. CLAUDE E. GRAYES, 16 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. DONALD E. GRAY, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRANK L. GRAY, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. JUNIUS M. GREGORY, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. FORREST S. GREGORY, 21 Apr 1945.
PFC. GEORGE P. GRIFFIN, 28 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. EARNST V. GRIFFIN, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. GIVENS GRIFFIN, 3 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. O. C. GRIFFIN, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. KLINE L. GRIGGS, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH D. GRIMES, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM L. GRIMES, 8 Aug 1944.
PVT. EMER J. GROVES, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. HILARIO R. GUJARDO, 4 Sep 1944.
SGT. JAMES C. GURRY, 26 Aug 1944.
SGT. JACKSON A. HAGANS, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. JOHN L. HAGERTY, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. AXEL W. HAGLUND, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. HAPOLD E. HAINES, 6 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM J. HAINES, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR K. HALL, 26 Aug 1944.
SGT. JOHN HALL, 15 Dec 1944.

PVT. ROBERT E. HALL, 16 Aug 1944.
PFC. F. W. HAMILTON, JR., 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. GILBERT D. HAMILTON, 10 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ROY L. HAMILTON, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLIFTON HAMMER, 14 Apr 1945.
MAJ. JOHN L. HANBY, 3 Aug 1944.
SGT. STEPHEN E. HANSON, 16 Apr 1945.
CPL. RAYMOND C. HANSON, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. HOWARD W. HAPPERSETT, 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. JULIAN R. HARGETT, 4 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOHN D. HARRIGAN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. FREDERICK HARRIS, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH T. HARRIS, 18 Sep 1944.
PFC. KENNETH P. HARRIS, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. OTTO J. HARRIS, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. GILBERT A. HART, 5 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. LAWRENCE B. T. HATTON, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND E. HAWKINS, 6 Apr 1945.
SGT. JOHN T. HAWLEY, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. BYNUM E. HAYES, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND L. HAYES, 18 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. RICHARD W. HAYS, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. OLLIE J. HEARD, SR., 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM H. HECHTUS, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH S. HEGEDUS, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. CALVIN H. HEIDORN, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. HARRY L. HEIDRICK, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. ROLAND G. HENDRIX, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. BEN W. HENKLE, 12 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND W. HENSLEY, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. KIRLIN H. HERBST, 3 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES E. HESCHER, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. RICHARD J. HEWITT, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. KENNETH L. HICKMAN, 11 Apr 1945.
PVT. CARL A. HICKSON, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES R. HICKS, 21 Dec 1944.
PVT. JAMES L. HICKS, 3 Feb 1945.
PFC. HENRY HIEB, 3 F b 1945.
PVT. RUSSELL L. HIGGINS, 24 Aug 1944.
CAPT. WILLIAM B. HIGGINS, 11 Feb 1945.
PVT. ROBERT HIGMAN, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. THOMAS H. HILDRETH, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. BELTRAM L. HILL, 6 Apr 1945.
PVT. BILLIE B. HILL, 2 Dec 1944.
PVT. KENNETH E. HILL, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. MAURICE T. HILL, 17 Feb 1945.
T/SGT. ARNOLD L. HINKLE, 26 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. LEROY C. HINRICHS, 3 Sep 1944.
PVT. DENNIS M. HIPP, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. HAROLD E. HISSON, 4 Feb 1945.
CPL. JOHN HITCHINS, 3 Feb 1945.
PFC. WILLIS HOBBS, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDGAR C. HOCHGRABER, 14 Aug 1944.
SGT. CLARENCE A. HOFF, 28 Jul 1944.
CPL. JAMES F. HOFF, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. CARL C. HOGAN, 11 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. FLOYD C. HODAN, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. GENERAL P. HOLLAND, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH P. HOLLAND, 15 Dec 1944.
PVT. ALBERT C. HOLMAN, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND HOLT, 1 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILLIE F. HOMBURG, 20 Dec 1944.
PFC. EARL HOOKER, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE F. HOOPER, 18 Dec 1944.
T/SGT. CLIVE H. HOOVER, SR., 1 Sep 1944.
PFC. LESTER J. HORN, 6 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILMER C. HOSELER, 2 Sep 1944.
SGT. FESTUS C. HOUSE, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. CECIL C. HOWLAND, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN M. HUBBARD, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. LLOYD R. HUBSON, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM E. HUEY, 1 Aug 1944.
T/5 RICHARD W. HUGHES, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROBERT T. HUMPHRIES, 28 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. JOHN E. HUNLEY, 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. VIVIAN G. HURON, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. LELON C. HUTCHESON, 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. JAMES F. HUTSON, 19 Feb 1945.
PVT. JUNIOR ISAACS, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. RUFFIN D. ISHEE, 10 Aug 1944.
SGT. VERNON H. JACKSON, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CARL JACOBSEN, 18 Mar 1945.
PFC. MARO L. JAHR, JR., 15 Dec 1944.
T/5 LOUIS JANEK, 22 Jun 1944.
SGT. JULIAN W. JARVIS, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. MARTIN JASAS, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. ERNEST A. JENICO, 15 Dec 1944.
PVT. EVAN H. JERNIGAN, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. ALBERT JETER, 21 Jul 1944.
PFC. LOUIS C. JEZSIK, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT L. JOHNS, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. ADOLPH H. JOHNSON, 1 Aug 1944.
CPL. CARL V. JOHNSON, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. DEWIE L. JOHNSON, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. HANSEL L. JOHNSON, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROBERT L. JOHNSON, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. SILAS A. JOHNSON, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. ARTHUR F. JONAS, 30 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. FOREST JONES, 11 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES E. JONES, 14 Sep 1944.
PVT. LEMMY JONES, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. WARREN C. JONES, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. CHARLES L. JONES, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. ALVIN J. JOSLOW, 8 Aug 1944.
T/4 ORLO JUNK, 4 Feb 1945.
SGT. JAMES K. KAIN, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. EDWARD M. KAVANACH, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. EARL KEISLER, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT M. KELLAR, 2 Feb 1945.
PFC. ORVILLE W. KELLEY, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH F. KELLY, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. RALPH L. KENYON, 3 Sep 1944.
T/5 ANTHONY R. KESEROS, 4 Feb 1945.
CAPT. JOHN R. KILBERT, 27 Oct 1944.
PFC. FRANCIS J. KILEY, 10 Jun 1944.
PVT. KARL E. KIMBALL, 14 Apr 1945.
PVT. ALBERT M. KING, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. AUBREY B. KING, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. LESLIE D. KING, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. MELVIN L. KING, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOHN D. KINSER, 20 Feb 1945.
PFC. GEORGE KITTLE, 8 Aug 1944.

PFC. RAYMOND J. KLISH, 19 Feb 1945.
 PVT. ERNEST L. KNIGHT, 28 Jul 1944.
 CPL. JOSEPH W. KNOWLES, 29 Aug 1944.
 PFC. EDWIN F. KOCH, 20 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. FREDERICK W. KOENIG, 15 Dec 1944.
 S/SGT. WILLIE V. KOENIG, 3 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. JOHN J. KOLCZYNSKI, 17 Jun 1944.
 PFC. RALPH G. KOLVINS, 6 Oct 1944.
 SGT. JEROME KOZLOL, 2 Sep 1944.
 SGT. ROBERT H. KRAFT, 7 Feb 1945.
 PVT. EDWARD E. KRANENPOOL, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JACK O. KRAUSHAAR, 4 Feb 1945.
 PVT. PHILIP M. KRILOFF, 25 Aug 1944.
 PFC. CECIL J. KRITZER, 28 Jul 1944.
 SGT. FRANK KUKURA, 27 Jan 1945.
 PFC. JOSEPH E. KUTIN, JR., 8 Jul 1944.
 1ST LT. WALTER E. LAKE, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. DAVID C. LAMPART, 6 Apr 1945.
 PVT. LEONARD J. LANGOWSKI, 28 Aug 1944.
 PVT. EARL V. LANSOON, 28 Aug 1944.
 PFC. RAYMOND L. LARRABEE, 18 Dec 1944.
 PVT. LLOYD E. LATHROM, 26 Aug 1944.
 2ND LT. OLIVER C. LAWRENCE, 12 Jun 1944.
 PFC. FELIX S. LAYTON, 10 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT E. LECOUNT, 13 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. CLIFTON H. LEE, 7 Aug 1944.
 T/SGT. GEORGE W. LEE, 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. HELMER W. LEE, 14 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. FRANK W. LEGER, 15 Dec 1944.
 S/SGT. ADOLPH A. LENARC, 20 Jun 1944.
 PVT. FRANK LESTER, 1 Aug 1944.
 PVT. STEPHEN J. LEVAN, 11 Aug 1944.
 PFC. HENRY E. LEVERETT, 26 Apr 1945.
 PVT. ABRAHAM LEVY, 25 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WARREN H. LEWALLEN, 2 Sep 1944.
 S/SGT. MILES S. LEWIS, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. ALBERT F. LIBERT, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. MICHAEL C. LICEA, 7 Feb 1945.
 T/5 ROBERT R. LINGOE, 12 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. WALTER T. LINDQUIST, 18 Dec 1944.
 PVT. ALBERT W. LINSAY, 7 Jun 1944.
 T/4 ROSCOE LINER, 27 Jul 1944.
 PVT. LEWIS W. LIPPARD, 18 Jun 1944.
 T/SGT. ANTHONY C. LOPEZ, 16 Apr 1945.
 PFC. DAVID LOPEZ, 14 Dec 1944.
 PFC. ERNEST D. LOPEZ, 1 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. ALOYSIUS J. LORENZ, 26 Aug 1944.
 PVT. GEORGE H. LORENZO, 4 Feb 1945.
 PFC. WARREN F. LOWERY, 20 Feb 1945.
 PVT. MICHAEL M. LUBOVA, 1 Feb 1945.
 PFC. FRANK L. LUDWIG, 29 Aug 1944.
 T/5 LAVANE N. LUHMAN, 21 Jul 1944.
 S/SGT. GEORGE LUTIFE, 20 Oct 1944.
 S/SGT. THOMAS H. LYNN, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. STANLEY G. MacFARLAND, 13 Aug 1944.
 PFC. DAVID F. McBRIDE, 6 Feb 1945.
 PFC. WILLIAM J. McCAMMON, 16 Jun 1944.
 PVT. GERALD J. McCARTNEY, 1 Feb 1945.
 SGT. ROBERT McCLAUCHERY, 12 Aug 1944.
 PFC. DONALD E. McCOMBICK, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. WILLIAM M. McDANIEL, 10 Aug 1944.
 CAPT. JOHN R. McELROY, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. KELTON McGEER, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. EDWARD L. McGILL, 1 Aug 1944.
 PVT. BUFORD, McGRAW, 18 Jun 1944.
 PFC. JOHN McHUGH, 16 Apr 1945.
 PVT. ROY L. McKENZIE, 15 Jul 1944.
 PFC. GEORGE L. McKINLAY, 27 July 1944.
 PFC. WILLIE E. McKIMMY, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JAMES J. P. McLaughlin, 1 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. WILLIAM C. McMILLEN, 31 Aug 1944.
 PVT. GEORGE McPHEETERS, 10 Feb 1945.
 SGT. WILLIAM H. McPHERSON, 10 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. SHERIDAN A. MACKAY, 28 Aug 1944.
 PFC. NORMAN W. MADDEN, 14 Apr 1945.
 PFC. JOSEPH J. MADZIARZYK, 26 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JOHN G. MAGNESS, 22 Aug 1944.
 CPL. HOWARD J. MAHONEY, 1 Feb 1945.
 PVT. FRANK R. MAIOLI, 14 Oct 1944.
 SGT. JOE P. MAKOVY, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. AULDEN P. MANNING, 12 Aug 1944.
 PFC. FRANCIS L. MARLETT, 14 Dec 1944.
 PFC. LIONEL E. MARLOWE, 31 Aug 1944.
 PFC. ARTHUR R. MARONEY, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. VERLYN C. MARROTT, 29 Jul 1944.
 PFC. JOSEPH A. MARTIN, 11 Jun 1944.
 PVT. JOSE A. MARTINEZ, 19 Jun 1944.
 PFC. JUAN S. MARTINEZ, 10 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. LESTER F. MARVIN, 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. RUDOLPH MARX, 13 Aug 1944.
 PFC. HENRY B. MASON, 16 Jun 1944.
 T/5 JAMES W. MATECHINSKY, 12 Aug 1944.
 PVT. DONALD R. MATHEWS, 2 Feb 1945.
 1ST LT. RAYMOND E. MATTESON, 25 Aug 1944.
 PVT. CLIFFORD MATTHIENSEN, 30 Jul 1944.
 PVT. DONALD W. MATTSON, 26 Aug 1944.
 PFC. SALVATORE S. MAURO, 26 Mar 1945.
 T/SGT. RUFUS J. MAXWELL, 31 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JAMES H. MAY, 25 Aug 1944.
 PVT. CHARLES W. MAYER, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. CHARLES R. MAZE, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. EARL MEADOWS, 9 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT C. MEALING, 29 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM A. MEEHAN, 11 Aug 1944.
 PVT. MALCOLM H. MELTON, 17 Dec 1944.
 PVT. LEWIS E. MENDENHALL, JR., 29 Dec 1944.
 PFC. JOSEPH A. MESSICK, 25 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. JOHN M. MICHALEC, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. LYNN D. MIDGET, 16 Jun 1944.
 PFC. FRANK MIKLOS, 30 Jul 1944.
 T/SGT. JOSEPH F. MILES, 26 Jun 1944.
 PVT. AUBREY T. MILLER, 17 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. KENNETH F. MILLER, 13 Jul 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM H. MILLER, 1 Aug 1944.
 2ND LT. ALEXANDER MILLIGAN, 10 Feb 1945.
 2ND LT. JOE E. MILLS, 12 Jun 1944.
 PFC. RALPH S. MILLS, 13 Aug 1944.
 PVT. FRANCIS J. MILNE, 18 Sep 1944.
 PVT. GEORGE A. MINICK, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ERNEST MITCHELL, 14 Apr 1945.
 SGT. FRED MITCHELL, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. WILSON E. MIXON, 4 Feb 1945.
 PVT. EMIL W. MLADENKA, 12 Jun 1944.
 PVT. RALPH L. MOE, 1 Sep 1944.
 PVT. JOHN M. MOFIELD, 17 Jun 1944.
 PVT. JAMES H. MOHWINKEL, 3 Sep 1944.
 S/SGT. EARLIE W. MONCRIEF, 18 D. c 1944.
 PVT. DONALD W. MONSELL, 2 Aug 1944.
 SGT. PASCUAL MONTANEZ, 30 Aug 1944.
 SGT. ROBERT H. MONTJOY, 3 Feb 1945.
 PFC. EUGENE B. MOORE, 13 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. HARRY K. MOORE, 5 Mar 1945.
 T/5 JOHN R. MORGART, 12 Apr 1945.
 PVT. WILFRED E. J. MORIN, 10 Aug 1944.
 2ND LT. EDWARD P. MORRIS, 26 Jul 1944.
 PVT. EDWARD M. MULLGREW, 6 Oct 1944.
 PVT. JOSEPH F. MUNOZ, 12 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM J. MURDAUGH, 29 Jun 1944.
 PVT. CHARLES I. MURDOCK, 28 Aug 1944.
 PFC. EDWARD J. MURRAY, 25 Aug 1944.
 PVT. THOMAS MURRAY, 30 Aug 1944.
 PFC. JOHN E. MUTER, 25 Aug 1944.
 PFC. LOUIS E. MYERS, 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. LEONARD P. NADEAU, 25 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. JUAN P. NEBARESE, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. CHARLIE R. NEESE, JR., 28 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ETHA NETTLES, 25 Aug 1944.
 PFC. CARL T. NEWBERRY, 10 Aug 1944.
 STANLEY L. NEWBERRY, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. SERIL NEWBAM, 14 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. JACK M. NICHOLSON, 23 Aug 1944.
 PVT. CURTIS E. NICHOLSON, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT H. NICKERSON, JR., 10 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JOHN M. NICOLOSI, 10 Jun 1944.
 PFC. EDWARD T. NISKI, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. RAYMOND B. NISSLEY, 30 Aug 1944.
 CPL. CLAUDE B. NIX, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. GEORGE J. NOLIN, 21 Dec 1944.
 PFC. FELIX J. NORRIS, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. FLOYD NORWOOD, 28 Aug 1944.
 PFC. HAROLD L. NORTON, 10 Aug 1944.
 PVT. WENDELL A. NYE, 1 Sep 1944.
 PFC. ANTHONY M. OBLER, 3 Feb 1945.
 PVA. CLAUDE O'BRIEN, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. JOHN O'BRIEN, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. JOSEPH J. OCIESIELSKI, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JACK C. OHARA, 3 Sep 1944.
 PVT. FLOYD E. OLPHIN, 25 Jun 1944.
 PVT. CHARLES W. O'MALLEY, SR., 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. CHARLES F. O'NEIL, JR., 17 Jun 1944.
 PFC. HAROLD J. O'NEIL, 18 Sep 1944.
 PVT. HENRY OPALECHUK, 26 Aug 1944.
 PFC. ARTHUR E. ORCUTT, 3 Aug 1944.
 PVT. HAROLD N. ORELL, 13 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. NETTUNO P. ORTALI, 30 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. HAROLD D. OSTERWELL, 31 Jul 1944.
 PVT. PETER OVIAN, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. RAYMOND C. OWEN, 21 Jul 1944.
 SGT. WILBURN L. PAGE, 31 Aug 1944.
 PVT. CLAYTON B. PALMER, 3 Feb 1945.
 SGT. FRANK L. PALMISTO, 28 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. JACK T. PARKER, 1 Sep 1944.
 SGT. WALLACE W. PARRISH, 3 Sep 1944.
 1ST LT. BERT PARSONS, 17 Aug 1944.
 PVT. PETER B. PATNAUDE, 27 Jul 1944.
 SGT. GRADY W. PATTERSON, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. VICTOR W. PATTERSON, 2 Aug 1944.
 PVT. DANIEL T. PATTON, 27 Jul 1944.
 PVT. HARRY PAUSHTER, 30 Jul 1944.
 SGT. EARL PAXTON, 1 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JAMES E. PEACE, 20 Jun 1944.
 PFC. CARL R. PEALH, 26 Mar 1945.
 PFC. CARL E. PEARSON, 12 Jun 1944.
 PFC. FRANKLIN C. PECK, 16 Dec 1944.
 KENNETH W. PELHAM, 27 Jul 1944.
 PVT. GROVER H. PENDERCRASS, 28 Aug 1944.
 SGT. MARSHALL S. PENICK, 11 Aug 1944.
 SGT. ALBERTO V. PERALES, 26 Jul 1944.
 S/SGT. JONATHAN E. PERRY, 12 Aug 1944.
 PFC. HERBERT PESARE, 14 Dec 1944.
 PVT. RAYMOND F. PFAFF, 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. DUANE H. PHANEUF, 6 Mar 1945.
 S/SGT. ARTHUR C. PHELPS, 18 Dec 1944.
 PVT. FRANK PHILLIPS, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ARTHUR W. PICKRELL, 24 Jun 1944.
 T/5 WILLIAM J. PIERCE, 3 Aug 1944.
 T/SGT. AUGUST H. PILSNER, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JOSEPH PIRCHIO, 26 Aug 1944.
 PVT. WILLIAM PISKO, 3 Sep 1944.
 PVT. HENRY H. PITCHER, 25 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JAMES D. PLACE, 13 Aug 1944.
 CPL. SYDNEY L. PLIMLEY, 18 Feb 1945.
 PFC. ERNEST R. PLYLER, 27 Jul 1944.
 S/SGT. FRANK J. POLKZYWA, 27 Aug 1944.
 PVT. HOWARD J. POLK, 13 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JOSEPH POPIELARCHECK, 18 Dec 1944.
 PVT. PHILIP A. PORTO, 19 Jul 1944.
 PVT. FRANK J. POSINSKI, 24 Jun 1944.
 PFC. JAMES F. POST, 26 Jul 1944.
 PVT. WILLIAM P. POTTER, 9 Jun 1944.
 PVT. JOHN O. POTTS, 3 Sep 1944.
 1ST LT. THOMAS R. POTTS, 10 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM D. POTTS, 26 Apr 1945.
 PFC. OTIS G. POWELL, 16 Jun 1944.
 CPL. EDWARD T. POWERS, 9 Aug 1944.
 PFC. HAROLD V. POWERS, 13 Feb 1945.
 S/SGT. LEO I. PRATT, 27 Jul 1944.
 PVT. CLAUD W. PRICE, 16 Jun 1944.
 PVT. DENNIS H. PROFFITT, 4 Sep 1944.
 PFC. RALPH PROSCIA, 28 Jul 1944.
 PFC. JAMES PROVENZANO, 4 Sep 1944.
 PVT. RUDOLPH J. QUARANTA, 4 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM H. QUALMAN, 8 Feb 1945.
 PFC. FRANK B. QUEZADA, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. DENNIS C. QUINLAN, 11 Aug 1944.
 PFC. LEWIS L. RADCLIFFE, 17 Jun 1944.
 PVT. MICHAEL A. RAMIREZ, 5 Sep 1944.
 PVT. MAL D. RAMSEY, 29 Aug 1944.
 PFC. ETHAN RATLIFF, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. FRANKLIN H. REDFOX, 16 Jun 1944.
 1ST LT. VICTOR W. REIHM, 3 Jul 1944.
 PVT. TERENCE F. REINHART, 3 Sep 1944.
 PFC. FRED RELLA, 14 Apr 1945.
 SGT. PAUL E. RENFROW, 2 Sep 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT S. RENTZ, 26 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ALVIN W. RETTIG, 1 Aug 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT L. REUTER, 26 Jun 1944.
 PFC. CHARLES K. REWER, 30 Jul 1944.
 PFC. DOMINGO REYES, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JOSE H. REYES, 1 Feb 1945.
 S/SGT. WALTER W. REYNOLDS, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. WALTER F. RHODES, 2 Sep 1944.
 PFC. GEORGE E. RICE, 14 Sep 1944.
 PFC. JAMES J. RICE, 3 Jul 1944.
 S/SGT. RAYMOND C. RICE, 25 Aug 1944.
 1ST LT. WILLIAM C. RICHARDS, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. NOEL W. RICHARDSON, 18 Jun 1944.
 SGT. KENNETH O. RIGGS, 23 Jun 1944.
 PVT. EARNEST E. RILEY, JR., 2 Aug 1944.
 PVT. FRED O. RITCHEY, 15 Dec 1944.
 PVT. JOE C. RIVAS, 6 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. THOMAS C. RIVERS, 2 Sep 1944.
 PFC. HARRY P. ROACH, 11 Apr 1945.
 PVT. BRUCE E. ROBBINS, 28 Aug 1944.
 PVT. EUGENE ROBERTS, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. HERMAN ROBERTS, 28 Jul 1944.
 SGT. JOHN R. ROBERTS, 3 Feb 1945.
 PFC. SIDNEY E. ROBERTS, 28 Jul 1944.
 T/5 JOE C. ROBINSON, 23 Jun 1944.
 PFC. O. B. ROBINSON, 22 Jun 1944.
 2ND LT. ROBERT L. ROBINSON, 23 Aug 1944.
 PFC. JAMES ROBISON, 29 Aug 1944.
 PFC. THEODORE J. ROEMELE, 11 Jul 1944.
 PFC. WILLIAM J. ROGERS, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. THEODORE E. ROLFE, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. CHARLES B. ROYLS, 15 Jan 1945.
 S/SGT. ROY H. ROOP, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. LOYD H. ROOT, 20 Feb 1945.
 PVT. FRANK J. ROSANIA, 26 Aug 1944.
 SGT. EDDIE M. ROY, 17 Jun 1944.
 PFC. ALBERT RUCKE, 2 Feb 1945.
 PVT. ANTONIO V. RUIZ, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. MANUEL V. RUIZ, 31 Aug 1944.
 PVT. REFUJO B. RUIZ, 16 Jun 1944.
 PFC. WALTER M. RYBACKI, 11 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JOHN G. RYBAK, 8 Jun 1944.
 PFC. ANDREW F. SABO, 15 Dec 1944.
 PVT. DANIEL M. SALITSKY, 28 Aug 1944.
 T/5 EMMIT G. SANDERS, 13 Aug 1944.
 SGT. ERNEST S. SANDOVAL, 7 Feb 1945.
 SGT. LESLIE R. SARENPA, 4 Jul 1944.
 T/SGT. BILL SARGENT, 11 Aug 1944.
 PVT. LUMAN SARNIE, 21 Jun 1944.
 PVT. WILLIAM C. SAUL, 6 Sep 1944.
 PVT. HOLSE E. SAUNDERS, 26 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. EMIL A. SCHIELE, 26 Jul 1944.
 PVT. WALTER F. SCHLUPP, 4 Sep 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT A. SCHOLZ, 3 Feb 1945.
 PFC. HERBERT E. SCHULTE, 18 Apr 1945.
 PFC. HEYE J. SCHULTZ, 3 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. RUFUS N. SCHUSTER, 18 Jun 1944.
 PVT. DILLARD M. SCOTT, 28 Jul 1944.
 PVT. SIMPSON C. SCOTT, JR., 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. RALPH L. SEDELMEIER, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. LOUIS B. SEGURA, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. WALTER E. SEITZ, 7 Mar 1945.
 PFC. JULIUS SELBITSCHKA, 16 Feb 1945.
 PVT. LONNIE SERGENT, 17 Jun 1944.
 S/SGT. JOHN E. SHARP, 26 Apr 1945.
 PVT. RALPH A. SHAYKEY, 30 Aug 1944.
 PVT. JAMES P. SHELTON, 2 Sep 1944.
 PFC. GEORGE L. SHIELDS, 15 Dec 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT R. SHOENMAKER, 26 Jul 1944.
 CPL. BRYCE L. SIDESINGER, 31 Aug 1944.
 PFC. ANTERO SILO, 30 Jul 1944.
 PFC. HURLEY R. SILVEY, 29 Aug 1944.
 PVT. HERMAN E. SILVIA, 4 Sep 1944.
 1ST LT. ARTHUR A. SIMON, 13 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. JOHN R. SIMONETTI, 16 Jun 1944.
 PVT. RAYMOND SIMPSON, 13 Jul 1944.
 PFC. FREDERICK T. SLADE, 30 Jun 1944.
 PFC. CORNELIUS F. SMITH, 15 Dec 1944.
 PVT. DOUGLAS P. SMITH, 30 Aug 1944.
 PFC. GRADY A. SMITH, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. JAMES R. SMITH, JR., 26 Aug 1944.
 CPL. JOHN B. SMITH, 17 Dec 1944.
 PFC. ROBERT M. SMITH, JR., 26 Aug 1944.
 PFC. SAMUEL F. SMITH, 12 Jun 1944.
 PFC. HUBERT SMOAK, 9 Jun 1944.
 PVT. DOCK SNYDER, 9 Feb 1945.
 PVT. EDWIN B. SPEAR, 5 Feb 1945.
 PFC. EDGAR O. SPENCER, 26 Jul 1944.
 PFC. STEVEN A. SPRINGER, 2 Jul 1944.
 SGT. JOE L. SQUIREL, 28 Aug 1944.
 PVT. MERTON H. SROCK, 3 Feb 1945.
 PVT. CECIL C. STANBRO, 9 Jun 1944.
 1ST LT. STEVEN S. STANIZEOSKI, 3 Aug 1944.
 PFC. FRANCIS H. STANKER, 16 Dec 1944.
 PFC. CLAUDE H. STANLEY, 20 Dec 1944.
 PVT. TROY B. STEADING, SR., 20 Jul 1944.
 PFC. EDWARD A. STECZ, 13 Dec 1944.
 SGT. JOHN H. STEED, 6 Sep 1944.
 PVT. PAUL R. STEINEL, 6 Sep 1944.
 1ST LT. ROBERT W. STENGLE, 10 Mar 1944.
 PFC. JOHN L. STEPHENS, 18 Apr 1945.
 PVT. JESSIE F. STEPHENSON, 2 Aug 1944.
 PFC. CARROLL M. STEVENS, 30 Aug 1944.
 PFC. RALPH STEWART, 18 Dec 1944.
 PVT. JOHN J. STIBITZ, 21 Jul 1944.
 PFC. EDWARD STIMEL, 8 Aug 1944.
 PFC. ROBERT G. STINNETTE, 29 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. CLAYTON G. STODDART, 3 Sep 1944.
 T/5 JOE T. STOKES, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. CHARLES E. STRATTON, 3 Feb 1945.
 S/SGT. SELVIN STROUD, 30 Jul 1944.
 PVT. BERNARD J. SULKOWSKI, 16 Jun 1944.
 PVT. ROBERT G. SULTZBERGER, 27 Jul 1944.
 PFC. ARTHUR W. SUTTLE, 30 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. EDWARD J. SWIECHOCKI, 12 Aug 1944.
 S/SGT. RALPH J. SYLVESTER, 3 Feb 1945.
 PVT. WALTER E. SZAPKA, 17 Apr 1945.
 PVT. FRANK J. TANZELLA, 26 Jul 1944.
 PVT. SIMS J. TASSIN, 4 Feb 1945.
 PFC. WILLIE TATE, JR., 15 Dec 1944.
 PVT. ARTHUR V. TAYLOR, 3 Feb 1945.
 PVT. ELTON L. TAYLOR, 24 Jun 1944.
 PVT. JOHN A. TAYLOR, 28 Aug 1944.
 PFC. WALTER P. TAYLOR, 14 Dec 1944.
 PFC. TURNER T. TERRELL, 15 Jul 1944.
 PVT. JACK TERRY, 20 Jun 1944.

PVT. JAMES L. TERRY, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. RALPH R. TERRY, 9 Feb 1945.
PVT. KENNETH F. THAMES, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. WALTER W. THAMES, 17 Jul 1944.
SGT. HOWARD J. THEAS, 11 Apr 1945.
PFC. WILLIAM THOMAS, 14 Dec 1944.
SGT. DOUGLAS THOMAS, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. HOMER E. THOMPSON, 29 Aug 1944.
SGT. JAMES R. THOMPSON, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. KELON H. THOMPSON, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. RUPERT L. THOMPSON, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. RUSSELL L. THORN, 20 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. BILL W. THUNEY, 21 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. EVERETT C. TIMBERMAN, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLIE TINSLEY, 14 Dec 1944.
T/5 CLARENCE R. TORRANCE, 8 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. VALERIANO D. TORRES, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ERNEST J. TRIFPO, 6 Feb 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM C. TRIPLETT, 2 Aug 1944.
SGT. FRANK L. TRUESDALE, 3 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOHN A. TUDOR, 11 Aug 1944.
PVT. ARNOLD B. TUDOR, 11 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM W. TURNBULL, 17 Dec 1944.
PFC. JAMES C. TURNER, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WOODROW W. TURNER, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. EDWIN O. URBAT, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. THOMAS C. USKEY, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILFORD J. VAKOC, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. BENNIE VALENTI, 31 Jul 1944.
T/4 JOSEPH N. VALENTI, 14 Apr 1945.
CPL. CARL K. VANCE, JR., 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. PROFIDIO VARGAS, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. ALBERT VARNER, 25 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. J. D. VAUGHN, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELLSWORTH S. VENESKEY, 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. WALTER C. VERDELL, 19 Jul 1944.
SGT. WALTER S. VILGA, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES E. VINSON, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. ERICH H. WAGNER, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. RICHARD H. WAKEFIELD, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. INGRAM G. WALKER, 3 Feb 1945.
PFC. ROBERT E. WALKER, 17 Sep 1944.
PFC. LAWRENCE WARD, 3 Jul 1944.
PVT. PAUL R. WARD, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. CARL M. WARNASH, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. MARVIN M. WARKNE, 3 Feb 1945.
2ND LT. JOHN O. WATSON, JR., 15 Apr 1945.
PFC. JOHN WAUZYNSKI, 22 Dec 1944.
PVT. FRED WELLS, 11 Jul 1944.
LT. COL. H. K. WESTON, 15 Oct 1944.
PVT. CLAUDE V. WEST, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. HOMER C. WEST, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. KENNETH L. WESTERHOLD, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH WEXLER, 9 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. MARVIN WHALEY, 14 Dec 1944.
PFC. FRANK R. WHITE, 4 Feb 1945.
PFC. THOMAS E. WHITE, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. CLEO WHORTON, 25 Oct 1944.
PVT. HUBERT P. WILKINSON, 8 Aug 1944.
PFC. PAUL T. WILKINSON, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRED WILLIS, 13 Nov 1944.
1ST LT. CLAUDE O. WILLIAMS, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH B. WILLIAMS, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. BELTON E. WILSON, 11 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. CLARK C. WILSON, 18 Apr 1945.
PFC. PAUL D. WILSON, 1 Feb 1945.
PVT. GEORGE L. WIMBERLY, 22 Dec 1944.
PVT. THERON B. WINDHAM, JR., 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND R. WINTER, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. HERBERT R. WINTERS, 15 Aug 1944.
CAPT. ADOLPH L. WINTHER, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT C. WISE, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHESLEY G. WISE, 1 Feb 1945.
WOJG RALPH W. WITTENMYER, 11 Apr 1945.
PFC. JOSEPH S. WOJCIK, 18 Jul 1944.
PVT. FRANK E. WOJTKIEWICZ, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. GEORGE S. WOODWARD, 12 Oct 1944.
PFC. ARTHUR M. WOOLF, 15 Apr 1945.
T/SGT. WILLIAM C. WOLPHAM, 26 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT J. WRIGHT, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROSS WRIGHT, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. ELMER E. WROTEN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. WALTER YATES, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. WALTER M. YEARWOOD, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELDON L. YOUNG, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. STANLEY A. ZAIDA, 29 Jul 1944.
PVT. FRANK J. ZAMBELLA, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. ALDO ZINETTI, 15 Dec 1944.
PFC. JACOB ZUNAMON, 18 Apr 1945.

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SGT. WILLIAM M. ABLE, 16 Apr 1945.
PFC. JOSEPH ADMO, 23 Jan 1945.
PFC. JOSEPH N. ADAMS, 12 Aug 1944.
SGT. FRANK ADAMSKY, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. FRANK T. AGUIRRE, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. ARVEL G. ALEXANDER, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. MILES M. ALEXANDER, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. SELSTON B. ALEXANDER, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. LEONARD J. ALFANO, 28 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. HECTOR M. ALLAN, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. JACK ALLEN, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. WALTER E. ALLEN, 16 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. HOWARD L. ALLOWAY, JR., 20 Jun 1945.
CPL. CHARLIE ALMAREZ, 6 Sep 1944.
PFC. ALFRED L. ALVIEREZ, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY V. AMBRANO, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. ROBERT E. ANDERSON, 26 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. ANTHONY ANDRULIS, 27 Jul 1944.
SGT. ENESTO ANES, 15 Jan 1945.
PFC. HOUSTON G. ANTHONY, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY ANTOLIK, JR., 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. NORMAN L. APPELEGATE, 13 Oct 1944.
PVT. MAX W. AREHART, 28 Jul 1944.
SGT. BERNARD J. ARMSTRONG, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR L. ARNOLD, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. ASHBAUGH, 9 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE M. AUTOBEE, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILIS C. BABCOCK, 21 Aug 1944.
PFC. FRANK L. BABINETZ, 18 Dec 1944.

PFC. BENNIE F. BACHUS, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRANK J. BAGIENSKI, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. EUGENE BAILEY, 23 Jun 1945.
2ND LT. FRANK J. BAILEY, 28 Aug 1944.
T/4 JUNIOR BAILEY, 14 Sep 1944.
PVT. WILSON G. BAIRD, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT B. BAIRD, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES B. BAKER, 13 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. BILL BALWIN, 21 Jun 1945.
PVT. DISHMAN E. BANKS, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND F. BANKS, 1 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JOHN J. BANYAR, JR., 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. ELWIN L. BARBER, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. RUDY C. BARRERA, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. THOMAS C. BARTON, 5 Oct 1944.
2ND LT. CHARLES E. BATES, 19 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. HOMER P. BATES, 13 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. ROBERT T. BAUGHMAN, 21 Jun 1945.
S/SGT. ARMON A. BAUGHMAN, 29 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. FRED A. BEADLE, 15 Aug 1944.
SGT. CARL BECHTOLDT, 16 Jul 1944.
PFC. NOVEMBER M. BELL, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN J. BENKO, JR., 7 Apr 1945.
SGT. CLYDE M. BENNETT, 23 Jan 1945.
PFC. JAMES P. BENNETT, 9 Jan 1945.
SGT. STEPHEN J. BERES, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. PAUL K. BERGMAN, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROYCE K. BERGMAN, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWARD BERNARD, 21 Jan 1945.
PVT. ALLEN C. BERTOLDI, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. GEORGE F. BEST, 14 Sep 1944.
PVT. CHESTER J. BESEMEYER, 17 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. MARSHALL W. BIESEN, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOHN S. BIRCHFIELD, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. RALPH L. BISHOP, 15 Sep 1944.
PVT. LEWIS W. BITTLER, 3 Feb 1945.
T/5 FRANK G. BLEA, 9 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT V. BLOSSOM, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES J. BOITANO, JR., 5 Apr 1945.
PVT. BERNARD E. BOLIN, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. BOHME E. BOLINGER, 17 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHN M. BONADURER, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANDRES C. BOTELLO, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. DONALD E. BOWERS, 21 Jan 1945.
PFC. RAYMOND J. BOWMAN, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. JOHN C. BOYLE, 19 Jul 1944.
PFC. IRIS L. BRADSHAW, 14 Jul 1944.
PFC. EDWARD D. BRANCH, 20 Dec 1944.
PVT. JAMES C. BREWER, 24 Nov 1944.
SGT. HARRY E. BRICKMAN, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROBERT J. BRIEGER, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. DAVID J. BRIGGS, JR., 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILMER H. BRINKLEY, 15 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. JOHN W. BRITTAIN, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN BRNDIAR, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. GLENN W. BROOKS, 12 Aug 1944.
SGT. OSCAR L. BROOKS, 18 Jan 1945.
T/SGT. ROY M. BROOKS, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. OSCAR L. BROWN, 24 Jan 1945.
T/SGT. DUNWOOD H. BROWN, 12 Jun 1944.
TSGT. WALTER BROWNELL, 10 Sep 1944.
PVT. ANDREW G. BROZENNA, JR., 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. STANLEY B. BRUMBACK, 6 Jun 1944.
PVT. HAROLD L. BRUNK, 16 Feb 1945.
SGT. WALTER E. BRYANT, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. MYLES L. BURKE, 25 Mar 1945.
PFC. JOSEPH M. BURK, 10 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. BOB BURROW, 8 Aug 1944.
PVT. MERIT BURSON, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. CHOICE E. BURT, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOHN O. BUSLER, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND BUSTOS, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE E. BUTTERHOFF, JR., 29 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. VOLNEY L. BYERS, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. CARL CAIN, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. J. B. CALHOUN, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. W. J. CALLOWAY, 18 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. DAVID P. CAMPBELL, 14 Jul 1944.
SGT. FREEMAN CAMPBELL, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR J. CANNON, 14 Jul 1944.
SSGT. VIRGIL V. CARLILE, 27 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. CHARLES C. CARPENTER, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN V. CARR, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. HOWARD H. CARROLL, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOE E. CARVER, JR., 4 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. ROY D. CARVER, 22 Jan 1945.
PFC. LAWRENCE L. CASSITY, 13 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. REX N. CASTER, 2 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ROBERT L. CASTOR, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDWARD CAYOZOS, 26 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. JOHN L. CAULFIELD, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. MARTIN CERNY, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JEFFERY S. CHAMPAGNE, 19 Jan 1945.
PFC. ALPHONSO P. CHAPMAN, JR., 19 Sep 1944.
PFC. EUGENE W. CHAPMAN, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. ARON C. CHEADLE, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. ARTHUR L. CHESLEY, JR., 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. GENEROSO CHICHELO, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. PHILIP CHLENTZOS, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES W. CHRISTENSON, 30 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRED A. CHRISTMAN, JR., 22 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. WILLIAM S. CHRISTMAN, 27 Feb 1945.
PVT. FRAZIER CHURCHWELL, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN CHAO, 9 Sep 1944.
PFC. ANDRES CISNEROS, 14 Feb 1944.
PVT. JOHN P. CITRANO, 4 Feb 1945.
PVT. AUDRA J. CLARK, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. CARL C. CLARK, 13 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT W. CLARK, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLARD CLARK, 19 Jun 1944.
2ND LT. JOSEPH J. CLARKE, JR., 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. LELAND G. CLAUSES, 13 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. IRA B. CLEMENTS, 25 Mar 1945.
PVT. LYMAN O. CLEVENGER, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JESSE W. CLIFFORD, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. THOMAS E. COOPER, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. TOM W. COKER, 2 Jun 1944.
SGT. ALBERT E. COLEMAN, 15 Jan 1945.
PVT. OWEN P. COLEMAN, 18 Jul 1944.

S/SGT. ANDREW B. COLLEY, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE J. COLLINS, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. TOM COLLINS, 15 Jan 1945.
PFC. FRANK C. COLONNA, JR., 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. HOWARD E. COLUMBER, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. ARTHUR B. CONGOS, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDWARD D. CONNER, 21 Jun 1944.
SGT. FOY F. CONRAD, 21 Jun 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM A. CONTES, 18 Apr 1945.
PFC. DARRELL C. COOK, 9 Sep 1944.
SGT. EDGAR W. COOK, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. GUY COOK, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. LIZZIE T. COOPER, 13 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. THOMAS A. COOPER, 13 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. SAM V. COOPER, 4 Aug 1944.
CAPT. FRANKLIN L. COINWELL, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. ADRON O. CORPIER, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES A. CORREIA, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. CORRIGAN, 25 Aug 1944.
SGT. ARMAND CORRIEVAU, 29 Jun 1945.
PFC. PAUL C. COTTRILL, 11 Sep 1944.
PFC. ARNOLD D. COVEY, 8 Apr 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH D. COX, 8 Jun 1944.
PFC. LEROY COX, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT M. COX, 8 Jun 1944.
PVT. JERRY COZZOLINO, 16 Sep 1944.
PFC. EDWARD M. CRAIG, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROLPH E. CRAIG, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. NAHLE A. CRAM, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLES L. CRANFORD, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT A. CRANFORD, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN R. CRAVER, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT L. CRAWFORD, 5 Sep 1944.
2ND LT. THOMAS B. CRAWFORD, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM H. CREASEY, 28 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. HARRY J. CRESSWELL, 12 Jun 1944.
SGT. EDWARD C. CRITCHER, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. OLIVER E. CROCKETT, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. ODIE V. CROSSNOE, 28 Dec 1944.
PVT. RUFINO J. CRUZ, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. GUILLERMO P. CUEVAS, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. CUMMINGS, 15 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. R. M. CUMMINGS, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRANK P. CUSIMANO, 31 Oct 1944.
PVT. ALBERT J. DABULIS, 16 Jan 1945.
PVT. LINDO M. DAMICO, 30 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH DANCHISE, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. HUBERT DANIEL, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. VERNON H. DANIELS, 4 Mar 1945.
PVT. IRVY DAUZAT, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. CLARENCE E. DAVIS, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT L. DAVIS, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM C. DAVIS, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. TOWNSEND P. DAWSON, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. WILLIAM S. DE BURGH, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. ALEJANDRO S. DE LEON, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM G. DE PRIEST, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES C. DE SANTIS, 3 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN DEAR, 12 Oct 1944.
PVT. ALPHEUS DECORAH, 4 Mar 1945.
PFC. JOE A. DEFACIS, 20 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. HENRY DEIFE, 4 Mar 1945.
PFC. ANTHONY L. DE ROSA, 3 Feb 1945.
PFC. VICTOR J. DESPOSITO, 26 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. OLIN J. DIAMOND, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. ANGELO D. DI ANGELO, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. JEROME J. DOLINGER, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. JULIUS D. DOMINICI, 3 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. DANIEL DOMINY, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. MELBURN R. DONOVAN, 21 Dec 1944.
PVT. FELIX P. DORKOWSKI, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM E. DORMIRE, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALFRED C. DORMY, 18 Jan 1945.
T/SGT. DOUGLAS E. DOWDNER, 18 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. MARTIN S. DROBNER, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. FLOYD P. DUDLEY, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES P. DUFFE, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR L. DUNCAN, 18 Jan 1945.
PFC. ROBERT L. DUPRE, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. JESSIE A. DUPREE, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE T. DURANTE, 2 Aug 1944.
SGT. DONALD W. DURHAM, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. THOMAS E. DURNING, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. EGO P. DUVALLE, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. WALTER H. EARLEY, 5 May 1945.
PVT. JAMES E. EDWARDS, 30 Aug 1945.
PVT. STEPHEN B. EGLER, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. JEROME J. EICHLER, 13 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. WALTER D. ELAM, 21 Jan 1945.
PVT. LAURENCE B. ELPERT, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. GUY E. EMERICH, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. CURTIS W. ENGLUND, 16 Apr 1945.
PFC. THEODORE H. ENNIS, 25 Mar 1945.
PFC. IRWIN P. EMERY, 13 Apr 1945.
PFC. HAROLD V. EPPENBACH, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE K. ERDMAN, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. JAMIE M. ESSARY, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. CLIFFORD L. EVANS, 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. EWING, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH F. FADER, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. ARMAND F. FAINO, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR V. FAJIN, 12 Jul 1944.
CPL. WALTER D. FANSLER, 12 Aug 1944.
PFC. JESSIE W. FANSLER, 22 Jun 1944.
SGT. EDWARD FEDOK, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. O. C. FELKER, 15 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. DAVID P. FERNERTY, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. LLOYD E. FENSKO, 30 Jun 1944.
PVT. LYLIAM C. FERGUSON, 21 Aug 1944.
PFC. ERMAN P. FERRELL, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. FRANK W. FIELDS, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLAIR L. FIERSTINE, 13 Apr 1945.
PFC. FRANCIS A. FIEZLE, 8 Apr 1945.
SGT. ALEXANDER M. FILIA, 11 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. VICTOR J. FILLIN, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND J. FILLINGER, 13 Sep 1944.
SGT. WILLIAM B. FINKE, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES F. FITZGIBBONS, 5 Mar 1945.
PVT. ROBERT FLEMING, JR., 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JUAN R. FLORES, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. SCOTNESS R. FLORES, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE W. FORBES, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. IRVING W. FORTAL, 18 Sep 1944.
PFC. BENNY F. FORTMEYER, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. EDWARD J. FOSTER, 26 Jul 1944.

S/SGT. VERNON L. FOSTER, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES A. FOWBLE, 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. CLYDE T. FOX, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. IRVIN R. FOX, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. LLOYD FRETWELL, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. RUDOLPH G. FRIEDHOFF, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES W. FRITZ, 25 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN P. FROSS, 14 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROY L. FRUIT, JR., 14 Jul 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE T. FURRY, 15 Jan 1945.
T/SGT. G. C. GAINEY, 17 Sep 1944.
PFC. SHELDON H. GANOE, 19 Jan 1945.
PVT. WILFRED V. GANSKOW, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. ENRIQUE GARCIA, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. TOMAS GARCIA, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. CORNELIUS O. GAREY, 9 Jul 1944.
PVT. VINCENT J. GARITO, 12 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHNIE B. GARLAND, 15 Jun 1944.
SGT. CHARLES P. GARRISON, 13 Sep 1944.
T/4 THOMAS E. GARHWAIT, 31 Dec 1944.
PFC. EDWIN J. GARWIT, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM J. GEYER, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. RAWLIN H. GIBSON, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. THEOPH P. GIGLIOTTI, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. AUBRA GILES, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. TERENCE G. GILES, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. FLOYD V. GILLIAM, 28 Dec 1944.
T/4 ALFRED GINI, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH S. GIRGENTI, 27 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. JAMES H. GLASS, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE T. GLOVER, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT H. GOATS, 13 Oct 1944.
CPL. FRANK J. GOETZ, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDGAR E. GODNEY, 31 Aug 1944.
SGT. LOWELL E. GOLDER, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALVIN GONZALES, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. FRANCISCO C. GONZALEZ, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRED GONZALES, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. GREGORIO GONZALES, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES W. GOOD, 16 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. THERON C. GOODNIGHT, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. GEORGE C. GOODWIN, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM H. GRAEBER, JR., 9 Jan 1945.
T/4 WILLIAM R. GRAFE, 1 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. DAVID H. GRASSMICK, 8 Apr 1945.
PVT. JAMES C. GRAY, 1 Sep 1944.
PFC. LEROY D. GRAY, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. JACOB GREENBERGER, 23 Aug 1944.
PFC. AUGUST F. GREEN, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM R. GREGORY, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN F. GRETTON, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. DAVID V. GRIBBLE, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN M. GRIMES, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH J. GRIMES, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. THOMAS J. GRINER, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. GARNIE L. GRIZZLE, 13 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. PRIMO F. GUARDIANI, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH R. GUARDIELLA, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. HOWARD H. GUNTER, 12 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. MANUEL GUSMAN, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. CARL W. GUSTAFSON, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHN J. GUZELI, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JUAN M. GUZMAN, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. WALTER HAGEN, JR., 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. LYNN HAGOOD, 13 Apr 1945.
PVT. LOYD M. HALE, 14 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. EDWARD J. HALEY, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. VERNON HALL, 15 Jul 1944.
CPL. ANTON HALTMEIER, JR., 17 Apr 1945.
PFC. BILLY A. HAMBER, 28 Nov 1944.
PVT. JAMES E. HAMBLIN, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. LEONARD F. HAMILTON, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES L. HANEY, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. DAVID J. HANLON, 16 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. EDWARD M. HARDY, 8 Sep 1944.
PVT. NATHAN HARJO, 8 Apr 1945.
T/SGT. WILBURN R. HARKINS, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. JOHN T. HARKER, 14 Jun 1944.
PFC. COY HARRIS, 29 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. SAM W. HARRIS, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. LESTER E. HARTMAN, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. ROBERT B. HARTZINSKI, 27 Jul 1944.
T/5 LAWRENCE A. HATTE, 6 Feb 1945.
PVT. LAMBERT F. HAUBRO, 12 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. GLENN W. HAUSHALTER, 17 Sep 1944.
PVT. DAVID E. HAWKINS, 3 Aug 1944.
SGT. JAMES P. HAWKS, 29 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. OSCAR A. HAY, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. WAYNE R. HAYDEN, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. KANOV L. HAYES, 12 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. WALTER L. HAYES, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. HARRY L. HAYNES, 4 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. WILLIAM R. HAYNES, 27 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. THOMAS H. HAYWORD, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. SOLOM T. HAZLERIG, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. ABRAHAM HEANE, 5 Oct 1944.
PFC. JAMES R. HEATH, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. MAURICE G. HEISER, 16 Jul 1944.
PFC. HERBERT G. HEITKAMP, 26 Dec 1944.
PFC. OLAV T. HELLESTOL, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES M. HELMS, 13 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CLAUDE HENSLEY, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. RAYMOND J. HERRIHEY, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. DOMINGO C. HERNANDEZ, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. VICTOR P. HEROLD, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. PHILLIP A. HERREL, 25 Jul 1944.
PVT. JACK W. HERRON, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRED B. HERTER, 18 Jan 1945.
PFC. NOMAN W. HICKEY, 27 Jul 1945.
T/5 FLOYD HICKS, 19 Jan 1945.
SGT. MELVIN G. HIFFMAN, 25 Mar 1945.
PFC. DONALD G. HILL, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. ESTLE D. HILL, 1 Jul 1944.
MAJ. WILLIAM R. HINSCH, JR., 21 Dec 1944.
T/SGT. AUGUST HITTLE, JR., 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE H. HIXATH, 15 Jul 1944.
SGT. ROBERT W. HOCKER, 13 Jan 1945.
PVT. JAMES R. HOHL, 19 Jun 1944.
SGT. ELBERT H. HOLLAND, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. HAROLD H. HOLLOWAY, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. CANNON HOLY, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. CARL W. HONEYCUTT, 12 Aug 1944.
PFC. THEODORE C. HOOD, 3 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JOE J. HOOSER, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT H. HOOPER, 8 Apr 1945.
PFC. ELMO O. HOVEND, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. DARRELL L. HOWARD, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. DOYLE V. HOWARD, 8 Oct 1944.
PVT. LUCIAN L. HOWARD, 1 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. ERNEST B. HOWELL, 13 Sep 1944.
PVT. PAUL H. HOWETT, 14 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. HERBERT HUBBARD, 19 Jan 1945.
1ST LT. JOHN W. HUBSON, 2 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. PAUL A. HUGHES, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN HUISENGA, 2 Feb 1945.
LT. COL. WILLIAM S. HUMPHRIES, 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. CHARLES R. HUNTER, 16 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHN W. HUNTER, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. VERNON G. HURLEY, 5 May 1945.
PVT. CHARLES M. HUTCHESON, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM C. HYMAN, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRANK J. ILLES, 14 Jul 1944.
SGT. ROY R. ILLK, 26 Jul 1944.
T/5 ARNE H. JAAKELAINEN, 7 Sep 1944.
T/SGT. ALVIS L. JACKS, 12 Sep 1944.
CAPT. DAN R. JAGLOWSKI, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. THOMAS F. JAMES, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. RUDOLPH JANECEK, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE L. JANSSON, 9 Apr 1945.
PVT. HENRY F. JAUSSAUD, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. HOBSTON, C. JEFFCOAT, 13 Sep 1944.
PFC. SUDNEY J. JEFFCOAT, 5 Dec 1944.
PVT. JOHN B. JEFFERS, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLIE H. JENKINS, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN JODLOWSKI, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. BERNARD P. JOHNSON, 1 Sep 1944.
PFC. BLUFORD B. JOHNSON, 8 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOEL M. JOHNSON, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM J. JOHNSON, 2 S p 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM V. JOHNSON, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. JAMES C. JOLLY, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. LOUIS E. JONES, 6 Feb 1945.
PVT. NORMAN R. JONES, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM T. JONES, 19 Jun 1944.
2ND LT. WILLIAM J. KAELIN, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. KAMINSKI, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT J. KANE, 5 Oct 1944.
PVT. ELDRED W. KAMP, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. HYMEN KARNESKY, 16 Sep 1944.
PVT. MINER J. KARNES, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN E. KEATING, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. IRVIN E. KELLER, 1 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. RUSSELL J. KELLEY, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. KELLY, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. CECIL D. KENDALL, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. HAROLD E. KENDALL, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. LONNIE J. KENT, 14 Jul 1944.
T/SGT. JOE T. KIMBLE, 11 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. HAROLD W. KIMSEY, 12 Jun 1944.
T/4 CHARLES J. KING, 27 Dec 1944.
SGT. DONALD E. KING, 15 Jan 1945.
T/5 FRANK KIRKPATRICK, 29 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. EAMES R. KIRKPATRICK, 20 Jun 1944.
PVT. JARLES S. KISER, 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. BERNARD B. KIZNIS, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT M. KLEINHANS, 15 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE R. KNIGHT, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. THOMAS J. KNUDTSO, 4 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ANTON J. KOELH, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. RALPH C. KOELLE, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. VERNON H. KOHLBUSCH, 18 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. JOHN KOLY, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. LAWRENCE C. KOPLIN, 8 Aug 1944.
PFC. PETER W. KORTH, 23 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. ANTHONY T. KOVALISH, 10 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. CARL M. KRAIL, 17 Dec 1944.
SGT. FRED R. KRAMER, 4 Aug 1944.
CPL. JOHN H. KRAUSE, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. DALE E. KRIEGER, 24 Jan 1944.
PVT. ERNEST F. KRISTOF, 12 Feb 1945.
T/5 ALPHONSE K. KROG, 15 Jan 1945.
PVT. HARRY R. KRUEGER, 16 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. ROY A. KRUM, 11 Sep 1944.
PFC. WALTER N. KULCZYNSKI, 25 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. LEO C. KUNCELMAN, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. GEORGE F. KUSINSKE, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. STANLEY KUTULIS, JR., 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH T. KWIAKOSKI, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. FRANK J. LA PORTA, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN L. LACKEY, 10 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. HOWELL L. LACY, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRANKLIN E. LADD, 8 Apr 1945.
SGT. HARDY L. LAKEY, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM D. LAMSON, 15 Oct 1944.
PVT. CLAYTON W. LANG, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES L. LANGE, 13 Jun 1944.
SGT. GILBERT LANSDALE, 5 Apr 1945.
PVT. MARCIAL LARA, JR., 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES LARKIN, 5 Apr 1945.
PFC. HERBERT L. LARSON, 18 Jan 1945.
SGT. ALFRED LASTER, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. MIKE LASTOOKA, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. LEROY LAWE, 18 Apr 1945.
PFC. DAVID D. LAWSON, JR., 1 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. EUGENE E. LAWTON, 13 Jan 1945.
SGT. MARCUS G. LAY, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. MICHAEL J. LAZZARO, 13 Aug 1944.
SGT. CURTHIS G. LEMKE, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. ARTHUR H. LEWIS, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. FREDERICK E. LEWIS, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. MARCUS H. LEWIS, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. EARNEST A. LEWMAN, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. JULIO V. LIMON, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN S. LINTON, 29 Dec 1944.
CAPT. EUGENE E. LITTLE, 16 Sep 1944.
SGT. MAURICE W. LITTLE, 18 Sep 1944.
PVT. BASIL P. LITTLETON, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. CHARLES R. LODS, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT J. LOHR, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. DENSON LONG, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. HENRY D. LONGORIA, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. PEDRO F. LONGORIA, 25 Jul 1944.
PFC. RUSSELL J. LONIELLO, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. PETE E. LOPEZ, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROY LOTT, 22 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. ROBERT A. LOVELADY, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. CALVIN E. LUDWIG, 17 Jan 1944.
PFC. HAROLD J. LUDWIGENHOFF, 12 Sep 1944.
SGT. ERNESTO LUJAN, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. EDWARD LUNA, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. EDWARD N. LUNDGREN, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. MELVIN G. LUPOLD, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. PAUL LUSK, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. NORMAN MCCAMMON, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. JAMES A. McCANN, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES A. McCARTNEY, 30 Aug 1944.
CPL. PATRICK P. McCARVEL, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. THOMAS S. McCUNE, 16 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. JOHN M. McCUTCHEN, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. ELDON H. McENDOLLAR, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JUNIOR W. McPALL, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES L. McGEE, 18 Jan 1945.
PFC. BERNARD McGOLDRICK, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. HERBERT R. McGREW, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. THEODORE C. McINTOSH, 21 Jun 1944.
CPL. ROBERT H. McKINNEY, 26 Jun 1944.
PFC. LOICÉ J. McPHERSON, 4 Aug 1944.
SGT. JOHN J. McVEIGH, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOHN E. MACKEN, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. OSCAR V. MAGEE, JR., 13 Aug 1944.
T/5 FLORINDO MAINENTE, 23 Feb 1945.
PFC. WALTER C. MALCOMB, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN B. MALL, 1 Sep 1944.
PFC. ALEXANDER MALUCHNIK, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. JOHN D. MANCINI, JR., 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. JERRY C. MANGINO, 28 Jul 1944.
CWO ROBERT H. MANNING, 9 Sep 1944.
PVT. PANK J. MANOFZSKY, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. TITTA J. MANZO, 21 Jan 1945.
PFC. THOMAS E. MARSHALL, 6 Apr 1945.
PFC. ELMER M. MARSHALL, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. BRUCE E. MARTIN, 12 Jun 1944.
T/5 ALBERT MARTINEZ, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. ENRIQUE MARTINEZ, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. JUAN C. MARTINEZ, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. JULIO MARTINEZ, 17 Aug 1944.
PFC. SATURNINO H. MARTINEZ, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. VINCENT MARTINEZ, 13 Jun 1944.
SGT. JOSEPH L. MASTERS, 13 Sep 1944.
LT. COL. JAMES J. MATHEWS, 14 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. GEORGE E. MATHIS, 16 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLES T. MATLOCK, 5 Jul 1944.
PVT. EUGENE M. MATTS, 25 Jul 1944.
PFC. RUDOLPH MATUSCIN, 5 Apr 1945.
PFC. OLIVER L. MAY, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDDIE L. MAYBORN, 16 Sep 1944.
PFC. ELI MAYZEL, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM R. MAZUR, 9 Aug 1944.
PFC. PETER J. MECCELLA, JR., 26 Dec 1944.
SGT. SAMUEL A. MEDLEY, 12 Jul 1944.
SGT. RALPH L. MEEKER, 9 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILMER MENARD, 2 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOE V. MENDEZ, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN G. MERRITT, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM H. MESSER, 14 Jul 1944.
SGT. EDWARD L. MEYERS, 24 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH J. MIGNANO, JR., 29 Aug 1944.
CPL. FRANK MIKOS, 10 Sep 1944.
PFC. EUGENE R. MILLER, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. GLENN G. MILLER, JR., 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH H. MILLER, 7 Apr 1945.
SGT. JOY T. MILLER, 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. SCOTT W. MILLER, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. THOMAS L. MILLER, 12 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. WILLIAM F. MILLER, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. HENRY C. MILLIGAN, 21 Jun 1944.
SGT. ANTHONY J. MINKIEWICZ, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. THEODORE J. MISKELL, 22 Jun 1944.
T/4 JOE L. MITCHELL, 17 Oct 1944.
PVT. SANTOS A. MOJICA, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY T. MONTANTE, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. DONALD MONTGOMERY, JR., 26 Dec 1944.
PFC. JAMES T. MONTGOMERY, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. MONTGOYA, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. PORFIDO MONTGOYA, 30 Jul 1944.
CPL. GEORGE H. MOORE, 12 Sep 1944.
T/5 IRA L. MOORE, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. OSCAR T. MOORE, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. PERRY MOORE, JR., 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. WENDELL D. MOORE, 4 Feb 1945.
PVT. JESSIE W. MORROW, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. HANSEL B. MORTON, 14 Sep 1944.
PVT. ABAL R. MOSER, 12 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. WILBERT J. MOSER, 16 Jan 1945.
PFC. RAYMOND J. MUELLER, 25 Jul 1944.
PFC. ERNEST W. MULINIX, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. ANDREW J. MULLEN, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. RUFFINO S. MUNOZ, 18 Jan 1945.
PFC. JAMES E. MURPHY, 18 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. ROBERT R. MURPHY, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN R. MURRAY, 25 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES M. MURRELL, 17 Jun 1944.
CPL. FRANK J. MURTHA, 5 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLES C. MUSTIN, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND H. MYERS, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN B. NALL, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM G. NATZKE, 25 Jul 1944.
PVT. HOMER M. NEAL, 18 Jun 1945.
S/SGT. GORDON K. NEELY, 16 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. DONALD P. NELLIST, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN NELSON, 3 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. LEWIS R. NEWMAN, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. RUFUS W. NICHOLS, 4 Mar 1945.
PVT. JESSE L. NICKLAS, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. RUSSELL E. NIEDERHOFER, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALBERT F. NOBLES, 6 Oct 1944.
PFC. BRUCE R. NOLAND, 12 Aug 1944.
PFC. MELCHOR R. NOLASCO, 4 Mar 1945.
PFC. ETHEL NORMAN, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. THOMAS M. NOVATNACK, 14 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ANTHONY J. NUCCIO, 12 Sep 1944.
PFC. WALLACE W. NYE, 4 Jul 1944.
PFC. EMORY J. OAKES, 4 Mar 1945.
T/5 CARLIE B. ODOM, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. O'LEARY, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. CLARENCE L. OLIVER, 13 Sep 1944.
PFC. STEVEN OROZ, JR., 11 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. BENITO G. ORTIZ, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. DAVID S. ORTIZ, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH L. OSIP, 29 Dec 1944.
PVT. THOMAS J. PACCIONE, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. LUPE PACHECO, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. VITO M. PAGLIARULO, 26 Jun 1944.

PVT. JESSIE A. PALACIOS, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRANK A. PALLONE, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. HIRAM W. PALIN, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROBERT W. PALM, 10 Mar 1945.
CPL. OSCAR C. PALMER, 5 Jul 1944.
PFC. MYRON E. PARKER, 25 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN PAVCIK, 20 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. STEVE P. PAVLISKO, 19 Jun 1945.
S/SGT. CLARENCE O. PEAVLER, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT E. PECK, 8 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROLAND J. PENNINGTON, 22 Jun 1944.
T/5 R. DOH PERRY, 12 S p 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM L. PERRY, 21 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ELIHU F. PETERSON, 18 Aug 1944.
PVT. LESLIE G. PETERSON, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT PETROLINI, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM R. PETSCHKE, 19 Sep 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM R. PETTY, 16 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY R. PEPPER, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALFRED S. PHELPS, Jr., 29 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. MARVIN R. PHILLIPS, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. ANCELO PIERANTONI, 17 Jul 1944.
PVT. BRYSO H. PILKINGTON, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. JUNIOR T. PINCKARD, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH A. PINDEL, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. MICHAEL PINKOSKY, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM H. PIZOR, 28 Dec 1944.
T/4 RICHARD P. PLUMMER, 16 Jul 1944.
PVT. FRANK B. POCHMARA, 16 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN PODISH, 13 Oct 1944.
T/SGT. JAMES S. POLASKI, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH F. POLICASTRO, 18 Jan 1945.
2D LT. BERNARD POLLOCK, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILBUR J. POTTER, 13 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. JAMES W. POWELL, 12 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM I. PRIEST, 13 Apr 1945.
PVT. TOM B. PRESTON, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. PETER PRIANTI, Jr., 11 Jul 1944.
CPL. FREDRICK E. PRICE, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM R. PRIDGEN, 26 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. MARVIN H. PRINDS, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. PAUL A. PROCOPIO, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. PRZENSLAK, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. STANLEY J. PRZEZDZINK, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. SHADY L. E. PULLEY, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE PUPENA, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE W. E. PURCELL, 19 Dec 1944.
2D LT. CLAYTON E. PYLE, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ARVEL C. PYLE, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. JERRY L. PYLES, 20 Jan 1945.
PFC. LEONARD QUERQUES, 14 Apr 1945.
T/SGT. ARTHUR F. QUINN, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. HAROLD QUINN, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWIN F. RAABE, 9 Mar 1945.
PFC. ANTHONY J. RAIMOND, 4 Aug 1944.
SGT. JOE RAMIREZ, 15 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM H. RAMSAY, 25 Jul 1944.
PFC. EDWIN T. RAND, 16 Jul 1944.
PVT. HARRY N. RANDALL, 18 Jan 1945.
S/SGT. NORMAN N. RAPERT, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. MILTON A. RASTBERGER, 3 Sep 1944.
PFC. BENJAMIN H. RAUTE, 30 Jun 1944.
SGT. JAMES L. REA, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRED M. REBEL, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALGUS G. REDDICK, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. ERNEST C. REED, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRANK R. REED, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. LLOYD E. REED, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. DEWEY H. REEDER, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOSEPH P. REGAN, 27 Oct 1944.
PFC. JOHN REI, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. CHARLES R. REIGNER, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN A. REINBOULT, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHNNY J. REMEDES, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. R. L. RENFRO, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CHARLES E. REYNOLDS, 6 Feb 1945.
2D LT. EDWARD J. REYNOLDS, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELLIS REYNOLDS, 5 Feb 1945.
PFC. VERNON A. RHOADES, 16 Apr 1945.
SGT. LEROY E. RICE, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. DENNIE G. RICHARDSON, 19 Oct 1944.
PVT. HUGH G. RIEBEL, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. LAWRENCE W. RINKE, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANTONIO P. RIOJAS, 8 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JOSE RIOJAS, 28 Jul 1944.
T/5 ROBERT S. RISHELL, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. KENNETH RITTELL, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. PORTINO E. RIVAS, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. EDGAR E. ROADLANDER, 13 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. BENJAMIN H. ROBINSON, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. RENO A. ROBUSTELLINI, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. STEVE ROCKOVICH, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. MERITHEE E. RODGERS, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRANK RODRIGUEZ, 5 Feb 1945.
T/4 GILBERT C. RODRIGUEZ, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. LOUIS RODRIGUEZ, 19 Jun 1944.
2D LT. GEORGE H. ROE, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ERNEST G. ROLES, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. JULIO ROMERO, 27 Jul 1944.
SGT. HOWARD T. ROOK, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. CORNELIA P. ROSS, 5 Mar 1945.
PVT. DONALD E. ROSS, 12 Jul 1944.
2D LT. DAVID E. ROSSER, 29 Jul 1944.
PVT. MICHAEL ROSSI, 13 Sep 1944.
PVT. EDWARD A. ROWE, 14 Aug 1944.
T/5 JOSEPH A. ROWE, 12 Jul 1944.
SGT. GILBERT A. ROWLAND, 19 Jan 1945.
PVT. CHARLEY D. RUBY, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. CLIFFORD T. RUBY, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. HARRY W. RUDD, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM B. RUE, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLYDE A. RUEBUSH, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. JIMMIE RUNYAN, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. J. B. RUSH, 8 Apr 1945.
PVT. LEO SAL, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. DANIEL R. SANTA ANA, 21 Jun 1944.
SGT. EARL J. SCAMARDO, 17 Jun 1944.
SGT. VINCENT K. SCANTON, 21 Jun 1945.
PFC. GEORGE SCHAEFF, 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRED J. SCHINDLER, 17 Aug 1944.
SGT. ERNEST B. SCHLAUD, 9 Apr 1945.
CAPT. MYRON SCHMALLT, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. DELBERT V. SCHMIDT, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. CHARLES B. SCHOENBORN, 28 Jul 1944.

PFC. FRANK W. SCHOLTZ, 6 Apr 1945.
PFC. MATHIAS P. SCHULTZ, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. ELI J. SCHUSTER, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JESSE B. SCOTT, 12 Aug 1944.
PVT. PAUL D. SCOTT, 14 Apr 1945.
PVT. MANUEL SECURA, 3 Feb 1945.
PFC. EUGENE E. SEIFRIED, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES SELVAJE, 6 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. THOMAS J. SENFFNER, 17 Apr 1945.
PVT. RAMON M. SEPULVEDA, 17 Oct 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND F. SEVENING, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. BERNARD SEXTON, 17 Sep 1944.
SGT. BUD SEXTON, 1 Jul 1944.
PFC. EUGENE D. SHELTON, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES SHIMEL, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOHN W. SHIRLEY, 23 Jan 1945.
PFC. HERBERT SHONBERG, 19 Jul 1944.
CPL. THOMAS M. SHULSKIE, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN SILLINSKY, JR., 30 Jun 1944.
PVT. FRANCIS A. SIMON, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JESSE H. SIMPKINS, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. JAMES H. SIMS, 17 Sep 1944.
CPL. TALMADGE M. SIMS, 14 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. FRANCIS J. SINCAVAGE, 13 Jan 1945.
PFC. JOHN H. SINKENBERG, 14 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. DOUGLAS M. SJORBERG, 26 Aug 1944.
PVT. EUGENE E. SKAHAN, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. BENJAMIN L. SKORZANSKI, 1 Sep 1944.
CPL. EDWARD J. SLATTERY, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. PAUL J. SLUSNE, 17 Jul 1944.
PVT. DAVID C. SMIGELSKI, 31 Aug 1944.
PVT. CLETON C. SMITH, 16 Jul 1944.
PVT. DICK P. SMITH, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDGAR SMITH, 19 Dec 1944.
PVT. EDWARD E. SMITH, 27 Jun 1944.
PFC. ELZIE B. SMITH, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. FLORND B. SMITH, JR., 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE H. SMITH, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. HAROLD W. SMITH, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. JAMES B. SMITH, JR., 13 Sep 1944.
PVT. OMER L. SMITH, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. OVA SMITH, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. RICHARD A. SMITH, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. WHEELER SMITHERMAN, JR., 4 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. IRA SMITHEY, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. MATTHEW B. SMITHWICK, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. DEE C. SINPES, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. WADE SNYDER, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROBERT SOJOURNER, JR., 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. RUSSELL S. SOLHEIM, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. JACK A. SORENSON, 11 Jun 1944.
PVT. VINCENT J. SOWERS, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. AUBREY F. SPENCER, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. RICHARD SPENCER, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. ROBERT I. SPENCER, 23 Jul 1944.
PVT. VERNON H. SPENCER, 30 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WALDEMAR E. SPENS, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT C. SPOTTS, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES C. SPRINGER, 4 Feb 1945.
PVT. ALEXIS STAFFORD, 13 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. VINCENT J. STANCAVAGE, 9 Sep 1944.
PVT. RICHARD L. STANCHAK, 3 Feb 1945.
PVT. GLEN W. STANDING, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN B. STANFORD, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES W. STANFIELD, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. HERBERT D. STANTON, 13 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. WILLIAM L. SPARKLING, 6 Feb 1945.
PVT. CHARLES W. STARBUCK, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDWARD A. STEELE, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. REFUS G. STEELE, JR., 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. OSWALD C. STEPHAN, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. MORAGNE W. STEPHENSON, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN W. STERBINSKY, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. PAUL T. STEVENS, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT P. STEVENS, 12 Sep 1944.
PFC. JAMES A. STEVENSON, 2 Aug 1944.
PVT. WALLACE R. STEWARD, 9 Mar 1945.
PFC. ANDREW G. STEWART, 6 Aug 1944.
PVT. BILLY J. STEWART, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. LAWRENCE C. STOCKDALE, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. RADA J. STOICL, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. COLIE B. STONE, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. LEONARD W. STRATTON, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES E. STRAUGHN, 19 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. ROBERT S. STRICKLAND, 17 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOHN E. STRINGER, 17 Jun 1944.
CPL. JACK A. SULLIVAN, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES R. SULLIVAN, 6 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. HERBERT A. SUTTON, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. FERDINAND R. SWANN, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. R. C. SWANN, 11 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. CALVIN H. SWICEGOOD, 5 Apr 1945.
PVT. RALPH W. SWICKARD, 27 Jul 1944.
SGT. SIGFRIED W. SZYMANSKI, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. CREST A. TAPIA, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALEXANDER W. TASSIE, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. ALBERT G. TAYLOR, 21 Jan 1945.
PFC. HERMAN D. TAYLOR, 28 Jan 1945.
PFC. JOSEPH C. TAYLOR, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROY D. TAYLOR, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM TAYLOR, JR., 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. LONNIE A. TEAGUE, 12 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE P. TERRAZAS, 19 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE TERZIAN, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. GEORGE P. THARES, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES M. THOMAS, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. MAURIE O. THOMAS, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. LAWRENCE W. THOMPSON, 1 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. MAJOR C. THOMPSON, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. GEORGE C. THILMAN, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. ADRIAN M. TINDELL, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. JAMES J. TINTINGER, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. MAURO TOFFOLO, 8 Apr 1945.
PVT. CLAUDE E. TOLER, 20 Dec 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM TOPALIAN, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. HENRY J. TOPP, 4 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM A. TOWNSEND, JR., 23 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. MAX B. TRENN, 30 Aug 1944.

PFC. CARL B. TRIPLETT, 25 Jul 1944.
PVT. SHELDON E. TROSDON, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY F. TROSKO, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. WALTER L. TROTTER, 14 Jul 1944.
PFC. IGNACIO TRUJILLO, 5 Apr 1945.
PVT. EUGENE C. TRULLICK, 5 Feb 1945.
PFC. SAM M. TURNER, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. ALTON TURNER, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ELMER T. TUSKO, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. DANIEL J. UNGER, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. RICHARD J. VALENTI, 15 Jun 1944.
CAPT. KEITH G. VAN NESTEN, 13 Apr 1945.
PVT. CLAUDE VAN VOLKENSBERG, 5 Sep 1944.
PVT. C. J. VAN VONDEREN, 27 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. OCTAVIO R. VARGAS, 18 Jan 1945.
PVT. JAMES H. VARNELL, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. JOSE V. VASQUEZ, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. MANUEL A. VASQUEZ, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES W. VAUGHAN, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROSS R. VEACH, 5 Oct 1944.
PFC. EARL J. VERDON, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. ERNEST VELA, 14 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. NOLEN VEST, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. HAROLD H. VESTAL, JR., 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN C. VILLARREAL, 3 Feb 1945.
SGT. STANLEY VOGEL, 3 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. ANDREW J. VOSCEK, 5 Apr 1945.
CPL. HARLAN C. WADE, 11 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH A. WADE, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. DELMER J. WALKER, 18 Apr 1945.
PFC. PASCO WALSINGHAM, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. CARL J. WARIS, 23 Jul 1944.
T/5 PAUL F. WAUGH, 17 Jul 1944.
PVT. MORRIS WEINER, 21 Jan 1945.
PVT. JAMES T. WEIR, 13 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CHARLIE R. WELLS, 17 Dec 1944.
PFC. DELBERT E. WELLS, 26 Jul 1944.
T/5 JOHN E. WENGER, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES D. WESSINGER, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. WALTER J. WESTER, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT A. WHELOCK, 28 Oct 1944.
PVT. JAMES G. WHITBY, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRANCIS N. WHITE, 6 May 1945.
PFC. GEORGE A. WHITE, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. HARRY W. WHITE, JR., 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. HORACE E. WHITE, 30 Aug 1944.
PVT. MERRILL WHITE, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. ODIS WHITE, 24 Feb 1945.
PVT. GORDON L. WHITEHEAD, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH H. WHITEHOUSE, 13 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. ROBERT W. WHITMORE, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. GARTH A. WHITTIER, 21 Jan 1945.
CPL. EUGENE J. WIDMER, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES R. WIEDERHOLD, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALBERT R. WIER, 14 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. DILLARD B. WIGGINS, 18 Jan 1945.
2D LT. JOHN WRIGHT, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. WALLACE W. WILBERCHT, 23 Oct 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM D. WILLIARD, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. WILLIAMS, 20 Jun 1945.
CPL. LAWRENCE J. WILLIAMS, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. MELVIN WILLIAMS, 30 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. MARVIN A. WILLIAMSON, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. AUDIE C. WILLIS, 27 Jul 1944.
T/SGT. JOHN C. WILLIS, 31 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROBERT J. WILLS, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. HOSEA WILSON, 26 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN E. WILSON, 1 Jul 1944.
SGT. DONALD C. WIMBLAD, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. HAROLD C. WINGERD, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. MOSES WINSHIP, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ARTHUR R. WITTENBORN, 9 Oct 1944.
T/5 HARRY K. WOLFE, 31 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. HENRY J. WOLTON, 30 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. WOODHEAD, 16 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN W. WOODS, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. ROY C. WOODWARD, 2 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. EUGENE WORACK, 20 Jan 1945.
PVT. SIMON T. WORKMAN, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. CAROLD L. WRIGHT, 31 Jan 1945.
PVT. JOHN A. WRIGHT, 17 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. RODGER E. WRIGHT, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. HERBERT H. YAGER, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. CARL E. YOUNG, 14 Jul 1944.
SGT. THEODORE B. ZACK, 5 Aug 1944.
T/4 CHARLES P. ZAHN, JR., 8 Jul 1944.
PFC. FRANK J. ZAJAC, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. HYMAN J. ZALL, 30 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN W. ZANONI, 13 Apr 1945.
SGT. JOE G. ZEPEDA, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. BERNARD A. ZETTNER, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. OTHELO A. ZUCCHIATTI, 31 Jan 1945.
SGT. ANDY ZVARA, 9 Apr 1945.

38TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

1ST LT. EDWARD C. ABAJIAN, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND A. ABBOTT, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. PRIMIO J. AGOSTINELLI, 18 Jul 1944.
2D LT. DAVID E. AIKEN, JR., 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT M. ALBER, 23 Mar 1945.
PFC. ALBERT ALBRECHT, 27 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CLYDE L. ALBRITTON, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT L. ALDRICH, 18 Dec 1945.
PVT. ANTHONY F. ALESI, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. JIM M. ALEX, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. HAYWARD ALEXANDER, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. CORSE E. ALLEN, 3 Sep 1944.
T/5 DONALD ALLEN, 21 Mar 1945.
SGT. DEWEY C. ALMOND, 4 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALBERT ALT, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE A. ANDERS, 6 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE P. ANDERSON, 31 Jul 1944.
PVT. WENDELL L. ANDERSON, 21 Jun 1944.
PFC. NEVIN C. ANSBACH, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. RODOLFO APOLINAR, 20 Jun 1944.
CAPT. BOYD E. ARINGDALE, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. DAVID ARMSTRONG, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. LLOYD E. ARMSTRONG, 2 Apr 1945.
PFC. MERVIN ASBERRY, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM J. ASHMORE, 7 Aug 1944.
PVT. PHILIP J. ASTRELLA, 21 Jun 1944.

PFC. CHARLES S. AXE, 22 Mar 1945.
PFC. HOWARD F. AYERS, 5 Mar 1945.
PFC. PHILLIP BABCHICK, 21 Jun 1944.
PFC. LEALON BABER, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. GEORGE BABINETZ, JR., 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDWARD J. BACH, JR., 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. BERT J. BAILEY, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. LYNDEN D. BAILEY, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. ERNEST E. BAKER, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. ESSELL E. BAKER, 1 Jul 1944.
PFC. EVERETT E. BAKER, 24 Nov 1944.
2D LT. FREDERICK C. BAKER, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. PAUL J. BAKER, 6 Jun 1944.
PVT. RALPH M. BAKER, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. LLOYD C. BALLARD, 29 Jul 1944.
PFC. CARROL E. BALLENGER, 23 Jun 1944.
SGT. SIDNEY A. BANDY, 15 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDWARD F. BANKS, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. CHARLES L. BARB, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. PAUL J. BARCUS, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. CLELL C. BARE, 4 Aug 1944.
SGT. ROY L. BARNETT, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. NELSON BARNOSKIE, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. ARTHUR M. BARRAZA, 4 May 1945.
PVT. DANIEL BARRERA, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. VANCE A. BARRS, 10 Jun 1944.
PVT. GORDON B. BARRY, 5 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. MAC L. BASHAM, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. VINCENT J. BASILE, 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. OSCAR K. BASS, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. HERBERT H. BAZIER, 17 Apr 1945.
PFC. WILLIAM E. BEAN, JR., 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. JAMES T. BEARDEN, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. DORIE E. BEATTY, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. GEORGE BEBBIN, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN BELL, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. REGIS C. BENEDIK, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. HERBERT M. BENEFIELD, 3 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. CARL BENNETT, 28 Jul 1944.
2D LT. PETER BENNETT, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES N. BERGEN, 12 Apr 1945.
PVT. JAMES R. BERKENMEIER, 5 Feb 1945.
PFC. EMIL G. BERNHITZ, 27 Apr 1945.
1ST LT. ELMO K. BILLINGTON, 20 Dec 1944.
PVT. HARVEY O. BISHOP, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. BLACKLEDGE, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. LEAMON S. BLAND, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. J. W. BLANKENSHIP, 13 Apr 1945.
T/SGT. CHARLES J. BLASZCZYK, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. VIRGIL BEVINS, 29 Dec 1944.
1ST LT. JOSEPH P. BLOOMFIELD, 5 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. ANDREW BOCHONOK, 13 Jun 1944.
T/5 JOE BOBNAKCHUK, 12 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. HAMILTON W. BOGARD, 15 Aug 1944.
SGT. ROBERT W. BOGAR, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. EMAMIT W. BOLIN, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. BONNER, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES O. BORDERS, JR., 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. LEONARD A. BORGHI, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. RULON J. BORGSTROM, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY BORZILLO, 23 Mar 1945.
PVT. LAWRENCE E. BOSAW, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. CLIFFORD D. BOSWORTH, 10 Sep 1944.
PVT. THOMAS A. BOWLEN, 5 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT P. BRACALE, 27 Aug 1944.
SGT. LLOYD BRADFIELD, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. MURL A. BRADFORD, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. LEWIS L. BRANDT, 6 Oct 1944.
PFC. MARVIN H. BRANDT, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. LAUREL E. BRANTZ, 11 Sep 1944.
SGT. ISAAC W. BRANTLEY, 13 Jun 1944.
SGT. DEMOND BREAEND, 1 Jul 1944.
PFC. MCKINLEY BROCK, JR., 20 Dec 1944.
PVT. NATHAN BRONSTEIN, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. FELIX G. BROWN, 29 Jul 1944.
PFC. GERALD R. BROWN, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN D. BROWN, 2 Apr 1945.
PFC. PAUL A. BROWN, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. WARREN G. BROWN, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. ALBERT R. BRUNER, 18 Apr 1945.
SGT. CHARLES E. BRYANT, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. NEWMAN W. BRYAN, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. PETER P. BUCZEK, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. HERCULANO S. BUENO, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. PERRY W. BULLOCK, 26 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. GERALD J. BUNCEY, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. HARRY H. BURGESS, 15 Jun 1944.
PVT. HENRY BURKHART, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM H. BURKHART, 19 Nov 1944.
PVT. OTTO W. BURNS, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. ALBERT BUTCHER, 31 Jan 1945.
SGT. GEORGE J. BUTCHER, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. PAUL R. BYERS, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH F. CALLAGHAN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. CLIFFORD G. CAM, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. DAY CANTERBURY, 11 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ALVIN P. CAREY, 23 Aug 1944.
PVT. RUFUS G. CARNEY, 23 Mar 1945.
PVT. JAMES A. CARNEY, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. EDGAR T. CARR, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. MILLARD L. CARR, 14 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOHN L. CARROLL, JR., 28 Dec 1944.
PFC. EUGENE C. CARTER, 18 Apr 1945.
PVT. WILBUR G. CARTER, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. BALDASAR J. CARUSO, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. DEWEY T. CHAMBERS, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. GEORGE N. CHANDLER, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. EUGENE J. CHESSON, 22 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. WILLIAM D. CHRISTENSEN, 8 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOHN L. CHRISTIANSEN, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. LOYD J. CHURCH, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT A. CIPOLELLI, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. MELVIN L. CLAFLIN, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. GLENN H. CLANTON, 29 Dec 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM E. CLARK, 27 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN M. CLAWSON, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. HARMON T. CLINGER, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. OTTAVIO J. COCHI, 25 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. DAVID T. COFFMAN, 2 Sep 1944.
PVT. SHELDON E. COHEN, 13 Aug 1944.
SGT. DORSEY COLE, 2 Sep 1944.
SGT. CHARLES L. COLLINS, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. MELVIN E. COLN, 5 Aug 1944.
CPL. HAZEL L. CONNELL, 18 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. TONY W. CONNELLY, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROY F. CORBIN, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES R. CORCORAN, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. EDUARDO B. CORDOVA, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT J. CORRIHER, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. WALTER E. CORRIN, 30 Dec 1944.
PFC. EARL G. CORZINE, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. STEPHEN P. COSTA, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. HAROLD J. COSTELLO, 11 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. FRED V. COTHREN, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. GLADYS H. COUCH, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. ARTHUR H. COUNTS, 16 Apr 1945.
PVT. HENRY C. COX, JR., 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. MILTON R. COX, 3 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. LEALAND C. CRABB, 20 Feb 1945.
SGT. RUSSELL CRAWFORD, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. SAMUEL W. CREAMER, 31 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ROBERT H. CROCKETT, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. HENRY E. CROSBY, 20 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. JOHN W. J. CROW, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. GEORGE W. CULBERTH, 28 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. CALVIN O. CURL, 28 May 1945.
PVT. JEROME J. CZAJA, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. GARLAND M. DALLEY, 5 Aug 1944.
PFC. METRO E. DALLANE, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. CARL O. DANIEL, 4 Mar 1945.
T/5 LONNIE L. DAVIS, 19 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. PAUL F. DAVIS, 26 Jul 1944.
T/SGT. WILLARD H. DAVIS, JR., 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM R. DAVIS, 12 Apr 1945.
PVT. JOHN P. DAWKINS, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. ARNOLD B. De BOLT, 23 Mar 1945.
CPL. ERVIN M. DECKER, 4 Mar 1945.
SGT. HENRY C. DeLONG, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. RALPH A. DePAOLIS, 15 Apr 1945.
PFC. WALTER L. DeSALLE, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. JESSE E. DeVORE, 27 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. BAIRD E. DEANE, 10 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWARD E. DEARDORFF, 6 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOE L. DEHERRER, 15 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. LEONARD D. DEROUIN, 23 Jun 1944.
T/5 SAMUEL A. DEVINE, JR., 15 Apr 1945.
SGT. MARTIN A. DEWITT, 12 Jun 1944.
PFC. RALPH Q. DICKEY, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. HAROLD E. DICKINSON, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. VINCENT DIGIULIO, 22 Jun 1944.
PFC. LARRY O. DIGMAN, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. EDGAR L. DILDY, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. LOUIS W. DILLON, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. FREDERICK J. DIXON, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. THOMAS H. DIXON, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. ADAM DODGE, 23 Aug 1944.
PFC. VINCENT D. DOOLEY, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. THOMAS E. DORAN, JR., 6 Sep 1944.
T/SGT. WILLIAM C. DORRY, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. REZIN J. DOUGHERTY, 15 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN G. DOVER, 23 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. DLEMENT A. DRABNIS, 29 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN S. DRAKE, JR., 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN P. DREILING, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. DANIEL J. DRISCOLL, 23 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROLLIN E. DUKEMAN, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. GEORGE E. DUNBAR, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. HARVEY J. DUNBAR, 3 Jul 1944.
PVT. FORREST W. DUNN, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. DONALD W. DURHAM, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. ROBERT L. DURHAM, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE E. DYER, 26 Dec 1944.
SGT. ALEXANDER A. DZIUBEK, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOE EASTER, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHARLES W. ECKELLS, 22 Mar 1945.
PFC. PAUL F. EDMOND, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. CHESTER EDMONDSON, 9 Jun 1944.
2D LT. RICHARD P. EDSALL, 4 Mar 1945.
CAPT. HOWARD E. EDSTROM, 13 Sep 1944.
PFC. CHARLES EDWARDS, JR., 23 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE E. EGNER, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. CECIL E. ELLER, 15 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN A. ELLERD, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. AUSTIN H. ENGLISH, 12 Jun 1944.
PVT. LEO J. ENGLISH, 20 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. MARVIN B. ENGLISH, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE J. ERICKSON, 24 Jun 1944.
PVT. LUCIO M. ESPINOZA, 18 Aug 1944.
PVT. EUSELIO M. ESQUIBEL, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. CARROL B. EVANS, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. RUSSELL A. EXTON, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. MICHAEL FABINY, 7 Aug 1944.
PFC. JAMES FACCIOLLO, 13 Jun 1944.
SGT. JOSEPH FACHIN, 28 Jul 1944.
SGT. MICHAEL D. FAHEY, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROBERT G. FAIRCHILD, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ALBERT S. FAIRINGTON, 14 Aug 1944.
CPL. FRANK F. FALTER, 7 Apr 1945.
PVT. GEORGE D. FARRELL, 22 Dec 1944.
PVT. DONALD FARRIER, 30 Jan 1945.
PVT. CHARLES H. FARRIS, 23 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH J. FAROLINO, 18 Dec 1944.
T/3 SIDNEY M. FEDER, 11 Dec 1944.
PVT. CHARLES L. FELL, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. JERRY J. FERRANTE, 14 Feb 1945.
1ST LT. DAVID J. FIELDS, 18 Dec 1944.
SGT. FRANK A. FIORELLO, 23 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE T. FISCHER, 8 Nov 1944.
PFC. ROSS FISHER, 2 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOHN T. FLANAGAN, 23 Mar 1945.
CPL. JOHN P. FLEMING, 24 Nov 1944.
PFC. JOHN D. FISHER, 25 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. EDWIN B. FLEXER, 1 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRANK N. FLICK, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. ALFRED W. FLOOK, 7 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOE E. FLORES, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOE M. FLORES, 6 Jun 1944.
PFC. EVERETT J. FONES, 5 Aug 1944.
PFC. WEE H. FONG, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. HARRIS FORBES, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. HENRY C. FORBES, JR., 20 Jun 1944.
T/5 IRVING V. FRANCIS, 11 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. ARTHUR H. FULLER, 15 Apr 1945.
CPL. ROBERT B. FULLER, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANGELO J. FUSCO, 20 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. MARION L. GALLAWAY, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. RUDOLFO C. GARCIA, 7 Feb 1945.
PFC. DOYLE D. GARDNER, 14 Jul 1944.
PVT. GEORGE GARDNER, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM N. GARDNER, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. MANFORD E. GARLAND, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. CECIL E. GARNER, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. DAVID GARRETT, 3 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. EMMETT H. GARRETT, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. CLAUD B. GARRIGUS, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. FRANCIS G. GAUDET, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. FESTUS J. GAUTREAUX, 3 Jul 1944.
SGT. R. T. GAYLOR, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ALEX E. GEIST, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. LAWRENCE GEORGEATOS, 4 Aug 1944.
SGT. THOMAS T. GEORGE, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. RALPH H. GIBSON, 29 Jun 1944.
PFC. HAROLD E. GIDDING, 10 Sep 1944.
PFC. MORRIS C. GILBERTSON, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. ARTHUR C. GILDERSLEEVE, 16 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDWIN C. J. GILLERSTROM, 6 Jul 1944.
PFC. DAVID N. GILRAD, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM GLENDINNING, 28 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. MARTIN GOLAND, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. RICHARD N. GOLOMSKI, 5 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. HAROLD J. GONYA, 13 Jul 1944.
PFC. CELESTINE H. GONZALES, 22 Jun 1944.
SGT. ROSENDO P. GONZALEZ, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. ALVIN G. GOODE, 14 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. CLARENCE GOODMAN, 30 Dec 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM H. GOODWINE, 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. MELVIN GOTTLIEB, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. IRVING B. GOUGH, 14 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. FRANCIS E. GRASER, 2 Sep 1944.
2D LT. EDWARD A. GRASSMUCK, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. OSCAR J. GRAY, 12 Jun 1944.
SGT. SILAS E. GRAY, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. JESS T. GREEN, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. JAMES R. GREGG, 21 Jun 1944.
T/5 JAMES GRIFFITH, 28 Dec 1944.
PVT. PAUL GROGAN, 27 Jul 1944.
CPL. EMIL C. GUNDLACH, 14 Jun 1944.
PFC. JUAN GUTIERREZ, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. IRWIN GUTTERMAN, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. JAMES E. HAGLER, 3 Sep 1944.
2D LT. ALBERT S. HAGOOD, 23 Mar 1945.
T/4 WAYNE A. HALFORD, 27 Mar 1945.
PVT. CHARLES J. HALLACK, 22 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. ORVILLE D. HALLMARK, JR., 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM M. HAMANN, 4 Mar 1945.
CAPT. PAUL E. HAMBLE, 16 Jun 1944.
PFC. WALTER T. HAMMERSCHLAG, 26 Aug 1944.
2D LT. PERRY P. HAND, 9 Sep 1944.
PFC. WILTON HARBIN, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. ORA L. HARDIN, 13 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. ANDREW W. HARPER, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. JOHN P. HARPER, 22 Jun 1944.
PVT. LESLIE S. HARPER, 12 Jun 1944.
T/5 RICHARD HARRIS, 15 Apr 1945.
PFC. JAMES H. HARTMAN, 4 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. MONROE H. HATFIELD, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. JUNIOR D. HAWLEY, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. RAYMOND HAYES, 18 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. LEO J. HAYS, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN J. HEGENER, JR., 11 Oct 1944.
PFC. ELMER L. HEMMER, 30 Jan 1945.
PVT. JOSEPH L. HEMMY, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. T. C. HENDRICKS, 3 Oct 1944.
PVT. HENRY C. HENDRICKSON, 9 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. DONALD F. HENNESSY, 16 Dec 1944.
CAPT. ALTON V. HENRY, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. THOMAS L. HENRY, 28 Jun 1944.
PFC. CLAUDE V. HENSLEY, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. RALPH E. HERRMANN, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOHN C. HICKS, 14 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WOODROW W. HILL, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. LOUIS E. HIRSCHBERGER, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. CHARLES G. HODGE, 2 Apr 1945.
PVT. ROBERT H. HOERBERT, 1 Sep 1944.
PVT. E. E. HOLLANDSWORTH, 22 Dec 1944.
PFC. EVERETT C. HOLLIDAY, 10 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. JERRY A. HOLLINGSWORTH, 26 Jul 1944.
T/SGT. CLIFFORD C. HOLZHAUER, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY F. HONOROWSKI, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. PERRY D. HOPKINS, 8 Sep 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH E. HORN, 21 Dec 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM F. HORN, 17 Dec 1944.
SGT. JACOB HOROWITZ, 1 Jul 1944.
PVT. LANSING B. HOUSE, 19 Jun 1944.
SGT. HOWARD M. HOUSEMAN, 11 Jul 1944.
T/3 FREDRICK J. HOWARD, 21 Jul 1944.
2D LT. RANSOME B. HOWE, 11 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOE D. HUBBARD, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANTHONY J. HUDSON, 1 Sep 1944.
PFC. AMEL B. HUETT, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM V. HUETT, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. VIRGIL R. HUGHES, 12 Jul 1944.
SGT. CECIL HUMPHREY, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. THOMAS HUMPHRIES, 23 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE E. HUNT, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. LOUIS V. HUNZIKER, 17 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. WALTER B. HUTTO, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. PAUL G. HYNEK, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. ROBERT S. IRWIN, 23 Aug 1944.
PVT. HENRY T. ISRAELI, 4 Jul 1944.
PFC. GRIFFIN G. IVEY, 27 Jul 1944.
SGT. MORSE IVEY, 9 Aug 1944.
PFC. EARL J. JACKSON, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM H. JACKSON, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. VAUGHN K. JACOBS, 1 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. WILLIAM L. JAMESON, 24 Jun 1944.
PFC. ALEX J. JANAK, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH JANOWSKI, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. SIMON V. JARAMILLO, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN J. JASZEK, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. MAURICE J. JEANNETTE, 2 Sep 1944.
1ST LT. JOHN I. JENSEN, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. WALTER A. JEZOWSKY, 17 Jun 1944.
PFC. A. C. JOHNSON, 21 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES I. JOHNSON, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. LLOYD G. JOHNSON, 14 Sep 1944.
PFC. WALTER W. JOHNSON, 9 Jun 1944.
SGT. IRWIN J. JONES, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. ALBERT S. JONES, 3 Sep 1944.
PVT. CLARENCE A. JONES, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN E. JONES, 22 Mar 1945.

PVT. NORMAN G. JONES, 9 Feb 1945.
PFC. VIRGIL E. JONES, 25 Jun 1944.
PVT. RICHARD F. JORDAN, 14 Jul 1944.
PFC. LEWIS JOYNER, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. DANIEL A. JULIO, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. EZRA JUSTICE, 19 Jun 1944.
PVT. LEON C. KACZMARCZYK, 12 Sep 1944.
PVT. SANFORD L. KAHN, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. ABRAHAM KALMIKOFF, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. LEONARD L. KAMINER, 30 Jun 1945.
PVT. HYMAN KANEFISKY, 16 Sep 1944.
PFC. EARL E. KEESEB, 27 Jul 1944.
T/5 ALLE A. KELHUS, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. ROBERT K. KELLEY, 27 Mar 1944.
PVT. JAMES J. KENNEDY, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM H. KENWORTHY, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. VERNON L. KIKER, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. VINCENT M. KILLEN, 21 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT G. KIRCHNER, 31 Jan 1945.
SGT. CLARENCE W. KITCHENS, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. WALTER J. KLAPUT, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROBERT F. KLEIN, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CHARLES H. KLOSS, 11 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. MARTIN L. KOCURKO, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. ANDREW KODOBOK, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. HAROLD J. KONIG, 10 Sep 1944.
PFC. FRANK E. KONICKA, JR., 13 Jul 1944.
PVT. CHARLES KOSTOPOULOS, 25 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. KENNETH C. KOTIKE, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. GEORGE V. KOVACH, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. MAX A. KRAUSE, 10 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. MELVIN E. KUHLOW, 12 Jul 1944.
T/5 STANLEY A. KUMIEGA, 25 Mar 1944.
PFC. STEVE KUNDLA, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. EVERETT R. LAIRSON, 20 Jun 1944.
PFC. EMPHERS T. LAMB, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOHN T. LAMM, 30 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROBERT B. LAMM, 14 Apr 1945.
PFC. JOHN E. LANGFORD, 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. HARVEY J. LANGSTON, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. LEON C. LA POINT, 9 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. DAVID H. LAUNIUS, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH A. LAURICELLA, 2 Jul 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND P. LAVELL, 14 Feb 1945.
S/SGT. WILLIAM R. LAWRENCE, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CLYDE E. LAWSON, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. ALBERT LAZZTRI, 5 Aug 1944.
PVT. WALTER W. LEIFFER, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. ERVIN LENDEMANN, 14 Aug 1944.
T/5 ALOIS V. LESIKAR, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. STEPHEN A. LESNAK, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH LESNE, 12 Sep 1944.
PFC. CARMEL LESTER, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. MERLE E. LESTER, 23 Aug 1944.
PFC. RUSSELL G. LETSON, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. BERTRAM L. LEWIS, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. ELMER LEWIS, 25 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM R. LEWIS, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. MARTIN LIEBERMAN, 27 Mar 1945.
PFC. DELBERT A. LOCKS, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. EARL W. LOEY, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN W. LOGSDON, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. THOMAS E. LONG, 28 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOHN M. LOPEZ, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. PERSHING LOULE, 15 Jun 1945.
CPL. FLOYD C. LOVAAS, 30 Dec 1944.
PVT. FAUSTINE LOVATO, 19 Dec 1944.
PFC. JUAN J. LOVATO, 20 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. MARTIN G. LOVELL, 12 Jul 1944.
SGT. VICTOR A. LOWEN, 1 Apr 1945.
PFC. DUEY L. LOWERY, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN LUKACENA, JR., 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. ANTONIO LUNA, 16 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. GUY D. MABE, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. DUANE E. MACKENZIE, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN MACDONALD, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. FLOYD S. MADDERA, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. DANIEL E. MAGNUSSEN, 23 Mar 1944.
PVT. MARTIN V. MAKI, 28 Jul 1944.
T/SGT. ANTHONY MALAK, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES M. MALONE, 6 Feb 1944.
S/SGT. LAWRENCE R. MALONE, 18 Jun 1944.
PVT. SAMUEL MAMULA, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. ANTHONY A. MANCINI, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. MIKE MANO, 9 Oct 1944.
S/SGT. EUGENE F. MANTOOTH, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH MARCHSE, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALBERT G. MARIANGELO, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. FRANK MARKOSICH, 9 Jun 1944.
PFC. STEPHEN M. MARKOWSKI, 9 Jun 1944.
CPL. DONALD MARTIN, 1 Apr 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH J. MARTIN, 21 Nov 1944.
PFC. KENNETH D. MARTIN, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. NELSON H. MARTIN, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. WALTER F. MARTIN, 22 Jun 1944.
CPL. NORMAN A. MARTZ, 19 Dec 1944.
PVT. STANLEY MASIAK, 4 Sep 1944.
PVT. ELBERT L. MASON, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. THEO J. MASTER, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. CLARENCE A. MATZKE, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. EDDIE L. MAYBORN, 16 Sep 1944.
PFC. LAWRENCE W. McADAMS, 7 Apr 1944.
PFC. DONALD E. McCALL, 27 Aug 1944.
SGT. HOMER L. McCARVER, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. WALTER A. McCOY, 8 Sep 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM C. McCRAY, JR., 24 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. BURTON D. McCREADY, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. AMOS H. McDONALD, 12 Jul 1944.
PVT. LESTER H. McGOWAN, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. ADAM G. McKONIS, 1 Aug 1944.
PFC. DEAN L. McMUNN, 4 Mar 1944.
PFC. THOMAS I. McNAIR, 9 Sep 1944.
PVT. James A. McQUISTON, 23 Mar 1944.
SGT. THOMAS W. McWALTERS, 21 Jun 1944.
SGT. CECIL J. MEADOWS, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. EDMUND E. MEKOLAT, 11 Jul 1944.
PFC. YSIDRO A. MENDOZA, 26 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. JOE L. METCALF, 27 Jul 1944.
SGT. WILBERT E. MEYER, 3 Aug 1944.
PVT. GEORGE M. MICOY, 20 Jun 1944.
2ND LT. ROBERT E. MIERS, 9 Sep 1944.
PFC. EDWARD L. MIHALA, 29 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALFRED M. MILLER, 20 Jun 1944.
CAPT. ERNEST B. MILLER, 13 Jun 1944.
CPL. MEREDITH J. MILLER, 7 Apr 1944.
PFC. WILLIAM M. MILLER, JR., 16 Oct 1944.
T/SGT. MURRAY C. MILLS, 11 Sep 1944.
PVT. HENRY H. MILTON, 18 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. MATTHEW J. MIOLEVITS, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. JASQUALE S. MIRANDA, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. THEODORE K. MISTER, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. LOUIS B. MITCHELL, 20 Jul 1944.
T/4 ROY H. MITCHELL, 28 Dec 1944.
PFC. NICHOLAS MITRIONE, 9 Sep 1944.
PVT. GEORGE T. MITTLEER, 11 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. KENNETH F. MIZELL, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROBERT J. MOBLEY, 21 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. ROY E. MODOE, 30 Jan 1944.
SGT. JOHN J. MODRAK, 25 Mar 1944.
PFC. WOOTEN MOODY, 6 Feb 1944.
PVT. EDWARD D. MOHR, JR., 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. HECTOR S. MOLINA, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. WALTER J. MOONEY, 29 Jul 1944.
SGT. CHARLES D. MOORE, 29 Dec 1944.
PVT. CHARLES E. MOORE, 4 Sep 1944.
PFC. MORRIS MOORE, 14 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH R. MORAMARCO, 26 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. ABERY E. MORGAN, 23 Mar 1945.
T/5 FORREST E. MORR, 28 Mar 1945.
1ST LT. KENNETH A. MORRELL, 18 Sep 1944.
SGT. HERMAN A. MOSS, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. SPERLING J. MOYER, 30 Mar 1945.
2ND LT. SEYMOUR L. MULLMAN, 14 Jun 1944.
SGT. JOSEPH C. MURDOCK, 13 Aug 1944.
1ST LT. MURLE W. MURPHY, 2 Sep 1944.
T/SGT. FRANCIS MURRAY, 28 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOHNNIE W. MUSE, 4 Mar 1945.
PFC. LESLIE G. MYERS, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOHN NAKONESHNY, JR., 11 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. LLOYD I. NAUGLE, JR., 14 Jun 1944.
2ND LT. BERLE H. NEEDHAM, 13 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. THOMAS E. NEELY, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. BRADY L. NELSON, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. CARLTON S. NEWELL, JR., 7 Jun 1944.
PFC. HAMMETT NEWTON, JR., 11 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JAMES E. NICKERSON, 21 Jun 1944.
SGT. DANIEL J. NIELSON, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. EDWIN K. NISULA, 3 Jul 1944.
PVT. MERCEDES G. NORTE, 12 Sep 1944.
PFC. HENRY NUSS, 31 Jun 1944.
PFC. JAMES NUTT, 31 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALFRED E. OBERLIES, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. CARL E. ODOM, 17 Dec 1944.
PFC. EARL T. OGDEN, 25 Mar 1945.
PVT. MICHAEL J. OLIVER, 11 Jul 1944.
PVT. MAURICE E. OLSON, 14 Aug 1944.
SGT. BERNARD J. OMIECINSKI, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. PETER G. ONEILL, 19 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROY J. ORR, 16 Jun 1944.
SGT. WILLIAM T. OURS, 27 Mar 1945.
SGT. EARL W. ORTELL, 18 Jun 1944.
PFC. ANTONIO S. PACECCA, 27 Mar 1945.
PFC. WILLIAM M. PAINTER, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. ANDREW PAPAL, 19 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. WILLIAM O. PARKER, 3 Jan 1945.
CPL. PERSHING PATE, 8 Jun 1944.
PVT. JOSEPH J. PATTERNO, 27 Mar 1945.
PFC. BRUCE C. PATTERSON, 11 Aug 1944.
PVT. KENNETH F. PAULSEN, 28 Jul 1944.
PFC. ADELBERT L. T. PAVELKA, 4 Aug 1944.
PFC. MARSHALL B. PAYNE, 12 Jun 1944.
CPL. STEVE J. PEAKLER, 21 Dec 1944.
PVT. ISAAC PEARL, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. ERNEST H. PEICK, 17 Dec 1944.
PFC. JACOB A. PEIFFER, 3 Aug 1944.
PFC. DONALD J. PELLEGRIN, 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. PEDRO PENA, 3 Jul 1944.
2ND LT. REX W. PENNELL, 2 Sep 1944.
SGT. AUBREY PEOPLES, 30 Jan 1945.
PVT. ROBERT J. PEPE, 4 Aug 1944.
PVT. HARRY PERSCHACHIER, 23 Aug 1944.
T/SGT. MATTHEW J. PETEK, 15 Jun 1944.
PFC. DAVID C. PETERSON, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. ROBERT E. PETERS, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. GEORGE E. PFEIFFER, 25 Aug 1944.
T/4 MILTON S. PHARES, 14 Apr 1945.
PFC. ROBERT S. PHILLIPS, 13 Jun 1944.
T/SGT. WILIE C. PIERCE, 16 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALAN H. PIGGOTT, 7 Aug 1944.
PFC. DAVID PILNIK, 5 Feb 1945.
PVT. LESTON G. PLYMALE, 10 Sep 1944.
2ND LT. ROLAND F. PLYMALE, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. JOHN L. POJE, 14 Jun 1944.
PVT. GROVER D. POLLARD, 23 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. JOSEPH S. POMBER, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILBORN M. PONDERS, 31 Jan 1945.
SGT. CLARENCE T. PORTER, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. LAKEY D. POSTON, 19 Jun 1944.
PFC. FRANCIS D. POWELL, 6 Jun 1944.
PFC. OLIVER P. POWELL, 9 Sep 1944.
T/SGT. WILLIAM J. POWELL, 3 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES V. POWERS, 26 Jul 1944.
SGT. RAYMOND F. POWICKI, 25 Aug 1944.
PFC. ALBERT J. PRANIS, 10 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. DANIEL W. PRAY, 23 Jun 1944.
PFC. STROTHER J. PRESTON, 4 Mar 1945.
SGT. JAMES E. PRIVETTE, JR., 2 Apr 1945.
PFC. CLEVE K. PUNCH, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. STEVE F. PURDY, 4 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. ROY A. PURKISS, 22 Mar 1945.
2ND LT. ALFRED P. PY, JR., 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. CLIFFORD G. QUERR, 11 Jun 1944.
SGT. L. O. QUENSENBERRY, JR., 25 Aug 1944.
PVT. GLEN W. RAINWATER, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. CLEO R. RALEY, 31 Jul 1944.
PFC. JOSE RAMERIZ, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. ROJELIO G. RAMIREZ, 13 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. WARD RANDOLPH, 15 Apr 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM H. RANKIN, 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. VICTOR J. RAPALADIOS, 13 Aug 1944.
PFC. LEWIS L. RAY, SR., 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. GLENN E. RAYMAN, 22 Jun 1944.
S/SGT. BOB M. REED, 30 Jul 1944.
SGT. RUSSELL S. REED, 27 Aug 1944.
2ND LT. LEON W. REINHHEIMER, JR., 17 Dec 1944.
PVT. ALBERT B. REISINGER, JR., 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. BENJAMIN RENERT, 18 Dec 1944.
PVT. RAYMOND RENKERT, JR., 18 Dec 1944.
SGT. DONALD RESSLER, 12 Jul 1944.
PFC. ERNEST REVERA, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. JAMES W. REW, 6 Jun 1944.
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T/5 JOSE REYES, 14 Aug 1944.
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PFC. ESKLEY N. RHINE, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. DEWEY RHOADES, 27 Jul 1944.
PVT. VINCENT RICCIARDI, 30 Jul 1944.
PFC. DOMINICK RICCIATELLI, 26 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE M. RICH, 11 Jul 1944.
SGT. FRANK RICHARDSON, 22 Jul 1944.
PFC. SILVIO RICHIETTI, 10 Oct 1944.
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PVT. ALBERT C. ROBERTSON, 20 Jul 1944.
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PFC. VERNON L. ROSENBERG, 9 Sep 1944.
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SGT. THOMAS B. ROUSE, 11 Jul 1944.
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PFC. ALFRED C. SCHULKE, 6 Jun 1944.
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PVT. BERNARD SCHUMER, 9 Feb 1945.
PVT. HENRY J. SCHWARTZ, 29 Jul 1944.
PVT. ROY L. SCHWERDFEGER, 26 Jul 1944.
1ST LT. FRANK A. SCOTT, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. WILLIAM SCOTT, JR., 22 Jun 1944.
SGT. ROBERT E. SEAMAN, 27 Aug 1944.
PVT. VITTOLO SEDER, 11 Jul 1944.
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PFC. DAVID B. VASQUEZ, 21 Jun 1944.
T/5 VINCENT F. VER STRAETE, 9 Apr 1945.
S/SGT. JOHNIE B. VIGIL, 13 Jun 1944.
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PFC. GIOACHINO J. VITALE, 1 Jan 1945.
PVT. GARLAND M. VOGLER, 13 Sep 1944.
PVT. ROBERT E. VOGT, 8 Sep 1944.
PVT. SALVATORE M. VOLANTE, 26 Jul 1944.
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2ND LT. HERMAN G. WENZEL, JR., 13 Jun 1944.
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PVT. EDWARD WHITE, 14 Aug 1944.
PFC. GEORGE C. WHITE, 13 Jun 1944.
PVT. LESLIE WHITE, 8 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN L. WHITMAN, 1 Aug 1944.
SGT. DAVID J. WHYTE, 20 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. MICHAEL WICHROWSKI, 12 Jul 1944.

PFC. ANTHONY WIECZOREK, 17 Jun 1944.
PVT. ALGER R. WIEDYKKE, 30 Jan 1945.
PVT. REX R. WIEDYKKE, 24 Aug 1944.
PFC. BUFORD C. WILKERSON, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. WILBUR WILKIE, 19 Nov 1944.
PVT. BENTON M. WILKINS, 12 Feb 1945.
PVT. CARL E. WILLIAMS, 27 Dec 1944.
PVT. BRUCE O. WILSON, 13 Aug 1944.
PVT. JOHN E. WILSON, JR., 28 Aug 1944.
PVT. KERMIT WILSON, 24 Mar 1945.
PFC. WOODROW W. WINFREIE, 15 Jul 1944.
PFC. HENRY S. WINSTON, 5 Aug 1944.
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S/SGT. ELVIN J. WISE, 17 Aug 1944.
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PFC. FRANK E. WOHLGEMUTH, 24 Oct 1944.
SGT. HERBERT E. WOIKE, 23 Jun 1944.
PVT. JULIAN J. WOLANOSKI, JR., 12 Jul 1944.
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PFC. JOE E. WOLF, 14 Jul 1944.
T/5 JOHN J. WOLFE, 30 Mar 1945.
PFC. RUBEN WOLLMAN, 27 Aug 1944.
PFC. MELVIN A. WOOD, 19 Dec 1944.
S/SGT. SAM H. WOOD, 9 Sep 1944.
S/SGT. HENRY I. WOOLF, 26 Jul 1944.
PFC. LESTER C. WORCESTER, 25 Mar 1945.
PVT. WILLIAM WORSHAM, 15 Apr 1945.
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PVT. WILLIAM G. WRIGHT, 28 Jul 1944.
PVT. STANLEY J. WYSOCKI, 8 Sep 1944.
PFC. PAUL J. YANOK, 26 Jul 1944.
PVT. LEONARD B. YARBER, 7 Jun 1944.
1ST LT. DELMAR W. YENZER, 13 Jun 1944.
PFC. JOHN C. YOUHAS, 4 Mar 1945.
S/SGT. PERRY E. YOUNG, 9 Jun 1944.
PVT. THOMAS J. YOUNG, 11 Jul 1944.
S/SGT. JOSEPH V. ZABOROSKI, 3 Sep 1944.
PVT. ANTHONY C. ZACCARO, 27 Jul 1944.
PFC. WALTER ZALACZKOWSKI, 16 Dec 1944.
PFC. JOSEPH P. ZANDALAZINI, 10 Feb 1945.
SGT. ALFRED F. ZAWATSKI, 16 Aug 1944.
S/SGT. HUGO R. ZIMMER, 23 Mar 1945.
PFC. LLOYD B. ZIMMERMAN, 18 Dec 1944.
PFC. LOUIS J. ZONDLAK, 29 Dec 1944.
PFC. CHARLES Z. ZUB, 2 Sep 1944.
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1ST INFANTRY DIVISION - WORLD WAR II

